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 Abstract 
 
 
 
Hindu nationalism has seen a dramatic growth in India and abroad from 
the nineteen eighties. This growth has coincided with – and relates in 
complex ways to – several other highly significant developments, includ-
ing (in no particular order) the instituting of liberalization in the econo-
my; the legislation on reservations for ‘Other Backward Castes’ and its 
implementation; the intensification of the integration of the middle clas-
ses into the global economy; and the intensifying pauperization of the 
rural poor. These developments as well as Hindu nationalism’s links with 
them have been the subject of scholarly attention from a variety of per-
spectives and disciplines.  
Apart from these however, one may also note the unfolding of less 
obvious, but equally significant and related developments in this period: 
the growth and intensification of female feticide and infanticide; the in-
crease in dowry related violence and deaths; the targeting of women as 
objects of sexual violence, especially during communal riots, but also 
routinely; the increasing presence of women in rightwing organizations 
and mobilizations; an intensification in the policing of sexual discourses 
and sexuality; conversely and paradoxically, there has also been an in-
crease in the visibility of women in the public sphere (through for in-
stance, the widening of options for employment for women). Feminist 
scholarship has addressed several of these issues, independently and in 
their intersections; it has also addressed the rise of Hindu nationalism. 
However, there is little work on the relations that obtain between these 
issues and the more obvious ones set out above. Specifically, there was 
and remains a serious deficiency of attention to the relations between 
masculinity and Hindu nationalism.  
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This study hopes to contribute towards addressing this deficiency in 
several ways. Firstly, it seeks to locate itself in the theoretical and analyti-
cal spaces between gender studies and political economy. It attempts to 
do so by reviewing and then parting from, the dominant trends in the 
theoretical and analytical debates on men and masculinity. In my thesis I 
have therefore focused, not on kinds and forms of masculinity – which 
remains the dominant approach in masculinity studies – but on the ways 
in which institutions, organizations and structures come to be gendered, 
and consequently, on the processes of gendering that are invoked in the 
articulation and elaboration of power within specific structural, institu-
tional and/or organizational relations. I have sought to develop this ar-
gument specifically with regard to masculinity/ies by proposing the idea 
of ‘masculine hegemony’. Briefly, through this term I wish to suggest 
that uneven power distribution may be understood in Gramscian hege-
monic terms, and that this hegemony is usually gendered as masculine. 
Any given society is organised along multiple and intersecting hierarchies 
of domination and subordination that determine the access to and exer-
cise of power – the distribution and possession of its resources and 
rights – within it, as well as the terms within which that power is (to be) 
exercised. Further, the organisation of these hierarchies may be dis-
cerned as hegemonic formations that favour specific social groups 
and/or alignments. Any given hegemonic condition is thus layered by 
multiple and intersecting hierarchies of domination and subordination 
that extend far beyond conventionally recognised macro manifestations 
– race, nation, region, religion, community, class – to its manifestations 
at the fundamental ‘cellular’ (or in Gramsci’s terms, ‘molecular’) level of 
the family and the organisation of sexuality. Thus, while the multi-layered 
hegemonic formations that constitute the given hegemonic condition are 
all diversely marked by other signs – of race, class, age, region, religion, 
etc – they are all inflected by the foundational discourse of gender. This 
is the broad theoretical perspective within which the thesis is elaborated, 
because it provides for the multiple articulation of complex phenomena 
with each other, across history as well as across regions. 
Based on this, and secondly, it seeks to approach the issue of Hindu 
nationalism from a historical perspective. The study therefore begins by 
chronologically examining the term ‘Hindu’ and the various semantic 
and social transformations in its history, beginning with its early deriva-
tion from ‘Indus’, through the medieval period when it gradually but 
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nebulously came to identify a community, to its coalescence into the 
more concrete religio-social entity that emerged through the colonial en-
counter and the caste and other reform movements of the nineteenth 
century, to its politicization under B G Tilak and V D Savarkar (among 
others) into a religio-cultural nationalism in the early part of the twenti-
eth century. Crucial to understanding this evolution, the study argues, is 
the pan-Indian spread of the Brahmin castes (as opposed to the localized 
presence of the lower-castes), and the consequent identification of ‘Hin-
du’ territory with the presence of the Brahmins. In mapping this process, 
I emphasize the gender and caste dynamics inherent to the construction 
of this identity, especially in the concretizing of communal lines around 
the issue of personal laws, and elaborate on the economic, communal 
and political determinants of this gendered dynamic in the construction 
of the identity ‘Hindu’. It thus argues that the strongly Brahmanical 
caste-profile of the anti-colonial nationalist movement indicates the ex-
tent to which Brahmanical patriarchy (or masculine hegemony) and its 
practices came to define the hegemonic understanding of the identity 
‘Hindu’ as well as ‘India’ – and continued to do so even after independ-
ence. The argument of the thesis is that, unless one takes account of the-
se processes, it is difficult to fully comprehend the depth, scale and reach 
of Hindu nationalism – as a latent and as an active ideology. 
Thirdly, I argue the need to factor in another process in the under-
standing of Hindu nationalism, which also has its roots in the colonial 
encounter but which gains a different dynamic after independence: the 
idea and practice of ‘development’. The study proceeds to briefly histori-
cize the idea of development and then to chart the trajectories of its im-
plementation through the Nehruvian emphasis on Planning and state 
driven social change, and the consequent impact on the changing social, 
economic and political theatre of the country after independence. It 
analyses this impact specifically on the gender and caste dynamics of this 
period, arguing that the Brahmanical hegemony of the pre-independence 
period begins to transform in the seventies, as it negotiates with and then 
accommodates the increasing visibility and volubility of lower caste pres-
ence in the political domain. Similarly, even as women’s movements suc-
cessfully moved the state to implement policies that actually empowered 
women and made possible their greater participation in the public 
sphere, the gradual and ongoing process of shifting control of the econ-
omy from the state to the private sector has ensured that safeguards for 
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women, labor, lower castes and other marginal groups are almost non-
existent, or at best, remain arbitrary and at the mercy of the private sec-
tor. The study proposes that the processes of liberalization and privatiza-
tion were thus crucial to the transformation of Brahmanical masculine 
hegemony, in its strategies to retain hegemonic power. In other words, 
the study argues that the developmentalist agenda of the post-
independence Indian state contributed, in no small measure, to the re-
surgence of Hindu nationalism on the political stage, from the late sev-
enties and particularly in the eighties, into the present.  
Finally, the study explores the tensions and relations that obtain be-
tween the multiple dichotomies generated in the thesis – the personal 
and the political, the hegemonic and the hegemonised, upper caste and 
lower caste, Hindu and non-Hindu, masculine and feminine, modern and 
traditional, etc. I argue that Hindu nationalist positions should not be 
understood as manifest only in its organizational and/or institutional 
manifestations, but in and through this field of beliefs, actions and rela-
tions that constitute the masculine hegemony of Brahmanical patriarchy, 
within and from which Hindu nationalism finds its visceral roots. I close 
by proposing that unless we take cognizance of this, and look beyond 
the electoral performances of the Bharatiya Janata Party to the ways in 
which hegemonies are maintained using the very tools and structures 
intended to dismantle them we will not truly be able to counter the Hin-
du right or its masculinist violences. 
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De vorming van het pitrubhumi (vaderland):  
Masculiene hegemonie en de vorming van de hindoe-staat 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Sinds 1980 is het hindoe-nationalisme in India en in het buitenland sterk 
toegenomen. Deze toename is gepaard gegaan en hangt op een complexe 
manier samen met enkele andere zeer belangrijke ontwikkelingen, waar-
onder (in willekeurige volgorde) de liberalisering van de economie; de 
wetgeving over en implementatie van quota voor ‘Other Backward Clas-
ses’ (een door de overheid vastgestelde categorie achterstandsgroepen) 
op de arbeidsmarkt en in het hoger onderwijs; de sterkere integratie van 
de middenklasse in de wereldeconomie en de toenemende verpaupering 
van de arme plattelandsbevolking. Deze ontwikkelingen worden op zich 
en in verband met hindoe-nationalisme vanuit verschillende perspectie-
ven en disciplines bestudeerd.  
In deze periode waren er echter ook verwante ontwikkelingen die 
minder zichtbaar, maar even belangrijk waren: de toename van het aantal 
gedode vrouwelijke foetussen en pasgeborenen; meer geweld en dodelij-
ke slachtoffers in verband met bruidschatten; seksueel geweld tegen 
vrouwen, vooral tijdens ongeregeldheden, maar ook stelselmatig; de toe-
name van vrouwen in conservatieve organisaties en bewegingen; een in-
tensivering van het toezicht op (het debat over) seksualiteit. In tegenstel-
ling hiermee en paradoxaal genoeg is de zichtbaarheid van vrouwen in 
het publieke domein toegenomen (bijvoorbeeld door de verruimde ar-
beidsmogelijkheden voor vrouwen). Feministische wetenschappers heb-
ben zich beziggehouden met een aantal van deze onderwerpen en de 
verbanden ertussen en hebben ook aandacht besteed aan de toename 
van het hindoe-nationalisme. Er is echter weinig onderzoek gedaan naar 
het verband tussen deze onderwerpen en de meer in het oog springende 
ontwikkelingen die hierboven beschreven zijn. Er is in het bijzonder een 
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gebrek aan aandacht voor het verband tussen masculiniteit en hindoe-
nationalisme.  
Dit onderzoek voorziet op een aantal manieren in deze leemte. Ten 
eerste neemt het op theoretisch en analytisch gebied een plaats in tussen 
genderstudies en politieke economie, door een overzicht te geven van de 
dominante trends in het theoretische en analytische debat over mannen 
en mannelijkheid en hier vervolgens afstand van te nemen. Dit proef-
schrift richt zich dus niet op soorten en vormen van mannelijkheid, wat 
nog steeds de heersende trend is in onderzoek naar masculiniteit. In 
plaats daarvan gaat het in dit onderzoek om de wijze waarop gender 
doordringt in instellingen, organisaties en structuren, en daarmee om de 
gender-gerelateerde processen die worden opgeroepen bij de formulering 
en uitwerking van macht in specifieke structurele en institutionele relaties 
en/of relaties binnen organisaties.  
Dit thema wordt specifiek met betrekking tot masculiniteit(en) uitge-
werkt door het idee van de ‘masculiene hegemonie’. Deze term geeft aan 
dat een ongelijke machtsverdeling opgevat kan worden in termen van 
hegemonie zoals Gramsci die definieert, en dat deze hegemonie gewoon-
lijk mannelijk is. Elk samenleving is georganiseerd volgens verschillende, 
elkaar overlappende hiërarchieën van overheersing en ondergeschiktheid 
die de toegang tot en uitoefening van macht in die samenleving bepalen 
(de verdeling en het bezit van machtsbronnen en het recht op macht), 
evenals de voorwaarden waaronder deze macht wordt uitgeoefend. Ver-
der zijn deze hiërarchieën geordend als structuren van hegemonie die 
bepaalde sociale groepen en/of verbanden bevoordelen. Elke toestand 
van hegemonie is dus opgebouwd uit verschillende, elkaar overlappende 
hiërarchieën van overheersing en ondergeschiktheid die veel veder reiken 
dan algemeen erkende verschijningsvormen op macroniveau, zoals ras, 
land, regio, godsdienst, lokale gemeenschap of klasse; en doordringen tot 
het basale, ‘cellulaire’ (of ‘moleculaire’, zoals Gramsci het uitdrukt) ni-
veau van het gezin en de organisatie van seksualiteit. Hoewel de gelaagde 
structuren van hegemonie waaruit een bepaalde toestand van hegemonie 
bestaat ook nog andere kenmerken hebben, zoals ras, klasse, leeftijd, re-
gio of godsdienst, speelt in al deze structuren dus het fundamentele dis-
cours van gender mee. Dit is het brede theoretisch perspectief van dit 
proefschrift, omdat het de meervoudige formulering van complexe ver-
schijnselen en hun onderlinge verbanden toelaat, en ruimte biedt voor 
zowel historische als regionale vergelijking. 
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De tweede bijdrage die dit onderzoek levert is gebaseerd op het voor-
gaande: dit onderzoek benadert hindoe-nationalisme vanuit historisch 
perspectief. In het onderzoek wordt de term ‘hindoe’ met de verschillen-
de semantische en sociale transformaties die deze term in de loop van de 
tijd heeft ondergaan chronologisch onderzocht. Na de vroege afleiding 
van ‘Indus’ trad er in de middeleeuwen een geleidelijke maar vage bete-
kenisverschuiving op naar ‘gemeenschap’. In de negentiende eeuw kreeg 
de term onder invloed van de koloniale verhoudingen en de kasten- en 
andere hervormingsbewegingen de betekenis van een concretere religi-
eus-sociale entiteit, en begin twintigste eeuw werd de term onder B. G. 
Tilak en V. D. Savarkar (onder anderen) gepolitiseerd tot een religieus-
cultureel nationalisme. Volgens dit onderzoek is voor een goed begrip 
van deze evolutie de verspreiding van de kaste van de brahmanen over 
heel India (in tegenstelling tot de meer plaatsgebonden aanwezigheid van 
de lagere kasten), en de consequente koppeling tussen ‘hindoe’-gebied en 
de aanwezigheid van de brahmanen essentieel. Bij het in kaart brengen 
van dit proces wordt in dit onderzoek de dynamiek van gender en kaste 
die inherent is aan de constructie van deze identiteit benadrukt, vooral bij 
het concretiseren van gemeenschappelijke elementen bij het onderwerp 
persoonlijke wetten, en worden de economische, gemeenschaps- en poli-
tieke determinanten van deze gender-gerelateerde dynamiek bij de con-
structie van de hindoe-identiteit verder uitgewerkt. In het onderzoek 
wordt aldus betoogd dat het sterk brahmaanse kasteprofiel van de anti-
koloniale nationalistische beweging aangeeft in welke mate het brah-
maanse patriarchaat (of de masculiene hegemonie) en de bijbehorende 
gebruiken zowel de hindoe-identiteit als de Indiase identiteit hebben ge-
definieerd in termen van hegemonie. Dit bleef zelfs zo na de onafhanke-
lijkheid. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat het moeilijk is om de 
diepgang, omvang en reikwijdte van het hindoe-nationalisme als latente 
en als actieve ideologie volledig te begrijpen zonder rekening te houden 
met deze processen. 
In de derde plaats wijst dit onderzoek op nog een factor die nodig is 
om hindoe-nationalisme te begrijpen: het idee en de praktijk van ‘ont-
wikkeling’. Deze factor heeft ook zijn wortels in de koloniale tijd, maar 
heeft een andere dynamiek gekregen na de onafhankelijkheid. Het on-
derzoek geeft een kort historisch overzicht van het begrip ontwikkeling 
en beschrijft vervolgens het implementatieproces met de Nehruviaanse 
nadruk op planning en door de staat geleide sociale verandering, en de 
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invloed hiervan op de sociale, economische en politieke veranderingen in 
het land na de onafhankelijkheid. De analyse richt zich specifiek op wat 
dit betekende voor de gender- en kastendynamiek in deze periode, waar-
bij betoogd wordt dat de hegemonie die de brahmanen voor de onaf-
hankelijkheid hadden verandert in de jaren zeventig wanneer de lagere 
kasten steeds zichtbaarder worden en meer van zich laten horen in het 
politieke domein. Tegelijkertijd heeft de geleidelijke en voortschrijdende 
verschuiving van een door de staat geleide economie naar een markteco-
nomie ervoor gezorgd dat maatregelen ter bescherming van vrouwen, 
arbeiders, lagere kasten en andere marginale groepen vrijwel ontbreken 
of hoogstens willekeurig en bij de gratie van de private sector genomen 
worden, ondanks het feit dat de vrouwenbeweging erin geslaagd is om de 
staat ertoe te bewegen een beleid te voeren dat vrouwen meer macht gaf 
en de deelname van vrouwen aan het maatschappelijk leven bevorderde. 
In het onderzoek wordt dus gesteld dat de processen van liberalisering 
en privatisering van essentieel belang waren voor de transformatie van de 
masculiene hegemonie van de brahmanen in hun streven om de macht te 
behouden. Met andere woorden, volgens dit onderzoek heeft de ontwik-
kelingsagenda van de staat India na de onafhankelijkheid in hoge mate 
bijgedragen aan de opleving van hindoe-nationalisme op het politieke 
toneel vanaf eind jaren zeventig en vooral de jaren tachtig tot op heden.  
Ten slotte verkent dit onderzoek het spanningsveld en de relatie tus-
sen de diverse dichotomieën die in dit proefschrift onderscheiden wor-
den: het persoonlijke en het politieke, heersers en degenen die overheerst 
worden, hogere en lagere kasten, hindoes en niet-hindoes, masculien en 
feminien, modern en traditioneel, etc. Er wordt betoogd dat hindoe-
nationalistische houdingen niet alleen tot uitdrukking komen in een or-
ganisatie- en/of institutionele context, maar ook in en door dit brede 
gebied van overtuigingen, handelingen en relaties waaruit de masculiene 
hegemonie van het brahmaanse patriarchaat bestaat, waarin en vanwaar 
het hindoe-nationalisme geworteld is. Het proefschrift sluit af met de 
stelling dat hindoe-rechts en het daaruit voortkomende masculinistische 
geweld alleen bestreden kunnen worden door deze realiteit te onderken-
nen en verder te kijken dan de electorale prestaties van de Bharatiya Ja-
nata partij door zich te richten op de wijze waarop hegemonieën worden 
gehandhaafd met de instrumenten en structuren die nu juist bedoeld wa-
ren om er een einde aan te maken. 
 
  
1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Hindu nationalism has seen a dramatic growth in India and abroad from 
the nineteen eighties onward. This growth has coincided with – and re-
lates in complex ways to – several other highly significant developments, 
including (in no particular order) the instituting of liberalization in the 
economy; the legislation on reservations for ‘Other Backward Castes’ 
and its implementation (also sometimes referred to as the ‘Mandalisation’ 
of India, following the Mandal Commission that recommended these 
reservations); the increasing tendency towards coalition-based govern-
ments, not just at the centre but in the states as well, indicating a deepen-
ing of divides in the socio-polity; the opening out of the media, and the 
consequent burgeoning of private producers, broadcasters and channels; 
the boom in the information and communications technology sector, the 
growth of the service sector and the consequent intensification of the 
integration of the middle classes into the global economy; the intensify-
ing pauperization of the rural poor; and the steady but consistent with-
drawal of the state from welfare programs, the growth of financial insti-
tutions, and of their role in shaping the economy, politics and public 
policy.  
These developments as well as Hindu nationalism’s links with them 
have been the subject of scholarly attention from a variety of perspec-
tives and disciplines. Apart from these however, one may also note the 
unfolding of less obvious, but equally significant and related develop-
ments in this period: the growth and intensification of female feticide 
and infanticide; the increase in dowry related violence and deaths; the 
targeting of women as objects of sexual violence, especially during com-
munal riots, but also routinely; the increasing presence of women in 
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rightwing organizations and mobilizations; an intensification in the polic-
ing of sexual discourses and sexuality; conversely and paradoxically, an 
increase in the visibility of women in the public sphere (through for in-
stance, the widening of options for employment). Feminist scholarship 
has addressed several of these issues, independently and in their intersec-
tions; it has also addressed the rise of Hindu nationalism. However, there 
is little work on the relations that obtain between these issues and the 
more obvious ones set out above, and especially not through the dual 
framework of gender and Hindu nationalism. Specifically, although vari-
ous scholars have observed and commented on the highly masculinized 
discourses and practices of Hindu communalism as well as of Hindu na-
tionalism, there was and remains a serious deficiency of attention to the 
relations between masculinity and Hindu nationalism. This study aims to 
fill that lacuna. 
The project is an exploration of the relations of gender – specifically 
of masculinity – with nationalism, as these take shape within vocabularies 
and practices of purported (but essentially political) religiosity. Specifical-
ly, the project is focusing – as is evident from the above – on the con-
temporary phenomenon of ‘Hindutva’, or Hindu nationalism, terms that 
will be elaborated shortly. Close examination would reveal firstly, that 
this is not just a political phenomenon – in the sense of party pro-
gramme or agenda at the level of electoral politics – but is an active pro-
cess of creating cultural uniformity, i.e. it is informed with the objective of 
creating a mass base of people with identical cultural practices, who may 
be identified then as a single nation.1 Secondly, ‘culture’ is understood to 
have essentially religious roots – so that the diverse and very heterogene-
ous variety of practices that have specificities of a regional or linguistic or 
tribal or caste character – each further diversified by differential gender 
conceptions and practices – come to be subsumed under the general ru-
bric of religious affinity, with whatever differences or even contradic-
tions that might exist being elided or erased as inconsequential to the 
‘larger’ identity of being, nevertheless, ‘Hindu’. However, ‘culture’ does 
not exist independent of the social, the political and the economic: the 
multiplicity of practices and discourses that constitute a given culture are 
inevitably shaped and moulded by the pressures of the social, the eco-
nomic and the political – just as these are in turn constituted by the cul-
tural (Williams 1977). In other words, even as the organisation known as 
the mother-organisation of Hindu nationalism, the Rashtriya 
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Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its Hindu nationalist affiliates seek to un-
derstand and establish ‘Hindutva’ as a ‘purely’ cultural phenomenon, it is 
clear that such an understanding would be far from complete or satisfac-
tory. To understand ‘Hindutva’ then, it is necessary to examine it not just 
as a ‘cultural’ phenomenon, but as a social, economic and political phe-
nomenon.2 Therefore, the emphasis on gender in much Hindu national-
ist articulation of identity will also be examined well outside the sphere 
of the cultural, in this study. The focus will be primarily on the factors 
that shape its forms and understandings of masculinities; this is, at the 
first instance, because of Hindutva’s own well-known tendencies to rep-
resent itself in highly masculinised terms; but also, from a more theoreti-
cal perspective, because, as Joane Nagel (1998) points out, the role and 
meanings of women and of femininities in constructions of nationalism 
have been studied with accelerated intensity in recent years; but there has 
been less analogous attention paid to the highly significant relations that 
obtain between masculinities and nationalisms.  
1.2 The Object of this Study 
The object of this study is an ill-defined, enormous and still unfolding 
phenomenon in the processes of, in fact, also continuously defining it-
self. Hence, a central focus of this study will be to actually identify and 
define its object/subjects of study – not just because of the amorphous, 
multi-dimensional and somewhat evasive nature of the phenomenon re-
ferred to as ‘Hindutva’, but also because it is a phenomenon that affects 
so many other processes and currents that may be linked to it but are 
distinct from it (e.g. caste politics or urbanisation or even, to some ex-
tent, the women’s movement).. Precisely because the object of study is (a 
particular form of) nationalism, this thesis has followed the model of a 
meta-narrative that has tried to trace the unfolding of that nationalism 
and of its processes of gendering and sexualisation, in the dynamics of its 
historical growth. In doing so, it has had to construct a conceptual frame 
that can accommodate such a narrative, which in turn has entailed the 
reconstruction of several conceptual and analytical terms available for 
the study of gender and nationalism. While the reconstruction will be 
undertaken in detail in the course of the narrative, it would be useful, at 
this point, to make a preliminary identification of some of the key areas, 
terms and issues involved in the constitution of this meta-narrative. In 
what follows therefore, I will set out some of these.  
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1.3 Theoretical Aspects of the Research 
These can be identified as located around four conceptual clusters: i) na-
tionalism and nationalist discourses; ii) hegemonic masculinity and mas-
culine hegemony; iii) religion and religious politics; and iv) caste and 
caste-politics. These are distinctions that are not theoretically separable 
even in principle, and are drawn partly for convenience of analysis and 
partly for their usefulness in structuring the narrative of this thesis: while 
the first of these clusters – nationalism – is pervasively present through-
out, the thesis pays attention to each of the others in an accreting, se-
quential order that demonstrates the relations between these distinct 
theoretical clusters. Here, I will briefly outline some of the key features 
of each of these clusters, as these pertain to the thesis. 
Nationalism  
The literature on and around nationalism is too vast and diverse to be 
adequately covered here; indeed, there is a veritable nationalism industry 
in the academe. From journals like Nations and Nationalism to digital, in-
ternet-based enterprises like The Nationalism Project, and apart from the 
many volumes of individual theoretical, sociological and ethnographic 
work on the topic,3 there are now entire encyclopaedias available on it 
(Leoussi and Smith, 2000). However, it is possible – and necessary – to 
identify some of the generic and generally accepted conceptual relations 
at work within this concept. These include:  
(a) The distinctions of the idea of the ‘nation’ from related concepts 
like ‘community’, ‘country’ and ‘state’. While ‘nation’ usually incorporates 
understandings of ‘community’ and ‘country’, it is distinct from the idea 
of the ‘state’, even if it is invariably related to it. 
(b) Consequently, the relations of ‘nation’ to the idea of the ‘nation-
state’. While the nation-state as a political model has varied across histo-
ries and regional locations – depending on current conceptions of nation 
and of state that are applicable – nations have not always generated, es-
tablished or entered into harmonious relations with state-formations 
(which explains the need for the hyphen in ‘nation-state’). Hindu nation-
alism is a peculiar instance of this relation: while its relations with the 
Indian state have been generally harmonious, it remains nevertheless (as 
yet) unable to actually establish its own version of the state in India. The-
se issues will be addressed in greater detail in the course of the thesis. 
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(c) The significance of geographical space – territorial size – and pop-
ulation strengths – majoritarianism – in the determination of these un-
derstandings, in particular instances. With many instances of nationalism, 
particularly of the religious variety, there are strong relations between 
ideas of sacred space – or holy land – and the space of the nation. Con-
versely, the rituals and symbolisms inherent to most nationalistic dis-
courses – even of the avowedly secular variety – inevitably construct the 
physical-territorial space of the nation as a sacrosanct one. An important 
aspect of this relation between sacred and profane spaces is the strong 
community importance given to the places of worship that are scattered 
throughout the country: they, defined as pilgrimage spots, realise in a 
concrete way the presences of the sacred in the profane (van der Veer, 
1994).  
(d) The differences and connections with related concepts like patri-
otism, citizenship and nationality – as state promoted ideologies – on the 
one hand, and on the other, with ideas like sovereignty or independence 
(economic, cultural, political). While these are necessary parts of any na-
tionalist arsenal, they relate in different ways to it, serve different pur-
poses and mediate the relations between the nation and the state. For 
instance, citizenship is at once a statutory and legal status (entailing rights 
and responsibilities) and an identity status (invoking a sense of belong-
ing). Nationality on the other hand indexes identity, but does not always 
index a statutory-legal status – witness the nationality movements in 
Kashmir or in the North-Eastern states of India.  
(e) The relation to issues of development: to what extent does nation-
alism function as a substitute for development, and/or serving to draw 
attention away from the difficulties of crucial development agendas? One 
of the key arguments of the thesis is in fact that, in the Indian case, the 
discourses of nationalism and of modernisation-development are inextri-
cably interlinked, and that they are deeply gendered. 
Religion and religious politics:  
There are several issues:  
(a) understandings of religion, perhaps as conditioned by the domi-
nance of understanding religion through the Semitic religions – meaning 
that it is necessary to clarify the structure of relations between politics 
and religion – or the political role of religions – through the definitions of 
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religious structures themselves: the Semitic possibly being the dominant 
epistemic frame for this analysis till now. Which is why the question, Is 
Hindutva a process of the semiticisation of Hinduism? 4 is a structural-political 
question. (It is necessary to maintain a caution here: though a political 
question, the process of semiticisation is to be understood analytically, in 
terms of analogies and differences in strategies of dissemination, popu-
larisation and consolidation, and not as a comparison in values or power, 
between the Semitic and non-Semitic religions). There is a special signifi-
cance here to the word dharm, or dharma, for this process: precisely be-
cause it has the twofold connotations of ‘religion’ as well as of ‘natural 
order’5 (also understood often as ‘way of life’) there is an easy and no-
ticeable slippage between religion and culture. Further, it inhabits the 
many systems that constitute and articulate the permeable spaces re-
ferred to as ‘public’ and ‘private’. These factors render this phenomenon 
highly exploitable towards political ends. These issues will be of concern 
throughout the thesis, but will be examined in detail in the concluding 
chapter.  
(b) The relation between religion and communal identity: its historical 
development, in the emergence of the specificity of the term ‘communal-
ism’ to the Indian context. One of the most significant issues here will be 
the relation of communalism to communal violence, on the one hand, 
and to discourses of Hindu nationalism on the other. These questions 
will be addressed throughout the thesis. 
(c) In the Indian case, the difficulty of separating caste from religion, 
even conceptually – not just in relation to Hinduism but also in relation 
to the choice of conversion by lower castes (as for instance, in the 
Meenakshipuram case of 1981).6 Thus, the need to examine the for-
mation of contemporary Hinduism as much as a product of transfor-
mations in caste dynamics, especially during and after the colonial peri-
od, as of its engagements with other religious formations like Islam and 
Christianity.  
(d) The related issue of conversion itself: prior to the arrival of Chris-
tianity and Islam in India, the only clear instance of what might be con-
sidered conversion is from Hinduism to Buddhism.7 This however, must 
be qualified by the following considerations: firstly, conversion to Bud-
dhism did not necessarily imply a rejection of ‘Hinduism’, but of the 
Brahmanical system (which I will later elaborate on) because the idea of a 
‘Hindu’ religion and its concomitant identity is a much later develop-
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ment; secondly, from a purely chronological and territorial perspective, 
Christianity was in India fairly early, with conversions happening in the 
same way as with Buddhism, or later with Islam, but regional differences 
in the growth and trajectories of individual religions tend to be clouded 
by the current imagination of a unified India with a unified historical ter-
ritory; thirdly, that conversion may have meant the acceptance of a new 
system of religiosity – of new deities, beliefs and rituals – but not neces-
sarily a rejection of the social ordering of caste that has come to be un-
derstood as one of the defining characteristics of Hinduism. Bearing the-
se in mind, one must yet ask, In what more recent history is the term 
conversion understood? That is, it is in the specificity of the redrawn 
alignment of the populace with the state, with the coming of the British 
– the state as now empowered to intervene in the determination of pre-
viously non-state terrains of authority: marriage, divorce, transmission of 
property – that issues of and over conversion become visible as issues of 
material and political interest, and not just religious ones. Significant here 
is also who has the right to claim membership of the national communi-
ty, and through that membership, rights to the resources of the state. I.e., 
it is no longer a context in which conversion simply meant acceptance of 
a new faith (if indeed it was ever only that), but one in which conversion 
means an almost entirely different set of rights and privileges.  
(e) To examine ‘Hinduism’ (but also Christianity and Islam, and in 
this sense, religion, more generally) specifically in terms of the ‘ability’ 
(not just the capacity) to aggressively – even violently – assert identity. 
That is, to understand the phenomenon of religious violence as a means 
to asserting communal identity. In this, the thesis will focus specifically 
on the emergence in the nineteenth century of the binary ‘Order/Danda’ 
identified by Ranajit Guha (1997; pp. 24ff) as a means to enter into the 
analysis of violence in its relations to communal identity.  
(f) The importance, in this context, of the tension between, on the 
one hand, conceptual and ritual-oriented fissures within Hinduism, that 
resist its homogenisation, and on the other, the centripetal forces seeking 
to homogenise Hinduism into a nationalism.  
(g) The relation of religion to the official versions and practices of 
secularism, specifically the understanding of secularism as the tolerance 
of all religions by the state.  
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Caste and caste politics 
There are divergent theories of caste – as jati, as varna and even as race – 
and it is necessary to examine the importance of this for the develop-
ment of caste-based politics. Related issues here will be regional differ-
ences in caste denominations and local caste systems, and the questiona-
bility of the term ‘Hinduism’ in describing Dalit and/or tribal religious 
beliefs and practices. Further, it has been observed that the pervasiveness 
of caste extends to its practice amongst other religious communities like 
the Muslim and Christian communities. The thesis will take into account 
the historical trajectories by which what I have termed ‘Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony’ has negotiated the issue of caste, as well as its per-
vasive impact on the shaping of caste relations, within the ‘Hindu’ and 
within other communities. It will also factor in the inclusive but exclud-
ing perception of Dalits by Brahmanical Hinduism, as compared to the 
purely excluded perception of Brahmanical Hinduism among Dalits. The 
religiosity of the principle of exclusion is accepted, in other words, only 
by one of the two sets of people relating through this system; the other 
recognises it as a simple relation of power. The thesis examines the polit-
ical impact of this dynamic, as it unfolds after the 1960s in particular, and 
its consequences for the shaping of Hindutva. 
Gender relations and masculinity 
The arguments around these themes examine the possible sources of 
Hindutva violence – in particular, and its growing power in general – as 
not, as is often alleged, a ‘real’ historical grievance of ‘de-masculinisation’ 
and shame, but in Brahmanical masculine hegemony itself. This hegem-
ony is understood as defined, among other things, through violence, and 
therefore as sustaining among other things, on a rhetoric of shamed 
pride: violence is represented within this rhetoric as a retributive resusci-
tation of Hindu masculinity. The thesis therefore explores: (a) the need 
to understand patriarchy as masculine hegemony (which will be elaborat-
ed in the following chapter). (b) The relation between masculine hegem-
ony and hegemonic forms of masculinity that are defined by violence: 
violent masculinity is examined as the hegemonic perception of mascu-
linity here, and the thesis explores the historical dynamics by which this 
comes to be so, and sustains as such. It examines the forms and concep-
tions of masculinities that such a masculine hegemony suppresses, or 
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negotiates into marginality, as well as the enthusiasm to resuscitate the 
community specifically as ‘masculine’. (c) Conversely, the thesis also ex-
plores other, non-gender specific sources to Hindutva violence – caste or 
class tensions, for instance – and analyses the articulation of these di-
verse hegemonic forms in relation to each other. It examines the pro-
cesses by which they become gendered, hegemonic and the dominant 
way of understanding and acting on these otherwise non-gender speci-
fied sources of violence. The focus of the argument is that, while Hin-
dutva violence is and has been noticeably on the rise, along with its in-
creasingly strident masculinist posturing, little concern has been shown 
for the connections this might have with its commensurate and simulta-
neous political growth: these issues thus indicate the conceptual and the-
oretical orientations of this specific study. 
1.4 Discursive Location of the Thesis 
The body of scholarship on Hindu nationalism that has emerged over 
the last three decades is now enormous. Ranging from the anthropologi-
cal (Peter van der Veer), through the sociological (Thomas Blom Han-
sen), the discursive (Jyotirmay Sharma, Chetan Bhatt), the political 
(Christophe Jaffrelot, Achin Vanaik), the historical (Gyan Pandey, John 
Zavos, Romila Thapar), to media studies (Arvind Rajagopal) and cinema 
(Karen Gabriel), there has also been an active examination of its gender 
aspects by feminist writers (Ratna Kapur, Tanika Sarkar, Zoya Hasan, 
Paola Bacchetta, Karen Gabriel, Sikata Banerjee). These classifications 
often overlap and intersect – partly because of the strongly interdiscipli-
nary nature of much of the work, and partly because of the pervasiveness 
of Hindu nationalist ideas and practices. The debates are focused on a 
wide range and variety of aspects of Hindu nationalism – from its histor-
ical emergence, to its relations to the larger political economy, to the ide-
ological and conceptual apparatus that it propagates, to its organisational 
and structural arrangements, through to the prescriptions and proscrip-
tions of its gender relations. One dominant school of thought on the 
emergence of Hindu nationalism proposes that it evolved as a conse-
quence of, or response to, colonial administrative mechanisms and poli-
cies, especially those of census enumeration and the codification of iden-
tities (Cohn, 1996; Kaviraj, 1992; Hansen, 1999; Corbridge and Harriss, 
2000). Another tends to locate it as the meta-discourse of communalism, 
emerging out of institutionalised communal and caste violence, often 
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understood as manipulated to serve the political interests of specific in-
terest-groups and/or political parties (Brass 2003; Jaffrelot 1996, Hansen 
1999; Varshney 2002). Social scientists of various disciplinary and politi-
cal hues have also keenly debated on whether or not Hindu nationalism 
is a form of fascism: political economist Prabhat Patnaik (1993) and his-
torian Sumit Sarkar unhesitatingly label the Hindutva phenomenon ‘fas-
cist’, in its promotion of ‘cultural’ homogenisation in the name of cultur-
al nationalism, in its promotion of violent and authoritarian forms of 
masculinity as a means to achieve this, and more specifically in the or-
ganisational structures of its constituent bodies. Others like Chetan Bhatt 
(2001) and Achin Vanaik have critiqued this as being inaccurate and ex-
cessively polemical, because of the absence of many features that charac-
terise fascism, and have preferred to consider it a form of ‘cultural exclu-
sivism’ (Vanaik 1997: 275).  
Further, a large number of commentators have emphasised the fact 
that Hindu nationalism has generally preferred to work from within – 
rather than against and from outside – the constraints of the political 
framework of constitutionalism (see for instance Jaffrelot 1996; Hansen 
1999). Equally, others have pointed to the tendencies within Hindutva 
towards extra-constitutional practices, essentially in the form of fostering 
communal tension and violence, but also in terms of proposing that the 
constitution itself be replaced by a new one more appropriate to the ‘In-
dian’ cultural context (Sachar 2001). Other commentators argue that 
there is in fact no liberal democratic tradition of political discourse in 
India, within which Hindu nationalism is articulated, but rather only a 
superficial imposition of it on a cultural terrain that is hostile to it 
(Nandy 1987; Madan 1997). This argument also proposes that Hindu 
nationalism specifically, and communalisms more generally, are in fact 
products of the attempt to impose a ‘western’ style secularism in the In-
dian polity (Nandy and Madan; P Chatterjee 1997). These arguments 
have been critiqued by scholars like Peter van der Veer (2006) and Achin 
Vanaik (1997), for assuming that secularism and modernity are finished 
products of the ‘west’, inalienable from that context. Jaffrelot among 
others has been particularly influential in arguing that Hindu nationalism 
is a form of ‘ethnic nationalism’ (1998; but especially his ‘Introduction’, 
2006) that in fact has complex relations with modernity. Countering Jaf-
frelot’s thesis, Corbridge and Harris (2000), have argued that Hindu na-
tionalism’s relations to modernity are precisely what prevent it from be-
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ing considered an ethnic nationalism, but must itself be considered a 
product of that very modernity. 
In the above, I have tried to offer a brief sketch of a very large set of 
debates around Hindu nationalism; in what follows, I will briefly profile 
another set of related but distinct debates around the same issue – spe-
cifically the feminist interventions in and extrapolations of this debate. 
Feminist interventions in this debate have tended to centre on a few key 
issues that remain generally unconsidered or merely touched upon in this 
debate. First of these is the issue of personal laws and the way in which 
Hindu nationalism has been constructed around the gender logic that is 
foundational to these laws. While Partha Chatterjee (1986) was probably 
the earliest to draw attention to this, subsequent work by feminist schol-
ars like Kumkum Sangari (1993; 1995), Tanika Sarkar (1993), Brenda 
Cossman and Ratna Kapur (1996) and Zoya Hasan (2009) have elaborat-
ed substantially on the relationship of personal laws to community for-
mation on religious lines, on the one hand, and to the status of women, 
on the other. This work has been particularly significant in establishing 
the centrality of gender issues to the evolution and the directions of 
growth of Hindu nationalism. Feminist critiques of Hindu nationalism – 
and even of the often gender-blind discourses that also proffer critiques 
of it – have drawn on this work to explore the position of women, in 
discursive and practical terms, within this nationalism. Scholars such as 
those named above, along with others like Sikata Banerjee (2005), Tanika 
Sarkar and Urvashi Butalia (1995), Tanika Sarkar (1998, 1999), Zoya Ha-
san (1994), Flavia Agnes (1994), Amrita Basu (1999), Amrita Basu and 
Rekha Basu (1999), Hansen (1996), Paola Bacchetta (2004) and Runa 
Das (2004), have produced important work on a variety of aspects of 
gender in relation to Hindu nationalism, including the organisational 
(Bacchetta, Sarkar, Hansen, Banerjee), the issue of violence against 
women (Sarkar, Basu, Hasan) , the issue of nuclearisation (Basu and 
Basu), the nature and orientation of women’s participation in the Hin-
dutva programme (Bacchetta, Agnes), the intersections of law and gen-
der in relation to Hindutva (Cossman and Kapur, Agnes) and the inter-
sections of gender and caste in relation to Hindutva (Sangari, Das, 
Agnes).  
However, it is only recently that some work has emerged specifically 
engaging with the issue of masculinity in relation to Hindu nationalism 
(Sarkar, Hansen, Banerjee, Basu and Basu). This work has tended to fo-
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cus either on the emphasis within Hindutva discourses of explicitly mas-
culinised actions and rhetoric; or has focused on the shaping of concep-
tions of masculinity in the organisational and discursive arrangements of 
Hindu nationalism; or has examined the close relations of violence to 
understandings of masculinity in Hindu nationalist actions, programmes 
and organisations. There is no study that seeks to explore the relations 
between the organisational, ideological, programmatic dimensions of 
Hindu nationalism, and its engagements with the larger political econo-
my (or economies) that it is situated in, specifically with regard to its 
productions and deployments of masculinities. Further, while there have 
been studies of men and masculinity in relation to (contexts of) devel-
opment (Cornwall and Lindisfarne, 1994; Greig, Kimmel and Lang, 
2000; Chopra, Ossella and Ossella, 2004), these have been more descrip-
tive than analytical, serving the essential purpose of drawing attention to 
some of the relations and conjunctions that avail between masculinity 
and development, but either avoiding theorization or failing to theorize 
these adequately. These are the lacuna that this particular study seeks to 
fill. In doing so, it hopes to contribute to a larger theoretical and analyti-
cal discussion on masculinity and men’s studies – which will be located 
and discussed in detail in the following chapter – as well as to argue that 
gender – specifically certain ways of thinking about men and masculinity 
that I adopt in the thesis – may prove unarguably central to understand-
ing the phenomenon of Hindu nationalism. The significance of such a 
study lies not only in contributing to the academic debates in these areas, 
but to make considered and calibrated political interventions possible in 
these fields. 
1.5 Objectives and Relevance of Research 
The objectives of the proposed research may be condensed as broadly 
addressing the following sets of questions, which also indicate the scope 
and range of its relevance: 
1. To dislocate the idea of hegemony from its hegemonic understand-
ings, as a totalitarian system of coercive and yet consensual domi-
nance. This theoretical divergence will help formulate the under-
standing of patriarchy as masculine hegemony – a formulation that is 
essential to understanding Hindutva as founded on the dynamics of 
Brahmanical masculine hegemony. 
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2. To examine the relation between contemporary Hindu nationalism, 
its own historical past, and the ‘historical’ pasts that it seeks legitima-
cy in. What are the gender forms and configurations being effected 
by – and influencing – this relation, and to what extent is the power 
of these forms dependent on their historicities (real or mythified)? 
The thesis will attempt to show that nationalism in India emerged 
through an engagement with the past that sought to reconfigure the 
gendered power relations established under colonialism, and that the 
emergence of Hindu nationalism is inextricably entwined with this 
nationalist history. In particular, the thesis will focus on attitudes to-
wards violence and its role in inscribing identity as well as conduct 
(at the personal and political levels), in the consolidation of Hindu 
nationalism. 
3. To examine the sites of such gendering. Specifically, the thesis will 
argue that Hindu nationalism has evolved in a history of modernisa-
tion – beginning in the nineteenth century, and evolving through the 
dynamics of colonial rule – and developmentalism that has served to 
accentuate its agendas. It will attempt to show in particular that the 
transformations in caste dynamics that were catalysed by these pro-
cesses, also forced Hindu nationalism to redefine itself and its agen-
das. 
4. To analytically outline the conjunction of gender and nationalism – 
specifically, of masculinity and Hindu nationalism – as it obtains in 
contemporary India. The thesis will explore some of the major fronts 
on which the battle to transform India into a Hindu nation is being 
carried out, and the inextricable immanence of gender in this battle. 
1.6 Research Questions 
The following broad research questions guide the analytical orientation 
of this thesis: 
1. In studying the Hindutva, how important is masculinity as an analyti-
cally incisive category? How explanatory is it of the phenomenon – 
or at least, of the ground realities that it thrives on? Or – in what 
terms can we configure masculinity to produce it as an enabling ana-
lytical tool to understand Hindutva?  
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2. What is the position of gender identities in situations and conditions 
where significantly contested political identities are not gender-based, 
but based on other issues: caste, religion, class, political ideology? 
What are the terms of relations in which gender intersects and/or in-
tegrates with these other issues?  
3. What are the relations that obtain between: 
(a) masculinity and violence;  
(b) violence and nationalism, particularly religious nationalism, par-
ticularly Hindutva;  
(c) state and non-state forms of violence, specifically in relation to 
the construction of the nation-state; and  
(d) how do these three sets of relations get articulated? 
4. Does the concept of ‘hegemony’ work as a useful paradigm for un-
derstanding the operations of Hindutva? Can patriarchy be under-
stood as a form of hegemony? In what ways must the latter term be 
re-conceptualised to factor in gender and gendered relations?  
5. An analytical question of definition: is the Hindutva a community? 
Or is it the label for an ideological and political force that is attempt-
ing to create a community? Does the label identify a set of organisa-
tions and institutions or a sentiment/culture?  
6. What are the relations that obtain between the history of Hindu na-
tionalism and the histories of modernisation and developmentalism? 
How have these affected its modes of organisation, its agendas, the 
constitution of its identities, its relations to caste and to caste poli-
tics? How have these processes affected its constructions and prac-
tices of gender, and how have they in turn been determined by its 
gendered politics? 
7. One significant question is the relation of this set of relations, in 
turn, to the transformations in the economy that have been officially 
underway since 1990, but whose inceptions may be traced to the ear-
ly ‘80s. How does one understand liberalisation, and the increased 
role of the market, in relation to Hindutva? Have caste or creed affil-
iations been affected by it? Has it led to a crisis in upper-caste he-
gemony and this in turn to social violence? And has this violence 
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been directed at lower-castes, or at other ‘privileged’ communities, or 
both?  
1.7 Methodological and Analytical Issues 
An important issue here is the scope, or level, of the study: a peculiar 
problem of concepts like nationalism – particularly when complicated as 
religious nationalism – is that as an object of study it escapes bounded-
ness, even if, as Geschiere and Meyer note, ‘classification and marking 
boundaries seem to be basic to scientific research.’ (1998: 603) I will ex-
amine the phenomenon of Hindu nationalist – Hindutva – masculinity 
not as it manifests itself across the country – in that sense, not confined to 
an analysis of specific instances of communal violence, or of Hindutva 
mobilisation – but as at least a ‘sensitising concept’ (ibid., p. 601) if not 
an analytical one. This means attempting to understand all that comes 
under the rubric of Hindutva – both, as acknowledged by its propagators 
and as ascribable to it from outside, for various socio-historical and the-
oretical reasons – through the lens of gender, specifically masculinity. 
Broadly, Hindutva is a conglomerate of three conceptual packages: na-
tionalism, religion and the caste-class configuration (the processes of 
modernisation are important factors here). The study is an attempt to 
‘read’ masculinity as it is announced and encoded in the relational play of 
these packages, using the analytical framework of masculine hegemony. 
The thesis therefore examines these packages as constituting the terms 
by which masculine hegemony is constructed and structured, and thus 
examines the dynamic of their relations to each other as constituents of a 
hegemony.  
This study therefore seeks its groundings in the very object of its 
quest – in the multiple realities that that object occupies. The procedure 
involved is substantially interpretational; but precisely because all inter-
pretation needs an object of interpretation, the first procedural step is to 
identify this object – Brahmanical masculine hegemony – and the Hin-
dutva masculinity (or masculinities) that it generates. However, this ob-
ject, it must be noted, is of ambiguous ontological status itself, in that, 
being conceptual, it possesses a cognitive and even imaginative being; 
but it also operates at the level of the practical – as the practices of eve-
ryday life, in the multiple dimensions of everyday life: from the familial, 
the communal, the national; to its economic, institutional and political 
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aspects. And it is these multiple dimensions of its existence that together 
constitute the object of this study. 
However, given that the study has to first constitute its object of 
study – there is no prior literature that specifically refers to it, especially 
in relation to Hindu nationalism, and in the context of contemporary 
India – the first task was to ‘materialize’, so to speak, the object itself. 
The study is therefore organised predominantly through the analysis of 
discourse around the object of study, from which its existence and oper-
ations can be gleaned. Jacob Torfing, discussing the relation between 
hegemony and discourse, notes that, ‘Hegemony and discourse are mu-
tually conditioned in the sense that hegemonic practice shapes and re-
shapes discourse, which in turn provides the conditions of possibility for 
hegemonic articulation.’ (Torfing 1999: 43) This is a succinct account of 
the dynamic that we seek to uncover, as well as the method that will be 
adopted. It involves on the one hand, a documentation of the trajectories 
followed by the term ‘Hindu’ and its evolution in the nineteenth century 
into a clearly identifiable community, as well as the multiple processes of 
gendering that were fundamental to this evolution; and on the other, the 
maintaining of a careful distinction between ‘literal’ deployments of this 
category – as indexing a religious conception of the self as well as an 
enumerated community in census records – and metaphorical deploy-
ments that register power-relations between social groups at various lev-
els (caste, religion, community, nation). The analysis will continuously 
explore the relations between these conceptions of ‘Hindu’ and the 
broader field of Brahmanical masculine hegemony that they draw from 
and, in turn, feed. Or, to put it differently, the thesis will analyse the mul-
tiple discourses that go into constituting the meanings of the terms ‘Hin-
du’ and ‘masculine’ in particular, as these discourses intersect and inte-
grate, as well as in their (joint and separate) relations to the wider 
discursive and non-discursive field that constitutes – and is in turn con-
stituted meaningfully by – them. Needless to say, this dynamic is a con-
tinuously contested one – albeit in multiple contests, at multiple sites and 
levels, of varying intensities and extents, undertaken by diverse (groups 
of) actors – and therefore yielding varying degrees of fixity of meaning. 
The term ‘discourse’ then, is used in this thesis as constituted of the 
articulations of discrete signifying elements – ‘the relational ensemble of 
signifying sequences’ (Torfing, 1999: 91) – in a larger field of discursivity, 
as well as in non-discursive environments of varying stability. Michel 
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Foucault, in his pioneering work The Archaeology of Knowledge (1985), main-
tained a distinction between the discursive and non-discursive realms, 
which, according to Torfing, he subsequently abandoned for a more flu-
id perception of the separation between them (Torfing 1995: 90-91). I 
am aware that this is also in consonance with dominant understandings 
within discourse theories, which tend to see the discursive realm as, not 
so much denying the objective world, as insisting that that world is only 
available in and through the discursive. I have chosen to maintain the 
distinction nevertheless, for two reasons: firstly, because, while the non-
discursive realm may be available only in and through discourse, it pos-
sesses a dynamic of operations – its own logics and mechanics that are as 
complexly constituted as the world itself – that is not dependent on the 
discursive – that, in fact, necessarily shapes the material conditions of 
discourse, even as specific discourses may in turn constitute that world in 
specific ways. Secondly, it is not possible to discuss or analyze hegemo-
nies as ‘purely’ discursive, because any hegemony, by definition, is con-
stituted of a combination of coercion and consent. While the second 
may obtain discursively, the first is a physical operation that can be re-
duced to the discursive only at the cost of extreme trivialisation.8 Thus, 
the research undertaken here has necessarily employed discourse analysis 
as a primary methodological approach; but it has also acknowledged the 
need to address the question of hegemony as also constituted non-
discursively. The methodology involved establishing the presence of a 
hegemony through analysing the relations between discourses, events, 
processes and practices – and in this sense, the methodology is more 
than just discourse analysis, it is hegemony analysis. 
Initially, this second aspect of the thesis was to have been dealt with 
through a year’s fieldwork – in Delhi in the north, which in general is 
dominantly Hindi-speaking, Hindu, upper-caste, and middle-class, with 
fairly strong support for Hindutva across the board; and in Kochi in the 
south, which is Malayalam-speaking, less dominantly Hindu upper-caste, 
and with a much stronger left-democratic political profile, but with 
roughly the same economic constitution, and an increasing groundswell 
of support for the Hindutva. Accordingly, fieldwork was carried out in 
both places. But it became clear fairly early on, both from the engage-
ments with respondents as well as from the survey of primary and sec-
ondary literature undertaken, that the forms and practices of masculinity 
that were being examined as (in one way or another) self-evidently asso-
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ciated with Hindu nationalism in the existing literature, in actual fact 
emerged and drew sustenance from a wider base of gender practices, that 
I subsequently theorized as constituting Brahmanical masculine hegemo-
ny in the thesis. It became clear that these forms and practices of mascu-
linity were not just localised gender regimes, confined to Hindu national-
ist organisations or precepts, but fundamentally embedded in more 
pervasive and historically long-term formations of patriarchy in India, 
within (and outside) Hinduism in general. It further became clear to me 
that the relations between men, masculinity and Hindu nationalism ex-
tended into a web of relations outside the institutional and political 
forms of Hindu nationalism – including caste, class, sect and region – 
and that it was important to draw attention to these relays. Hindu na-
tionalism, in this understanding, moved beyond its doctrinal pro-
nouncements and practices at the level of parties and organizations, to its 
traces in and linkages with processes like development, liberalization and 
globalization. 
This meant that any engagement with the relations between men, 
masculinity and Hindu nationalism could not be confined to the present 
but had to explore the evolution of these relations, historically, in order 
to arrive at a conceptual framework that could tackle the ways in which 
the masculinities of Hindu nationalism evolved out of a more prevalent 
and pervasive dynamic of social, political and economic forces. 
This realization necessitated, firstly, a theoretical approach to men 
and masculinities that could accommodate such a task – which led to the 
conceptual innovation of the idea of masculine hegemony as a more nu-
anced approach to understanding patriarchal formations. Secondly, it 
required that prevalent understandings of Hindu nationalism themselves 
be re-examined from this perspective, which in turn required an excursus 
into the historical evolution of Hindu nationalism in gendered terms. 
And finally, it required that this excursus be extended into a perspective 
on the recent resurgence of Hindu nationalism from the same theoretical 
and analytical perspective. The thesis thus evolved into a historical-
theoretical analysis of Hindu nationalism through the conceptual frame-
work of masculine hegemony, rather than a detailed ethnographic study 
of men and masculinities within Hindu nationalism. In this sense, it may 
be understood as an extended but necessarily preliminary stage, that lays 
the theoretical, analytical and methodological ground for a second stage 
of a longer study, which will involve fieldwork at multiple levels and lo-
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cations, to elaborate the operations of this masculine hegemony at the 
molecular level. That, however, for reasons of space and time, would 
have to be another project altogether. The fieldwork that was undertaken 
for this project, therefore certainly influenced the character and ap-
proach of the analysis and findings; it has been used directly to some 
small extent in the body of the thesis itself – but it did not, in itself, be-
come the focus of analysis.  
Discourse analysis, as understood in the context of the thesis, then 
involved the analysis of specific primary texts relating directly to the ob-
ject of study, Brahmanical masculine hegemony – as for instance, with 
the analysis of Gandhi’s writings in Chapter IV – but also of a large body 
of secondary literature that dealt separately with – and constituted the 
discourse on – Hindu nationalism, on the one hand; and another much 
smaller corpus of writing – also constituting a discourse – on men and 
masculinity on the other. In both cases, the focus of the analysis was less 
on language and its uses – as with most contemporary discourse analysis 
– and more on mapping the terrain of discursivity around caste, gender, 
nation and other terms of significance for understanding Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony. This was the process by which the object of study 
was itself gleaned out of the discourses on and around it, and constituted 
as an object of study. But the secondary literature was also significant for 
its registering the multiple perspectives through which this object has 
been studied, and consequently for its mapping of the multiple processes – 
social, cultural, political economic – through which Brahmanical mascu-
line hegemony has been constituted. It could be said that the analysis at 
this level was therefore a ‘meta-discourse analysis’. Some additional 
sources of commentary and information have also been used to fill in the 
picture that emerged – such as newspaper reports – but the foundation 
of the research – since the focus was the identification and ‘materializa-
tion’ of Brahmanical masculine hegemony – was the secondary literature 
that constituted the bulk of the discourses around it. 
The Hindu nation, as of today, is an unrealised myth: whether as mas-
culine or otherwise, it remains an ‘ideal’ to aspire for and work toward, 
rather than an already existing state. As idea, therefore, it has a strong 
discursive component which is ceaselessly being projected and ‘sold’; and 
since the current research is focused on the nature of the solicitation and 
projection of this aspiration, and the work involved in it, it is of necessity 
– at the risk of repetition – an analysis of the discourses involved in this 
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process. To this extent, the method of analysis is deliberately not the 
method of postulating a hypothesis and testing it in its ‘real’ reference 
frames, but that of proposing a series of questions for research, that are 
all fundamentally oriented around the conglomerate of concepts within 
which I propose to identify Hindutva masculinity. If there is nevertheless a 
fundamental theoretical proposition underlying these questions, it is that (Brahmani-
cal) masculine hegemony is a useful analytical device for examining the structures of 
power that may be seen to operate in the relations of these concepts with and in each 
other. It is this case that may be said to be on test; but whether or not the 
postulation – that it is the most useful analytical device – is ‘proved’ or 
‘disproved’ (in the sense of being irrelevant or relevant to those struc-
tures), the study will have established the relations of Brahmanical mas-
culine hegemony to those structures – and this, in itself, is a sufficient 
end. 
1.8 Epistemological/Ethical Issues 
In the course of this study, I have had to confront several problems, 
some of an essentially methodological nature. One was the mixed subjec-
tivities I carried to the field of study, in my roles as interlocutor, as ana-
lyst as well as ‘heretic’. The last is not an unconsidered epithet: I am cat-
egorized as a Hindu by religious persuasion, officially. At the time of 
conducting the fieldwork, I was also a (relatively) young, upper-caste, 
upper middle-class, highly educated male – all of which make me an ideal 
candidate for the Hindu Right, as sympathiser if not activist. However, 
my obvious status as outsider – not just to Hindutva, but to Kerala, 
where I conducted my fieldwork – was compounded by the fact of my 
actually being a native of Kerala. (Note however that non-resident Hin-
dus are frequently known to be Hindutva sympathisers). Fieldwork in 
Delhi was no less complicated: although Delhi is a more cosmopolitan 
space, and therefore in many ways more accommodating of ‘outsiders’, 
there was and still is, explicit hostility to ‘outsiders’ to the faith of Hindu 
nationalism. In my interactions with my respondents in both places – 
especially with members or sympathisers of Hindutva – I was therefore 
frequently called upon to declare my own convictions – religious and 
political, and on several occasions asked for financial contributions. Be-
ing male, my questioning of issues that should have been taken for 
granted or tacitly understood, raised surprise if not irritation and suspi-
cion – questions of male parental responsibilities, of the gendering of 
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social and public spaces, of the intensity of women's participation in the 
movement, for instance, among others. Finally, the one issue that was 
discussed with extreme reluctance, usually only to deny or underplay it in 
various ways, was violence, whether communal or otherwise. 
In negotiating these problems, my options were to either profess cu-
riosity in order to gain access; or lay my cards on the table and engage in 
argument and debate. I eventually settled on a mixture of the last two. 
On issues of violence I was perforce pushed into silence. However, the 
comparisons of the fieldwork in Kerala and Delhi suggests that there is 
an increasing sense of anxiety among the members of minority commu-
nities, not so much because of local Hindutva activity, as the fact that 
incidents of violence against minorities have only been increasing. But 
what was most striking was that there was very little articulation of any 
sense of unreasonableness or inappropriateness, leave alone injustice, in 
the Christian perception of the Hindutva demand that Hindu majoritari-
an India should be a Hindu country. This, for me, was the sharpest indi-
cation of the general prevalence of Brahmanical masculine hegemony, 
the rules of which govern the tensions and violences between the various 
internal hegemonic formations.  
It must be noted finally, that this understanding of the prevalence of 
Brahmanical masculine hegemony would probably not have been possi-
ble without undertaking the fieldwork that I did. If this project eventual-
ly evolved almost entirely into a theoretical-historical study, the terms 
and parameters of its theoretical and historical concerns were neverthe-
less set by the experience of fieldwork. For instance, on the issue of vio-
lence, it became clear that, even as it was a prevalent phenomenon, there 
was equally a tacit and insistent silence around it. Fieldwork indicated the 
phenomenon: but understanding and analysing it required a different, 
more inferential, deductive approach that demanded that an initial con-
ceptual and analytical frame be constructed to accommodate it, precisely 
because of the silence around it. In both fieldwork locations it was clear 
that the specific phenomenon (violence in this instance) was invariably 
an inextricable and pervasive component of larger, more general and in-
terlinked phenomena (gender construction, communalism, nationalism), 
but without necessarily being revealed as such, and without revealing the 
complex ways in which the more general phenomena weave together to 
effect the specific one. This project thus became concerned with tracing 
the dynamic of this weaving, as the frame within which to locate and un-
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derstand its specific effects. Of necessity then, it was guided as much by 
those effects, as they emerged in fieldwork, as by the lack of sufficiently 
explanatory theoretical frames and historical perspectives on them. 
1.9 Chapter Outline  
Chapter I: Introduction 
This (the current chapter) will introduce the basic thematics and prob-
lematics of Hindu nationalism, and the significance of the analysis of 
masculinity, for the understanding of this phenomenon.  
Chapter II: Theorising Masculinity & Nationalism 
This chapter engages with existing literature on theories of patriarchy, 
gender and masculinity, and examines the relations between masculinity 
and nationalism. Gramsci's theory of hegemony is drawn upon as the 
most inclusive theoretical paradigm for such an analysis. I will attempt to 
construct a theoretical argument for masculine hegemony, as a viable 
conceptual tool for political analysis. This chapter will be the analytical 
base of the discussions undertaken in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter III: The Emergence of the Hindu Right - I 
This chapter will examine the evolution of the term Hindu historically, 
from roughly the beginning of the previous millennium to the 19th centu-
ry. It will examine its relations to formations of identity along (gendered) 
religious and ethnic lines, and its gradual concretisation into a term de-
noting a national community. The intention is to address the historicity 
of Hindu nationalism’s claims to being a historically unified community 
and nation. 
Chapter IV: The Emergence of the Hindu Right - II 
This chapter will discuss the period from the nineteenth century to the 
moment of Independence. It will attempt to trace the relations between 
emergent Hindu nationalism and the mainstream nationalism of the In-
dependence movement, within the gender framework of Brahmanical 
patriarchy. It will focus specifically on the ways in which the colonial en-
counter reworked patriarchal formations as well as the masculinities they 
generated, and on how this has shaped the subsequent directions of na-
tionalism. It will thus lay the ground for an exposition of religious na-
tionalism as having its roots in a much larger public base than can be un-
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derstood through its institutional manifestations. This will then be ex-
plored and elaborated in the next chapters. 
Chapter V: From Independence to the Present 
This chapter will explore the themes of masculinity, patriarchy and na-
tionalism in relation to the issue of ‘development’. It will explore the 
ways in which transformations in caste patriarchies and their political 
consequences, have demanded adjustments in Brahmanical patriarchy 
that have had a profound impact on the shaping of contemporary Hindu 
nationalism, and its dramatic rise in the last two decades.  
Chapter VI: The Present 
Framed by the discussions of the previous chapters, this chapter will 
work out the relations that obtain between the discussions of Ch. 2 and 
Chs. 4 & 5. It will undertake to examine the relations that obtain be-
tween local forms of patriarchy, global processes and their effects on 
these forms, and the articulation of these two within the discourses of 
Hindu nationalism. It will focus in particular on the relations between 
Hindu nationalism, Islam, Christianity and the women’s movement in 
India, as these have played out in contemporary India.  
Chapter VII: Conclusion: An ‘Indian’ World-View? 
In this last chapter, I will review the findings of the preceding chapters, 
reflecting simultaneously on my positions in the debate - as male, upper-
caste, Hindu - and their possible effects on the nature of my findings and 
arguments; as well as on my prospective understanding of the future of 
Indian secularism. 
Notes 
 
1 See for instance, the BJP leader LK Advani’s statement, in elaborating on what 
is meant by ‘Hindutva’: ‘If a common, unifying sense of “Americanness” can be 
forged in 400 years, certainly there is a case for insisting that a far more robust 
and intrinsically more humanistic sense of “Indianness” has unified India’s di-
verse religious, ethnic, linguistic and caste groups for thousands of years.’ 
(http://www.lkadvani.in/eng/content/view/378/344/, accessed 26 June 2007) 
2 However, see also the Supreme Court judgment on this matter on 11 December 
1995, discussed by Noorani (1995). The judgment essentially upheld the view that 
‘Hindutva’ was not a religious concept but a cultural one and could therefore le-
gitimately be used as the basis for election campaigns. It is significant also for 
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indexing the extent and spread of the ideologies of Hindu nationalism among the 
elite of the country. 
3 See Smith (1998) and Jaffrelot (2003) for useful reviews of this literature. 
4 A term used by Rajni Kothari (2004, p. 2698) 
5 For a useful discussion of how this concept figures in Hindu nationalist dis-
courses, see Tamminen (1996).  
6 This was a highly conreoversial case of the mass conversion of Hindu lower 
castes – from the Pillar community – to Islam, in protest against the social and 
economic discriminations they suffered at the hands of upper castes. See Mumtaz 
Ali Khan (1985) for a detailed analysis of this controversy. 
7 Unless one were to acknowledge adoptions or rejections of Shaivism or Vaish-
navism, by other sects and cults, as similar cases of conversion. 
8 It is not possible (for reasons of space and scope) or necessary (for reasons not-
ed below) to engage with the extensive theoretical debates around discourse theo-
ry and its methodology, discourse analysis. (For fairly detailed discussions of the 
former, see Torfing (1995); for the latter, see de Beaugrande (2006)). In many 
senses, this ongoing debate can be boiled down to that oldest of philosophical 
questions, ‘Which is more true, Reality or the perception of Reality?’ My concern 
here is strictly confined to establishing the theoretical basis and analytical meth-
ods that I have employed in the course of this research; to this extent, I have en-
gaged with the debate only to indicate my own methodological approach. 
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2 
Towards a Theory of Masculine 
Hegemony 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will attempt to engage with existing literature on theo-
ries of patriarchy, on the one hand, and with those of gender and mascu-
linity, on the other. With regard to the first part, the intention is not to 
review the voluminous debate around the term, but to identify certain 
theoretical and ideological positions that have emerged with respect to it, 
in order to make possible a critical reclamation of the term. I will attempt 
to show how Gramsci's theory of hegemony can be drawn upon as the 
most inclusive theoretical paradigm for such an analysis. In other words, 
I will examine three concepts - hegemony, patriarchy, masculinity - and 
attempt to construct a theoretical argument for masculine hegemony, as 
a viable conceptual tool for the political analyses that will be undertaken 
in the latter parts of this thesis. The latter half of the chapter will be de-
voted to then examining the theoretical demands of employing and de-
ploying these terms analytically in the study of Hindu nationalism.  
2.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this chapter are: to 
1. Review certain dominant understandings of the term patriarchy, and 
the debates around them. 
2. Elaborate and examine the notion of masculinity as it has developed 
in masculinity studies, and thereby outline and analyse the problems 
with the existing conceptions of gender in most masculinity studies. 
3. Explore the theoretical and conceptual requirements for a gender 
analysis of political phenomena like Hindu nationalism. 
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4. Outline a theory of patriarchy as masculine hegemony, as the most 
viable conceptual frame within which to undertake an examination 
of Hindutva masculinities. 
2.3 Preliminary Propositions on ‘Patriarchy’ 
I will begin with a set of propositions on the term ‘patriarchy’ that will 
serve as the theoretical framework within which this chapter is articulat-
ed, and that it is attempting to enunciate. These propositions will be 
elaborated and substantiated in the course of the chapter: 
Patriarchy1 is a characteristic of most historically dominant forms of 
social organisation. It is now well accepted that there is no one singular 
‘Patriarchy’, as descriptive of a (universal or even common) form of so-
cial organisation, but ‘patriarchies’ – historically and geographically di-
verse, varying economically and often with blatantly contradictory char-
acteristics – leading to the charge that the term itself is not analytically 
useful.2 Nevertheless, it is both possible and necessary to maintain the 
usefulness of the term as indicative of a discernibly specific characteristic 
of the societies that it is applied to, however diverse they may be. For 
now, I propose that this characteristic may be located in (among other 
things) the given society’s (gendered) relation to violence – in its practic-
es and their meanings, its roles and utilities in delineating the organisa-
tional forms of that society, its ethical and legal status, in the mythologies 
that engender and are engendered by it. Inevitably then, this characteris-
tic is directly engaged with the production and perpetuation of the spe-
cific gender-forms of the given society – with its practices and prescrip-
tions of masculinity and femininity. I argue therefore that patriarchy is an 
essential analytical tool for grasping the operations, as well as the means 
of sustenance and reproduction, of the structures and dynamics of dom-
inance and the distribution of power; specifically for our purposes, its 
analytical potential needs to be sharpened by examining the processes by 
which it comes to legitimise and institute practices of violence. In other 
words, it is necessary to explore the function of violence within patriar-
chal systems, in the maintenance and reproduction of those systems, as 
well as in their historical transformations and adaptations. If patriarchies 
have had a near universal dominance, historically, it is because, as this 
chapter will try to show, violence is an inherent, definitive and structural 
component of all patriarchies. 
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Having stated this, and without rehearsing the voluminous and exten-
sive debates on the meanings and utilities of this term, it is possible to 
posit that using it is both unavoidable and problematic for any feminist 
gender analyses – perhaps problematic in fact, because it is unavoidable. 
One of the discomforts with patriarchy owes to the unqualified use of it 
as a portmanteau term, which, as one argument goes (Anthias & Yuval-
Davis, 1989), blunted its analytical edge. On the one hand it appeared to 
be too generally applied, and on the other, impossible to apply too spe-
cifically to any given social situation or formation without dissipating in 
meaning. There was then a sense in which, like ‘capitalism’, patriarchy 
appeared to exceed any functionally applicable definition, and yet – like 
‘pornography’, in Potter Stewart’s famous pronouncement – can prompt 
the observation, ‘I know it when I see it’.3 However, the critical move-
ment in feminist thinking away from a ‘classical’ understanding of patri-
archy toward one that demonstrably accommodated the specificity of 
context and location conceptually (Kandiyoti 1997, Sangari and Vaid 
1993; Gandhi and Shah 1993; Moghadam 1994; Yuval-Davis 1997) sub-
stantially restored the analytic uses of the concept. Nevertheless, precise-
ly because of this swing towards emphasising specificity of context and 
location, the term began to be considered meaningful only in association 
with specific instances; it therefore remains a term that is more often 
used descriptively than analytically.  
The contention here is that the term in fact continues to have signifi-
cant analytical and political utility. Its fundamental utility lies precisely in 
its generic quality, which permits its persistent identifiability in otherwise 
dramatically contrasting and diverse cultures and situations. It is of 
course politically vital to cognise this generic quality – which I will elabo-
rate below – because it is only by recognising patriarchy as an extensive 
and generic system of oppression and exploitation that effective strate-
gies to challenge and dismantle it may be organised: like with all systems 
of oppression and exploitation, patriarchy inhabits and is bolstered by a 
host of systems, structures and institutions, accounting for say, the syn-
chronicity between imperial, patriarchal and caste agendas or the gender 
regimes of labour. Any successful challenging and resisting of even spe-
cific instances of it needs to be conceptualised and deployed at the level 
of systems and structures which, especially in the age of globalisation, 
have transnational linkages and interests. Retaining patriarchy as a con-
cept facilitates a systemic understanding of gender oppression and en-
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courages the understanding that dismantling it would require a large-
scale, historicised and sustained resistance at several levels, and across 
institutions, rather than localised action alone. The locality being referred 
here is more than geographical; it is systemic and structural, explaining 
why an analysis and redress of patriarchies in India for instance, would 
involve looking at (among other things) caste, property relations, labour 
relations, communalisation and coloniality as well. The centrality of any 
conceptual frame to the politics of action, to praxis, cannot be empha-
sised enough not least because it records the close relation that obtains 
between the theoretical and the political, which are mutually foundation-
al. Just as the theoretical must be grounded in, extrapolated from, built 
on and must directly address the multiple and diverse political forces and 
contexts that obtain in any given situation, political action is sharper and 
more focused when its theoretical and analytical basis is incontestably 
explicit and clear. Then, in order to activate ‘patriarchy’ and ‘patriarchal’ 
as substantive terms possessing more than just polemical value, it be-
comes imperative to theoretically explore and elaborate on what I have 
referred to above as its generic quality, and what I noted in the introduc-
tory propositions as the location of this quality – in any given society’s 
relation to violence.  
In what follows, I will enter into such a theoretical exploration and 
elaboration by actually digressing a little, into a field of gender research 
that has contributed substantially to the dilution of the usefulness of the 
term ‘patriarchy’: the field of ‘masculinity studies’. By doing so, I hope 
to, on the one hand, locate and elaborate on some of the theoretical and 
political consequences of abandoning the concept of patriarchy (whether 
in gender studies or otherwise), and on the other, to elaborate on the 
intricate and intimate relations that obtain between the concepts of patri-
archy and masculinity – to suggest, in other words, that to understand 
patriarchy (and its relations to violence) it is also imperative to explore 
and analyse the ways in which ‘masculinity’ is conceived. 
2.4 On Masculinity Studies 
I will begin this by examining an aspect of masculinity studies that re-
mains relatively taken for granted and unexamined: that masculinity stud-
ies is about the study of masculinity (or the plural, masculinities).4 At first 
glance it seems too obvious a question to raise for scrutiny: masculinity 
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studies must be about masculinity – which is why in the first instance (in 
a tautological circle) it is referred to as masculinity studies. But the seem-
ing silliness of such speculation diminishes substantially if we ask why it 
is that there is no corresponding field of femininity studies. While femi-
nisms of various persuasions have been around for a while, and women’s 
studies too, there is as yet no burgeoning field of scholarship called ‘fem-
ininity studies’. To infer from this that femininity does not either exist or 
warrant study would be logically possible (and historically much prac-
tised even without that inference) but somewhat blind to political and 
empirical realities. The argument that the feminisms and women’s stud-
ies fields sufficiently address the question of femininities, while more 
tenable, then refocuses our attention on the terminological distinction 
between ‘feminisms’, ‘women’s studies’ and ‘masculinity studies’.  
In the case of the first two a difference in agenda is explicit in the la-
bels themselves. Given some flexibility the following generalizations may 
be offered about them: feminism (of whatever kind), like most isms, is at 
once a philosophical, ideological and political program, and in associa-
tion with women’s studies, explicitly focuses on the condition and status 
of women in a dominantly patriarchal5 world, and is concerned with cri-
tique, correction, amelioration and transformation. While the field of 
women’s studies may be understood to confine itself to the more aca-
demic dimensions of feminist concerns, like most feminisms it is con-
cerned with women’s roles, economic social and political status, identi-
ties, subjectivities, sexualities, gendering, representations and through 
these with (re)defining women as a political as well as epistemological 
constituency. If this has increasingly also involved the analyses of mascu-
linities and male sexualities – has expanded to include a concern with 
and for marginalized sexual identities, and the oppression of weaker men 
as well within patriarchal systems – it is not at the expense of the primary 
commitment to the elimination of women’s oppression. Understanding 
patriarchy to extend across and inhabit both genders, most feminist 
schools today undertake the study of masculinities and men within the 
continuing larger programme of disbanding patriarchy. Different strands 
of feminism have at different times emphasised different aspects of so-
cial injustice and their causes, but invariably with the focus on how they 
impact on women in particular. In the study of patriarchies, their consti-
tution and their working for instance, particularly after the intervention 
of third world scholarship, issues of race, caste and ethnicity and their 
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interventions into gender and sexuality have become intrinsic to theoris-
ing gender (masculinity and femininity) and sexuality if only in the self-
reflexivity it demanded of the (white male) speaking subject. 
‘Masculinity studies’ however displays neither the philosophico-
political tags nor the inclusiveness of feminism and women’s studies. It 
cannot term itself ‘masculinism’ in a literal counterpart to feminism, for 
the heavy association of masculinity with privilege and power would 
render such a term ideologically at least suspect if not debilitating (in an 
implicit acknowledgement of feminism). It must be noted here that the 
early years of masculinity studies in the 1980s in the United States (re-
sulting from the Men’s Liberation movement of the 1970s) did see an 
attempt to register it as a field called ‘the new men’s studies’ – presuma-
bly as a male answer to the field of ‘women’s studies’ – under the aegis 
of Harry Brod (Brod ed. 1987).6 It was immediately controversial, under 
attack as being essentially bourgeois, self-pitying and digressive from the 
more serious, even arguably more legitimate concerns of women’s stud-
ies. Subsequent attempts to carve out a sphere of men’s studies carefully 
avoided the tag and the preoccupations of this early navel-gazing narcis-
sism, opting instead for a gender-based approach, with wider scope and 
the evident decision to address the processes of gendering – of the mak-
ing of men’s masculinity, rather than of male subjects themselves. Hence 
the more distanced term ‘masculinity studies’, alluding to an apparent 
disembodiment from the ideological weight of masculinism, through a 
focus on its displayed attributes, i.e. on masculinity.  
But the response of distancing itself is suggestive of the very power 
and freedom to do so. A ‘femininity studies’ would be inconceivable not 
because of the absence or irrelevance of femininity to the gendering of 
women, or to the analyses of women’s social conditions, but because of 
the inconceivability in feminism and women’s studies of a separation 
(between femininity, femaleness and women) of the kind that is both 
possible as well as instituted (between masculinity, maleness and men) in 
masculinity studies. While obviously the distinction between the catego-
ries “femininity” and “female” is maintained, femininity is not reified in 
feminism or in women’s studies as masculinity is in masculinity (or 
men’s) studies. This is evident in the treatment of masculinity as a prop-
erty (or set of properties) that is (or are) worthy of analyses in itself/ 
themselves. (Property here must be understood not just in a ‘neutral sci-
entific’ sense as attribute, but in a more subjective and compromised 
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sense, as that which is acquired or owned.) Such reification is one symp-
tom of a somewhat embarrassing alignment that much masculinity stud-
ies perforce engages with but also wishes to wish away. In short, there is 
a discursive and practical alignment of masculinity with power that is so 
pervasive that it extends to and informs even the attempts to disavow 
that power evident in the apparently neutralising appellation ‘masculinity 
studies’. 
There are at least two immediate consequences to such an attempted 
neutralisation: one, by implying that the gendering of men is about the 
construction of masculinities, a fundamental feminist insight is elided – 
that gendering is not about attributes or properties but is a process, and is 
about the inextricable entanglement of femininity with masculinity in that 
process. The second and further consequence is that, feminist concerns 
with the structural and organisational processes by which women in gen-
eral are systemically placed, subjugated, exploited, co-opted and/or vio-
lated in patriarchal systems then give way in much of masculinity studies 
to the examination of the culturally defined attributes of men and prac-
tices of maleness, and of the categories and kinds of masculinity. While 
the analyses of power-relations may enter such explorations, rarely do 
these extend to the examination (for instance) of concepts of femininity 
and their role and influence in the shaping of masculinity and patriarchy 
or of the political, social and economic relations (in a given context) that 
generate and privilege certain masculinities (or certain attributes of mas-
culinity) over others. It is particularly telling of the uneasy relation of 
masculinity studies to questions of power that violence, for instance, gets 
studied almost as a disembodied cultural artefact that somehow attaches 
to specific moments and events, rather than as systemic, embodied and 
most importantly, inherent to the structures of patriarchy – as I hope to 
show.  
It is worth looking illustratively at one of the more nuanced defini-
tions of masculinity to have emerged from masculinity studies. RW Con-
nell’s attempt to define masculinity as ‘a configuration of practice around 
the position of men in the structure of gender relations’ (Connell, 1996: 
2), while seeking to retain structural factors in the analysis, nevertheless 
typically returns to a focus on men as definitive of masculinity. The in-
tent is avowedly to retain ‘the way in which reproductive capacities and 
sexual differences of human bodies are drawn into social practice’ (Con-
nell, 1996: 3) – i.e. to remember that masculinity has to do with embod-
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ied agents, and not abstract disembodied qualities – and the point is well 
taken. But there is a twofold danger in this: the first is that the focus on 
men will occlude the presence of women and femininities in the shaping 
of masculinities, as well as confine the meanings of masculinity to men. 
Such a sex-based biological criterion for the definition of masculinity can 
lead to a debilitatingly limited understanding of it as primarily a male 
concern. The tendency to narcissism then inevitably remains strong. 
Consequently it is not just distorted structural critiques that are resulted 
in masculinity studies, but distortions in the understanding of gender it-
self, producing a rather lopsided emphasis in this field. Connell is himself 
aware of this when he narrates the transformation of the men’s move-
ment of the seventies into the bourgeois, right-wing ‘masculinity therapy’ 
politics of the eighties and later.7  
Michael Flood as late as in 1998 was to note that 
Much of the men’s movement has had an overriding emphasis on person-
al growth and healing. It has had an important therapeutic emphasis, while 
other movements focus—either instead (green, labour), or as well (wom-
en’s, gay and lesbian)—on social change. I say "has had" because I think 
that this is shifting, as more and more men realise that personal growth 
and the reconstruction of individual masculinities are useless without an 
accompanying shift in the social relations, institutions and ideologies 
which support or marginalise different ways of being men. Additionally, 
one wing of the men’s movement is engaged in increasingly politicised and 
often anti-feminist campaigns on such issues as family law and domestic 
violence. Nevertheless, many participants are politically inexperienced and 
for many social change is not an important focus. (Flood, 1998: 3) 
 Despite Flood’s suggestion that more men are increasingly thinking 
in terms of social, institutional, and ideological change, the points to note 
here are the ‘anti-feminist’ tendency of at least some strains of the politi-
cising of men’s issues,8 as well as his closing remark: that ‘for many social 
change is not an important focus’. 
The second and related danger is that masculinity studies consequent-
ly is frequently dominated by very subjective orientations – how are men 
constructed, how does one understand men understanding masculinity, 
how does one understand the male psyche, its productivity and repro-
ductivity, its sexuality, its relations to violence, etc. Beynon for instance 
identifies an analytical frame entailing a threefold approach: formal or 
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representational, experiential, and performative (Beynon 2002: 10-16), 
and in each instance focuses on men as the primary agents determining 
and being determined by the significations and practices of masculinity. 
The deployment of the term ‘masculinity’ in much masculinity studies 
thus basically disguises a fundamental preoccupation with the male sub-
ject, specifically, and if not in isolation, then as the subject of priority. 
Masculinity studies remains willy-nilly rooted in the subjective preoccu-
pations of the earlier Men’s Movement. The point is reinforced by ob-
serving that most scholarship in masculinity studies (at least in the An-
glo-American context) was and remains male generated. It remains 
largely a dialogue of men with men, about men.  
A typical statement from some of the more established thinkers in 
masculinity studies will bear out some of the implications of its emphasis 
on men.  
The emphasis on the pressure that masculinity imposes on men to per-
form and conform to specific masculine roles (emotional and psychologi-
cal as well as political and social) has highlighted the costs to men of cur-
rent gender arrangements. (Greig, Kimmel and Lang, 2000: 8) 
The phrases ‘pressure…to perform and conform’ and ‘costs to men’ 
indicate a tendency to represent men as victims ‘too’. While men are no 
doubt also victimised under patriarchy in several ways the cause of op-
pression here is presented as the pressure of modes of masculinity, rather 
than the uneven structural distribution of power and resources that place 
certain men at a disadvantage in relation to other men and women more 
privileged in that patriarchal order. Further, there is an implicit equation 
of the kinds and quality of victim-hood for men and women under patri-
archy that is inappropriate at the very least, if not outrightly absurd. The 
implicit and often explicit argument that follows is for changes at the 
level of the kind of masculinity to adopt in relation to that order, rather 
than changes in the order itself. To acknowledge that would be to 
acknowledge a systemic transformation that would entail involving 
women and femininity – as partner-subjects and -objects of analysis and 
action – and consequently an acknowledgement of long-held feminist 
positions and arguments on patriarchy. The evidence available does not 
suggest that masculinity studies, by and large, is as yet willing to do that. 
Yet, evidently, masculinity studies implicitly and explicitly drew and 
continues to draw on and respond to feminist thought and practice 
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(Beynon 2002: 3). One easily evident consequence of the focus on mas-
culinity has been the proliferation of masculinities, almost as masculine 
counterparts to the multiplicity of feminisms: straight, gay, hegemonic, 
subjugated, camp, hybridized, marginalized, co-opted, black, coloured, 
post-colonial, Hindu (or Islamic or Christian or Jewish) etc.9 While some 
of these are avowedly programmatic (gay, black, post-colonial) and in 
that sense corresponding to the ideological diversities in feminism, most 
remain labels descriptive of specific attributes or traits. The weakness of 
such multiplicity as a theoretical and political end in itself is best under-
stood through noting the unviability of a hypothetical feminine ‘con-
verse’: the deep-structural associations of femininity with disempower-
ment and dependency in patriarchal social formations pre-empt any 
attempt to generate multiple femininities (analogically to the multiplicity 
of masculinities) as conceptual and analytical figures denoting subject 
positions, political affiliations, or personal and communal locations and 
practices. Any such attempt would be compromised by this latent value 
of the term, referring all femininities to either an implicitly contrasted 
and empowered masculinity or to individual women denoted thus specif-
ically and only because they are women. While terms like ‘butch feminin-
ity’, ‘black femininity’ or ‘brahminical femininity’ may well invoke certain 
subject positions and/or locations, they offer little by way of analytical 
input into our understandings of these. Illustratively, ‘brahminical femi-
ninity’ says little about its relation to an implicit ‘brahminical masculini-
ty’, to non-brahminical masculinities and femininities, to ethnic (in this 
instance; racial in other cases), class or regional variations within that 
femininity – and so on. Without such analytical input the crucial point 
remains that whatever the term may suggest, it remains identified with a 
degree of disempowerment and/or dependency and/or an essentialized 
sex-based gender identity. 
Obviously, the point being made here is the extension and applicabil-
ity of this critique to the usages of ‘masculinity’. It is not that ‘masculini-
ty’ or ‘masculinities’ are completely unproductive analytical terms but 
that to become fully so, they should be understood in relation firstly to 
notions of femininity; and secondly to a larger set of structural, institu-
tional and economic factors and forces that allocate masculinities and 
femininities along scales of distribution of power and agency. As Marj 
Kibby notes ‘[t]he study of masculinity inevitably leads us back to issues 
of femininity and sexual orientations and the links between gender, and 
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race, class and national identity, to the construction of individual subjec-
tivities.’ (Kibby, n.d.) The further point of focussing on femininity here 
is to demonstrate and emphasise the mutuality of the terms, not as a 
tightly bound binary opposition but as always invocative of each other. 
The blindness to this in masculinity studies develops out of the uni-focal 
gaze on male subjects that is classically patriarchal, precisely because of 
the link between masculinity and power in patriarchal societies – which 
today pretty much means all societies and cultures – however patriarchy 
may vary in its forms and institutions. When control of much public and 
private space is largely in the hands of men, as in all patriarchal societies, 
how that control is operationalised, shared, wrested, lost, may come to 
define the qualities of the men in control and their masculinity. This 
tends to suggest a possible dissociation from femininity and a definitively 
sufficient association of masculinity with power – i.e., that we may un-
derstand masculinity sufficiently through understanding its relations to 
power. This reveals another dimension of masculinity studies, viz., that 
its end seems very often to be less the exposure and explication of patri-
archal gender systems in their comprehensiveness and more the ways in 
which specifically men relate to power as men. Which is why ‘masculinity’ 
has almost come to replace patriarchy as an analytical category in mascu-
linity studies, obscuring the ways in which women and femininity are 
fundamental to the sustenance of any patriarchy, in their relations to 
men and masculinity. If the end of masculinity studies is a transformative 
gender politics then this is not just a lopsided means to achieve it but for 
strong theoretical reasons unable to achieve it – unable to be more than a 
dialogue of men with men about men and their relations to power.  
Sources of Masculine Trouble 
This is partly a consequence of the specific trajectory of the development 
of masculinity studies out of anthropology, feminism and gay and lesbian 
scholarship. Its origins lie in the confluence of anthropological ‘discover-
ies’ of ‘other’ constructions of gender, feminist insights into the opera-
tions of gender relations, and the political emergence of gay and lesbian 
work on the formation of sexual identities. Much work in masculinity 
studies was and remains, again, ethnographic (see for instance Cornwall 
and Lindisfarne 1994), drawing on the tools of ethnography and the 
conceptual apparatuses offered by feminism to gaze anew at conceptions 
and practices of masculinity. Anthropology exposed variances in social 
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practices deriving from variance in gender systems, while feminism and 
women’s studies (of whatever persuasion) argued for the focus on sex 
and gender systems in the first place, and identified the gendered power-
relations at work in the constructions of knowledges, cultures, societies 
and subjectivities. Equally significant was the contribution to the growth 
of masculinity studies from the search for alternative theoretical modes 
for understanding gay sexualities and masculinities in gay and lesbian 
studies. By redrawing the (heterosexual) norms of appearance, conduct, 
and terms of (especially sexual) relations, and critically re-examining and 
interrogating the bases of their normativity, gay and lesbian cultural criti-
cism generated new analytical frames – often derived again from anthro-
pology and feminism but importantly also from psychoanalysis – to lo-
cate and understand gender relations in general, and masculinities in 
particular. Hence the inevitable theoretical and conceptual proliferation 
of masculinities. 
But the focus on masculinities is also substantially a consequence of 
another set of historical forces, viz. colonial and imperial gender dis-
courses, and post- and neo-colonial responses to them. It is the gendered 
political gaze of nationalism and the nationalist that has engendered for 
instance both anti-colonial Indian nationalism and the more recent Hin-
du nationalism as well as their constructions of ‘national’ masculinities 
and femininities. C Enloe (1989: 44) notes that “nationalism has typically 
sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and mascu-
linised hope”.10 That is, attention to masculinity and masculinities has 
originated in postcolonial and developing-world contexts outside of the 
disciplinary fields of anthropology and feminism, within the political dis-
course of the nation and the state (see specially Nandy 1983 and Chatter-
jee 1986). The discourses around masculinity and the nation have taken 
essentially two forms: colonial and anti-colonial perceptions of the rela-
tions between coloniser and colonised as gendered (colonial power = 
masculine, colonised disempowered = feminised), with the discourses of 
the colonised replete with allusions to a humiliated masculinity and the 
parallel discourses of the coloniser disparagingly alluding to colonised 
men as feminised (M Sinha 1995); and more contemporary relays of and 
reflections on the explicability, justifiability, consequences and/or rectifi-
ability of such gendered discourses (the gender concerns of the Hindu 
RSS, or the Muslim Taliban, exemplify this well). The latter by and large 
remain concerned with the macro-political dimensions of the issue, in 
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terms of the historically gendered identity of the nation as influencing 
and affecting its postcolonial politics, and less with the (here more perti-
nent) questions of its impact on specific processes of gendering.  
Two directions for analysis of this distinct if not entirely separate evo-
lution of masculinity discourses – importantly, not coinciding with the 
two kinds of postcolonial discourses but applicable to both – are imme-
diately obvious: one, what is the aetiology of this phenomenon, what are 
its discursive and derivative coordinates (its frames of reference and allu-
sion), how do issues of gender surface in it to explicitly trope macro-
political issues, what are the historical pressures that effect such a 
troping? And two, what are the effects, consequences and impacts of 
these discourses of masculinity on the actual, everyday formations and 
constructions of gender11 at a micro level? How do they relate to concep-
tions of gender that originate in a different history, the history of western 
modernity and feminist thought and struggle, debates that form part of 
the process of modernising the postcolonial nation? Most pertinently, in 
what ways do the understandings of masculinity that emerge in these dis-
courses relate to the notions of masculinity that are increasingly prolifer-
ating in academic men’s studies? Are they analysable in terms of these 
other masculinities – i.e. is masculinity studies sufficiently equipped to 
handle these postcolonial (to put it broadly) notions of masculinity and 
femininity? What are the theoretical, analytical and empirical gaps that 
are made visible in the analysis of masculinity with the introduction of 
these discourses and their terms of reference, and what discursive arma-
ture is required to fill the gaps, if any? 
While there is now an emerging body of work in masculinity studies 
that deals with these aspects, firstly it remains rather thin and secondly, it 
hardly if ever acknowledges that the production of femininities and mas-
culinities – i.e., of gender – in these contexts might be of a different or-
der, arising out of different historical imperatives, and requiring qualita-
tively different analytical means and tools; it therefore largely remains 
within the theoretical frames set by conventional masculinity studies. 
Perhaps most tellingly, much of this work is located in the field of devel-
opment studies as part of the larger debate over gender and development 
or GAD (see for instance Greig, Kimmel and Lang, 2000). The historical 
coincidence of an efflorescence in masculinity studies with the sudden 
attention that (the mainly Euro-American) development agencies began 
to pay to men and masculinity in developing societies, is itself an issue 
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worthy of study. But for now, it does suggest the urgent need to contex-
tually re-examine both the bases of such attention and the terms on 
which it plays out. Which is why it is worth stating the obvious here: the 
stakes in the battle against patriarchies in developing societies, for both 
men and women but especially for women, are too high to permit laxity. 
2.5 Examining Patriarchy and Masculinities 
From the above it is clear that the analysis of masculinity, especially in 
contexts outside the metropolitan locations of the origins of the field, 
demands that the term itself firstly be released from singular attention 
and studied in combination with (the production of) femininity; and sec-
ondly that it should be opened to a vastly more complex analytical pro-
cess than the ones outlined above, by locating it in its historical and so-
cial contexts of generation and usage. It is also important not to lose the 
powerful insights of feminist scholarship in the course of attempting to 
establish masculinity studies as a separate field. One such insight is that 
neither patriarchy nor masculinity is as self-evident or homogeneous as 
they may appear to be. Understanding gender-constructions and the 
placement of women in them therefore requires understanding the oper-
ations of masculinity as much as of feminine subjectivity. But conversely 
then, understanding masculinity and men then demands understanding 
the operations of and on femininity. It may seem self-evident that mas-
culinities need to be studied because of an apparently equally obvious 
relation between men and power. The obviousness of the need to study 
masculinity and of the relation to power should not however blind us to 
the need for a relational rather than a unifocal analysis. The orientation 
of masculinity studies should instead be towards the analysis of the struc-
tures of patriarchy that generate masculinities of different kinds and orders. 
Such an analysis inevitably must take into account the generation of fem-
ininities (and other categories of gendered identities) as well.  
The point is important enough to bear some elaboration in the fol-
lowing broad propositions. Firstly, men’s relations to power and wom-
en’s relations to disempowerment, while nowhere absolute or unquali-
fied, remains definitive of masculinities and femininities in patriarchal 
societies. Secondly, therefore, masculinity and femininity are substantially 
defined, understood and practised as exclusive identities based on the 
experience of gendered power or disempowerment in such societies. By 
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this we mean that there are and will be forms of masculinity and femi-
ninity that are effected by belonging to communities of men and com-
munities of women respectively – forms that are the consequence (and at 
least one basis) of intra-sex relations, forms based in other words on the 
principles of homosociality prevalent in the (given) community. This 
does not preclude the theoretical and empirical possibility of the inces-
santly emergent definitions of masculinity and femininity in such com-
munities being differentiated along lines of physique, sexuality, caste, 
class, race, ethnicity, religion, region, etc. Rather, it focuses on the ways 
in which masculinity and femininity, seeking to be stabilised as internal-
ised and practised identities, negotiate these other variables. Thirdly, 
there is nevertheless a seepage of definitions between such sex-based 
(albeit nebulous) communities resulting in a further process of intra-sex 
gendering, whereby feminised masculinities and masculinised feminini-
ties may and do result. Consequently, masculinity and femininity while 
substantially moulded by the experience of being male or female in spe-
cific communities of men and women respectively, are not exclusively 
defined thus, and are as substantially a result of the relay and deployment 
of their significations between and across communities. That is, they are 
defined as much by their mutuality as by their separateness. Fourthly, 
masculinity and femininity are further defined by the terms in which sex-
ual, social and productive and reproductive relations are organised in so-
ciety.12 So apart from their being defined and understood in their sepa-
rateness and in their mutuality, masculinity and femininity are situated 
terms with functional values and meanings, within a larger economy of 
practices that are organised along gender ideology lines – practices that 
would broadly constitute the specific form that patriarchy takes in that 
society. One could think of such practices – social, sexual, productive, 
reproductive – as constituting the vehicles in the traffic of functions, 
values and meanings of gender within a given society. 
If these propositions are granted it then becomes important not to 
see masculinity and femininity as subjective phenomena constructed sui 
generis by individuals or solely in the psychosocial factories of subjectivity 
(or ideology in Althusser’s institutional terms) that are nuclear families, 
schools, clubs and groups, but as operating in very extensive and ramify-
ing realms. Specifically for us, masculinity as an attribute of identity 
opens a line of analysis into forms of identity politics; masculinity as a set 
of practices opens another into the politics of social practices. But al-
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ready here it is no longer about masculinity alone but about its links to 
and relations with other social, political and economic formations, struc-
tures and systems which are also fundamental to the forms of identity 
politics noted above. I.e., it is important to see masculinity as not just an 
attribute (or a set of attributes) possessed by individuals (or a nation or 
community), but as part of a set of terms that define social and economic 
relations, along with femininity, class, caste, race, etc, and that constitute 
a terrain of ceaseless political negotiation and contestation. Once we 
acknowledge – as with the above propositions – that gender is an em-
bedded network of values and practices and not just a taxonomical cata-
logue of kinds of masculinity and femininity, we can identify the ways in 
which it enters the fields of macro-politics. Unlike class, race and to a 
lesser extent caste, these gender terms do not necessarily imply or invoke 
a specific objective grouping beyond the vague portmanteau categories 
of ‘men’ and ‘women’. That they are nevertheless, in identity politics, 
frequently forged into such an implication or invocation – alluding to or 
being claimed by communities or societies – is an indication of the ur-
gent need to unravel the ways in which the languages and practices of 
gendered intimacy can become vehicles for, if not actively mobilised by, 
sectarian, exclusive and insular politics that consequently and inevitably 
monitor and determine these languages and practices.  
Because masculinity and femininity as terms with extensive social 
connotations are nevertheless bound intimately to the sexed body,13 and 
to the related terms of pleasure and reproduction, they have a subjective 
dimension that may be understood essentially as the personal articulation 
of the social and therefore of the political too. They not only cut across 
lines of caste, class, race, etc. but constitute the terms on which these are 
internalised by the subject, and often reorganised and replayed in the 
world – establishing a circulation between private and public, personal 
and political, domestic and worldly. The investment in this circulation is 
important since it brings the values and terms of interaction of the pri-
vate back into the public, and vice versa, each thus mutually reinforcing 
the gendered meanings and interpretations of the other. Indeed, it is now 
sufficiently established by feminist critics (See for instance the work of 
Linda Nicholson 1992, Cynthia Cockburn 1992, Elisabeth Fox-
Genovese 1991) that these divides are themselves products of the pro-
cess of gendering, rather than absolute objective realities that are defini-
tive of gender and gender roles. We noted earlier that in patriarchal soci-
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eties, negotiations over the control of these realms come to define spe-
cifically the relations of masculinity to power, while remarking on the 
insufficiency of this to a comprehensive understanding of masculinity. 
We now see that this way of defining masculinity through its relations to 
power must be supplemented by the examination of other kinds of rela-
tions, including but not only its relations to femininity – which is what 
we meant by the embedded networks of gender values and meanings. In 
contexts of high-intensity identity politics and conflicts, it is then obvi-
ous that the process of gendering – the creation and definitions of mas-
culinity and femininity – will necessarily be moulded by other factors de-
termining those politics and political conflicts, as much as they supply 
their terms of functioning. When, as in the case of Hindutva, gender val-
ues and meanings have roots in the organisation and practices of patriar-
chy, as much as in a historical trajectory that is bound to the history of 
colonialism and imperialism, it becomes evident that the existing and 
conventional modes of analysis of masculinity and femininity would be 
both insufficient and even possibly misdirected, and demand a more 
comprehensive framework.  
To see gender like this is to see how it works in a moment in history. 
It is to see that the analysis of masculinity is not to be confined to the 
analysis of masculinities as formal cultural artefacts of conduct and sub-
jectivity but opened out to the examination of masculinity as embedded 
in and affected by a multiplicity of historical forces and limits. In the 
specific context of my arguments, it is to see how masculinity works, is 
worked out and is working itself out, through analysing the multiple 
strands of forces underlying the emergence and operations of Hindutva 
in the current historical moment. I will now dwell briefly on a specific 
concept within masculinity studies – the concept of ‘hegemonic mascu-
linity’ – that has gained much popularity in recent times, not least be-
cause of a theoretical illusion it practices, by employing the idea of he-
gemony, of linking masculinity to larger social, economic and political 
processes. The significance of this for our understanding of patriarchy 
will emerge when I re-deploy the concept of hegemony to expand on 
patriarchy as ‘masculine hegemony’. 
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2.6 Hegemonic Masculinity and Masculine Hegemony 
‘Hegemonic masculinity’ was a term initially introduced by Tim Carrigan, 
R. W. Connell and John Lee, in their now classic ‘Toward a New Sociol-
ogy of Masculinity’ (1985), and subsequently popularised by different 
writers on the issue of masculinity(-ies). ‘Hegemonic masculinity’ is less 
an uncomfortable marriage of two different concepts - ‘hegemony’ and 
‘masculinity’ - than an attempt to signify precisely those crystallisations 
of the meanings of masculinity that gain authoritative and definitive 
power within a given society. Yet, Carrigan, et al caution us: 
Hegemonic masculinity is far more complex than the accounts of essenc-
es... would suggest.... It is, rather, a question of how particular groups of 
men inhabit positions of power and wealth and how they legitimate and 
reproduce the social relationships that generate their dominance. 
(1985:592) 
In a fairly sophisticated and yet critical development of this idea, An-
drea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne further qualify this by noting that  
various hegemonic models can coexist. Rarely, if ever, will there be only 
one hegemonic masculinity operating in any cultural setting. Rather, in dif-
ferent contexts, different hegemonic masculinities are imposed by empha-
sising certain attributes, such as physical prowess or emotionality, over 
others. And, of course, different hegemonic masculinities produce differ-
ent subordinate variants.... (1994: 20) 
Where they take Carrigan, et al to task is when the latter argue that 
‘most men benefit from the subordination of women and hegemonic 
masculinity is centrally connected with the institutionalisation of men’s 
dominance over women.’ (1994: 20) Cornwall and Lindisfarne assert 
that, while the argument makes ‘a contingent connection,...the relation 
between men and masculinity is made to seem incontrovertible’ here; 
this is because of (a) ‘naturalised’ associations between men and power; 
(b) a ‘consistent’ masculinising of power itself, so that men and women 
in power are in positions of ‘masculinity’; and (c) the converse and ‘per-
vasive’ metaphorising of masculinity as powerful. (1994: 20-22) Two fea-
tures of Cornwall and Lindisfarne’s argument are striking, and merit 
some attention. Firstly, in all three causal factors, they in turn imply an 
incontrovertible relation between the conceptions of masculinity and 
power, even if they argue for its ‘dislocation’, and highlight the contin-
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gent rather than necessary nature of the relation between men and mas-
culinity. However, they do not sufficiently distinguish between the rela-
tions that obtain between men and masculinity and those that obtain be-
tween masculinity and power, resulting in an implicit confusion of the 
idea of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ with the more controversial proposition 
(being elucidated here) of a ‘masculine hegemony’. While the former re-
fers to the possibility of a specific variant (or of several specific variants) 
of masculinity gaining dominance over others, at specific historical mo-
ments, it is the latter that implies a singular dominance of the masculine 
– however the latter may be conceived or practised – and therefore, 
within the terms of this hegemony, an incontrovertibly evident link be-
tween masculinity and power. The second striking feature of their re-
marks is the attention that they draw to the external and determining 
conditions - ‘naturalised’, ‘consistent’, ‘pervasive’ - within which ideas of 
masculinity are formed. ‘External’, because what they are clearly arguing 
against is any notion of innate masculinity, and therefore implicitly for a 
cultural-constructionist theory of masculinities: i.e., ideas and practices of 
masculinity that are external to individuals and that influence - if not ac-
tually determine - their choices of thought and conduct. While one may 
separately debate the extent of usefulness of the cultural-construction-of-
gender argument,14 more pertinent here is the implication of a pervasive 
hegemony of specifically masculine ideas: in other words, even as they ar-
gue against it, what emerges alongside the conceptualising of any specific 
hegemonic masculinity (or its possibility), is its implicit dependence on 
an assumed pervasiveness of a ‘masculine hegemony’. That is, that the 
power of any specific hegemonic masculinity is dependent on a more 
general - ‘naturalised’, ‘consistent’, ‘pervasive’ - hegemony of masculinity, 
or masculine hegemony.15 
In an interesting analysis of the set of relations that now emerge as 
obtaining between men, masculinities, power and hegemony, Nigel Edley 
and Margaret Wetherall begin by suggesting that there is increasing con-
sensus - initiated in feminist debates on the issue - amongst social scien-
tists that, ‘any adequate theory of men and masculinity has to reflect the 
fact that masculinities are both “structured” in dominance and, in turn, 
help maintain or reproduce that dominance.’ (1996: 97-8) Like Carrigan, 
et. al., they too relate this dominance to the practices of men - i.e., the 
male sex - in particular; but they caution that ‘[m]en’s collective interests 
and their disproportionate power and influence are not maintained 
44 CHAPTER 2 
through active and self-conscious male conspiracies’ but in ‘much more 
complex, indirect and subtle’ ways (1996: 108) – suggesting, like Corn-
wall and Lindisfarne, a larger and determinative environment. What is 
more revealing is their un-theorised - even unargued - labelling of these 
processes: they argue that the complexity and subtlety of these processes 
are ‘because patriarchy, like any culture, does not declare its own partiali-
ty.’ (1996: 108) There appears no doubt for them that the processes that 
construct hegemonic masculinities - what has been repeatedly referred to 
above as masculine hegemony - constitute ‘patriarchy’. However, this 
‘dependency relation’ that is thus seen to obtain between hegemonic 
masculinities and masculine-hegemony-as-patriarchy, is neither acci-
dental nor arbitrarily posited, even if it is problematic. Sylvia Walby for 
instance, notes: 
One of the major problems with many theories of patriarchy is that they 
suggest that there is only one base to patriarchal relations, and that this is 
determinant of other aspects of gender. The base itself varies between dif-
ferent theorists but the base-superstructure model is shared. It is this that 
makes the analysis of gender relations so static and makes it difficult to an-
alyse changes except by stepping out of the framework. (1996: 243) 
This describes well the peculiar problem that emerged in Cornwall 
and Lindisfarne’s critique of Carrigan, et. al., even as they, too, attempt 
to ‘step out of the framework’. 
Part of the problem has derived from feminist discomforts with the 
term patriarchy as an umbrella description for the oppression and exploi-
tation of women, through recognition of its multiple victims - children, 
the aged, men occupying positions of weakness in the specificities of its 
distributions of power - and of the complicity of women in its processes; 
this has led to more nuanced analytical devices, oriented essentially 
around gender, as an analytical category, but at the expense of relegating 
‘patriarchy’ to the ‘base’ that Walby identifies.16 The problem is com-
pounded then by the increasing popularity of studies on the ‘cultural 
constructions of gender’, seeing it as essentially a problem of meaning, 
further consolidating the dichotomy of the base-superstructure model. 
Without belittling the usefulness of such work, it may be recognised how 
such comprehensive unwillingness to negotiate with the ‘base’ that all 
such work must inevitably refer to - as demonstrated above with Corn-
wall and Lindisfarne - can lead to the other, more disturbing dimension 
 Towards a Theory of Masculine Hegemony 45 
to this problem: with specific reference to ‘masculinity studies’, it has led 
to the (now well-entrenched) argument that men and masculinity - the 
objects of these studies - are deserving of an exclusive, even isolated ex-
amination.17 
I wish to offer here a brief critique of these critiques. Critiques of pa-
triarchy-theories of male dominance, while drawing attention to the in-
adequacies of its conceptual and analytical power, tend to ignore its pri-
mary case, that of a general - not universal, nor eternal, nor immutable – 
condition of oppression and exploitation, of women by men. To 
acknowledge this is seen as tantamount to accepting a transhistorically 
essentialist and inexorable reality, and a consequent denial of agency, 
when in fact, it is no more than an initial insight into the bases - the con-
ditions of possibility, the load of the dice in different situations - of gen-
der and other relations. Ignoring this in favour of the individual analysis 
of specific hegemonic masculinities results in the peculiarities identified 
by Cornwall and Lindisfarne – that of assuming an absolute relation be-
tween men and masculinity even while arguing against it; and those in 
Cornwall and Lindisfarne’s own argument, as analysed above – that of 
assuming a pervasive relation between masculinity and power, even as 
they attempt to deconstruct it. It is of some significance that several at-
tempts have been made to ‘rethink hegemonic masculinity’ as a concept, 
to address some of the problems raised. Connell and Messerschmidt 
(2005) for instance, argue that the concept needs to be rendered more 
complexly – through, for instance, emphasizing the agency of women; 
recognising the geographies of masculinities; disaggregating analysis into 
local, regional and global levels; and taking note of its internal contradic-
tions. However, they do not attempt to theorize this process; they merely 
note that these are the analytical dimensions into which ‘hegemonic mas-
culinity’ needs to be integrated. Separately, Connell has argued for the 
concept of a ‘patriarchal dividend’ – indexing ‘the advantage to men as a 
group from maintaining an unequal gender order’ (Connell, 2009: 142) – 
but does not attempt to theoretically integrate it with the concept of 
‘hegemonic masculinity’. In both these instances, there is an explicit 
recognition of structural and hegemonic factors of a more generalised 
character that impact on gender, but there is no concomitant attempt to 
theorize those in terms of masculinity/masculinities. 
I propose here the renewed deployment of the idea of patriarchy as a 
masculine hegemony.18 The specifics of this may differ from context to con-
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text, and between specific hegemonic forms of masculinity, but it is in all 
of them indicative of a general condition of the dominance of men – es-
sentially over women, but also over other oppressed men, the old, the 
very young, the infirm; and through whatever cross-sections of caste, 
class or race obtained – and consequently of the masculine, in whatever 
the currently dominant, specific form of hegemonic masculinity. This 
apparent truism would do well with a brief closer look, if it is to pass 
theoretical muster. It seems to me what is required is not so much the 
debunking of the concept of patriarchy, as its qualified understanding, in 
its relations with the specific dynamics of individual hegemonic mascu-
linities. That is, the term ought to be understood as an analytical proposition refer-
ring to the generally recognisable social, cultural, economic, institutional and political 
configuration (that may obtain anywhere) of the dominance of men - in other words, as 
masculine hegemony, or the hegemony that permits the hegemonic power of specific heg-
emonic masculinities - rather than as is currently understood, as an (inade-
quate) descriptive proposition with a stultifying universal applicability. In 
such a proposition, any given hegemonic condition may be characterised 
as masculine only in terms of the sustaining investment in it - as routine 
practice - of discourses of masculinity as a means of protecting its inter-
ests, i.e., the extent to which its hegemonic power generates discourses 
and practices of masculinities as legitimising, sustaining and expanding 
its hegemonic status. This opens the possibility of reading the gendering of 
hegemonies – economic, political, cultural, social – rather than the hegem-
ony of individual gender-forms. It is in this sense that one may speak of 
patriarchy - the hegemonic system itself – not merely as if it was an im-
personal objective system "out there", but as a set of hegemonic subjectivities, 
themselves inter-locked in relations that are defined economically as 
much as socially, politically and culturally, lived and practised by individ-
ual selves, both men and women. Without engaging in two disconnected 
realms of analysis, the macro and the micro, and without permitting the 
collapse of ‘femininity’ to ‘women’, and ‘masculinity’ to ‘men’, per se, it 
retains the strength of making them generalisable in terms of the relations 
that obtain in the material practices of individual men and women. Such a 
theoretical position addresses and allays suspicions of the kind raised by 
Jeff Hearn in his discussion of the analytical usefulness of ‘masculinity’; 
he lists his problems thus: 
 the wide variety of uses of the concept 
 the imprecision of its uses in many cases 
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 its use as a shorthand for a very wide range of social phenomena, 
and in particular those that are connected with men and males but 
which appear to be located in the individual 
 the use of the concept as a primary and underlying cause of other 
social effects. (1996: 203) 
He goes on to note that, ‘with some usages of the concept, the focus 
on men might be developed to divert attention away from women, ren-
dering them invisible and excluding them as participants in discourse.’ 
(1996: 203). This, he argues, leads to the focus on the reconstruction of 
ideas of ‘masculinity’, rather than on the totality of practices that sustain 
them. Further, he notes that the deployment of the category in loose di-
chotomies of ‘masculinity’/‘femininity’ only leads to the reification of the 
categories ‘men’ and ‘women’, into the corresponding terms, ‘masculini-
ty’ and ‘femininity’. With the theoretical grounding of hegemonic mascu-
linities in the concept of a general ‘masculine hegemony’, however, this is 
conceptually cleared, as referring to practices. That is, one may employ 
the term as descriptive, in a broad sense, of the general terrain one is re-
ferring to, without falling into the shorthand that Hearn rightly deplores, 
or into essentialisms that distort or render reductive specific analyses, in 
terms of the specific configurations of local hegemonic masculinities. It 
follows from this that different masculine hegemonies may obtain in dif-
ferent times and places, themselves constituted by, and constituting, dif-
ferent hegemonic masculinities within them; but that such configurations 
need not and do not always obtain – or that, even when they do, they 
may be inflected differently in each case – is no refutation of the primary 
analytical potential of the proposition, patriarchy as masculine hegemo-
ny.19 
The Gramscian understanding of hegemony that I invoke here, as in-
volving both force and consent, needs to be clarified further. Gramsci’s 
own use of the term is broad but largely as descriptive of the means by 
which the ruling classes in democratic states acquire and maintain what he 
calls ‘ethical-political’ control – through a combination of force and con-
sent – over the rest of ‘civil society’, and thereby over the means of pro-
duction. The possible objection that using hegemony in gender definitive 
terms, as I am, is then tantamount to treating it as a class category, is 
nevertheless misconceived: Gramsci repeatedly refers to the process of 
the formation of hegemony, firstly, as a ‘molecular’ one, operating even 
in the smallest economic units (the individual, the family), irrespective of 
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class; secondly, as an individual process of internalisation of laws as 
‘principles of moral conduct’, by which ‘necessity has already become 
freedom’; and thirdly, as a general principle evident in any society: ‘in any 
given society, nobody is disorganised and without a party, provided that 
one takes organisation and party in a broad and not a formal sense’.20 As 
Raymond Williams notes, the concept of hegemony ‘sees the relations of 
domination and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, 
as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living – not only of polit-
ical and economic activity, nor only of manifest social activity, but of the 
whole substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a depth that 
the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific eco-
nomic, political, and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures 
and limits of simple experience and common sense.’ (1977: 110) Given 
this, it is clear that what passes for ‘consent’ in hegemonies is not actually 
consensual, but rather the outcome of a substantially internalised and 
encouraged perception of ‘compelling’ circumstances – ranging from 
economic dependencies, to institutional positionings, to conventional 
and customary expectations, to legal prescriptions and proscriptions – 
within which ‘necessity becomes freedom’, and the challenging of which 
implicitly entails (or threatens to entail) a reactive and punitive violence.21 
It is also clear then that all hegemonies are premised on the possibility – 
if not the actual practice – of violence. 
Given such an understanding, it is possible to see how patriarchal sys-
tems generate masculinities. In any given condition of masculine hegem-
ony, it may be argued that hegemonic masculinities are generated - and 
frequently in opposition to each other - as very much a part of the dy-
namic of maintaining that pervasive hegemony of gender relations: at no 
point can this generative process cease, for that would permit other 
forms of gender relations to gain prominence, if not dominance. As new 
forms of power emerge, it produces new types of hegemonic masculini-
ties to employ these forms, relegating the existing hegemonic types to 
subordinate forms of masculinity, and simultaneously producing hege-
monic femininities that correspond to, and are compatible with, these 
different masculinities. It is possible to see how, as new discourses, 
forms and practices of material power emerge, and are deployed in chal-
lenging existing masculine hegemonies, they are accommodated into an 
already changing socius, the hegemonic equations of which are already in 
transformation, in the generation of new kinds and forms of masculini-
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ties to suit the new discourses and practices of power. Certainly this 
helps explain for instance, the continued masculinisation of political 
power on the one hand, and of technological power on the other, despite 
the inroads made into both by women and women's movements interna-
tionally. 
2.7 Intersectionalities and Masculine Hegemony 
Some of the above arguments may be recognised as being ‘intersection-
al’, and in the following section, I will engage briefly with this term and 
the location of ‘masculine hegemony’ as a concept in relation to the the-
oretical and analytical discourse around it.  
One of the enduring conundrums of gender theorising in general, and 
of theorising men and masculinity in particular, has been the problem of 
articulating gender with other categories of social analysis like class, 
caste, race, ethnicity, sexuality, etc. This has arisen – and continues – 
primarily because social theorists and analysts have tended to present 
one or the other of these categories as having primacy. It is important to 
note that these categories of social analysis are all founded on – or at 
least cognisant of – the political positions that they signify and/or repre-
sent – which is also why there is an almost inexorable impulse towards 
establishing theoretical primacy, as a means to establishing political pri-
macy, and through that, presumably, primacy of political ac-
tion/programme. This is complicated by the fact that subject-positions 
signified and/or invoked, directly or indirectly, by these categories, have, 
in very many instances, not only found themselves inimical to each oth-
er, but have been actively oppositional. Without going into the details of 
the extensive debates on these issues here, it is possible to note that they 
have tended to take the following contours. Firstly, radical or extremist 
positions that either deny or dismiss the relevance of the other categories 
– thus for instance, certain orthodox schools of Marxist thought that 
find class to be the sole category of meaningful social analysis; or ver-
sions of radical feminism that tend to emphasise the gender/sex distinc-
tion as the primary form within which oppression and/or exploitation 
occur; or, in the Indian case, caste-based organisations/parties that dis-
miss or deny the validity of either class or gender as equally significant 
forms of political mobilisation. Secondly, versions of ‘dual systems’ theo-
risations, that focus primarily on class and gender, and attempt to articu-
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late them as addressing two related but distinct forms of oppression and 
exploitation – capitalism and patriarchy, respectively. These have also 
subsequently morphed into more complex theorisations that have at-
tempted to articulate these categories – class and gender – with others 
like race, ethnicity, sexuality, etc. They vary in their emphases, however, 
indicating particular politico-ideological predilections in stressing the 
primacy of one (or more) of these social categories over others, even as 
they acknowledge the significance of the latter. Alternative approaches 
along these lines emphasise the importance of context, rather than politi-
co-ideological predilections, in determining primacy: thus, race may 
trump gender and class in some situations, while class would be para-
mount in others – and so on. (It need hardly be pointed out that the lat-
ter, in privileging context, already relinquish any claims to generalisation 
into theory. I will discuss this position in greater detail a little later.) The 
most recent trend in this direction has been ‘intersectionality’, a term 
coined by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) to conceptualise the intersecting 
power relations between social categories that obtained in ‘concrete’ situ-
ations.22 Thirdly, broadly deconstructionist theorisations that (somewhat 
paradoxically) question the significance of any attempt to generalise into 
theory, on the basis of social categories that are seen to be inherently un-
stable to begin with. This group has something in common with the se-
cond, insofar as they too return ultimately to a focus on the specific con-
text – with the crucial difference that they do so with the explicit 
understanding that the context can only serve as the moment of political 
intervention, not of analysis, nor, consequently, of the particular validity 
of any one category over another. The particular category that may form 
the basis for a particular political intervention is seen as merely contin-
gent to the given situation, rather than as the basis of a theory, even if it 
is only of that particular situation. 
None of these approaches to political theorisation is entirely satisfac-
tory, even to those who theorise from within them, if only because they 
would be aware of other theoretical forms and persuasions outside of 
their own, that reject – or at least do not claim – their approach. If the 
aim of theory – especially political theory – is to achieve maximum pos-
sible and acceptable generalisation, then all of these approaches have al-
ready failed to do so. The one approach that comes closest to being gen-
erally acceptable – the alternative in the second approach noted above – 
does so, paradoxically, precisely because of its unwillingness to general-
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ise. This general insufficiency in theorisation is particularly telling in the-
orising men and masculinity because of the patent dissonance between 
an empirical observation – that men tend to be more powerful, and con-
sequently more capable of practising oppression and exploitation, than 
women – and the theoretical paucity to explain it. With specific regard to 
the ‘intersectionalities’ discourse, the primary problem with the term is in 
its metaphoric baggage: ‘intersection’ – whether understood mathemati-
cally or cartographically – denotes the point or area of contact or overlap 
between two mutually exclusive entities (for instance, these may be lines 
or sets in mathematics, roads or geological features in cartography). This 
metaphoric baggage seeps into social analyses that borrow the term. The 
term is unable to invoke the more subtle, complex, layered and blurred 
engagements that obtain between social constituencies, referred to by 
say, the terms ‘class’ and ‘gender’. To speak of the intersection between 
class and gender is to treat them as inflexible, impermeable categories, 
indexing processes that are simultaneous but hermetically isolated from 
each other – but grapple with each other for analytical/political domi-
nance. The end result is inevitably analysis that becomes descriptive of 
these processes as discrete phenomena, but that is unable to articulate 
them into a theoretical coherence with generalisable import – in fact, 
specifically resisting such import.23 Thus, while the votaries of ‘intersec-
tionality’ have identified a very genuine problem, they have arguably 
been unable to address it sufficiently. While theories of hegemonic mas-
culinity and/or the hegemony of men have gone some way towards re-
dressing this dissonance, they tend, as already noted, to focus on 
men/masculinity as the locus of analysis. This inevitably leads to varia-
tions – following available varieties – that in turn lead to unstable anal-
yses and/or insufficient explanatory power. 
What I have proposed here is that the concept of masculine hegemo-
ny offers a theoretically coherent means to articulate apparently irrecon-
cilable and irreducible social categories, while maintaining their specifici-
ties. The contention here is that ‘masculine hegemony’ offers a more 
integrative approach than the intersectionalities one, precisely because it 
attempts to retain the specificities of the local/micro levels, while articu-
lating them within the larger theoretical framework of a (gendered) he-
gemony. To elaborate a little on this: it is arguable that any given society 
is organised along multiple and intersecting hierarchies of domination 
and subordination that determine the access to and exercise of power – 
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the distribution and possession of its resources and rights – within it, as 
well as the terms within which that power is (to be) exercised. Further, 
the organisation of these hierarchies may be discerned as hegemonic 
formations that favour specific social groups and/or alignments (for in-
stance: power accruing from being upper-caste/white/property-owning; 
having affiliation or belonging to specific regions/tribes/clans/religions/ 
sects/institutions/professions; superiority in age/educational level/ 
institutional position/physique/appearance; or diverse combinations of 
these – etc.). While the organisation of these hierarchies is always, in Wil-
liams’ terms, represented as ‘common sense’, and therefore possessing 
and projecting an air of unchangeability, such hegemonic conditions are 
never stable because they are essentially constituted through and by a 
continuous process of contestation between themselves and emergent 
(and residual) formations striving to become hegemonic. In fact, the rea-
son for the instability of hegemonies is precisely the potential for vio-
lence that is structurally inbuilt in this continuous process of contesta-
tion. This is not to argue that all violences are the same or even alike, 
either in form or origins. One can conceive of violences that are not 
necessarily innate to specific structural formations, but erupt more con-
tingently, as for instance with arbitrary (as opposed to race or caste-
driven) mob lynchings. However, violences that erupt in conditions al-
ready defined in hegemonic terms may be said to evolve specifically out 
of the structural imbalances of the hegemonic condition itself. But this 
perpetual instability is also a necessary component of the logic of hegemo-
ny: it is vital to the maintenance of a sense of threat to the existing heg-
emonic order, that in turn serves, on the one hand, to maintain commu-
nal unity within the specific social group/alignment benefiting from that 
order, and on the other, to maintain its exclusivity through the very pro-
cess of ‘othering’ instituted by violence. Then, the conception, articula-
tion and deployment of violence, and the possession of the ability to do 
so, together come to constitute a fundamental organising principle in the 
emergence and sustenance of any given hegemony. Violence within a 
given hegemonic condition must therefore be understood as not just an 
event or occurrence that ruptures that hegemonic condition from with-
out, but as a discursive instrument that is internal and integral to it – that 
in fact, institutes its notions of internality and externality, of identity and 
otherness. It is not just a consequence of force or enforcement, but al-
ready implicitly in play with the invocation of force. It is in this sense 
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that violence is always already framed in an ethical discourse, however 
that is articulated. (In Chapter IV in particular, I will elaborate on the 
ethical conception of violence in colonial India, through the contesting 
terms of ‘Order’ and ‘Danda’, and their significance for the shaping of 
Hindu masculine hegemony in India). Our understanding of hegemonies 
as layered by multiple and intersecting hierarchies of domination and 
subordination must then extend as obtainable far beyond its convention-
ally recognised macro manifestations – race, nation, region, religion, 
community, class – to its manifestations at the fundamental ‘cellular’ (or 
in Gramsci’s terms, ‘molecular’) level of the family and the organisation 
of sexuality. It is at this level that violence as an organising principle in 
hegemonies dovetails with another fundamental principle of orientation 
and organisation: gender. 
In a careful analysis of the organisation of sexuality, Karen Gabriel 
has argued that  
The family as a principal ideological apparatus of the state that produces 
and reproduces gender, is backed by the state, informal power, or force, is 
often notionally coextensive with the home, is experienced variably as 
dangerous, reassuring, and imprisoning, is a locus of power and can be 
deeply disempowering.[…] It is the site where a number of institutions 
and their effects overlap minutely, where the female subject may be both 
the site for and the agent of control. (2010: 124) 
The family thus functions not in ‘interior’ isolation from the ‘exterior’ 
organisation of a given hegemonic formation, but as foundational to its 
dynamics of internality and externality. But the family is also the founda-
tional level of (at least) the sexual reproduction of a given hegemonic 
formation, and through that, of the significations of gender that accrue 
to and around sexuality.24 The hierarchies that ‘internally’ constitute the 
cellular-level hegemonic formation that is understood as the family thus, 
in specifically gendered terms, reproduce and are reproductions of the 
dynamic of the hegemony that it is embedded in. This in turn is borne 
outward, reflexively gendering the distributions and allocations of power 
and resources that shape and define the eventually constellated hege-
monic condition that prevails in the given society. If we now recall that 
the principle of organisation by which this condition is shaped is, in the 
final analysis, the control over the conception and deployment of vio-
lence, then it is clear that there is an intimate relation between the pro-
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cess of gendering – both within and without the family – and the phe-
nomenon of violence, in hegemonic conditions. This relation possesses a 
two way dynamic. Illustratively, education into gender is almost invaria-
bly a process of disciplining – ‘don’t cry like a girl!’ or ‘take it like a man!’ 
or ‘don’t be a tomboy!’ or ‘sit with your legs together!’ – that prescribes, 
proscribes, exhorts, threatens, and in general enforces specific life-patterns 
(conduct, dispositions, values, careers, etc) believed to be gender-
appropriate. But conversely, and perhaps more significantly, the violence 
inherent to the process of disciplining is itself gendered, so that control 
(or the lack of it) over the conception and deployment of violence is 
marked as either masculine or feminine. Within the multi-layered hege-
monic formations that constitute the given hegemonic condition, it is 
true that these prescriptions and exhortations are also diversely marked 
by other signs – of race, class, age, region, religion, etc. However, these 
are all inflected by the foundational discourse of gender, and their rela-
tions to violence are therefore inevitably also gendered.25 Additionally, it 
is now clear that, to the extent that – as argued earlier – all violence is 
framed in an ethical discourse, the gendered hegemonic condition is ar-
guably itself the (implicit or explicit) site of that ethical discourse, which 
means firstly, that any hegemonic condition necessarily contains an ethi-
cal framework that can, whenever necessary, justify violence; and sec-
ondly, that such an ethical frame (or frames) is itself coded in gendered 
terms. (Illustratively, the tacit acceptance of violence against women – 
whether sexual26 or otherwise, within marriage or outside – is based on 
ideas of appropriate femininity that are strongly coded in moral terms.) It 
is through this series of linkages between violence, hegemony and the 
ethical discourse that sustains it, that nationalism – particularly religious 
nationalism – is shaped as a gendered hegemonic discourse. This process 
is what this thesis will attempt to uncover and elaborate on, through the 
specific case of Hindu nationalism.  
It can now be argued, specifically, that the relation of violence to gen-
der – in terms of both, the coercive violence involved in the process of 
gendering, and in the allocation of the control over violence along the 
axis of masculinity-femininity – then defines the extent to which a given 
hegemony is masculine or feminine. However, historically, rarely, if ever, 
in any known hegemonic condition, has the control over the conception 
and exercise of violence been considered feminine. Even in situations 
where such control is exercised by women, it is not in itself a definitive 
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attribute of femininity, and has rarely ever been so.27 In other words, the 
dominant form of hegemony that has historically and geographically 
prevailed is masculine hegemony. It is in this sense that patriarchy is to 
be understood as masculine hegemony. It follows from this that any giv-
en condition of masculine hegemony may be composed and constituted 
of a variety of masculine hegemonies, co-relating in a complex play of 
alignments and contestations, the conjuncture of which comes to define 
the characteristics and dispositions of the given masculine hegemony, or 
patriarchy. Such an understanding of patriarchy would retain the original 
sense of systemic oppression and exploitation – with its attendant justifica-
tions of gendered violence(s) – while permitting the unravelling of nu-
ances and characteristics specific to individual patriarchal formations.  
2.8 Hindutva Masculinities 
In the above discussion I have tried to outline some of the limitations of 
conventional masculinity studies. I have argued for the need to open out 
the terrain towards a more inclusive and nuanced understanding of mas-
culinity, by tracing the theoretical bases for the relations between mascu-
linity and its contexts of generation and operation. I have argued that 
these relations may be best understood through a theoretical and histori-
cal understanding of patriarchy as masculine hegemony. Here and in the 
chapters that follow, I propose that, in the specific historical context of 
Hindutva, the masculinities generated by Hindutva have their roots in 
extensive transformations in the political economy of patriarchy in India 
from pre-independence times to the present. I will attempt to show that, 
given the different forms that patriarchy takes across caste and regional 
differences (Sangari, 1995), it is not possible or necessary to define a 
hegemonic Indian (or Hindu) masculinity. Rather, by focussing on the 
specific ways in which different masculinities are privileged at different 
moments in history and in different patriarchies, through the analysis of 
transformations in the terms of relations between men and women, mas-
culinity and femininity, I propose that the rise of Hindutva owes sub-
stantially to the consolidations of such privilege and therefore of patriar-
chy in general; in this sense, Hindutva may be understood as a prime 
discourse and political practice in the conservation and consolidation of 
masculine power, albeit articulated differentially (see also Vijayan 2004). 
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The relation between masculinity and nationalism is then about the 
politicisation of gender – about the ways in which politics works itself 
into gender constructions (for instance in the repeated distinctions 
drawn between a putative homogeneous ‘Hindu masculinity’ and other 
masculinities) and about the ways in which politics is written and prac-
tised in gendered terms (for instance in the understanding of individual 
communities as more or less masculine and/or feminine). In this sense, 
to say gender is political is to mean it also quite literally, as not just refer-
ring to gender politics (or the politics of the relations between the gen-
ders at a given historical moment), but to the meanings of gender in and 
for a specific political moment – in this case the rise of the Hindu right.  
What then are the historical forces and factors specific to the for-
mation of Hindutva masculinities and femininities? Conversely, what 
forms of masculinity and femininity are drawn upon by the ideological 
constellation referred to as Hindutva? In posing these questions, we take 
cognisance of a twofold agenda: one, the consolidation of a pan-Indian 
Hindu community, transcending the boundaries of caste, class, region, 
ethnicity, gender and in some versions of Hindutva, religion as well, into 
a singular nation; two, the translation of this consolidation into a political 
agenda that means control of the state, and in most versions of Hindut-
va, transforming the state itself.  
The first has defined the nation through the implementation of, or 
call to implement, Golwalkar’s famous criteria for who is a Hindu: ad-
herence to the Matrubhumi (motherland), Dharmabhumi (land of one’s 
faith), Karmabhumi (land of one’s dutiful actions), Punyabhumi (holy land) 
and Mokshabhumi (land of one’s salvation) (Golwalkar, 1996 [1966]: 81. 
The translations of the terms are mine.) It has also been influentially 
rendered as the Pitrubhumi (fatherland)28 by V D Savarkar. These may be 
understood to constitute the ‘ethical’ framework of Hindu nationalism, 
and may be separated into two sets: terms of origin (Matru- and Pitrub-
humi) and terms of attributes, attitudes and actions (Dharma-, Karma-, 
Punya- and Mokshabhumi). The separability, though not water-tight, 
suggests that belonging to or claiming the nation is as much a matter of 
volition as it is of birth. This brings it subtly but tensely into political 
alignment with the demands of a secular constitution, which upholds the 
right of the individual to choose his/her national identity (albeit in quali-
fied terms, witness the problem of Kashmir and other secessionist pro-
grams). The tension arises when the second set of terms is not either 
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acknowledged or in consonance with the first set, i.e., when the impera-
tives of the first are not implicitly or explicitly followed in the forms of 
the second. The organisation of the spaces of the nation in these terms is 
then less a matter of the ‘secular’ distinction of the ‘public’ and the ‘pri-
vate’, than of the distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ spaces. Spe-
cifically, the space of the nation turns profane when the attributes, atti-
tudes and actions encapsulated in the second set of terms imply and 
reflect secular rather than sacred or originary meanings. The term ‘na-
tion’ itself then loses its ‘sacred’ meanings, opening the terrain into a 
fractious debate (that is fought physically and ideologically) on the crite-
ria (whether of origin or action) for a national identity.  
Of immediate significance for us is the employment of certain under-
standings of masculinity and femininity in the outlining of these criteria, 
this ideology. The terms of origin are linked specifically to the intimate 
notions of maternity and paternity; they express a call to draw sustenance 
from the maternal even as they institute the obligation to submit to her, 
to preserve and defend her; simultaneously, they invoke the notion of a 
patrimony with the conception of the pitrubhumi, the land of the fathers, 
and thus issue a right of inheritance that in its essence cannot be voli-
tionally claimed. Who may be excluded and who included in the Hindu 
community thus remains flexible, yet with the potential to turn rigid. It is 
on this basis then that individual communities may at different times be 
either considered part of or outside of the Hindu nation – whether Mus-
lim, Christian or Sikh. The shifting registers at those moments also index 
shifts in the gendering of the community under consideration: when in-
imical to the matrubhumi, the community is represented as marauding, 
predatorily and faithlessly masculine – as often the case with Muslim 
communities. Similarly, when the community is represented as part of 
the matrubhumi, yet alien to the pitrubhumi, a condition most often associ-
ated with Christians, the community itself is feminised as weak and seek-
ing shelter. Obviously, these are not fixed terms, and shift with the na-
ture of historical events and incidents: missionary Christians may just as 
easily be imaged as predatorily masculine, in converting lower caste 
communities to Christianity. The point is that at an ideological and dis-
cursive level, the highly gendered nature of the framework permits such 
shifts in register to occur without much ideological damage to mainframe 
Hindutva. 
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This has important consequences for the second agenda, of claiming 
and transforming state power. While the first works primarily at the pos-
sibility of the forging (pun not intended) of a Hindu nation, the second 
must acknowledge the terms in which political power is sought, compet-
ed for, gained or shared, and maintained. That is, it must acknowledge if 
not always function within the statutory and constitutional constraints 
imposed upon the formation of ideologies of community, by a multi-
party electoral process in a broadly liberal-democratic framework of poli-
tics. Within such a framework, the path to political power is the path of 
the accretion of numbers; but it also demands strategies of compromise 
and settlement when outright numerical victory is unavailing. Important-
ly, the one strategy must not be seen to ideologically betray the other, the 
semiotic representations of ideological program and agenda must remain 
consistent with elected representatives and their practises (and vice ver-
sa). In this terrain, shifting gendered representations of the different 
strategies – of numbers and of compromise – serve to maintain them 
both simultaneously. Because they are both strategies for the accrual and 
maintenance of power, however, they are both masculinised, albeit 
through the deployment of different hegemonic masculinities. This is 
instantiated starkly in the repeated references in public media to the ‘two 
faces’ of Hindu nationalism in India being represented by the ‘moderate’ 
A B Vajpayee (the former Prime Minister of India) and the ‘extremist’ L 
K Advani (the former Deputy Prime Minister), both leaders of the Bha-
ratiya Janata Party, and both with strong roots in the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh. One could add to this the kind of lumpen mascu-
linist iconicity of the Shiv Sena chief, Bal Thackeray, the shrill gender-
crossing masculinity of the Uma Bharati (a former woman leader of the 
BJP), the organised street-violence masculinity of Narendra Modi (BJP 
member and Chief Minister of Gujarat during the 2002 genocide of 
Muslims in that state) and the piously poisonous and vituperative mascu-
linity of Praveen Togadia (head of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad), among 
several others.29 
There is however, a third dimension to the inter-relation of gender 
and nationalism, and especially so in the case of Hindutva. Apart from 
the two programmatic aspects of mainframe Hindutva outlined above, 
which correspond to the gendering of politics we had noted earlier, there 
is the matter of the politicisation of the processes of gendering undertak-
en by Hindutva, in which it intervenes in existing forms of gendering to 
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render them gender-with-a-political-purpose. Recent research has shown 
how women in particular become targets of such interventionist practic-
es, translating personal desires for alternatives to their immediate and 
conservative lifestyles as middle class housewives into social and eco-
nomic imperatives to be more visible and politically active, and those in 
turn into an ideological cause – the gendered structural and physical re-
production of the Hindu nation (Manisha Sethi 2002, Tanika Sarkar 
1998, Butalia and Sarkar (eds.) 1995). Thus an activist femininity is pro-
moted without necessarily challenging existing gender roles or patriarchal 
relations. My own fieldwork with the RSS conducted in Cochin in 2000 
revealed an adaptation of a different social and political situation from 
the north, to the demands of promoting Hindutva in the south, and spe-
cifically in Kerala. The much larger numbers of working women meant a 
greater sharing of household duties and responsibilities between men 
and women – a situation adapted to by the local RSS networks by simply 
promoting the idea of such sharing as a responsibly masculine attribute 
amongst the younger generation of men, while deploying the local VHP 
to train young employed single women along with employed and non-
employed housewives in the necessities of housekeeping, the inculcation 
of ‘cultural values’ in children, and the maintenance of conjugal relations, 
in the strictest of patriarchal paradigms. This in turn is hitched to the 
idea of a modernising nation that demands such changing gender roles, 
thereby attracting younger generations of Hindus with the idea that Hin-
dutva organisations in essence are more authentically modern than any 
tendencies towards westernisation, because they retain the gender values 
of the past by adapting them to and through the processes of social 
change. And this is promoted across caste differentials, suggesting the 
ways in which caste distinctions – while important in determining marital 
alliances especially – are also forced into secondary consideration, in the 
face of a uniformity of gender practices that substantially define the 
Hindu community for Hindutva. 
2.9 Conclusion 
It must go without the need for elaboration here that the three kinds of 
gender relations obtained here to nationalism are not either discrete or 
disparate, but work in tandem and through each other. Gender trans-
formations are fundamental to the agendas of Hindu nationalism; but 
what is obvious is that existing gender relations continue to determine 
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the intent, plan and implementation of the strategies of transformation. 
Existing patriarchal formations constitute a masculine hegemony that 
ceaselessly adapts to historical and political changes by redefining mascu-
linity and femininity to suit regional and political demands, while retain-
ing the essentially masculinist tilt of the hegemony itself. The Hindu na-
tion may be a distant reality just yet; but the attempts to formulate it in 
an inflexible binary code of masculinity and femininity continue cease-
lessly. In the following chapter, I will begin the exploration of the rela-
tions between Hindu nationalism and patriarchy that forms the sub-
stance of this thesis, and I will begin this specifically with an exploration 
and analysis of the term ‘Hindu’. 
Notes 
 
1 Gill and Grint note that the use of this term in social scientific writing originat-
ed with Weber, 'who used it to refer to a particular form of household organiza-
tion in which the father is dominant.' (1995: 14) The significance of this as meta-
phor for other and different social organisation lies primarily in its association of 
masculinity with power – a point that we will return to. 
2 See for instance Nira Yuval-Davis (1997: 7).  
3 The second analogy is perhaps more extensively structurally accurate than can 
be covered in this chapter, but briefly, one could think of pornography as very 
often being the scaled-down, laboratory-level, graphic representation of the struc-
tures of patriarchy. 
4 To avoid the clumsiness of this construction, I will in the course of this chapter 
use ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ as short hand for general references to multiple 
masculinities and femininities, and will specify singular usage wherever relevant in 
the text. 
5 Understood here – until we can elaborate it more specifically and analytically 
later – as used descriptively, and without conceptual prejudice. 
6 It is revealing that the title of the book that heralded this new field already indi-
cates the equation of men’s studies with the study of masculinities. 
7 Connell attempts to negotiate this particular problem by introducing the notion 
of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as invoking structural and historical factors. But the 
problem does not go away as long as this continues to refer to men or their prac-
tices as forms of masculinities, however classified. 
8 It may seem here that I am conflating the men’s movement with masculinity 
studies, thereby ignoring the possibility that no strand of the latter would assume 
an anti-feminist stand. But it is important to remember that the theoretical and 
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ideological bases for the coming together of men on antifeminist issues would 
necessarily emerge only from debates that would constitute some form of ‘mas-
culinity studies’. It further reinforces the point I wish to make here: that there are 
theoretical and ideological weaknesses in masculinity studies that render it vulner-
able to appropriation by such patriarchal tendencies. 
9 Connell (1996) identifies four basic forms of masculinity politics: Masculinity 
Therapy; the Gun Lobby Masculinity; Gay Liberation; and Exit or Transforma-
tive Politics. 
10 But see also the work of Franz Fanon, Gandhi, Vivekananda, Thionga wa 
Ngugi for the employment of gender as a trope in the construction of colonial 
and postcolonial nationalist discourses and practices. Needless to add, the critique 
of masculinity studies outlined above may be applied to Enloe’s statement here as 
well: that is, the understanding of ‘masculinized’ here is evidently as an implicit 
substitute for ‘specifically male relations to power in a patriarchal society’.  
11 John MacInnes (1998) offers a powerful argument for a re-examination of the 
explanatory power of gender as a category. He argues that the term is the product 
of the transition from feudal patriarchy to capitalism, and the consequent need to 
justify the continuation of male-biased relations of production and of the sex-
based organization of labour, in a polity that now espouses, in principle, the 
equality of sexes and privileges the rights of the individual. ‘Gender’, he argues, 
and the related terms of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, offered social and political 
theorists a way to retain sex-based distinctions, while re-inventing them as socially 
and culturally constructed. 
While this may be true, the point of course is not to seek explanations for the 
biases of patriarchy in descriptions of the gender system itself, but to use the 
terms of gender as analytical categories with referential roots in the natural and 
the socially constructed worlds – to deploy gender as a useful category of histori-
cal analysis, in the words of Joan Scott (1996). 
12 See Karen Gabriel (2010) for a thorough account of the formation of genders 
in a sexual economy.  
13 MacInnes (1998) suggests contrarily that the terms are not rooted in the body, 
but are assigned to the male and female body respectively on the basis of the sex-
ual division of labour, i.e. that there is no logical reason why ‘masculinity’ for in-
stance, and all its significations need not be ascribed to women. Again, the point 
is not the logical connection (or lack of it) between the body and its gender, but 
the historically specifiable connections that in fact demand that they be examined 
in their totality. 
14 One problem with cultural-constructionist theories of gender is obvious and 
immediately applicable: they assume - or consciously posit - that gender identities 
are primary identities, definitive in fundamental ways of individual identities - of 
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what it means to be a specific individual. Or, to put it differently, cultural-
constructionist theories of gender frequently suggest - if not openly state - that 
the cultural construction of identities is always and everywhere primarily, funda-
mentally gendered. To argue, in this instance, for the concept of masculine he-
gemony, is not the same as arguing for gender construction: masculine hegemony 
is only partially a matter of individual identities, and more a matter of the gender-
ing of a power distribution - literally, a hegemony. Also, if one takes into account 
other factors that determine identity - race, class, caste, religion, language, tribe - 
it becomes less tenable to maintain the primacy of gender in the construction of 
identity. This is amply demonstrated in the way women Hindutvavadis place their 
identities as Hindus above their identities as women; see for instance T. Sarkar’s 
‘Women, Nation and Community’ in Jeffery and Basu (1999). While it is not pos-
sible here to examine the full theoretical implications of the negotiations of gen-
der - as an issue of primary determinant - with these other factors, this project is, 
to some extent, an attempt at precisely such an examination. 
15 See Jim McKay (1993), for a similar but un-theorised usage of this term, but 
also a very illuminating account of how masculine hegemony operates and func-
tions in practice – in this case in the world of Australian sports. 
16 Walby’s own cautions about its usage might serve as a useful starting point for 
a possible re-deployment of this concept: she proposes the analysis of gender 
along six separate structures - household production, employment, the state, vio-
lence, sexuality and culture - articulated in different ways, ‘so creating different 
forms of patriarchy.’ She identifies the private and the public as two main forms 
of these.(1996: 243) This, while nuancing the problematic, does not as yet with-
stand the argument put forward by Nira Yuval-Davis, among others, that patriar-
chy ‘is still much too crude an analytical instrument’ because it ‘does not al-
low...for the fact that in most societies some women have power at least over 
some men as well as other women. Nor does it take into account the fact that in 
concrete situations women’s oppression is intermeshed in and articulated by oth-
er forms of social oppression and social division.’ Nira Yuval-Davis (1997: 7). 
Joan Scott pushes this argument further, suggesting that theories of patriarchy, 
because they base their arguments of male domination on physical differences 
between the sexes, assume ‘a consistent or inherent meaning for the human body 
- outside social or cultural construction - and thus the ahistoricity of gender itself. 
History becomes, in a sense, epiphenomenal, providing endless variations on the 
unchanging theme of a fixed gender inequality.’ (1996: 159) I have attempted to 
deal generally with some of these objections above, and will deal specifically with 
Scott’s objections in some detail later; but for reasons of space, like the theorisa-
tion of hegemony as a gender-definitive category - to which it is evidently related 
- this too will have to wait for a fuller elaboration. 
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17 R. W. Connell notes how, in the re-examination of history, and in the face of 
feminist arguments that mainstream history-writing was already masculinist, the 
‘central theme of a new men’s history...could only [emphasis added] be what was 
missing from the non-gendered history of men - the idea of masculinity.’ (1995: 
28). It must be noted that there are some exceptions to this tendency: R. W. 
Connell’s definitive work cited above is one such. Connell also cites - as excep-
tions again - Jeff Hearn’s The Gender of Oppression: Men, Masculinity, and the Critique 
of Marxism (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987) and Victor Seidler’s Rediscovering Masculin-
ity: Reason Language and Sexuality (London: Routledge, 1989), as work progressing 
in this direction. 
18 In the argument that follows, I will rely heavily on the theoretical value and 
weight of the Gramscian concept of hegemony, so a brief definitive note at this 
point would be in order: the matter is put succinctly by Raymond Williams: he-
gemony ‘is not limited to matters of direct political control but seeks to describe a 
more general predominance which includes, as one of its key features, a particular 
way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships.’ This includes the 
perceptions of ‘not just intellectual but political facts, expressed over a range 
from institutions to relationships and consciousness.... [I]t is seen to depend for 
its hold not only on its expression of the interests of a ruling class but also on its 
acceptance as “normal reality” or “common-sense” by those in practice subordi-
nated to it.... Thus an emphasis on hegemony and the hegemonic has come to 
include cultural as well as political and economic factors.’ (1983: 145). I will elab-
orate further on the Gramscian understanding of hegemony shortly. 
19 For a different, very thoughtful and useful theorising of patriarchy, see Walby 
(1990, 1995). My main point of departure from Walby's analysis is in the im-
portance I give to changing conceptions of masculinity as changes in the subjec-
tive engagements with patriarchies, and the effects these have on the hegemonic 
operationalising of patriarchies. For all the complexity of Walby's analysis, she 
tends to theorise patriarchy as an external, objective system - the weakness of 
most theories of patriarchy.  
20 See for instance, his ‘Americanism and Fordism’ and ‘State and Civil Society’ in 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1996). In other words, it is clear that Gramsci 
himself saw the process as applicable to the relations that obtain between any 
given set of groups, not necessarily in class terms, even if he himself did use it 
mostly in the analysis of class relations. 
21 Such a conception has close affiliations with the Althusserian notion of ideo-
logical interpellation and the subject’s obedience that it implicitly entails. This 
however is not the space to elaborate on that. 
22 I am drawing here on the distinction between the concrete and the real pro-
posed by Antonio Negri (2003) 
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23 See for instance Yuval-Davis’ (2006) attempt to unravel some of the tangled 
theoretical arguments and positions in the intersectionalities debate. 
24 This is not the space to elaborate on the relations between gender, sex and sex-
uality; but it is necessary to clarify that I follow the now-accepted distinction be-
tween gender and sex as respectively indexing socially constructed and biological 
differences. Sexuality is understood as the realm of the organisation of sexual 
reproduction as well as of erotic pleasure, which thereby invokes and regenerates 
processes of gendering. For detailed discussions of these issues, see Foucault 
(1978), Snitow (1983), Gabriel (2010). 
25 Classic examples of this are the feminisation of the ‘othered’ and coloured rac-
es during the violence of colonisation (see Ballhatchet, 1980; Hyam 1990; Sinha 
1995; McClintock, 1996) and the gendering of communities during communal 
violence (Sarkar and Butalia 1996, Vijayan 2004). 
26 In the Indian case, till recently, rape was almost impossible to prove in court: 
the onus of proving rape rested with the victims, with trials often degenerating 
into character assassination and implications of moral looseness on the part of 
the victim, thereby implicitly justifying the rape itself. 
27 I am aware of only the myth of the Amazons, wherein the exercise of violence 
is a specifically feminine attribute. There is the more problematic instance of 
women (a mother-in-law) organising and wreaking violence on other women (a 
daughter-in-law) as in the case of dowry death, in which such women have been 
understood as patriarchal and as agents of patriarchy, drawing attention to the 
need to identity patriarchy as systemic rather than as arbitrarily resident within 
specific individuals. 
28 "A Hindu is one who acknowledges Hindustan as his fatherland (pitrubhumi) 
as well as his holy land (punyabhumi). Whether he or she is a devotee of sanatan 
dharma is unimportant. Anyone who is or whose ancestor was Hindu in undivid-
ed India — including someone who was a Hindu but was converted to Islam or 
Christianity — is also welcome back to the Hindu fold provided he accepts India 
as his fatherland-cum-holyland." V. D. Savarkar, 1989 [1923]. 
29 A catalogue of the kinds of Hindutva masculinities on display in the public and 
political domain would be an interesting exercise, but possibly inexhaustible and 
in any case beyond the scope of this chapter. The point here is to note how they 
are generated in response to diverse political situations and demands. 
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3 The Emergence of the Hindu Right - I 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Any discussion of the emergence of Hindu nationalism – as idea, theory, 
programme, politics, identity – would do well to begin by examining the 
analytical, conceptual and historical distinctions between the terms ‘Hin-
du’, ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Hindutva’. Each of these is to varying degrees and 
in various ways associated with and invoked by the followers and practi-
tioners of Hindu nationalism, and often interchangeably. Leaving aside 
for the moment the question of the conceptual validity of such associa-
tion, invocation and inter-changeability, it must be noted immediately 
that these moves (of association, invocation and interchange) serve the 
important ideological purpose of reinforcing the claims of Hindu nation-
alism – to religious sanction, representative-ness, and majoritarian identi-
ty. The manners and methods adopted by Hindu nationalism in estab-
lishing these claims remain concerns that run through the thesis. Here, 
they will be addressed specifically through a historical examination of the 
rise of the Hindu right, and more specifically, in terms of the emergence 
of the identity ‘Hindu’.  
3.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this chapter are: 
1. To explore the historical origins of the terms ‘Hindu’, ‘Hinduism’ 
and ‘Hindutva’. 
2. To identify and trace the forces that acted on their specific trajecto-
ries of evolution. 
3. To examine the dynamics of their relations with each other, and the 
ways in which they invoke or exclude each other. 
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3.3 Conceptual Issues 
The term ‘Hindutva’ is of later coinage than either ‘Hindu’ or ‘Hindu-
ism’, so it is useful to begin with an exploration of the latter two terms, 
individually and in their relation to each other. Both terms have been 
ferociously debated, in terms of their historical origins, range and scope 
of applicability, varieties and versions, constituencies, and political deriv-
atives.1 Two broad positions may be identified: that of the social con-
structionists, who maintain that Hinduism is essentially a colonial con-
struct; and that of the indigenists, who argue for the presence of 
Hinduism, if not by name then by practice, as far back as the Vedic peri-
od (anywhere between the first and twelfth centuries BC). Similar battle 
lines are drawn on the term ‘Hindu’: the former group, while acknowl-
edging its use prior to the colonial period, insist that its definitiveness as 
an identity emerged against a Muslim identity, forged by British divide 
and rule policies; while the latter maintain that a ‘Hindu’ identity is evi-
dent well before this, registering the practitioners of the religion later to 
be called ‘Hinduism’. It is not my intention here to rehearse that debate 
yet again. Rather, it is to attempt to disentangle the terms from each oth-
er, to trace their emergence in the specificity of their respective histories. 
The immediate attempt will be to show that the contrariness of the two 
positions in the debate is a result not of historical confusion or ideologi-
cal affinities (at least in the first instance), but of conceptual slippages 
that result in a tendency to derive the one term from the other, or even 
on occasion to use them interchangeably.  
The first, most obvious distinction between the two is in their regis-
ters of operation. While the first term registers a (somewhat nebulous) 
social, cultural and religious identity, the second refers to a set of (equally 
nebulous, mainly religious) practices. In general the practitioners of the 
second are referred to as and through the first. At this level of generalisa-
tion the terms are as clear as they can be, given their nebulousness; and 
in contemporary everyday usage they usually serve to establish their ob-
jects of reference with some intelligibility. The problems with these 
terms arise when a more specific applicability is sought. Even in everyday 
usages for instance, the term ‘Hindu’ may be invoked legitimately to 
identify a non-practitioner of ‘Hinduism’; conversely, many practices 
otherwise identified as belonging to ‘Hinduism’ may be observed 
amongst subjects otherwise classified as non-Hindu (Jain, Buddhist, 
Christian, Muslim, Sikh, etc), as exemplified by the pervasiveness of the 
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caste system. One kind of nebulousness in the two terms then arises spe-
cifically in and through their relation to each other. That is, slippage and 
blurring occurs in and through two related processes: in the conversion 
of a set of practices into an identity (‘Hinduism’ → ‘Hindu’), and in the 
converse process of the association of an identity with a set of practices 
(‘Hindu’ → ‘Hinduism’). The questions that arise then are, Are these 
slippages analogous to each other, perhaps even derivative of each other? 
More pertinently, what historical and ideological circumstances permit 
such slippage, and why? Most importantly, what are the implications of 
this slippage? Addressing these questions will require a closer conceptual 
and historical examination of the two terms. 
3.4 The History of ‘Hindu’ 
The Pre-Christian Era to the Tenth Century AD 
Conceptually, the term ‘Hindu’ is arguably the older of the two terms.2 
Heinrich von Stietencron argues that it was originally a Persian corrup-
tion of the original term ‘Sindhu’, for the river Indus, so named by the 
settlers around it. It was used to designate ‘the people of Hind, the Indi-
ans’, and was in use as early as the sixth century BC (von Stietencron, 
1995). It re-entered Indian languages in this corrupted form primarily as 
a geographical indicator for the peoples around or east of the Indus: 
‘Hindustan means simply “Indian land” not “the land of (the religious 
community of) the Hindus”.’ (Habib, 1997) It is important to note three 
points here. One, the sense of difference or alterity that is inscribed into 
the term ‘Hindu’ from its origins is not self-identificatory, but generated 
heterogeneously, i.e., from the perspective of the Persians. At this point, 
the term is in use primarily as a geographically specifiable difference with 
some ethnic connotations. Two, the geographical specificity of the Indus 
was important only insofar as it marked a border and an ethnic separa-
tion. Thus, other points that could constitute such a ‘border’ or locus of 
interface between peoples – namely, ports and trading centres across the 
subcontinent, but especially along the western coast – also saw the de-
ployment of this term. Three, it is clear that this ethno-geographical 
sense of the term did not possess religious connotations, applying equally 
to practitioners of Buddhism, Jainism and the loose combination of Ve-
dic-Brahmanical-Sramanical3 practices that was to evolve into what 
would later be called ‘Hinduism’.  
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Before we explore this transformation of a geographical sense into an 
ethnic and subsequently a religious identity, it must be noted that, in the 
period from the sixth century BC to the eighth century AD, the subcon-
tinental region saw the rise and fall of several large empires and dynas-
ties, including those of the Mauryas, the Guptas, the Chalukyas and the 
Cholas in the south. These empires bound the region with varying de-
grees of political unity, but were not established as specifically ‘Hindu’ 
empires, suggesting that the ‘Hindu’ identity was not as yet a politically 
formed one, even if in this period it was accruing some social distinc-
tiveness. Even subsequently, when the empires fragmented into smaller 
kingdoms and warring princedoms, economic regions ‘unified by a spe-
cific material culture’ were distinct from regions with commonalities of 
religious or doctrinal practices (to the extent that such regions existed), 
but both were non-coincident with territorial boundaries of political 
formations (Kaviraj 1997: 229). The ‘Hindu’ identity, such as it was, was 
thus not evident as a political identity demarcating a specific regional or 
demographic constituency – and this remained largely true well into the 
medieval period and under Mughal rule. To the extent that there was a 
politicisation of religious identities, it was primarily in the tussle for pow-
er between the Buddhist and the Brahmanical traditions that lasted 
through the entire period from the sixth century BC to the eighth centu-
ry AD, with the eventual triumph of the Brahmanical-Sramanical com-
bine. 
One question that emerges then, in the transformation of the term 
‘Hindu’ from a simple geographical locator into an ethno-geographic 
identity with strong religious characteristics by the eighth century AD, is 
the extent to which this was also a growing process of self-identification 
as ‘Hindu’. Such a process is implicit in arguing a transformation, where-
by earlier identities – such as they were, of caste, sect, cult, language, re-
gion, profession, etc – were presumably subsumed under the overarching 
rubric of the term ‘Hindu’, generated through an ‘outside’ gaze. Such a 
self-identification would have been possible only in the sustained pres-
ence of that external and heterogenising gaze (transported, as it were, 
from the western side of the Indus). While the sub-continental kingdoms 
and empires did receive much attention (both hostile and friendly) from 
the north and the north-west, a sustained, self-proclaimedly and insist-
ently heterogeneous presence is difficult to identify till the early medieval 
period and the establishment of the Afghan and Turkish dynasties on 
 The Emergence of the Hindu Right - I 69 
north Indian soil. Romila Thapar notes that by the third century AD, 
there were ‘quite considerable numbers of strangers in the port towns 
and trade centres of the sub-continent’, but goes on to add that ‘many of 
these people had become Indianized [sic] in habits and behaviour’ (1966: 
121). She identifies two important processes that occurred in this interac-
tion. One was the conversion to Buddhism of large numbers of the 
‘strangers’ (Greeks, Kushanas, Shakas) as they sought to be assimilated 
into Indic societies. Conversion to ‘Hinduism’ was not an easy option, 
because of the technical difficulty in establishing caste.4 The other pro-
cess was reactive, as social laws became rigid in the face of the encounter 
with the ‘strangers’, in order that caste purity could be maintained: ‘the 
theories of Manu, the patriarch who is the traditional author of the Ma-
nava Dharmashastra or Law Code, written sometime during the first two 
centuries AD, were now quoted as the authority on social laws.’ (ibid.) 
Thus, there is evidence of a distinct socio-cultural-religious discourse 
based on alterity or difference gaining in definition in this period; how-
ever, there is no evidence that it was becoming explicitly identified as 
‘Hindu’. That is, the Brahmanical-Sramanical traditions, even as they 
grew in distinction from the Buddhist and Jain traditions, were not as yet 
identified as exclusively ‘Hindu’, because the term still encompassed the 
latter two traditions, and more importantly, was still primarily ethno-
geographic in its connotations. Further, even within the Brahmanical-
Sramanical traditions, there is much evidence of contention and conflict 
between diverse sects and cults, and violence was not uncommon, par-
ticularly between the Vaishnavite, Shaivite and Shakti sects. As religious 
identities, these were more consciously defined than the larger, more 
nebulous identity known as ‘Hindu’. In sum, there is little evidence to 
suggest a strongly self-conscious and avowedly ‘Hindu’ identity prior to 
the medieval period, and certainly none to suggest it was a political one. 
However, it is important to note that notions of community as being 
defined along religious lines, were already taking shape. Uma Chakravar-
ti, in her path-breaking essay, ‘Conceptualising Brahmanical Patriarchy in 
Early India: Gender, Caste, Class and State’ (1993) has shown how, in-
strumental to this process was the formation and entrenchment of caste 
lines, based on notions of purity, particularly in the period immediately 
after the Rig-Vedic period. She shows how the safeguarding of commu-
nal purity comes to be sited on women’s bodies, and maintained through 
the control of women’s bodies and sexualities. In other words, she iden-
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tifies the fundamental mechanism through which gender and caste come 
to be central to the formation of (religious) communities in early Indian 
history, which is, through the control and regulation of women’s bodies. 
However, although her work addresses the early historical period, 
Chakravarti goes on to note that ‘[t]he structure [of Brahmanical patriar-
chy] that came into being has shaped the ideology of the upper castes 
and continues to be the underpinning of beliefs and practices even to-
day.’ (Chakravarti 1993: 579) She writes, 
… [A] preliminary analysis of Brahmanical patriarchy in early India reveals 
that the structure of social relations which shaped gender was reproduced 
by achieving the compliance of women. The compliance itself was pro-
duced through a combination of consent and coercion. (Chakravarti 1993: 
585) 
She hastens to clarify, in a footnote, that she is not arguing for a 
‘monolithic development of patriarchy’, because of evidence indicating a 
diversity of material cultures, regions and groups (Chakravarti 1993: 585). 
This is an important observation, that has direct bearing on subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. Here, however, I will confine myself to continu-
ing to trace the evolution of the term ‘Hindu’ as an identity category. 
Unity and Heterogeneity 
The issue of heterogeneity noted by Chakravarti is an important one and 
will be returned to shortly. For now it is sufficient to note that this sense 
of ‘Hindu’ – as incorporating the Buddhist, Jain, and the Brahmanical-
Sramanical traditions – had by, the third century AD, become current in 
the ports and trading centres across the northern regions of the Indian 
subcontinent. To the extent it sustained independent of regional and 
other variations, it was transmitted during and through the expansion 
and disintegration of the great pre-Mughal empires, especially during the 
Gupta period (4th – 6th c. AD), across the northern and eastern regions, 
including and beyond the Bengal region, and even beyond the northern 
borders of the Deccan kingdoms in the peninsular south. The regions 
south of the Deccan remained substantially autonomous of the northern 
incursions, even as late as during Mughal rule. Such political autonomy 
however, belies the equally substantial extent to which social, cultural 
and economic interaction, exchange and transmission took place and 
continued. Several related factors contributed to this transmission: one, 
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the permeability of land borders and the continuous, albeit incremental 
migration of populations from region to region, but mainly south and 
eastward, carrying with them the concepts and identities of the north. 
Two, the advance of trade and trade routes into every pocket of the sub-
continent, linking the different regions economically; arguably these also 
served to carry the identity of ‘Hindu’, in the contact they bore to the 
world beyond the subcontinent. Three, the spread of Sanskrit and the 
imposition of Brahmanical-Sramanical customs and values: Vedic Brah-
manism had managed to establish itself across the southern region from 
at least the third century AD, and brought with it the spread of the San-
skrit and Prakrit languages and literatures. As Romila Thapar notes,  
‘No doubt the [southern] kings felt that to conform with the Vedic pattern 
would bestow a higher status on them. The Brahmans’ claim to being in 
communication with the gods, and their supposed ability to manipulate the 
unseen powers, was more convincing to the Tamil kings than the claims of 
the indigenous priests.’ (1966: 184-5)  
These regions were also strongly influenced by the southward move-
ment of the Bhagavata and Pashupata cults (worshipping Shiva and Vishnu 
respectively) as well as by Buddhist and Jain proselytising missions from 
the north, and the latter especially established strong roots in the south. 
Together they brought with them many of the debates and controversies 
of the north, not only between the different sects, but also between these 
Brahmanical-Sramanical and the Buddhist and Jain systems.5 Four, the 
consolidation of these traditions in the south was also effectively the 
consolidation – at least among the upper castes – of a sense of an ex-
tended community that ranged over the entire subcontinent. The notion 
of a common land or terrain had existed at least notionally from the time 
of the great epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.6 Gerald Larson, 
without specifying the period, notes that,  
In ancient times the Indians [sic] themselves referred to their country as 
Bhārata-varsa (…“the land of the Sons of Bharata,” a legendary ruler), 
Jambudvīpa (the “continent of Jambu” or of the rose-apple tree), 
Āryāvartta (the “abode of the noble or excellent ones”) and Brahmāvartta 
(the “abode of the Brahmanical people”). (1997: n. 23, p. 312) 
Both epics repeatedly use these names to refer to the land and its 
peoples – but Larson’s note reveals that three of the four epithets – 
Bhārata-varsa, Āryāvartta, Brahmāvartta – register a common people as 
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much as a common land, as well as the fact that it is a strongly upper-
caste and proprietary conception of the unity of this land and its peoples.  
The Buddhist and Jain traditions did emerge as and in strong opposi-
tion to the Vedic Brahmanical order, and especially to its emphasis on 
caste, but by the end of the first millennium they were rapidly giving 
ground before the growing dominance of the latter across the subconti-
nent, even though it remained riven by sectarian tensions. Bhakti or de-
votionalist movements, stressing the accessibility of god through devo-
tion and love and without the Brahmin intermediary, rose in southern 
India in the seventh century AD, predominantly in Tamil. Strongly influ-
enced by Sramanical and Buddhist and Jain forms of worship, they re-
mained adherent to the Vedic deities but were essentially against the 
caste system and the exclusivity of Sanskrit learning, thus also challeng-
ing Brahmanical hegemony. By the fourteenth century AD they had 
spread to and across many parts of northern India, reversing the direc-
tion of the spread of Brahmanical hegemony. The import of this lies not 
just in the challenge to Brahmanical orthodoxy but also in the ways in 
which these counter-traditions sought to weave Vedic ideas and beliefs 
with regional and local ones, opening the latter to the former. So, while 
‘they differed widely depending upon time, place, social roots and types 
of worship’ (Simeon, n.d.) they nevertheless succeeded in establishing a 
pan-subcontinental populist religious pattern of worship that transmitted 
through the vernacular languages instead of Sanskrit, and that was acces-
sible to the low as well as the high castes. But to the extent that they re-
mained tied to the Vedic traditions, they remained ineffective in disman-
tling the Brahmanical (especially caste) order, which therefore could 
maintain a degree of socio-political dominance. 
The Assertion of Brahmanical Dominance 
Perhaps the most important force in ensuring this dominance was the 
teachings of Sankara (the first Sankaracharya, whose dates are traditional-
ly set at 788-820 AD), the Brahmin Vedantic scholar-theologian from 
Kerala, who established the Advaita or monistic tradition of philosophy. 
Sankara’s aim was specifically to counter the challenges to Brahmanism 
from the Buddhist-Jain movements, heterodox sects and the Bhakti tradi-
tions. He set about this by philosophically assimilating many of the ele-
ments of Sramanical heterodoxy into dominant Vedic-Brahmanical per-
suasions, arguing among other things, that the world of perception was 
 The Emergence of the Hindu Right - I 73 
illusory and true reality could be revealed only through strict asceticism; 
by turning against unnecessary rituals and rites, and insisting on simplifi-
cation of the forms of worship; and by travelling extensively across the 
subcontinent, engaging brilliantly in debates with priests, scholars and 
philosophical schools, spurring new speculative thinking and converting 
many to his version of Vedantic7 Brahmanism. But most importantly he 
set up four muths (religious centres or monasteries) in the north (Badri-
nath in Uttar Pradesh), south (at Sringeri in Karnataka), east (Dwaraka in 
Gujarat) and west (at Puri in Orissa) of the subcontinent, thereby provid-
ing for the first time an organisational and institutional concreteness as 
well as a sense of geographical extensiveness and unity to the new ortho-
doxy he was establishing. Taken together, the southward spread of Bud-
dhism-Jainism and the Brahmanical-Sramanical traditions, the northward 
spread of the Bhakti movements, and later, the consolidation of Sanka-
racharya’s Advaitic Vedantic Brahmanism, all served to establish a sense 
of an organically whole and territorially defined religious entity, the dif-
ferent elements of which were often in conflict yet remained integrated – 
largely around the issue of the acceptance of or opposition to caste, but 
also, and significantly, through a territorial integrity that had as much to 
do with the dynamics and directions of trade and migration as with idea-
tional and philosophical claims. Thus, by the turn of the millennium and 
by the time of the arrival of Islamic cultural influences in the subconti-
nent, while there still was no avowedly and definitively ‘Hindu’ religious 
identity, there was in place an integrated set of philosophico-religious positions and 
debates, socio-religious practices like caste, and politico-religious consolidations, specifi-
cally of Vedic-Brahmanical-Sanskritic dominance, across the geographical terrain of 
the subcontinent. It must be noted that Buddhism and Jainism were and 
remained distinct from this religious entity, though it ceaselessly strove 
to incorporate them. The term ‘Hindu’ does not define this religion as 
yet though. ‘Hindu’ as a term was still invoked (if at all) even in the 
twelfth century AD as inclusive of Buddhism and Jainism, indicating the 
persistence of the ethno-geographic sense.8 So, while the grounds for the 
transformation of this ethno-geographic sense into a specifically religious 
one – registering the singular (if ill-defined) religious entity described 
above – are now well in place, the transformation itself, though possibly 
associatively already underway, is yet to emerge in full historical clarity. 
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3.5 Islamic Rule and the ‘Hindu’ Identity 
Harjot Oberoi notes that ‘at one stage the word Hindu as an ethno-
geographic category came to englobe all those who lived in India, with-
out ethnic distinction. It was only under the Muslim rulers of India that 
the term began to gain a religious connotation’ (cited in Lorenzen (2003); 
emphasis added). Islamic contact with the subcontinent can be dated to 
at least the seventh century AD, through Arab trade along the western 
coast. Some Arab military incursions into the regions of Sind and Guja-
rat did occur in the eighth century AD but it was the invasions of the 
Turko-Afghan Ghaznavid state in the eleventh and twelfth centuries AD 
that signalled the beginnings of Islamic conquest in the region. Larson 
notes accurately that, for the first time since the Vedic period,  
it was not simply an invading force to be absorbed or accommodate-
ed…into the dense and rich subcontinental civilization. This time an entire 
civilization, at least as dense and rich as the subcontinental, was making an 
appearance, and the encounter and accommodation would be exceedingly 
fruitful, albeit also deeply frustrating and painful. (Larson, 1997: 104) 
Islamic rule dominated the subcontinent from the thirteenth century 
onward, with the establishment of the Delhi Sultanates (1206-1526), fol-
lowed by the Mughals (1526-1858),9 till the establishment of British rule. 
This Islamic presence was predominantly Turkish and Afghan in origin, 
although there were large numbers of Arabs and Persians too, especially 
amongst the ruling elite in the north. From the fourteenth century on-
ward, a series of Muslim Sultanates were established in the south; but 
these were established by Turkish rulers (the Bahmani dynasty, for in-
stance) as distinct from the Afghani Mughals, and declared themselves 
independent of the Mughals. It is significant that none of these regimes 
were bound by religion: the history of the period is replete with conflicts 
between the different dynasties, between imperial and regional Muslim 
powers, and with strong evidence of social hierarchies maintained be-
tween the ‘originally’ Islamic populace and ‘native’ convertees. Further, 
there are records of ‘Hindu’ generals and soldiers fighting in the Mughal 
armies, and conversely, of Muslim troops in the armies of the regional 
‘Hindu’ princes. Yet Islamic practices and the Muslim populace in gen-
eral successfully resisted being absorbed into the Vedic-Brahmanical so-
cial order, even if a gradual process of mutually tolerant cohabitation, 
assimilation and synthesis did take place. As such Islam remained defini-
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tively heterogeneous to the spectrum of practices and beliefs earlier iden-
tified as having consolidated across the subcontinent.10 The strength of 
this heterogeneity is evident in the Brahmanical-Sanskritic literature of 
this period, in which Muslims are referred to by a host of terms that all 
index them as ‘foreigners’ – tajika, turuska, mleccha, parasika, yavana, hammi-
ra, and saka. ‘Mleccha’ in particular is interesting, because it was and re-
mains  
the term used for those who were outside caste society or did not observe 
caste regulations. So scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, Muslims, Chris-
tians, all these are described as mleccha, although, both among Muslims 
and among Christians there is a specific observance of caste, nevertheless 
they are regarded as being outside caste. (Thapar, n.d.) 
Caste then was integral to the way in which Muslims were perceived. 
Given the centrality of caste to the existing religious entity, dominated as 
it was by Vedic-Brahmanical ideas and themes, and given the coherence, 
sophistication as well as the definitive religious self-identification of Is-
lam, it was perhaps inevitable that the historical heterogeneity associated 
with the term ‘Hindu’ would involute at this point. To recall the point 
made earlier, the term ‘Hindu’ had been created as signifying alterity, 
from the early Persian point of view. That condition of alterity was now 
gradually becoming articulated in specifically religious terms, and in 
those, specifically in the rigid and intractable lexicon of caste (‘mleccha’), 
from the Brahmanical point of view. By the fourteenth century refer-
ences to ‘Hindu’ as an identity claimed by, rather than being externally 
attributed to, the upper caste order, are evident in the literature.11 Most 
of the references indicate an intent to differentiate types of rulers (‘Hin-
du’ sultan, rather than ‘Musalman’/ ‘Turk’/ ‘Yavana’/etc) but the very 
act of claiming the ruler as ‘Hindu’ in opposition to the explicitly defined 
religious identity of the Muslim sultans, intensified the process of per-
ceiving difference along religious lines. Peter van der Veer also notes 
several instances in this period of state policies being actively engaged in 
forming religiously defined communities – some of Aurangzeb’s (1618-
1707) policies, the prince of Jaipur, Jai Singh II’s (1688-1743) ‘attempts 
to create a society based on Hindu ideology’, etc. (vd Veer, 1994: 32). In 
other words, the steadfastness with which Islam was perceived to resist 
being absorbed, intensified the lines of alterity, impelling an inversion of 
the gaze whereby the terms and boundaries of the earlier nebulous socio-
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religious entity began to lucubrate in and as the religion of a ‘Hindu’ 
identity. Thus, in the period roughly after the twelfth century AD the 
ethno-geographic definition of ‘Hindu’ increasingly transformed into a 
religious identity. By the time of the renowned saint-poets of the six-
teenth century – Namadev, Pipa, Kabir and Raidas – all of who sought a 
religious space independent of both Islam and the ‘Hindu’ orders, the 
identification of the term ‘Hindu’ with that larger socio-religious entity is 
almost (but not yet definitively) complete. (Lorenzen 2003) This was to 
occur later, under British rule. 
Of course, to represent the history of the term thus is in some ways a 
distortion. The social history of the period is extremely complex, and 
processes that appear clear in argumentation are not always so in fact. It 
is important to note here that these transformations in the significations 
of the term ‘Hindu’ should not be construed as suggesting that Islamic 
culture and social practices always remained alien to the subcontinent. 
The perception of Islam as heterogeneous was a necessary element in the 
gradual concretisation of a Hindu religious identity. But in actual histori-
cal fact, that perception, centred as it was on caste ideologies of inclusion 
and exclusion, originated from the small Brahmanical elite that interacted 
with the ruling Muslim elite and found insurmountable differences in 
religious doctrines and philosophy, generating a long-lasting mutual sus-
picion and hostility (Larson, 1997: 112). It is not that this elite was blind 
to the myriad ways in which Islam was taking social and cultural root in 
the subcontinent. By the sixteenth century, the synthesis of Islamic influ-
ences with existing forms of social and economic organisation as well as 
in music, architecture, language and religion were profound. In religion, 
the Sufi tradition was an offshoot of Islam with strong strains of medita-
tion and mysticism that blended well with existing ascetic persuasions; 
Bhakti traditions of the period in particular were deeply influenced by 
these Islamic practices, while Sikhism emerged specifically as an amal-
gamation of Bhakti and Islamic themes.12 The very awareness of such 
assimilation however, probably alarmed the Brahmanical elite into an 
intensified obsession with caste differentiation as a marker of religious 
purity and difference. Thapar (quoted above) noted the penetration of 
the caste system into Islamic social organisation. But the gradual replica-
tion of caste hierarchies in social practices within Indic Islam, while itself 
an index of the levels at which assimilation was taking place, was simply 
an instance of the ruling elite appropriating existing mechanisms of exer-
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cising social power, not an example of submission to the Brahmanical 
order. What is perhaps most significant in these developments is the in-
cipience of a two-fold discourse, elaborating, on the one hand, processes 
of naturalisation and nativisation whereby Islamic thought and culture 
disseminated along with Muslim populations across the subcontinent; 
and, on the other hand, a theory of heterogeneity and intractable alterity, 
that appropriated the identity ‘Hindu’ to specifically exclude the Islamic. 
The first of these was the articulation of a socio-cultural synthesis, how-
ever uneven in its distribution and content, that was occurring almost 
invisibly, unobtrusively; the second elaboration was to gain in force and 
achieve the status of a historical truth especially under British rule, when 
the identity ‘Hindu’ – not as yet explicitly religious – extended into the 
label for a religion: ‘Hinduism’.  
3.6 ‘Hindu’ Identity and the European Impact  
European presence in India of course pre-dates British imperialism by 
many centuries, going back to the Greek and Roman visitations of the 
pre-Christian era and into the first century of first millennium of the 
Christian era. The arrival of St. Thomas on Indian shores around 50 AD 
marks the beginnings of Christianity in India. The next major phase of 
European contact with the subcontinent began with the arrival of the 
Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in the late fifteenth century. Euro-
pean contact in this phase was at several levels, beginning with trade and 
missionary activity, developing into economic and military conquest and 
culminating in administrative control of the entire subcontinent by the 
nineteenth century. An important reason for this was the decline of the 
Mughal Empire, which by the eighteenth century had fragmented into a 
conglomeration of provinces that barely acknowledged the authority of 
the emperor. British rule in the subcontinent is conventionally dated to 
the Battle of Plassey in 1757, with the defeat of one such provincial po-
tentate, Nawab Siraj-ud-daula of Bengal, at the hands of Robert Clive of 
the British East India Company, leading an army of British troops and 
Indian sepoys. The British East India Company established a complex 
administrative and bureaucratic structure over the next hundred years, 
battling and defeating other European colonial projects – namely, the 
French, Dutch and Portuguese – as it grew. While supported by the 
Crown (with British troops for instance), the Company remained essen-
tially a private enterprise till the rebellion of Indian sepoys in 1857 al-
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most succeeded in returning Mughal rule to Delhi. Following the quell-
ing of the rebellion, the administration of the subcontinent was taken 
over directly by the British imperial state, which then ruled till the Parti-
tion and independence in 1947. 
What is of relevance here is that during this period, the ‘Hindu’ identi-
ty was being examined, elaborated on and recorded, first, by early Euro-
pean travellers and later, through a series of interactions between native 
intellectuals (read Brahmins) on the one hand and Christian missionaries, 
colonial administrators and Orientalist scholars on the other. It is im-
portant to note here that the second and pertinent phase of European 
perceptions and understandings of the religions of the subcontinent 
begin in the sixteenth century, in the Mughal period, when ‘Hindu’ as a 
religious identity is accreting some socio-religious senses but has not yet 
consolidated into a defined religious identity. But these indistinct accre-
tions were sufficient for early missionaries and travellers to be concerned 
more with the ‘Hindu’ identity than with Islam. In the course of colonial 
administration, it became necessary in the later half of the nineteenth 
century for the British to examine the Muslim community in almost 
equal detail; but the religion of the ‘Hindus’ remained the focus of atten-
tion even later, for most Orientalists and administrators. One reason for 
this was obviously that by the time European explorers arrived in the 
subcontinent in the sixteenth century, Europe was already familiar with 
Islam from the time of the Crusades, but had little or no acquaintance 
with the religious forms and formations of the Indian subcontinent. But 
equally important was the fact that the plethora of deities, practices, 
codes, systems of thought and intricate socio-religious organisation de-
fied easy identification and categorisation.  
The Emergence of ‘Hinduism’ 
Lorenzen (2003) argues that the early travellers and missionaries from at 
least the sixteenth century record descriptions of religious practices – 
sometimes from observation, sometimes through communication with 
native interlocutors, sometimes both – that substantially match the ob-
servations in similar, more carefully researched work undertaken by later 
Orientalist scholars and administrators. Most of this work arrived at a 
distillation that Lorenzen refers to as the ‘standard model’ of Hinduism, 
which is essentially the Vedic-Brahmanical model. By implication then, 
the socio-religious entity observed earlier as having spread across the 
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subcontinent was, according to Lorenzen, identified as this standard 
model by European writers, but without initially naming it ‘Hinduism’. 
Two points must be noted here: one, that many of the early records were 
written by non-British (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese) missionaries; and 
two, it was by the nineteenth century that both Indian and European in-
tellectuals, actively engaged in attempting to define this religion, estab-
lished it as ‘Hinduism’ or ‘the religion of the Hindus’. Lorenzen offers 
this diversity of intellectual activity all arriving at the same conclusion as 
proof positive of the existence of ‘Hinduism’ prior to colonialism (and 
therefore that it is not a British colonial construct), even if it wasn’t earli-
er named as such. The weaknesses of this otherwise convincing argu-
ment are that first, it projects ‘Hinduism’ backward, assuming it to be a 
finished, more or less unchanging religious entity from the later Vedic 
period to the nineteenth century;13 and second, it assumes for the most 
part that the scholarly work on ‘Hinduism’ in each of these cases was an 
objective, academic enterprise. When Lorenzen does recognise that this 
is not the case, it is only to dismiss it, giving rise to further problems 
with his argument (as we shall momentarily see). 
In fact, of course, the discourse on Hinduism has never been an in-
nocent one; the observers each had different reasons for undertaking the 
study of Hinduism, and perhaps more importantly, brought to their ex-
amination of this socio-religious entity certain preconceptions of what 
constituted a religion in the first instance. The earliest European mis-
sionaries were Italian, and, as Lorenzen himself notes, they rarely used 
the term ‘Hindu’, preferring instead the term ‘gentile’ or ‘Gentoo’14 as it 
came to be anglicised. The term meant ‘pagan’, and did not refer to any 
specific religious formation or system so much as serve as a contrast with 
‘Christian’ and ‘moor’, or Muslim. Lorenzen dismisses their perception 
of the ‘gentoo’ religions as diverse and heterogeneous, as motivated by 
missionary considerations; he is particularly disingenuous in one passage 
that bears quoting at length:  
What could be more convenient from a Christian point of view than the 
idea that Hinduism was not really a single coherent religion at all, that it 
was not viewed as such by its followers, and that it was instead a heteroge-
neous collection of miscellaneous sects, beliefs and idolatrous practices?  
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Since many later colonial scholars were also committed Christians and, 
even if not, had little good to say about Hindu beliefs and practices, it is 
not surprising that they sometimes adopted similar views. (2003) 
Lorenzen then proceeds to insist that what they were actually referring 
to, without wanting to acknowledge it, was a unified coherent religious 
system, ‘Hinduism’. The further problems with his argument (apart from 
those already noted) lie then first, in his dismissal of some descriptions 
and studies as motivated, while uncritically accepting others, because 
they serve to reinforce his case that a recognizable religious entity ‘Hin-
duism’ did in fact exist prior to colonial times; and second, in claiming 
that the two kinds of studies are nevertheless actually referring to the 
same phenomenon.15 The point here is of course not whether there was 
or was not such a unification or coherence; we have already established 
that by the sixteenth century there was an unnamed socio-religious enti-
ty, evident more as a set of dynamic and interactive relations rather than 
a structured and/or institutionalised form, that stretched across the sub-
continent, and that was still barely differentiable from the Buddhist, Jain 
and Parsi religions. The point is that identifying this with the ethno-
geographic identity ‘Hindu’ (itself not entirely clear), and then projecting 
a nineteenth century construction, ‘Hinduism’, backward, as referring to 
the religion of this identity, involves a series of slippages between the 
terms that are conceptually unwarranted. The implications of these ob-
servations will become clearer shortly; for now, it is necessary to contin-
ue tracing the historical trajectory of the terms ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’. 
Colonial British Perceptions and the Construction of ‘Hinduism’ 
Later Europeans (namely the British) sought to identify the religion of 
the ‘Hindus’ not just for religious reasons, as with the missionaries, but 
for administrative, ideological and political reasons. The extensive work 
of Orientalists like William Jones, Max Mueller and Monier-Williams, 
while important in terms of making accessible in European languages the 
literature and thought of ancient India, sought to avoid the evident com-
plexity and diversity of the contemporary religious forms they encoun-
tered by referring back to a putative, more defined and structured classi-
cal religion, which had turned corrupt and decadent. This was useful for 
the British administration as well, in that it could identify communities 
demographically, for administrative purposes (law and order, taxation, 
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etc). John Zavos (2000: 32) demonstrates that William Jones’ work in 
particular was highly determined by a text-centred religious perspective, 
because of which he sought to establish the primary ‘Hindu’ religious 
texts that could serve as the law books for the community – an intent 
that was to have far-reaching consequences. Since much of the infor-
mation was acquired through Brahmanical interlocutors, it also served to 
consolidate a relation of power with a local elite, whose discourse on the 
‘Hindu religion’ could then be officialised.16 Larson describes one im-
portant strand of European response to the growing awareness of India’s 
religious history as  
highly critical of traditional Hindu and Muslim life, especially such practic-
es as the treatment of women generally, widow-burning, child marriage 
and polygamy, female infanticide and untouchability, all of which practices 
had developed through the long centuries of Muslim domination and of 
tense interactions between Hindus and Muslims in which traditional cus-
toms on all sides had become in-grown, rigid and defensive. (Larson, 1997: 
124-5)  
This led on the one hand to an elite response – trained in traditions of 
western rationalism – that accepted the critique and propounded reform, 
leading to the great socio-religious reform movements of the nineteenth 
century; and on the other hand to a deepening of ‘the orthoprax caste-
oriented ritual Hindu traditions of those middle and forward castes that 
did not accept Westernization’ (Larson, 1997: 126). We had noted earlier 
the beginnings of the elaboration of a theory of heterogeneity and intrac-
table alterity that had begun under Mughal rule; arguably, it took the in-
teraction of European administrators and scholars with the Brahmanical 
elite, to concretise this through labelling this upper caste version of reli-
gion ‘Hinduism’.  
Significantly, the term ‘Hinduism’ was probably coined by an Indian, 
not a European: the earliest known usage is by Hindu social reformer 
Raja Rammohan Roy, in two English language texts of 1816 and 1817 
respectively, that critiqued some aspects of the ‘Hindu religion’ as it was 
then being mapped out (cited in Lorenzen, 2003)17 Rammohan Roy’s 
position as a member of the Bengali elite, a pioneer in the reform 
movements of the nineteenth century who was keen to correct various 
social ills that he perceived to be part of the decadent contemporary 
form of Hinduism, is well documented.18 Along with the fact that the 
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word appears in English language texts, it confirms the argument here 
that the epithet ‘Hinduism’ developed as a product of the interaction be-
tween the native elite and the colonisers. However, the term was popu-
larised by European writings, such as Alexander Duff's India and India 
Missions: Sketches of the Gigantic System of Hinduism Both in Theory and Practice 
in 1839, or Monier-Williams’ Hinduism of 1877. All of these, including 
Roy’s initial usage, consistently referred the term to the Vedic-
Brahmanical model of religion that was actively practised by upper castes 
across the subcontinent, but either did not acknowledge the multitude of 
socio-religious practices of the tribes and lower castes or footnoted them 
as variants of the mainstream model. John Zavos cites Alfred Lyall 
commenting in 1884 that popular Hinduism was ‘“a whole vegetation of 
cognate beliefs sprouting up in every stage of growth beneath the shad-
ow of the great orthodox traditions and allegories of Brahminism.”’ (Za-
vos, 2000: 33)  
By the middle of the nineteenth century, various Hindu reform 
movements also began to discuss and debate the ‘Hindu’ identity and 
‘Hinduism’, particularly in reaction to the sense that the religion was a 
degenerate one with a classical and pristine past. The directions of re-
form that they advocated did not coincide, and often clashed; but the 
fact of an intense discussion and debate over what constituted ‘Hindu-
ism’ and who its true adherents were, is an overwhelming indication of 
the semantic instability of the term and of its continuing elaborations. 
Perhaps most importantly, it is in this period that the various proponents 
of the diverse elaborations of ‘Hinduism’ began to organise themselves as 
socio-religious entities, many of them deliberately along the lines of 
Christianity and Islam, seeking through such imitation to organisationally 
realise and stabilise a definitive ‘Hinduism’. Thus for instance the for-
mation of the Brahmo Samaj (1828), the Calcutta Dharma Sabha (1831) 
the Prarthana Samaj (1867), the Tadiya Samaj (1870), the Arya Samaj 
(1875), among many others. Not all of these organisations were upper 
caste, as in the case of Jyotirao Phule’s lower caste organisation, the 
Satyashodak Samaj (1873), but the logic of formation remained the same. 
The Satyashodak Samaj was formed in response to upper caste organisa-
tion, but served a similar purpose – community definition and organisa-
tion – except along caste lines. This again was to have far-reaching con-
sequences. A very significant, related development at this time was the 
emergence of the discourse of the three periods of Indian history, devel-
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oped first by James Mill in his A History of British India, which came out in 
1818. The argument here was that subcontinental history could be divid-
ed into three periods, the Hindu, Muslim and British periods. The disin-
genuousness with which Mill secularised the last has been commented 
on, and needs no elaboration here.19 The importance of this discourse 
however, lies in the way in which it presents the Hindu period as the 
‘Golden Age’ of ‘Hinduism’, and the Muslim period as the time when it 
sank into decay and stupor, implying thereby that the period of Islamic 
rule was responsible for the current decadence of Hindu civilisation. 
This interpretation of Indian history was to have a powerful impact par-
ticularly on upper caste sensibilities, because it framed a simultaneous 
discourse of an erstwhile Hindu supremacy, a contemporary Hindu 
weakness and decadence, and Muslim culpability for the same.20 Mill’s 
intent of course had been to promote ‘[s]tate-sanctioned textual Hindu-
ism…as the antithesis of contemporary degenerate Hinduism.’ (Zavos, 
2000: 34). But the sense of absolute alterity between Muslim and Hindu 
already gaining shape in pre-colonial times, was emphatically confirmed 
by this discourse, setting in play a communal logic that was fundamental 
to the evolution of community organisation in the nineteenth century.21 
The Impact of 1857 
One important and immediate consequence of these developments, de-
veloped in its turn into an independent factor that contributed substan-
tially to the subsequent directions of the construction of ‘Hinduism’. 
This was the war of 1857, variously understood as a mutiny, a rebellion 
and as the first war of independence. Commentators as historically apart 
and diverse as Vincent Smith (1981 [1958]: 664-9) and John Zavos 
(2000: 34) have equally noted that the main support for the war against 
the forces of the East India Company came from the conservative elite 
of both the ‘Hindu’ and the Muslim variety (especially the princes and 
nawabs smarting under British rule), threatened by the growing econom-
ic and military power of the Company, and upset by its reformist atti-
tudes and policies (the contempt for local history and culture evinced by 
writers like James Mill and Macaulay, the ban on sati and child marriage, 
the active encouragement to Christian missionaries, etc). The report that 
the immediate cause of the uprising was religious22 only served to accen-
tuate the sense that the Company had not taken local religious senti-
ments seriously enough. At the same time the reformist tendencies 
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amongst specially the Hindu elite were wary of sympathising with the 
rebels. What this elite feared was the return to Muslim rule promised by 
the rebellion. Dilip Simeon notes that  
The conservatism of the aristocratic leaders of the rebellion of 1857 was 
more organic - theirs was not so much religious revivalism as political nos-
talgia. The attitude of the Bengali 'bhadralok' (gentlefolk) of that time was 
far more complex - simultaneously orthodox and pro-British (that is, pro-
modernisation), that marked the beginnings of communalist revivalism. 
(n.d.) 
When the British government took over the administration of India 
from the Company after the quelling of the rebellion in 1858, it therefore 
began a deliberate policy of communal representation. Through this it 
sought to maintain channels of communication with the different reli-
gious communities, as a sign of its respect for their religious sentiments. 
In doing so, it is important to note that it was responding as much to 
European Christian missionary demands that the state stay neutral, as to 
‘Hindu’ and Muslim sensitivities, thus bringing a particularly modern 
sensibility to bear on the issue. (vd Veer 2000) Such a sensibility was 
premised on the notion of the sanctity of equality of identities, and fun-
damentally influential on the specific form that political identities would 
take in the subcontinent. As Sudipta Kaviraj has argued, the nineteenth 
century (especially its second half) is marked by a change in the mode of 
politics. The British state introduced three interferences in the existing 
political system: 1) the language of the new ontology of the social world: 
rationalistic, with new definitions of individuals, property and society. 
‘It’s unprecedented enterprise of mapping and counting through census-
es and surveys suggested and provided a new way of being in a new type 
of social world, with enormous political consequences for public action.’ 
2) It actively encouraged reform, ‘not merely introducing individually 
significant alterations of the social order....but in establishing the princi-
ple that the state had the authority to do such things, a principle without 
precedent in Indian social history.’ 3) Finally, it sought to weaken the 
power of the nationalist struggle by finding ‘unexceptionably noble prin-
ciples of political morality’ to divide it: ‘the encouragement of the idea 
that religious groups could not live together, and despite democratic 
constitutionalism, a religious minority would always be maltreated by the 
majority.’ (Kaviraj 1997: 231)23 Inevitably, subsequent articulations of 
‘Hinduism’ and the ‘Hindu’ identity began to interchange, as the diverse 
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socio-religious organisation and groups (both Hindu and Muslim) sought 
to be the representative voice of the religious community. The point to 
note is that it is in this development precisely – in the gradual establish-
ment of a politics of identity and a regime of religious representation – 
that a still nebulous socio-religious identity (‘Hindu’) completed its trans-
formation into a religious identity (‘Hinduism’): the question ‘what con-
stitutes Hinduism?’ now became crucial to answering the question ‘who 
will speak on behalf of the Hindus?’ and vice versa. The centrality of rep-
resentation to the nineteenth century evolution of the discourse on 
‘Hinduism’ is what will not permit the kind of backward projection of 
the term that Lorenzen undertakes, and confirms the colonial construc-
tion of ‘Hinduism’. We will discuss the issue of representation in our dis-
cussion of colonial state formation and the introduction of nationalist 
discourses in India, in greater detail, in the next chapter. Here too, we 
shall return to it in a moment; it is necessary first to identify some of the 
other consequences of the developments identified above. 
3.7 Heterogeneity, ‘Hinduism’ and the ‘Hindu’ Identity 
Several dichotomies (both synchronic and diachronic) that plague the 
term ‘Hinduism’ emerge from this history: Vedic-Brahmanical vs. popu-
lar, little traditions vs. great tradition, reformist vs. orthodox, classical vs. 
degenerate, revivalist vs. progressive, ancient vs. contemporary – and so 
on. It is now clear that they are all symptoms of a more fundamental his-
torico-conceptual problem underlying the terms ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’. 
The socio-religious entity that became increasingly visible as a pan-
Indian phenomenon by the twelfth century AD was and remains a lay-
ered, multidimensional one, the different parts of which are engaged in a 
continuous, continuing and dynamic dialogue. It is true that the Vedic-
Brahmanical-Sanskritic tradition did and continues to exercise an almost 
gravitational force, drawing the different discourses and practices inexo-
rably into engagement with, if not submission to it. But this tradition has 
itself seen innumerable modifications to accommodate the heterodox 
and heterogeneous elements that it engages with. Further, apart from the 
fallacy of ‘therefore’ identifying it as the mainstay of a religion called 
‘Hinduism’ – if not as ‘Hinduism’ itself – this essentially upper caste tra-
dition is itself not unitary, has never been so, and was and is riven by 
numerous sects, sub-traditions, regional variants and philosophical 
schools, as we have seen. The integrated set of philosophico-religious, 
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socio-religious and politico-religious phenomena that evolved along di-
verse historical trajectories but through continuous interaction in that 
evolution, will go on to be termed ‘Hinduism’, while the term ‘Hindu’ 
will go on to be applied specifically to its assorted followers and practi-
tioners. But here, the significance of ‘Hinduism’ as an anglicised neolo-
gism is of great import: it indicates the centrality of European concep-
tions of religion and religiosity to the perception, and later even the 
formation, of this religious identity. There was, prior to the colonial pe-
riod, no equivalent term for the entity itself, or the almost limitless varie-
ty of practices it encompassed. ‘Hindu dharma’ or ‘Hindu dharm’ has of-
ten been used as the Indian equivalent of ‘Hinduism’, but as Lorenzen 
himself admits, ‘the terms "Hindu" and "Hindu dharma" were never ad-
mitted to the premodern Sanskrit lexicon. The roughly equivalent term 
"sanatana-dharma" [or “eternal dharma”] can, it is true, be traced back to 
the Bhagavad-gita and the Puranas, but, as Wilhelm Halbfass and other 
scholars have argued, its precise meaning has always been ambiguous.’ 
(2003) Even if we allow that ‘Hindu dharm’ may have roots in pre-
colonial India, it is only with great inaccuracy that ‘Hindu dharm’ will al-
low translation as ‘Hinduism’ in the colonial period. Central to the prob-
lem then is the term ‘dharm’ or ‘dharma’ and its translatability.  
In the previous chapter, we noted some theoretical difficulties in ex-
amining Hinduism as a religion, specifically through examining under-
standings of what constitutes a religion. Here, some of the issues raised 
then become clearer. The religion itself, such as it was and is, is more 
than can be comprehended through the concept ‘religion’. This is partly 
because it insistently intrudes into even the minutiae, the most intimate 
dimensions of most domains of social life – prescriptively and proscrip-
tively (and it is useful here to recall the ways in which hegemonic systems 
operate from the ‘molecular’ to the national levels). But it is also because 
it intrudes diversely and variegatedly, complexly qualified and condi-
tioned in its intrusions by specificities of region, caste, gender, marital 
status, age, profession, sect, form of worship, deity worshipped, and so 
on. The Brahmanical term for these prescriptive and proscriptive frames 
of reference was and remains dharma, which as we noted defies direct 
translation, but indexes ‘variously “law”, “doctrine”, “righteousness” and 
even “truth” in Buddhist contexts. The term dharma also comes to have a 
technical meaning as the “constituents” or “force factors” that make up 
the phenomenal, empirical world’ (Larson 1997: 70). Evidently, the term 
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allows for a vast range of applications and situation-specific interpreta-
tions, even as it paradoxically registers the inflexibility of a natural or 
cosmic law (‘“force factors” that make up the phenomenal, empirical 
world’ in Larson’s words). (In this sense, it is eminently hospitable to the 
naturalising tendencies inherent to the dynamics of hegemonic systems – 
a point I shall elaborate on in the next chapter). Taken together with the 
multiplicity of sects, cults, movements and doxas, the terrain covered by 
either ‘Hindu dharma’ or by ‘Hinduism’ is almost boundlessly inclusive 
and at the same time fragmentary, unorganised and riven by innumerable 
lines of qualification and exclusion.24 The nineteenth century political 
context saw an aggravation of this fractious terrain in the emergence of 
diverse organisations and socio-religious movements that – true to their 
genealogy – often sought a pan-Indian legitimacy, but invariably re-
mained bound to the local determinants that had given rise to them in 
the first instance.25 What is of significance here is that by the end of the 
nineteenth century these divisions were being seen as divisive of a Hindu 
constituency, a problem compounded by the separation of Hindu from 
Muslim as constituencies. That is, not only was the Hindu constituency 
an inchoate and fractious one, its chief political counterpart, the Muslim 
constituency, was increasingly seen as being more organised and coher-
ent, and therefore more of a threat than its smaller size would have 
deemed it. This was of course not the case, since Muslim reform move-
ments too were not united and singular. But one strand of Islamic re-
form did contribute to the problem: the modernist-separatists under Say-
yid Ahmad Khan, who ‘believed that finally Muslims had to be separate 
from Hindus and Hindu civilization’ (Larson: 1997, 127). It is in this po-
litical and historical context that the early ideas of a Hindu nation – or 
‘Hindutva’ as it was later coined – emerged. 
3.8 The Emergence of Hindutva 
The New Politics of Representation 
We have so far not spoken of ‘Hindutva’ because it is of later coinage, 
arriving with VD Savarkar’s seminal text Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? pub-
lished in 1923. But the grounds for the discourse on Hindutva are laid 
earlier, in the nineteenth century. The very title of Savarkar’s text makes 
clear that it is addressing, in 1923, a debate that was continuing from at 
least the time of Rammohun Roy, one hundred years earlier: the question 
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of the ‘Hindu’ identity was still far from a settled one. Part of the reason 
for this is that the very meanings of religion undergo a change in the 
course of the nineteenth century. As noted earlier, a new sanctity was 
given to representational politics by the British imperial state, as it sought 
to establish a hegemonic apparatus of governance – for which the partic-
ipation and collaboration of the Indian elites was vital – after the war of 
1857. For the new language of ‘claims’ and ‘rights’ introduced by this 
representational politics to work, the definition and substantiation of 
constituencies became singularly important – a process that inevitably 
gained articulation through attempts to define communities in religious 
terms. The contestations of the many socio-religious reform movements 
that sprang up configured a new kind of public space, one in which – 
precisely because religion was now becoming tied up to questions of rep-
resentation and communal identity – issues of authenticity and of the 
domain of the religious began to get foregrounded.26 Intimately imbricat-
ed in this was the gradually emerging question of the Indian nation. Peter 
van der Veer makes the important point that  
Separation of Church and State does not lead to the decline of the social 
and political importance of religion. With the rise of the nation-state [in 
Europe] there is an enormous shift in what religion means. Religion pro-
duces the secular as much as vice versa, but this interaction can only be 
understood in the context of the emergence of nationalism in the 19th cen-
tury. And, in the case of Britain, when we deal with the national we deal 
simultaneously with the imperial. (2000)  
Arguably, the converse was also true – that is, dealing with the impe-
rial necessarily implied dealing with questions of nationality and national-
ism. The war of 1857 may be situated squarely in the middle of these 
emergent discourses of the nation: it reveals how deeply the ‘Hindu’ 
identity that was forming was imbricated in questions of nationhood. Its 
contradictory tendencies on questions of socio-religious critique and re-
form may have led to divergent opinions on the war itself; but it seems 
fairly clear that these tendencies (whatever their orientations) were 
framed – implicitly or explicitly – in the vocabulary and terms of nation-
alism. In short, the gradual articulation of ‘Hinduism’ as denoting a 
‘Hindu’ religious identity (and conversely, that of the ‘Hindu’ identity 
denoting a putative religion, ‘Hinduism’) took place in and through the 
formation of a public space embedded in discourses – sometimes con-
tradictory and rebellious, sometimes civil and cooperative – of communi-
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ty and nationalism, inextricably linking them. ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’ 
evolved as fundamental aspects of the national question – and inevitably 
so, given the historical forces at play in that period.27  
An important aspect of this development is the gradual introduction 
in the nineteenth century of hegemony as a form of rule and govern-
ance.28 The shape that this hegemony took however was substantially 
qualified by the vagaries of the historical forces noted above, and by the 
consequent contradictions in the class through which the imperial state 
sought to operationalise this hegemony. Amongst the well-known in-
stances of the ideological and discursive difficulties faced by early proto-
nationalists is the case of novelist and Hindu ideologue Bankim Chandra 
Chattopadhyay, whose Samya (a tract on social equality published in 
1879) decried the submission to British imperialism; three years later he 
was to argue that British rule was better than becoming the subjects of 
Muslim rule again, in his novel, Anandamath.29 Chattopadhyay was part of 
a growing middle class of professionals including lawyers, writers, teach-
ers, doctors, and civil servants. This class was to function, in British im-
perialist perceptions at least, as the medium for the planned hegemony, 
participating actively in the new public space, the limits of which were 
rapidly expanding under the impact of the new urbanisations,30 growing 
literacy, increasing reach of the print media, and more translations (espe-
cially of religious literature) becoming available.31 It was to serve as the 
means by which, through representational politics, imperial hegemony 
was to ‘trickle down’ to the ‘myriad forms of subaltern class discourse.’ 
(Zavos: 2000, 11). As Zavos and others argue, this was not to be: this 
middle class, pan-Indian in its effects and range, transformed the arena 
of hegemony into one where it set the terms of the public space, often 
therefore manipulating and subverting the imperial hegemonic project 
itself – not so much with the intent to overthrow imperialism (as yet), as 
to consolidate its own class-caste definition and position. The classic ex-
ample of such manipulation was in the manner in which members of the 
upper caste employed as census enumerators consistently sought to ex-
clude the lower castes from the religious category ‘Hindu’.32 The contra-
dictory discursive and ideological tendencies experienced by this evolv-
ing middle class are again evident here: on the one hand the need to 
maintain its upper caste status, dominance and ‘purity’; on the other, the 
increasingly sharp realisation that, in a transformed political context in 
which representational power was dependent on numbers, it was neces-
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sary to acknowledge, engage with, accommodate and involve the lower 
castes as well.  
Reform, Revival and Hindutva 
The two examples noted above – of Chattopadhyay and the census tak-
ers – identify two of several lines of contradiction. The first divides the 
loyalty of this colonised middle class as it emerged in and through both 
resistance to and participation in imperial hegemonic power in the nine-
teenth century. British rule had introduced an important Archimedean 
point of critique into ‘Hindu’ self-perceptions, besides promoting the 
idea of a once glorious civilisation that had been saved from Muslim 
depredations by European might and enlightenment. But these very fac-
tors also threatened to undermine even decimate, through the force of 
their critique, the traditional order, and to stymie any possibility of re-
covery of that ‘glorious tradition’, through revival and reform. The colo-
nial Indian intellectual class therefore had to negotiate both the critique 
and its object in articulating their position in relation to the hegemonic 
state.33 The second line of contradiction is a more complex one: it is the 
locus of negotiations of the critique itself, and may be better understood 
as an aggregation of several lesser lines of contradiction. Among these 
are: 1) the lines between upper and lower castes, sometimes manifesting 
in and through caste organisations; 2) lines between sects, cults, philo-
sophical schools – again often manifested through contesting organisa-
tions, and often as, 3) a division between revivalist and reform varieties; 
4) between the pan-Indian elites linked by English, and the local elites 
rooted in Sanskrit and the vernacular – a division that was more or less 
the same as that between the reformers and the revivalists, but not en-
tirely so;34 5) between Hindu and Muslim movements, whether of revival 
or of reform; and 6) between a secular nationalist agenda and a religious 
nationalist agenda. The last of these divides is a particularly significant 
one, in that it may be seen as the cumulative effect of all the other kinds of 
divides noted above. It is initially derivable from the fourth division not-
ed above, that between the pan-Indian elite and the regional ones. As the 
discourse of nationalism deepened its roots in this middle class intellec-
tual milieu, its two major themes of unity and range (or extent) were best 
articulated through the secular nationalist agenda. Its advantage lay in its 
position in the imperial hegemony: pan-Indian, perceived and promoted 
as more egalitarian than its native, Sanskritic equivalent (although in ac-
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tual fact both were equally upper caste dominated – a feature that is of 
tremendous importance in understanding the growth trajectory of Hindu 
nationalism), programmatically inclusive of the Muslim community in its 
conception of the nation, and perhaps most importantly, greatly at ease 
with the discourse and vocabulary of the colonial state and its apparatus 
of governance, of which they were an essential part.  
The members of this new elite…who accepted the notions of humanism, 
liberal democracy, and enlightenment rationalism became the vanguard for 
the nationalist movement which would eventually turn the new ideas of 
liberal democracy and enlightenment humanism against the very British 
rulers who had introduced the ideas in the first place. (Larson: 125) 
This strand of nationalist thought and action was to result in the for-
mation of the Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885. The moderate 
character of the organisation is revealed in the fact that it was not estab-
lished as an anti-imperial organisation but one that sought to address the 
failings of the imperial state within its own terms. To this extent, at least 
in its early years, it actually had the permission of the British state, which 
saw it as capable of greater representativeness than its regional counter-
parts. But, to return to the parenthetical note above, this elite was never 
very removed from its revivalist cousin, precisely because of the domi-
nance of upper caste Hindus in both – a factor that was to intensify 
Muslim distrust of the INC, and increasingly reinforce its own Hinduist 
tendencies, albeit never openly.  
3.9 Conclusion 
In the above arguments, we have tracked the dynamics by which the 
terms ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hinduism’ emerged historically, as concepts and as 
identities. It is evident that these terms consolidated into their current 
understandings under British rule, during the colonial period. In the 
ceaseless contestations and negotiations that occurred between imperial-
ist discourses on the one hand, and native-modern and native-traditional 
elites, on the other, two broad understandings of nationalism began 
evolving. What linked these two understandings however, was their simi-
lar and continued emphasis on political control lying with the elite – in 
this instance, upper-class, upper-caste Hindus. The Indian National 
Congress came to be the umbrella organisation that tried to represent 
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both understandings of nationalism and both the sets of interests they 
represented. 
The point to note here is that the INC was the first modern organisa-
tion to achieve a truly pan-Indian following and effectivity, precisely be-
cause of its programmatic inclusiveness. Even if it was fundamentally 
elitist in composition and orientation, dominated by upper caste Hindus, 
its focus on encountering empire on its own ideological terrain ensured 
that it operated on and in the site of the law and the state – which was 
pan-Indian. The Hindu organisations of the same period, in comparison, 
were too bound by regional, linguistic and caste factors, unable to arrive 
at any coherence of vision or purpose that would yield a pan-Indian uni-
ty, at least until the first Hindu Conference of 1909. This was to evolve 
by 1921 into the Hindu Mahasabha, the party that sought to speak as an 
openly and professedly Hindu voice. It emerged partly in response to 
perceptions of organised Muslim socio-political activity that urged a sep-
arate Muslim electorate and even a separate Muslim state; but it was also 
in response to the urgency of the various Hindu organisations to organ-
ise on a large scale, on the national scale. The Hindu Mahasabha may be 
said to be the first truly and avowedly national organisation of political 
Hinduism; but its constituency remained largely upper caste and middle 
class, well into the decades after independence. It is in this context that 
we must see the emergence of the concept and the epithet ‘Hindutva’, 
whose author, VD Savarkar went on to preside over the Hindu Mahasa-
bha for seven consecutive years. The next chapter will examine these and 
subsequent developments in the history of the Hindu right. 
Notes 
 
1 For a well-researched outline of the positions in the debate, see Lorenzen 
(2003). Lorenzen’s basic argument is that Hinduism is not a colonial construct 
but an identifiable set of religious practices and thought that can be traced back 
to the pre-Christian era, or at any rate, well before colonialism, even if it is not 
specifically identified as Hinduism. Lorenzen’s argument hinges on conceptually 
replacing Hindu with Hinduism quite unproblematically – a slippage that I will 
discuss in some detail below. 
2 The discussion that follows draws on several sources, including Thapar (1966), 
Larson (1997), von Stietencron (1995), van der Veer (2000), Habib (1997), and 
others. 
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3 ‘Sramanical’ refers to the cults of meditation-asceticism that initially separated 
from Brahmanical orthodoxy around the sixth century BC, following a pattern of 
devotionalism to a single, usually non-Vedic deity in worship. They were founda-
tional to the emergence of the Buddhist and Jain traditions, and later to the emer-
gence of the bhakti traditions in south India (see below). By the early part of the 
first millennium AD however they were already becoming incorporated into 
Brahmanical orthodoxies, as the non-Vedic deities gained in prominence in the 
latter. See Larson (1997: 66-75) 
4 Thapar uses the term ‘Hinduism’ here somewhat carelessly, projecting a later 
construction onto the Brahmanical-Sramanical traditions then extant. She also 
notes the interesting fact that Greeks and Shakas were conferred the status of 
“fallen kshatriya” or warrior caste, because they possessed political power.(1966: 
121)  
5 It is instructive to note here that both Buddhism and Jainism had emerged in 
the second half of the first millennium BC, in reaction to Brahmanical orthodoxy, 
self-consciously identifying it as the ‘other’ from which they broke. 
6 These were composed over several centuries, dating back to the eighth century 
BC, and had reached their final forms some time in the first half of the first mil-
lennium AD. They register a strong sense of a shared territory, stretching from 
the Himalayas to the southern seas. 
7 The term refers specifically to the philosophical traditions generated from the 
Vedas, as opposed to its cosmogonic, ritual and customary content. 
8 See Lorenzen (2003) who cites the Prthviraj raso, a historical romance composed 
around the end of the 12th century AD, for evidence of its continuing inclusive-
ness, although the beginnings of a specifically religious sense are also evident 
here. Lorenzen’s article is also useful for an idea of how sketchy the evidence of 
such usage is in this period. 
9 The Delhi Sultanates were Turkish, while the Mughals were Afghan in origin. 
10 One instance of the clear lines of opposition between the religions that is much 
cited is the Hindu-Turka-Samvada of Eknath (1533-99), a humorous poetical de-
bate between a Brahmin and a Muslim. It reveals both the Muslim perception of 
the Brahmanical religion as well as the latter’s perception of the former. See Lo-
renzen (2003). 
11 Cynthia Talbot notes that the title ‘Sultan among Hindu kings (hindu-raya-
suratrana),’ perhaps the earliest use of the term ‘Hindu’ in an Indian language, ‘be-
gins to figure in Andhra inscriptions from 1352 C.E. onward.’ Cited in Lorenzen 
(2003). 
12 See vd Veer (1994: 33-43) for Sufism in India, and Larson (1997: 103-119) for a 
useful discussion of the assimilation of Islam in the subcontinent. 
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13 It is interesting that Lorenzen specifically anticipates and denies this charge, 
while it is clear from his argument that he cannot escape it.  
14 For an interesting account of the history of this term see Sushil Srivastava 
(2001). 
15 What is perhaps most unacceptable in Lorenzen’s otherwise well-researched 
article is the over-riding intent to displace any argument that western Orientalism 
could have constructed Hinduism, and consequently to pre-empt any suggestion 
that it is substantially responsible for the history of communalism in India. His 
disingenuousness is most startling when he ends his piece with the observation, 
‘Hinduism wasn’t invented by anyone, European or Indian. Like Topsy, it just 
grow’d.’ (2003) 
16 See John Zavos (2000: 31-34) for a discussion of the thinking behind the in-
tent.  
17 Roy notes for instance that, contrary to popular perceptions of the diversity of 
deities in ‘the religion of the Hindus’, "the doctrines of the unity of God are real 
Hinduism, as that religion was practiced by our ancestors, and as it is well known 
at the present day to many learned Brahmins." His appeal to Brahmanical author-
ity as the true voice of Hinduism is telling. 
18 See Parthe Chatterjee’s (1986) discussion of this.  
19 See Zavos (2000: 33) 
20 Mill’s was of course not the only work that led to such perceptions; important 
contribution to it was made by other histories like James Tod’s The Annals and 
Antiquities of Rajasthan, first published in 1829, which recorded the legends of Raj-
put chivalry, especially against Muslim armies.  
21 See Peter van der Veer (2000) for another perspective on this issue.  
22 The apocryphal account is that Indian soldiers were being forced to use car-
tridges made with animal fat, objectionable to both the ‘Hindus’ (because of the 
sacrality of the cow) and the Muslims (because of religious objections to the pig 
as an unclean animal). 
23 See also Zavos (2000), for the importance of the new trope of organization to 
the emergence and formation of reform movements and representational politics 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
24 This has led several social thinkers to posit the trope of pollution as the single 
most important characteristic and organising principle of ‘Hinduism’. See for in-
stance, Dumont (1970), Srinivasan (1962), etc. 
25 The classic example of such striving is the Arya Samaj and its confrontation 
with the Sanatan Dharma Sabhas. The former sought to purify ‘Hinduism’ 
through a strict insistence on monism, adherence to Vedic texts, minimising ritual 
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and ceremony, and doing away with caste distinctions. The latter on the other 
hand was orthodox rather than reformist, and sought to maintain and preserve 
existing rituals, ceremonies, caste distinctions and traditions, in the face of re-
formism and Christian missionary activity. Both sought to establish themselves 
across the country, but both were largely restricted in actuality to their regional 
spheres of influence, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, respectively. See Zavos (2000) 
for an excellent discussion of these issues. 
26 For succinct discussions of the transformation of the public space in 19th cen-
tury India, see Zavos (2000: 9-16) Amir Ali (2001), Sandra Freitag (1996) and 
Peter van der Veer (2000). The history of the socio-religious reform movements 
has been covered ad nauseum in various excellently researched texts, so the allu-
sions to them here will be confined to indicating the ways in which they contrib-
uted to the rise of Hindu nationalism. 
27 To argue otherwise in the name of promoting a secular history, while strategi-
cally appealing, would be to implicitly acknowledge that secularism in India re-
quires a degree of fabrication, or at least papering over of unpleasant details. This 
is not only dangerous, it is unnecessarily so, since – even in strategic terms – it is 
more fruitful to identify the precise lines of force of discourse and practice, how-
ever non-secular these may appear, and leave the contradictions inherent in these 
to undo them. 
28 It is important to note the distinction between British attempts at imperial he-
gemony and the gradual formation of native elite communal hegemonies in the 
nineteenth century. As Ranajit Guha (1997) has so thoroughly demonstrated, the 
first was a failure, and was a case of domination without hegemony; the second, 
which he does not examine at all, I argue (here and in the following chapter), was 
an unqualified success, in that it mobilised a powerful nationalist movement that 
eventually led to Indian independence. 
29 See Dilip Simeon (ibid.) for a brief discussion of this, and Tanika Sarkar (2001) 
for a more detailed one. 
30 It is necessary to remember that important industrial and commercial cities like 
Madras (Chennai) and Bombay (Mumbai) were essentially established by the Brit-
ish. 
31 Kenneth Jones has referred to this as the “Protestantization” of Hinduism. See 
his Socio-religious Reform Movements in British India…. 
32 See Zavos (2000: 13-14). See also Bernard Cohn (1996) and R B Bhagat (2001). 
An important aspect of this caste divide is the racial theory of the common Indo-
European Aryan ancestry of the upper castes, specifically the Brahmins, pro-
pounded first by Max Mueller, which permitted the upper castes in particular a 
sense of racial equality with their colonial masters. Needless to add, the theory 
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has subsequently been proved to be bogus. See Dilip Simeon (n.d.) and Romila 
Thapar (n.d.). 
33 See KN Panikkar (1995) for a detailed analysis of this split. 
34 The difference lies in the frequent possibility that the regional, vernacular elites 
could often be reformist and against the regional Sanskritic, revivalist elite, as 
with the case of the Arya Samaj. 
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4 The Emergence of the Hindu Right - II 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we followed the historical evolution of a socio-
religious formation and its concretization into the definable, albeit con-
troversial and contested, entity called Hinduism. This concretization was 
inextricably embedded in political debates of constituencies, centered on 
the question of who or what was a Hindu. By the turn of the century, 
with specific regard to the process of defining a ‘Hindu’ constituency, 
the debate increasingly clarified into one on nationhood, between the 
moderates – espousing a liberal, secular and inclusive conception of the 
nation – and the extremists – who mostly inclined toward the idea of an 
exclusive Hindu nation. As ‘Hinduism’ gained in currency as registering a 
definite constituency, the moderates touted its very catholicity as eastern 
spiritualism’s answer to western rationalist secularism. This led to the 
peculiar paradoxical situation of both the moderates and the extremists 
claiming the ‘Hindu’ constituency as it was taking shape, but to conflict-
ing ends. In this chapter I will explore the historical and political trajec-
tories affected by this situation, in the growth and consolidation of Hin-
du nationalism, until Independence. 
4.2 Objectives 
This chapter will attempt the following: 
1. To outline the consolidation of Brahmanical patriarchy through the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, as the masculine hegem-
ony that forms the basis of Hindu nationalism. 
2. To analyse the specific roles of gender and violence in the manufac-
turing of this hegemony. 
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3. To analyse the political and ideological orientations of the various 
nationalist movements in relation to the gendered emergence of 
Hindu nationalism. 
4. To offer a critique of Gandhian nationalism as, in some ways, crucial 
to the articulation of Hindu nationalist thought. 
4.3 The ‘Public’ and ‘Personal’ Space in the Nineteenth 
Century 
Even before the legislative move of setting up the Morley-Minto re-
forms, and despite the eventual and substantial dilution of the Indian 
Councils Act of 1909, the British had (at least officially) set in adminis-
trative practice a policy of non-interference in what they perceived as 
native customs and traditions, leaving the adjudication of these matters 
largely to the religious leadership of the communities. Yet, while the co-
lonial state decided to refrain from interfering in native customs, it nev-
ertheless deemed it necessary for administrative purposes to identify, 
taxonomise and homogenize them (given their enormous diversity) in 
consultation with the religious leadership of the communities in ques-
tion. We have already noted in the previous chapter how significant this 
was in the construction of a singular ‘Hindu’ identity and in the manufac-
turing of a hegemonic form of governance. What is noteworthy here is 
that this hegemonic formation (as well as the communalised identities it 
was built on) was fundamentally inscribed by the new, vastly expanded 
and homogenized public-personal dichotomisation – one that attempted 
to apply across the terrain of the imperial state. Amir Ali notes that 
British and Anglo-Indian law had a ‘territorial’ scope and ruled over the 
‘public’ world of land relations, criminal law, laws of contract and of evi-
dence. In sharp contradistinction to this were Hindu and Muslim laws 
which were defined as ‘personal’, covering persons rather than areas, and 
dealing with more intimate areas of human existence – family relation-
ships, family property, and religious life. This sharp distinction was further 
bolstered by the Queen’s Proclamation of 1859, which promised absolute 
non-interference in religious matters. (Ali 2001)  
By the second half of the nineteenth century then, this policy had led 
to the construction of a series of hegemonic formations separated (hori-
zontally as it were) along personal and therefore communal lines; these 
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were in turn effected by the same public-personal divide that separated 
each of them (vertically) from the territorial imperial state. 
This had several important consequences: first, as Sandra Freitag 
(1996), Amir Ali (2001), Partha Chatterjee (1986) and others have shown, 
it had the momentous effect of almost entirely overhauling existing dis-
tinctions between the private (or the personal)1 and the public, and the 
dynamics between them. In the first instance, as Kaviraj notes, the state 
in pre-colonial India was never as central to the lives of its subjects as it 
came to be under and after colonization (Kaviraj 1995: 301ff). Prior to 
the interventions of the colonial state, the dynamic between the public 
and the personal was arguably much more localized, determined largely 
by the organization of power and hierarchies both geographically – at the 
respective levels of the village, province, kingdom, etc in specific regions 
– and communally – in terms of the specific, locally available relations 
between castes and religious communities, and between these communi-
ties and the particular dispensations of the local (princely or nawabi) state 
(Kaviraj 1997, Dumont 1970, Heesterman 1997). In contrast, the politi-
cal dispensation evolving in the west and that was introduced into the 
subcontinent by the British from the eighteenth century onward was al-
ready fundamentally inscribed by the emergent discourses of liberal indi-
vidualism, secularisation and the public-private dichotomisation of the 
social and political realms (Kaviraj 1995, Fox-Genovese 1991), embed-
ded in and shaped by the dynamics of an evolving capitalist economy. 
Since religion within this dispensation was essentially a matter of indi-
vidual and therefore private concern – along with issues of domesticity, 
marriage, family, etc. – the colonial state’s approach to religious matters 
in the subcontinent too was to treat them separately from public domain 
matters (criminal laws, laws of contract, land relations, etc). Yet this did 
not lead to the relegation of religious matters to an implicit private realm. 
Such relegation required a cognitive framework in which religion could 
be understood as the choice and practice of the otherwise secularised 
individual subject-of-the-state.  
Religion and Community Formation 
Arguably, the British worked with a conception of the religious that – 
besides being dominantly shaped by the Semitic, organised, text-based 
religions – was founded on its separation from secular or profane power 
and authority (and importantly, vice versa): none of the various tradi-
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tional and customary practices that constitute ‘Hinduism’ either sought 
or made such a separation – and indeed, given the understanding of 
dharma outlined earlier, could not have made it even in its hegemonic 
Brahmanical2 form. Further, as the census operations undertaken from 
the late nineteenth century were to reveal, it was notoriously difficult to 
distinguish caste from religious affiliation; the identity ‘Hindu’ and the 
entity ‘Hinduism’ in particular were repeatedly and openly contested 
through and in public domains and institutions (Bhagat 2001). Thus the 
policy of non-intervention brought into being and fashioned a sphere of 
practice and contestation that was officially ‘private’ but – because such a 
nomination had no historical or structural precedent in the socio-polity – 
had no identifiable constitution or defined content.3 These had to be de-
termined paradoxically through very public contestations and debates 
within the communities thus identified as ‘private’ – between traditional 
and westernised elites, caste elites, religious elites.4 These terms were in-
tensely contested, however, not just because they were to apply cross-
territorially, across differences of region, caste, language, etc. By the turn 
of the century, the British state had decided ‘to share its patronage 
among diverse sections of its subject population (in order to strengthen 
its position)’, in the ‘granting of public appointments and of political rep-
resentation’ (L Carroll, 1978: 244). Since the basic criterion for public 
appointments was caste status, this led to intense contestations amongst 
the various jati groups to establish varna superiority, and the formation of 
numerous caste associations intent on promoting themselves in caste 
terms as well as in terms of ‘public’ claims in the evolving politics of rep-
resentation (Carroll 1978; Jaffrelot 1996; Zavos 2000). In seeking to in-
stitute a hegemonic elite that would serve its purposes, the British impe-
rial state thus initiated a series of engagements and contestations within 
‘public’ space, that depended on the specific character of the ‘private’ 
that was articulated. In the event, it mattered little that the project of in-
stituting hegemonic control was a failure as far as imperial interests were 
concerned, and that the imperium was in the final analysis a dominance 
maintained largely through coercion (Guha 1997). Rather, for the Indian 
elites, the discursive ordering into the public-personal opened avenues of 
establishing hegemonic control within the communities that were taking 
shape. What was at stake in these debates and contestations was the 
character of the hegemony to be established and thus the identity of the 
community itself. 
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Caste, Gender and Community Formation 
This is especially the case with the ‘Hindu’ identity, because, as we have 
already established, as a definitive communal identity it took shape 
through this very process, unlike the Muslim, Sikh or Christian identities. 
In other words, it was more essentially defined by elite contestations 
over the personal than its subcontinental counterparts.5 More pertinently 
though, the main issues under contestation – the practice of sati, widow 
remarriage, abolition of child marriages, rights of inheritance, the educa-
tion of women – were clearly centred on the rights and status of wom-
en,6 thereby rendering the contestations over Hindu personal law (and 
consequently the Hindu identity itself) essentially a contestation of patri-
archal ideologies. The British colonial state engaged largely and consist-
ently, not with the unified ‘Indian’ identity envisioned by the INC but 
with separate and multiple patriarchies, within and between communities 
(Sangari 1995). Even as a system of representational politics was gradual-
ly evolving, the British perforce had to negotiate the issues noted above 
with and through the respective communal patriarchal elites. In the case 
of the Hindu identity,7 the initiation of census enumeration and of social 
reform movements that addressed the question of caste further compli-
cated the issue. On the one hand, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
various caste associations had formed across the country, struggling to 
promote their communities within the bureaucratically assigned and 
acknowledged social categories. On the other, these struggles were inevi-
tably also engagements with powerful upper caste articulations on ‘Hin-
duism’, which, whether liberal or conservative, tried to suppress the 
question of caste altogether.8 The essential point here is that these en-
gagements were largely on the terrain of the reform of the ‘personal’, 
inevitably therefore also entailing contestations over women’s rights and 
status.9  
The ambiguous legacy of colonial modernity was that it came to be re-
stricted to upper-caste women. Caste and gender were the two issues in-
ternal to Hindu custom and society that had to be reformed in order for 
upper-caste male reformers and nationalists to claim a moral-ethical space 
for anti-colonial nationalism. Though the ‘woman’s question’ as articulated 
by upper-caste reformers consistently elided issues of caste, radical assaults 
on caste ideology consistently focused on how caste regulations governed 
women’s behavior. (Rao 2003a) 
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Thus, Brahmanical patriarchy (following from Uma Chakravarti’s 
1993 account of it, as noted in an earlier chapter) remained decisively the 
hegemonic framework for defining the Hindu identity, even as lower 
caste social reform movements like Phule’s, Periyar’s, Narayana Guru’s 
and Ambedkar’s offered powerful contestations of Brahmanical patriar-
chy from alternative frameworks that focused on gender and caste equal-
ity.10 It is important to note however, that the patriarchal foundations of 
the personal were consequently never questioned, even as the constitu-
tion and constituency of the personal were. In fact, it would be accurate 
to say that these contestations had the decisive effect of remoulding and 
sharpening patriarchal formations in India, as I will argue below. 
Partha Chatterjee in his well-known analysis has argued that, while on 
the one hand the abolition of sati and later of child marriage, the promo-
tion of women’s education, and so on, did create greater spaces and op-
portunities especially for upper caste women to participate in public life, 
on the other, there was a concomitant clarification of the gendered lines 
of separation of social spaces: the inner, private and domestic was in-
creasingly understood as feminine space and the outer, public and non-
domestic as masculine space: this, according to Chatterjee, was part of 
the ‘nationalist resolution of the woman question’.11 Of course, this is 
too schematic a representation of the situation to sustain historical scru-
tiny; as Manisha Sethi notes: 
Not only is such a rigorous division untenable, but also that woman’s 
question [sic] did not silently fade away as [Partha Chatterjee] implies. It 
continued to figure prominently in the public debates. Women, their bod-
ies and their sexuality continued to inform the nationalist discourses and 
fore grounded publicly despite their so-called relegation to the private 
sphere even well into the 20th century.12 
Further, as Anupama Rao notes,  
[S]ocial reform in colonial India modernised gendered relations in the up-
per-caste family while often dispossessing lower-caste women of their 
rights to property and inheritance in attempts to homogenise caste and 
community-specific laws regarding such practices. (Rao 2003a) 
Consequently, the clarification of social spaces that Partha Chatterjee 
observes taking place in the nineteenth century, must be understood as 
an important but partial component of the broader ongoing process that 
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we noted above: the consolidation of upper caste (specifically Brahmani-
cal) patriarchal hegemony – which Chatterjee identifies as the ‘new patri-
archy’ (1993b: 128) – as the normative frame in the construction of the 
identity ‘Hindu’. The ‘personal’ became the space where the Brahmanical 
hegemony that was already in place across the subcontinent from at least 
the beginning of the millennium (as we noted in the previous chapter) 
would be re-inscribed, in the articulation and definition of the ‘Hindu’ 
community. But crucially, the ‘personal’ also now became the space 
where Brahmanical hegemony was striving to establish itself as a ‘new 
patriarchy’, as the gendered identity of the community. Hence the emer-
gence of the discourse that situated the nation on the bodies of its wom-
en, contrasting the purity of Indian womanhood to the immorality and 
spiritual barrenness of English women.13 The questions that then arise 
are, of course, why an upper caste hegemony that had already been in 
place for several centuries now sought to transform its patriarchal organ-
isation – to re-image itself as a ‘new patriarchy’ – and what the arrange-
ments of this new patriarchy were. 
The ‘New’ Patriarchy 
The answer lies partly in the specificity of colonial contact. Colonial and 
Orientalist discourses of gender, civilisation, modernity and power en-
gaged with their native upper caste counterparts in complex and dynamic 
ways. This engagement eventually incited a hybrid discourse of gendered 
identity and nationalism. Hansen refers to the “double discourse” of co-
lonial governance, one of which was of domination in relation to the ‘ir-
rational, passionate and traditional’, essentially subaltern, masses; and the 
other of persuasion and negotiation, in relation to the educated middle 
classes, literate provincial elites, leaders of castes, sects and petty king-
doms and of religious communities (Hansen 1999: 32). The Thomas Ma-
caulay proposal of 1835 – to deliberately fashion through English educa-
tion a compliant class of westernised Indians who would help rule by 
proxy – was abandoned after 1857, in favour of courting the traditional 
elites; nevertheless, English education and European political values and 
concepts gained enormous prestige in the circles of the communal and 
caste elites (Seth 1999; Guha 1997). The most important consequence of 
this was that the terms of political engagement between the British and 
the (moderate) nationalist leadership, right until independence, were 
drawn from these values and concepts. As Ranajit Guha notes: 
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Both [British and nationalists] proceeded from the standpoint of liberalism 
to regard the colonial state as an organic extension of the metropolitan 
bourgeois state and colonialism as an adaptation, if not a replication of the 
classical bourgeois culture of the West in English rendering. Generally 
speaking, that phenomenon was regarded by both as a positive confirma-
tion of the universalising tendency of capital….(1997: 3-4) 
Through the “double discourse” of colonial governmentality, the Brit-
ish tacitly bestowed, on the one hand, the powers of representation in 
the public sphere only on the educated and the rural elites, thereby ex-
cluding the vast numbers of ‘irrational’ masses; and on the other, specifi-
cally after the controversy over the Age of Consent Bill of 1891, conced-
ed to them almost inviolable rights of governance in the personal or 
private sphere. Mrinalini Sinha has argued that the discourse of de-
masculinisation that accompanied colonialism was reactively countered 
by the assertion of control over the domestic or personal realm. This 
must be understood though, not as a sign of the strength of the national-
ist elites in encountering and countering colonial dominance: this, far 
from challenging colonial power, was aligned with and sanctioned by it 
(Sinha 1995: 140). It is now well established that a very influential section 
of this early nationalist elite, in fact, far from countering colonial power, 
repeatedly avowed the importance of continued British rule in India. The 
double discourse then was more a sign of the uneven and contradictory 
operations of imperial power in its colonial setting.14 The specific prob-
lem that the nationalist elites consequently had was not that the British 
were ruling India; rather, it was the inevitable disjunction that this double 
discourse wrought between colonial political ideologies and colonial 
practice: British rule was criticised for not being “British” enough,15 inso-
far as it limited elite agency and control to the realm of the personal – a 
limitation that could easily be, and was, understood in gendered terms, as 
we shall shortly see. 
4.4 Emulation or Imitation? 
The Problem of Poverty 
Much of this early criticism though, was aimed not at achieving self-
governance (and in this sense was, in Sanjay Seth’s words, ‘“nationalist” 
almost by default, inasmuch as the petitioners were Indian and the peti-
tioned British.’ (Seth 1999: 101)) Rather, it was obsessed with the prob-
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lem of poverty in India, which, it was believed, a truly “British” rule 
could ameliorate instead of exacerbating (as articulated so felicitously in 
the “drain of wealth” theory). However, as Seth points out, the growing 
concern about the poverty of India amongst the nationalist elites in the 
later half of the nineteenth century is matched by their lack of any actual 
concern for the poor. He suggests that the reason for this is not just their 
prioritisation of class over national concerns but that poverty for them 
‘functioned as a metaphor for backwardness, which under colonial con-
ditions meant powerlessness and humiliation.’ (Seth 1999: 105) British 
rule could and should ameliorate poverty, in this view, not through direct 
programmes but through economic and industrial modernisation – 
which is why British policies aimed at improving labour conditions or 
tenant security were vocally opposed as harmful to Indian enterprise. He 
goes on to note that for the nationalists, 
To become modern and strong, India had to emulate England – and the 
unspoken question behind the poverty debate was, “Why, after more than 
a century of British rule, has India not become powerful and wealthy like 
Britain?” (Seth 1999: 106) 
Such an emulation was practicable only through first gaining access 
to, participating in and then establishing control over the processes of 
economic and industrial modernisation, as well as the capital it required 
– all of which lay in the public domain under British control, and all of 
which required a complex restructuring of the existing, localised, caste-
specific relations between gender and labour. I will return to this obser-
vation momentarily. 
A host of scholars (Nandy 1983, Kakar 1990, Chatterjee 1986, etc) 
have noted the profound impact of ‘the hyper-masculinist discourse of 
British Orientalism in India’ (M Sinha, 1999: 447) and the consequent 
Indian imitation of colonial Victorian notions of masculinity. Their ar-
guments however, focus largely on the perception, adoption, reproduc-
tion and adaptation of attributes and dispositions identified as masculine 
by (for the most part) the Indian elites, who were most in contact with 
the British. Such a line of argument is both insufficient and flawed: it 
tends to be – wittingly or not – patronizing in seeing the colonized Indi-
an elites as unreflexive, un-selfconscious mimics of the British. While 
this may or may not be true, it also treats masculinity as simply a set of 
transferable epiphenomena, a cultural currency of attributes and disposi-
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tions that were purchased, used and exchanged in the marketplace of 
colonial cultural semes – rather like sartorial accessories, readymade to 
be attached or detached on a uniform and undifferentiated base. I have 
already discussed the uses and limitations of this line of reasoning in 
Chapter II. Suffice it here to note that these arguments are actually allud-
ing to the gendered representational manifestations of a deeper structural 
process: that of the search for socio-economic parity that formed the 
beginnings of anti-colonial resistance. The process of masculinization of 
the Indian elites discerned here is thus an effect of changes in the struc-
tural arrangements and composition of Brahmanical patriarchy and its 
growth and spread into a masculine hegemony. It may be may be under-
stood less as blind imitation and more as the effect of a process of social 
reverse-engineering, as it were – seeking to restructure social spaces, and 
their concomitant hierarchies, as well as their gendering, in such a way 
that they matched the prescriptions and demands of the colonizer, and 
its concomitant hierarchies and gendering.16 And, as perhaps with all 
processes of reverse engineering, the end product was less an imitation 
than a hybrid, since the aim was not replication of the imperial socius, 
and its divisions and distributions, but the safeguarding of the economic 
and political interests of the Indian elites. Arguably then, the masculini-
zation of the public sphere was not so much an effect of cultural mimic-
ry as the consequence of a very specific socio-economic imperative: the 
protection and propagation of upper caste patriarchal interests.  
The problem for the nationalists was that British economic policies 
fell in the domain of ‘public’ law, outside the jurisdiction of the patriar-
chal elites who dictated ‘personal’ laws. In order to influence these, it was 
necessary for them to position and present themselves – by virtue of 
their educated ability to better appreciate the benefits of British rule on 
the one hand, and of their proximity in manners, custom and religion to 
the uneducated masses on the other – as a mediating class between the 
two. In other words, they sought to straddle the divide between the pub-
lic and personal realms carved by the colonial administration, claiming 
representative status of the one in the other. 
Problematising Imitation: Gendering the Economic 
It was in this context that the constitution of the personal laws became 
crucial. As we have already noted, Hindu personal law was determined in 
and through the contestations over social and religious reform among 
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the Brahmanical elite, primarily between the westernised liberals and the 
conservative revivalists. These reform movements invoked diverse 
sources of sanction – the scriptures or shastras, western liberal values, 
and importantly, caste and community practices, which could often only 
be vouched for by numbers.17 Increasingly then, social reform became 
political movement – more strident, more communalised, and more de-
termined by upper caste dispositions and interests than ever before. It is 
important to note that, consequently, the meanings of the ‘public’ and 
‘private’ were constituted in a fashion singular to this colonial context. 
The entire debate on the constitution of the personal took place dissoci-
ated from the liberal capitalist history that had so informed and fash-
ioned the discourse of the public and the private in the context of Brit-
ain. There, the gendering of social spaces –marking the public as 
masculine and the domestic as feminine – was a concomitant, even nec-
essary condition for the consolidation of the bourgeoisie and the spread 
of capitalism and liberal hegemony (Fox-Genovese 1991). In the Indian 
context, the gendering of social spaces was overdetermined by issues of 
caste and community. While the nationalist elite shared the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie’s belief in the universalising tendency of capital (to return to 
Ranajit Guha’s observation), it was subject on the one hand to criticism 
of its personal laws (or private spaces) from that same bourgeoisie, and 
on the other, to debates on the constitution of the personal within its 
own communal and caste formations. Moreover, the debate was embed-
ded in a context in which the idea of a coherent, specifically Indian 
economy – which this same elite, whether in rural or urban areas, already 
had enormous stakes in – was beginning to emerge consistently with and 
through the nationalist economic critiques of colonial rule. Perhaps nev-
er before in the subcontinent had the relations of economic to political 
power been drawn so extensively and explicitly as under colonial rule: 
the advent and establishment of communication and transportation on a 
scale hitherto never witnessed by the subcontinent, along with a vision 
(and practice) of industry and commerce that was (at least theoretically) 
unbounded by restraints of caste, creed, language or (perhaps most im-
portantly) region – these were instrumental in the emergence of this new 
relation of economic to political power.18 At stake in the determination 
of personal law then was not just the communal identity, but also the 
ability of the communal elites to claim that identity representatively in 
negotiating with the imperial state on matters in the public domain, par-
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ticularly in the formulation and implementation of its economic policies. 
The nature of the public-personal dichotomy was thus qualitatively dif-
ferent in the Indian context, marked not by secularisation and the de-
mands of liberal capitalism, but by the extension and entrenchment of 
upper caste, upper class patriarchies into communal patriarchies. The 
aim was thus as much to construct and consolidate communal identity as 
to secure hegemonic control over economic and industrial modernisa-
tion along the lines of imperial Britain – in fact, the one was a necessary 
condition for the other. That is, for the belief in the potential of capital-
ism to reproduce its effects (of modernisation and industrial success), it 
was first necessary to secure control over capital, production and distri-
bution through the new politics of representation. At the heart of the na-
tionalist movement then, was a drive to emulation that was not a mere 
imitative gendering that effectively feminised the realm of the personal 
but was additionally, undercut by a sense of racial and economic inferior-
ity, as well as crosscut by communal and caste divisions.19 
It must be clarified here that the feminization of the personal was not 
in itself a particularly new phenomenon, nor specifically a consequence 
of or reaction to British colonialism, but was already an integral part of 
upper caste – specifically Brahmanical – gender relations. What was new 
was what Soma Marik refers to as the modernization of this patriarchy,20 
by way of structural modifications to meet and exploit the demands of 
the imperial political and economic order, and the cellular propagation of 
these modified structures through the ranks of the caste system. The 
most striking instance of such modernization is probably the case of 
transformations in land relations introduced by the British, and their im-
pact on gender. The British introduced two kinds of changes into Indian 
land relations, the zamindari and the ryotwari systems.21 They both served 
to introduce the notion of private ownership of land, and in that process, 
dramatically altered the dynamics of all social relations, including gender. 
Veena Oldenburg (2002) has shown how this was in particular responsi-
ble for the transformation in the understanding of dowry. Anupama Rao 
summarizes Oldenburg’s argument thus: 
British attempts to rationalize the economy meant that they homogenized 
and codified laws, especially those regarding land tenure, and in that pro-
cess women became invisible, they became dependants on men. So colo-
nial law, what we historians have tended to call Anglo-Indian law, in fact 
enabled a more masculine economy to emerge. Boys also became more 
 The Emergence of the Hindu Right - II 109 
important in this economy, and the higher social worth of boys meant that 
dowry became a sort of economic transaction through which the groom's 
family made demands on the bride's family- i.e., we are taking care of her, 
she is less worthy, she's not capable of working in a commoditized econ-
omy, et cetera. So dowry by the 1850's went from being a way of showing 
the appreciation a family had for their daughter to becoming a demand. 
…. 
Briefly put, we might argue that though colonial governance might have 
rendered certain spheres of Indian society more free by bringing them into 
the domain of Western progress and improvement, it did so erratically, 
without great awareness of the contradictory processes it had initiated in 
indigenous society. Colonial law's intervention in matters of sexual propri-
ety and caste morality strengthened the sovereignty the colonial state 
claimed for itself, and it strengthened upper-caste privilege and patriarchy 
(2003). 
Evidently here, the practice of dowry was not abandoned within the 
new political economy; rather, it changed in value and meaning, and in 
turn served to change the values and meanings of the specific genders. 
Ownership of land and property came to be masculinized even more 
explicitly then they already were, with women losing almost all rights of 
possession.22 The demand to meet the revenues levied by the British ad-
ministration now fell on individual landowners, rather than the commu-
nity, leading to greater indebtedness. Additionally, it was increasingly 
possible for males to gain employment in or through the British admin-
istration – in the army, police, and lower administration, in particular – 
but not for women, leading to a premium being placed on male children, 
and the consequent demand for dowry as a compensatory source of in-
come for a debt ridden family. This in turn led to greater control being 
exercised over women’s sexuality, as the means of reproduction of the 
(male) community and the sole guarantee of patrilineality. Concomitant-
ly, through these changes, as women came more and more explicitly to 
be associated with being property rather than having property, the already 
existent upper caste seclusion of women into the personal/private do-
main began to gain in popularity amongst the other castes – a practice 
further impelled by, on the one hand, the competitive demands of the 
colonial economy and its tacit blindness to the costs of female labour 
(whether in the public or private domains) (Nirmala Banerjee 1999); and, 
on the other, British and Hindu protectionist, social reformist interven-
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tions in other areas – sati, child marriage, widow remarriage, polygamy, 
women’s education. This one instance amply demonstrates the fact that 
the transformations in Brahmanical patriarchy, and its increasingly evi-
dent masculinization, were not simply a consequence of socio-cultural 
emulation, but the effects of very specific changes in the political econ-
omy of the period. This trend only accelerated with the growth and 
spread of the nationalist movement, and its calls for greater Indian par-
ticipation – leading eventually to autonomous charge through independ-
ence – in the economy, industry and administration of the realm. 
4.5 The Consolidation of the ‘New’ Patriarchy and the 
National Community 
To return now to the questions we had posed earlier – why an already 
entrenched upper caste dominance now sought to transform its patriar-
chal organisation as a ‘new patriarchy’, and what the arrangements of this 
new patriarchy were – it becomes clear that such a transformation was 
not only necessary but inevitable. As Kaviraj (1999) has convincingly ar-
gued, the structures of relations within and between pre-colonial com-
munities, while precisely defined in terms of everyday practices and con-
duct, were “fuzzy”, in that the numbers, distribution and location of 
community members were not factors in determining the identity of the 
community. This arrangement – aptly described as ‘a circle of circles of 
caste and regional communities, with the state sitting at the centre’ by 
Kaviraj – sustained Brahmanical dominance to the extent that the latter 
both imposed and guaranteed the caste system itself; but within this ar-
rangement, the individual patriarchal organisation of each community 
operated relatively autonomously, and was not necessarily bound by 
Brahmanical codes and rituals. In contrast, the colonial administrative 
apparatus drew on and introduced a conceptual universe of rationality, 
instrumentalism and enumeration that demanded a radical re-
construction of the very bases of identity and community formation. Su-
parna Bhaskaran, for instance, cites Macaulay as saying,  
‘I believe no country ever stood in so much need of a code of law as India 
and I believe also that there never was a country in which the want might 
be so easily supplied. Our principle is simply this – uniformity when you 
can have it; diversity when you must have it; but, in all cases, certainty.’ 
She goes on to state that, 
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Those who prepared the Indian Penal Code (IPC) drew on English law, 
Hindu law, Muslim law, Livingstone’s Louisiana Code, and the Code Na-
poleon. Disregarding the numerous complex variations of customary law 
and practice prevailing among Hindus and Muslims in different parts of 
the country, Macaulay decided that all Muslims were governed by the 
Quran and all Hindus by the Manusmriti. (Bhaskaran 2002: 20) 
To elaborate this: the colonial apparatus, as it gradually entrenched it-
self, was faced with the choice of either recognising each caste and reli-
gious community separately (and thereby preserving the existing order of 
social relations) or subsuming them all under the general racial-religious 
rubric of ‘Hindu’ (defined in consultation with the perceived religious 
leadership of the Brahmins and which stood in a singular relation to the 
colonial state). The initial response of the colonial state was the former, 
but when it became clear that the bewildering plethora of community 
distinctions was potentially infinite and seemingly without any recog-
nisable rationale, it very quickly switched to the latter course of action, in 
conformity with its own conceptual and ideological orientation23 – the 
process we have outlined above. The new dispensation offered the pos-
sibility of realising clear institutional and economic gains of a sufficiently 
common kind, cutting across the separate circles of communities, 
through mobilisation and collective action directed at a highly centralised 
state (Kaviraj 1999: 147-8). The location of identity was consequently not 
just in the complex dynamics of social relations anymore, but increasing-
ly in a more instrumental understanding of representation and collectivi-
ties as well. Upper caste domination that hitherto had remained embed-
ded in – and therefore constrained by – the intricate web of social 
relations, was faced with a new task: that of speaking for the community 
from its position of dominance, and yet retaining that dominance despite 
being a minority, in the emerging politics of numbers and representation. 
As communal identity progressively came to be decided by the consti-
tution of the practices of the personal, upper caste dominance, whether 
in reformist or in conservative garb, sought to cast the sphere of the per-
sonal for the entire community in the image of its own constructions of 
the personal – i.e., in the organisation of Brahmanical patriarchy. Signifi-
cantly, both conservatives and liberals amongst the Brahmanical elite 
were united on the approach to two important issues, caste and gender: 
both wanted to subsume, even erase questions of caste in the projected 
construction of the ‘Hindu’ identity, while gender reconstruction in the 
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juridical institutionalisation of personal-communal practices became the 
principal basis of that identity. Thus, the conservative elite sought to es-
tablish Brahmanical practices (specially of gender) as valid for all castes, 
in their attempts to homogenise ‘Hinduism’; the westernised liberal elite 
in turn sought to erase caste practices of any kind as a corruption of 
‘Hinduism’. On the issue of gender however, the latter experimented 
with varying amalgamations of Brahmanical and liberal values and prac-
tices – strongly encouraging the education of women, for instance, but 
floundering most often on the questions of women’s control over their 
sexuality or of the nature and extent of their participation in the public 
realm.24 
It was soon evident that, in the new political arrangement, control in 
the public sphere could be regained (to some extent at least) through 
mobilising and controlling numbers – which demanded that the entire 
corpus of communities that could be labelled ‘Hindu’ be shown to share 
and participate in Brahmanical ideologies of the personal. Here, the dis-
course of de-masculinisation that accompanied the reduction of elite 
power served a dual purpose: on the one hand, it incited a reactive limit-
ing of colonial power to the realm of the public, and the concomitant 
preservation of native patriarchies in the realm of the personal; on the 
other, through this very reaction, it became the basis for Brahmanical 
patriarchy to present and establish itself as the more culturally, even civi-
lisationally evolved, superior to both the British and the other (more ‘de-
generate’) caste patriarchies – philosophically, spiritually, ideologically. 
The location of superiority in the realm of the personal produced two 
dovetailing discursive effects: one, because the personal was the realm of 
the spiritual (and of a sense of spiritual superiority arising out of a claim 
to spiritual purity), the sense of national identity evolving reactively to 
British imperialism was almost inevitably founded on religiosity and reli-
gious communalism; and two, the transformation of this spirituality from 
an inchoate, apparently fissiparous diversity of ideas and practices into a 
singular homogeneous entity, Hinduism, could only be effected through 
social, rather than religious, restructuring25 – a restructuring at the heart 
of which lay ‘the woman question’.  
To elaborate on this change, it is necessary to remember that pre-
colonial caste relations were as much about the social and economic in-
ter-dependency of the different castes present in any given region, a 
condition in which multiple patriarchies co-existed in hierarchical for-
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mation but were not, as divergent patriarchal structures, the sole bases of 
caste difference.26 The latter were as much interpreted and realised 
through differences in social function, economic status, regional dispari-
ties of wealth distribution, and so on. Under the colonial regime’s radical 
interventions in the sphere of contractual laws and in the new represen-
tational politics with its demand for caste to be subsumed under a single 
religious identity, these other modes of marking caste differences reced-
ed behind the concern with instituting a specific form of masculine he-
gemony as definitive of the ‘Hindu’ community. The personal realm as 
the repository of the feminine became an essential means of reifying 
Brahmanical gender practices as representing a ‘Hindu’ communal patri-
archate, through their (intended) restructuring of and replication in other 
caste patriarchies. Thus Brahmanical patriarchy assumed hegemonic 
proportions as definitive of ‘Hindu-ness’ precisely because Brahmanical 
dominance in other spheres of social relations began to weaken.27 Exist-
ing patriarchates therefore came under immense pressure to accept and 
adopt Brahmanical values and practices as their own, as discursively and 
ideologically powerful enough to counter the possibility of British inter-
vention, and its accompanying mark of de-masculinisation. I will return 
later to the specific dynamics of this masculinization; for now, it must be 
noted that it was thus in and through the personal realm that Brahmani-
cal patriarchy became the basis of the transformation of a qualified 
Brahmanical dominance (in pre-colonial times) into extended Brahmani-
cal hegemony (from coloniality onward) – a masculine hegemony that 
was strongly emulative of the colonial power on the one hand and yet 
often oriented oppositionally toward it in the imagination and construc-
tion of a unified ‘Hindu’ community on the other.  
4.6 Political Dynamics of the ‘New’ Patriarchy 
It is important to note that the transformation of patriarchy outlined 
above was not uniform either temporally or spatially, but varied in inten-
sity, tempo and ideological and structural specificities from region to re-
gion. The ways in which Brahmanical masculine hegemony evolved in 
Bengal (under the heavy influence of the Prarthana Samaj, and later the 
Ramakrishna missions) differed substantially from its evolution in say, 
Punjab (through the contests and compromises between the Arya Samaj 
and the Sanatana Dharma movements) or Kerala (where it negotiated the 
matrilineality of the Nairs on the one hand and the rise of the lower caste 
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Sri Narayana Guru movement on the other). Further, at no point in this 
process can we observe a completion, the extension of Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony was constantly challenged, resisted and hindered 
almost as much as it was advanced. The hindrance came from several 
sources and in several forms: in the strategic indifference of the colonial 
power to native agendas of social transformation, in the contests be-
tween diverse such agendas, in the emergence of independent lower 
caste and tribal movements, in the proselytism of Christian missionaries, 
and so on. The ceaseless engagement with these various hindrances was 
to render the evolving hegemony somewhat fragile and fractious, but 
nevertheless manifestly an upper-caste hegemony. Further, when this 
hegemony sought to establish itself nationally, it also encountered re-
sistance from other communal patriarchates, with telling consequences 
for the nationalist, anti-imperialist struggle. So, even before it could es-
tablish itself with any coherence, by the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, upper caste patriarchal hegemony was already being torn by the 
centrifugal pull of multiple contradictory imperatives. The vital require-
ment to project and establish itself as representative of not just the Hin-
du community, but of all of India, was undercut on the one hand by in-
creasing opposition, within this very hegemony, between the moderates 
and the extremists as well as between secular and Hindu nationalists; and 
on the other hand by hostility from other external hegemonic for-
mations. The most telling instances of these were in the splitting of the 
Indian National Congress – by then already the most effective institu-
tional organization of upper-caste hegemony – into the moderates and 
the extremists, and the formation of the Muslim League in opposition to 
the Congress (perceiving it to be essentially a Hindu party), both in 1906. 
The intricacies of the politics of the period have been studies and com-
mented on ad infinitum, and do not require rehearsal here. Instead, I 
would like to pay attention to some specificities of this politics that are 
pertinent to our understanding of the evolution of Hindu nationalism.  
To begin with, it is essential to understand that both, the internal frac-
turing of the Brahmanical patriarchate and the external scission from it 
of particularly the Muslim communal patriarchate, were catalysed specifi-
cally by the attempt to transform social restructuring programs into the 
singular political agenda of anti-imperialist nationalism. While this was 
probably inevitable, the fact of the fracturing has tended to suggest a 
greater ideological disparity than there actually was. Differences within 
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the Brahmanical patriarchate arose primarily on the question of swaraj 
(self-rule): how much was sought, by when and by and for whom. Till 
the early decades of the twentieth century, the moderate-dominated 
INC’s nationalism was confined to articulating a desire for greater Indian 
participation specifically in the administration and commerce of the sub-
continent, and the political and economic rights it claimed were explicitly 
sought for the educated elite.28 The extremists, in contrast, wanted an 
immediate end to British rule, and were willing to take up arms to this 
end. The extremists were also more concerned about the plight of the 
rural peasant masses, and sought to draw attention to it, as much as mo-
bilise these masses – often through religious institutions and practices – 
against the British; but for them too the end was rule by the educated 
elite rather than revolutionary transfer of power to the people.29 For 
both, the first priority of the nationalist movement was clearly to protect 
the economic and social interests of upper caste patriarchy, and to en-
sure control over the social restructuring that was already underway – 
even if they did not always agree on the precise terms of that restructur-
ing (traditionalists versus reformers, Arya Samajists versus Sanatan 
Dharmis, etc). Both the extremists and the moderates – who remained 
the dominant group in the INC throughout – are further divisible into 
Hindu traditionalists and secularists, resulting in a general distribution 
that can be represented in the following table (with some leading names 
to illustrate the schisms):  
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Table: Political Composition of the INC 
 Moderates Extremists 
Hindu Traditionalists Gokhale, Gandhi 
(Box 1) 
Tilak, Aurobindo 
(Box 2) 
Hindu national-
ists* (Box 5) 
Secularists Nehru (Box 3) Bhagat Singh, Bose 
(Box 4) 
* This cell is deliberately appended to the table to represent the uneasy equation of the 
Hindu nationalists with the INC, sharing many of the characteristics of the adjacent cell, yet 
following an independent ideological trajectory. 
 
 
Put differently, the INC was predominantly a Hindu traditionalist, 
moderate organisation, obliged by its resolve to follow non-conflictual 
Constitutional methods of reform, as well as by its pan-Indian repre-
sentative ambitions, to adopt a secular stance.30 Its emphasis on constitu-
tional means distanced it from the extremists, on the one hand, and its 
obligatory secular stance distanced it from the Hindu nationalists, on the 
other. However, as is evident from the table, the thin line separating ex-
tremist Hindu traditionalists from Hindu nationalists meant that, even 
after the INC split in 1906, both could and did retain strong influence 
and a continued presence on a fairly large scale in the INC – marked for 
instance by the reunion of the breakaway extremists with the moderates 
of the INC in the period of the first world war. Further, several leaders 
of the INC were closely associated with Hindu nationalist organisations 
like the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS at various points in time, while 
others were either actively involved in them or at least openly endorsed 
them. Thus, its fundamentally upper caste Hindu orientation and con-
cerns ensured both, that it was ideologically never very far from the Hin-
du nationalists and that it would (inevitably) invite sustained suspicion 
from the Muslim communal leadership.31 Additionally, the INC was bit-
terly critiqued and rejected by important lower caste leaders like Phule 
and Periyar for what they saw as its Brahmanical caste chauvinism,32 in 
fact, during the partition of Bengal in 1905, the Nama Shudras of Bengal 
formed an alliance with the Muslims, supporting partition against the 
upper caste nationalist resistance to it.33 In effect then, the only major 
point of difference between the dominant sentiment in the INC – as op-
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posed to its official ideological stand – and the persuasions of the Hindu 
nationalists, was on whether or not the nation, post-independence, could 
be explicitly identified and claimed as a Hindu nation. 
4.7 A Brief Recap 
In the above discussion, I have sought to show that the reform move-
ments of the nineteenth century and the introduction of representational 
politics, as well as the increasing awareness of the economic consequenc-
es of imperialism, led to the gradual restructuring of Brahmanical patriar-
chy from a set of similar but differentiated, localised, caste- and sect-
specific arrangements into a broad-based communal hegemony that 
sought to protect and promote upper caste interests, and necessitate for 
them a greater, more effective role in the new economic and political 
dispensation of imperialism.34 We have already noted that this hegemony 
was sought to be founded on the evolving separation of the public/civic 
from the private/personal domains. It essentially involved the replication 
and propagation of Brahmanical gender-practices (of the concentration 
and treatment of women-related issues in the private realm as ‘personal’ 
issues) and the concomitant embedding of these in a religio-spiritualist 
discourse – which as we have noted, ensured that the resultant national-
ism that was emerging would necessarily be deeply coloured by religion. 
But besides the pervasive politico-religious element, the emphasis on lo-
cating issues relating to the family, women, inheritance, etc in the per-
sonal realm had the consequence noted earlier: the inevitable masculini-
zation of the public arena – not just through the exclusion of women 
from it, but through the fact that that exclusion was also a form of direct 
control over women – i.e., it worked through confinement, the monitor-
ing and regulation of sexuality, arranged marital alliances, de-legitimisa-
tion of widowhood, sexual violence, denial of education and of financial 
autonomy, etc. The forms of control over women and their bodies guar-
anteed the masculinity of the men, since it not only indicated ownership 
(a male privilege), it also established not-being-controlled as not-being-
feminine, i.e., as being masculine. The gendered conception of pos-
sessing agency (or not) could and did slip easily into upper caste self-
perception (communal and individual) in relation to the colonizer – fem-
inised by virtue of lacking agency/being controlled – and in relation to 
other communities – threatened masculinity, by virtue of limited agen-
cy/lack of control. To reiterate the point, it is clear then that the dis-
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courses and practices of masculinization that began to mark the Brah-
manical patriarchate in the nineteenth century were thus not simply in 
imitation of the hyper-masculinity of the British, but generated from 
within the socio-economic transformations that this patriarchate was un-
dergoing. Arguably then, this arrangement was the basis of the ideologi-
cal core common to the entire nationalist movement, irrespective of oth-
er hues (secular/moderate/traditional/Hindu nationalist/etc).35 Taking 
this together with the fact of the sharpening of communal lines of sepa-
ration, it was inevitable that community formations and confrontations – 
whether between Hindus and Muslims or between colonizer and colo-
nized – came to be articulated in a deeply gendered discourse. It is at 
least partly as a result of this that the last decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury witnessed a sharp increase in incidents of communal violence – an 
increase that was to sustain, and in some areas further intensify, especial-
ly through the 1920s, right through the decades to the carnage of Parti-
tion.  
4.8 Problematising Violence 
Two clarifications are required immediately: one, the point here is not 
that there were not other causes to communal violence, or that they were 
any less in significance: they range in explanatory variety from ‘socio-
economic tensions’ amongst the labour in industry, ‘agrarian disturban-
ces’ (S Sarkar, 1983: 60-3), middle class cow protection movements (Za-
vos, 2000: 81-7), the Montford reforms and separate electorates (S 
Sarkar, 1983: 234-5), to anxieties about communal sexuality and Muslim 
population growth (amongst Hindus) and Hindu unification (amongst 
Muslims), to (later), the two nation theory. The point is that, whatever 
the cause(s) of the communal violence, it occurred (or at least began) in 
the realm of the public, an already definitively masculinized realm, and 
more importantly, a realm increasingly torn by inter- and intra-communi-
ty competition for the available politico-economic stakes. In this compe-
tition being manifested through violence, repeatedly, specially between 
religious communities, there is evident the dominance of a particular dis-
course of masculinity, both in the perceived ‘problems’ (of whatever 
kind) and in their violent ‘management’. The second clarification follows 
from this: to argue thus is not to suggest a ‘natural’ relation between vio-
lence and masculinity, per se, but rather the production, propagation and 
prevalence of a specific understanding of masculinity in the public realm 
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(with, of course, an attendant impact on the private/personal). In both 
clarifications the specific hegemonic masculinity being referred to is the 
association of masculinity with power and the concomitant association 
of femininity with powerlessness. The arrangements of this hegemony, 
with its relegation of women to the private/personal domain, and all its 
attendant implications of control and agency, were hitherto exercised as 
a form of gender organisation, primarily in the upper and middle castes; 
they now, however, became a marker of communal identity. The recon-
struction of the ‘private’ in terms of ‘personal law’, and the concomitant 
establishment of the ‘public’ as a territorial, pan-Indian category, ensured 
that gender organisation in the ‘private’ now had resonances in the ‘per-
sonal’, and consequently in the ‘public’ realms, so that the masculine he-
gemony of Brahmanical patriarchy now seeped through into the con-
struction of the community in the competitions of the public sphere, and 
brought with it its preferred form of hegemonic masculinity. The heated 
debates around the Age of Consent Bill, the Widow Remarriage Act, etc, 
stand testimony to this. 
Order and ‘Danda’ 
How and why did violence feature in the articulation of this hegemonic 
masculinity? The answer to this question is layered and complex. British 
presence in India, at least by this time, was by no stretch of the imagina-
tion maintained by consensus, let alone through democratically registered 
choice on the part of the Indians. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
it had ‘evolved through complex layers of cooptation, complicity and 
transformation’ (Hansen, 1999: 32), frequently entailing coercion and 
disciplinary action (in diverse proportions and measures, depending on 
region, circumstances, strength of resistance, etc). Ranajit Guha identifies 
two kinds of legitimations of violence in the colonial public realm, 
wrought into interaction in the service of the colonial state apparatus: 
one, the colonial language of Order and the other, ‘the idiom of Danda 
which was central to all indigenous notions of dominance’ (original em-
phases; Guha, 1997: 28). ‘Order’ was maintained by and through the co-
lonial army, penal system, police force and bureaucracy; further, ‘Order, 
as an idiom of state violence, constituted a distinctive feature of colonial-
ism primarily in one respect:…it was allowed to intrude again and again 
into many such areas of the life of the people as would be firmly kept 
out of bounds in metropolitan Britain.’ (Guha, 1997: 28)36 ‘Danda’, 
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drawn from ancient Indian polity and based on monarchical absolutism, 
‘emphasizes force and fear as the fundamental principle of politics’ 
(Guha, 1989: 238). In the Laws of Manu, Danda is described as the son of 
the ‘supreme generative deity Brahman himself’, ‘a red-eyed, dark-
skinned god’, ‘the universal authority’ (Guha, 1989: 238). Guha further 
notes that  
All the semi-feudal practices and theories of power which had come 
down intact from the pre-colonial era or were remoulded, without being 
radically altered, under the impact of colonialism, fed in varying degrees 
on this idiom. The private feudal armies and levies, caste and territorial 
panchayats governed by local elite authority, caste sanctions imposed by 
the elite and religious sanctions by the priesthood, bonded labour and 
begar [forced labour], the partial entitlement of landlords to civilian and criminal 
jurisdiction over the tenantry, punitive measures taken against women for 
disobeying patriarchal moral codes, elite violence organized on sectarian, 
ethnic and caste lines, etc., are all instances of [colonial coercion] framed 
in the idiom of Danda. (Guha, 1997: 28-9; emphasis added)37 
Hansen makes a similar point when he discusses the notion of sover-
eignty in the Indian context: he notes that the creation of the Penal Code 
in 1833 was an attempt to homogenize the public/civic realm and estab-
lish a monopoly of violence by the state, as a means of maintaining 
“public interest” – an entirely new concept in the subcontinent. Howev-
er,  
Beyond a few high-profile attempts to curb what were seen as traditional 
ills of Indian society [sati, ‘thuggee’], local forms of justice and/or revenge 
were dispensed by powerful families, or local notables or strongmen with-
out much interference from the judicial system or the police. In spite of 
this obvious fragmentation and lack of a monopoly of violence, the colo-
nial officers were determined to assert and perform the paramountcy of 
colonial power. (Hansen 2005: 119) 
Hansen also spatializes these disparate practices of violence, locating 
that of the colonial power – corresponding to Guha’s ‘Order’ – in the 
urban centres and predominantly amongst the upper class, upper caste 
elite; while the indigenous practices of authoritarian violence – corre-
sponding to ‘Danda’ – remained the prerogative of the rural elite, in the 
‘outlying areas of the colonial territory’ (Hansen 2005: 119). In other 
words, the topography of the public realm as it evolved through the 
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competitive formation of caste and religious communities was not only 
indelibly marked by its masculinization (in terms of the exclusion of 
women from it), but was wrought and shaped by two interacting con-
cepts of legitimised violence. Put another way, notions of legitimised violence 
and male exclusivity were historically conjunctured as dovetailing constituent and in-
teractive elements in the structuring, orientations and dispositions of the public realm 
as it evolved in the nineteenth century. 
Gender, Community, Violence 
To understand the complex relations between violence, masculinity and 
community formation in the public sphere at this time then, it is first 
necessary to recall that the shaping of community identity in the nine-
teenth century was severely gendered, was even defined more or less en-
tirely on the basis of differences in the communal organisation of gender 
and sexuality. The public articulation of that identity was also thus inevi-
tably gendered, and since the public was by now definitively masculine 
space, that gendering of identity was also inevitably masculine. The 
choice of strategy – violent or non-violent politics – as a means of articu-
lating communal identity also thus came to be gendered, as masculine or 
non-masculine. Again, this does not in itself explain the turn to violence 
– the reasons for that remained various and situation, region and event 
specific – but it opens the possibility for violence to be repeatedly articu-
lated and interpreted in gendered terms. If we now examine the evolving 
communal patriarchates and their nationalist discourses in this context, 
we note that, at the level of the elites, nationalist discourse was articulat-
ed in two ways: one, against the British, and anti-imperialist; the other, 
against Muslims (and later, Christians and communists as well) and anti-
secularist. We have already seen that there was substantial overlap be-
tween the two (see Boxes 2 and 5 of the earlier table). While there were 
many instances of the first turning to violence – particularly in the case 
of the extremists (Box 4) – the dominant strain of anti-imperialist na-
tionalism was, as we have already noted, moderate and non-violent, 
largely adhering to the dictates of imperial ‘Order’. Again, there were 
many instances of the second – essentially Hindu nationalist – also turn-
ing violent,38 but precisely because of the overlap, and because of the 
dominance of the moderates, much of Hindu nationalist practice (as op-
posed to discourse) remained non-violent – at the level of the urban elites. 
The situation was very different in the mofussil and rural areas, and 
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amongst the lower castes and poor. It was here that, from the late nine-
teenth century, India witnessed a series of incidents of social agitation 
often amounting to full fledged riots. Not all of these were religio-
communal in nature: some were in fact peasant expressions of violent 
resistance against the colonial state, or against its indigenous representa-
tives in the form of zamindars or landowners; some were labour agita-
tions against low wages and/or poor working conditions; there were in-
creasing instances of inter-caste conflicts, into the first decade of the 
twentieth century; the (sometimes violent) agitations around mass con-
version movements by lower caste and tribal groups; besides these, there 
were increasing instances of overtly anti-imperialist militancy in the 
mofussil areas; the first agitations in the twenties around the issue of the 
linguistic organisation of the states – and so on.39 But several of these 
took a communal turn, and then there were many that were expressly 
communal – especially when conjoined with or led by urban elite Hindu 
nationalists – as for instance in the Cow Protection Movement, which 
was seen by the Hindu nationalists as a means to organize and spread 
Hindu communalism in the rural areas.40 As is evident, these instances of 
growing social violence in the rural areas, while primarily determined by 
the codes of ‘Danda’, precisely because they were often locked in anti-
imperialist conflicts, manifest the signs of both ‘Order’ and ‘Danda’ in 
the shaping of nationalist discourses, in and through the transformations 
in Brahmanical patriarchy. The masculinist nationalist discourses that 
emerged in this context thus necessarily engaged with violence (as lan-
guage and as practice), whether or not they actually assimilated and de-
ployed it. I will return to the question of how this choice (on the de-
ployment or not of violence) was made later: for now, we need to attend 
to the extent and quality of the differences between the nationalist dis-
courses. 
Violence and Politics 
For the moderates, the social violence was a double-edged weapon 
against the British administration: its occurrence bolstered their claim to 
political and economic power within the representative politics of the 
colonial ‘Order’, as the only native buffers against anti-imperialist anar-
chy. But it also was a constant threat to that same claim, in that it could 
either be appropriated by the extremist nationalists or it could spiral un-
controllably, as happened on several occasions.41 For the extremist na-
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tionalists, these diverse instances of violence needed to be channelled 
into either an anti-imperialist revolutionary urge that would violently 
overthrow the colonial state, or (specifically for the Hindu nationalists) a 
programmatic exclusion and eradication of non-Hindus, primarily Mus-
lims, from the Indian territory. But for both, nationalism was never any-
thing but pan-Indian in conception. The nationalist leadership was large-
ly from the urban upper and upper-middle castes, from business and 
professional social backgrounds, often landowning and/or with strong 
familial and communal roots in rural areas, with substantial exposure to 
English education: as already noted, their interests lay in maintaining the 
economic and political leverage they had acquired with the British ad-
ministration. Violence and agitational politics were harmful to these in-
terests, not just in terms of harming business, but they were localised and 
focused on regional concerns, and hence tended to weaken the national-
ists’ emphasis on a pan-Indian unity, without which the latter were in any 
case too much of a minority in regional matters. For the dominant mod-
erates in particular, the very idea of agitational and violent politics was 
also threatening because it always contained the potential to become an 
anti-upper caste revolutionary politics; while for the extremists, this dan-
ger was sought to be avoided through invocations to religion and tradi-
tion, i.e. through the larger process of communalisation – the evolution 
of a singular communal patriarchal hegemony that underlay whatever 
ideological or sectarian differences were professed. Whatever the ideo-
logical persuasions of the nationalist elites then, as G Aloysius has argued 
(1998: 114ff), their insistence on nationalism as a pan-Indian concept led 
to the refusal to cognise, in their own terms, the national relevance or 
even legitimacy of local self-determination movements and agitations, or 
even to engage in dialogue with them. Arguably, this in turn intensified 
the agitational nature of the latter; but more significantly for our purpos-
es, it permitted manoeuvring space for the Hindu nationalists – as well as 
the fundamentalist Islamic elite – to incite the rampant communalisation 
of social violence that occurred in the second decade of the twentieth 
century. Thus, while the increasing instances of social unrest proved use-
ful to them, to the extent that they tested the British administration and 
reinforced their claim to representative leadership, such unrest was on 
the one hand consistently sought to be defused by the moderate leader-
ship, and on the other, to be communalised by the Hindu nationalist 
leadership – and, as we have repeatedly maintained, the two were not as 
124 CHAPTER 4 
antithetical as they appear. In retrospective balance, both forces were 
essential to maintaining and extending the influence of the upper caste 
patriarchate, in relation to the British as well as to the lower castes, and 
in that sense, served the same end.42 It is in this specific sense that we 
can say with some certainty that the elite attitude to and engagement 
with violence (in discourse and practice), in the final analysis, was deter-
mined by its effect on and consequences for the ‘new’ upper caste patri-
archy – and in this specific sense, was gender determined. Or, to put it 
differently, the relation between violence and gender in the colonial con-
text was, in the final analysis, mediated through and by caste. 
If we return now to the question posed earlier – about the basis on 
which the nationalists decided whether or not to adopt violence as strat-
egy – it is clear that the standard explanation – that for the moderates, 
violence was to be definitively eschewed, while for the extremists, specif-
ically the Hindu nationalists, it was a necessary component of the consti-
tution of the nation, intrinsic to the very conception of it – is too sim-
plistic to be actually explanatory. To recap briefly, the question arose in 
the context of the intensification of social violence and of the confluence 
of discourses of masculinity, with those of the communal constitution of 
the public sphere. In such a context, the turn – or not – to violence can-
not be fully explained in terms of ideological program or inclination, or 
even in terms of strategy (to the extent, if any, that these can be separat-
ed). This is especially so if we accept the argument above, that in bal-
ance, both violent and non-violent strategies were essential to the na-
tionalist elites. While the resorting to violence by the latter does mark, to 
some extent, the political difference between the moderates and the ex-
tremists, this difference in itself cannot and does not explain the eschew-
al of – or the turn to – violence.43 Further, violence was frequently re-
sorted to, as we have noted, outside of the control of the nationalist elite, 
whether moderate or extremist, which empirically confirms that its de-
ployment was not based on elitist ideologies; but it also logically implies 
that its deployment – or not – was not the sole prerogative of the na-
tionalist elite. To address this question fully, it is necessary to recall and 
reiterate that this period was witnessing the reformulation of the Brah-
manical patriarchy that constituted the socio-cultural basis of the nation-
alist elite: the ‘modernization’ of Brahmanical patriarchy was essentially 
aimed at accommodating the demands of imperial power by modifying 
existing Brahmanical social orderings, in such a way that it maximised 
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the power and control of the (male) upper castes in the new political and 
economic dispensation. In order to do so, this elite had to engage with 
challenges on three different fronts: one, from the imperial British state; 
two from other communal elites, primarily the Muslim elite; and three, 
from emergent regional tribal and lower-caste movements. Each of these 
challenged the representative status that the Brahmanical elite claimed 
for itself, with regard to the newly designed and designated ‘Hindu’ 
community specifically, but also with regard to the nation in general. The 
available tactics for dealing with these challenges were basically: one, to 
violently overcome them; two, to disarm them through persuasion and 
(advantageous) compromise; three, to overcome and nullify them ideo-
logically, as invalid and unnecessary; and four – which was the option 
that emerged almost unintentionally, in the overall manoeuvrings of the 
different factions of the elite – a strategic use of all three tactics, some-
times simultaneously, sometimes discretely, or in combinations.  
4.9 Hindu Nationalism and Violence 
Arguably, the first tactic of violence was actually used more often as 
threat – and in this sense, to bolster the other two tactics – than with any 
serious anticipation of achieving ultimate victory through violence – 
whether over the British, the Muslim community or the lower castes. 
The reasons why violence could not be – and was not – the sole tactic 
should be obvious: firstly, upper-caste patriarchy, in spite of its social 
and ideological strength, was (and remains) a numerical minority – 
whether in relation to the British, the Muslims or the lower castes. For it 
to engage successfully with the challenges to it – that too on three fronts 
– through violence, at the very least, it would have had to be composed 
of much larger numbers spread evenly across the colonial territory, when 
in actual fact it was composed of a miniscule percentage that was more 
urban-centred than rural, and comparatively fewer even in most urban 
areas. Secondly, as we noted earlier, a substantial number of the upper 
castes had land, business and professional interests and stakes that would 
have suffered heavily from following a solely violent strategy. Yet, the 
language of violence, and the will to use it, was not alien to this section, 
as is evident from the principle of ‘Danda’. Besides, the association of 
violence and martial codes with masculinity and power – already embed-
ded in ‘danda’ and certain upper caste ideals like the kshatriya code of 
honour, and augmented by the awareness of British colonial codes of 
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martial masculinity – demanded that there could be no complete es-
chewal of violence, in the response to the challenges. It was thus almost 
inevitable that violence would be invoked and used in conjunction with 
other modes of responding to the challenges. It is evident most clearly in 
Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s institutionalisation of an essentially private festival 
(the Ganesh Chaturthi) into a public one that, through the mobilisation 
of Hindus, transformed into a show of numerical strength aimed at both 
the British and the Muslims (and the inevitable communal riots that fol-
lowed); in the sporadic but incessant incitement of Hindu communities 
into communal violence against Muslims by Hindu nationalist leaders; in 
the continued and routine attacks by upper caste armies on lower castes 
(whether or not in response to socio-political movements organised by 
the latter); in the anti-imperial violence of revolutionaries like Bhagat 
Singh and Chandrashekhar Azad; and, of course, in the establishment of 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in 1925, as a communal, quasi-martial 
organisation. But this continuous and persistent violence was never ei-
ther allowed to become organised or legitimised, nor was it ever com-
pletely quelled – but from the last two decades of the nineteenth century 
and up until independence, it played out a ceaseless background score of 
varying volume and intensity on the grand stage of the independence 
movement. By the time of the Communal Award of 1932, communal 
relations were extremely volatile, and communal lines had hardened as 
never before: but it was only with the epochal event of partition that it 
erupted beyond control, leading to the conflagration that claimed hun-
dreds of thousands of lives. It was in one sense inevitable: the British 
had begun vacating their administrative powers, and neither the Hindu 
(or for that matter the Muslim) nationalist leadership, nor the liberal na-
tionalists of the Congress, had the reins of governmental control as yet 
to check the violence that they had been so steadily stoking for decades. 
It was in this moment of governmental liminality then that Partition took 
place, implying the complete withdrawal of Order from public space, 
leaving it open to the machinations of Danda – and it was truly ‘the red-
eyed, dark-skinned god’ that reigned over this bloodbath. It is in this 
context that the iconic and ideologically loaded figure of Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi – as well as his ethics of non-violence, his gender 
practices of ascetic celibacy and self-feminisation, and his political-
economic program of self-rule, village based economy and ‘trustee-ship’ 
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of the wealthy – gain an apparently paradoxical and overwhelming signif-
icance. 
4.10 Gandhi and his Ideas 
It is perhaps inevitable that a study of gender and the growth of Hindu 
nationalism should look at this larger-than-life figure with some ambiva-
lence, so it is best to clarify here that the intention is not to offer yet an-
other study of Gandhi or his ideas, but to situate them in relation to the 
theme of this study – the gendered growth and consolidation of Hindut-
va. Gandhi’s political and philosophical ideas evolved over a long period, 
but can for our purposes be narrowed to a few recurrent themes. The 
more prominently known of these are, Satya (Truth), Ahimsa (Non-
violence), Swaraj (variously either Self-rule or Home-rule), Sarvodaya 
(Universal benefit) and Satyagraha (broadly the philosophy of non-
violent resistance, literally the pursuit of Truth, effectively the combina-
tion of the other four). In what follows, I will very briefly undertake to 
locate this conglomeration of ideas and practices in the context outlined 
above, with specific attention to the transformation in the processes of 
gendering that accompanied the evolution of the nationalist and anti-
imperialist discourses, and their consequent impact on the shaping of 
Gandhian thought, as well as their implications for Hindu nationalism. 
The contention here is that Gandhi and Gandhian thought served the 
crucial purpose of inciting (in the Foucaultian sense) a discourse of ag-
gressive upper caste Hindu nationalism, precisely by emphasising non-
violence and Hindu universalism, with the aim (intended or not) being to 
ensure that the focus of the nationalist struggle would always remain on 
upper caste interests. 
Already it should be clear that the conglomerate of Gandhian themes 
listed above are evidently emerging out of and addressing the debates 
underway in the nineteenth century amongst the nationalist forces. It is 
true that Gandhi formulated many of these ideas in South Africa – spe-
cially the ideas of Sarvodaya, Ahimsa and Satyagraha – and it could be 
argued that he was therefore responding to a different set of circum-
stances, a different political reality. But this would be firstly, to ignore the 
fact that the British perceived Indians in the same light, whether in India 
or in South Africa. Secondly, it is well known that the genesis of this 
conglomerate lay not in South Africa but in Gandhi’s debates with expat-
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riate Indian extremists like Veer Savarkar and Shyamji Krishnavarma in 
London – debates that were essentially extensions on foreign soil of 
identical debates underway amongst the nationalists in India. Finally, the 
constituents of Gandhian thought share the same preoccupations and 
concerns as the nineteenth century nationalists: about the nature and 
constituency of the self, the nature and constituency of Hinduism, the 
significance of caste, the roles and status of women, and the relation be-
tween the individual and the communal selves. Gandhi’s formulation of 
Satya as a transcendental Truth that must be sought – and in that sense 
definitive of a journey to a goal rather than the goal itself – is arguably an 
answer to the theological and ideological contestations, both within 
‘Hindu’ thought and between ‘Hinduism’ and other faiths.44 Without 
questioning Gandhi’s own faith in this transcendental principle of Truth, 
it is evident that through it, he offered a forcible argument for moving 
beyond the specific sectarian and religious positions that threatened to 
tear the nationalist movement apart. That it had this specific function is 
clear from the fact that Gandhi did not offer this understanding as an 
alternative religious position, but rooted it within ‘Hinduism’ itself, as a 
civilisational enterprise unique to ‘Hinduism’, projected as the most ac-
commodating of all religions.45 By doing so, he sought not only to estab-
lish the spiritual superiority of ‘Hinduism’ to other religions, but also an 
innate integrity and homogeneity that belied what he saw as unnecessary 
and unwarranted sectarian conflicts. Thus, closely tied to this was the 
doctrine of Ahimsa: if Truth was transcendent, and if the relentless jour-
ney towards it was the only way in which it could be known, it followed 
that there could be as many journeys as there were individuals undertak-
ing them, with none the wiser than the other. Such a conception of 
Truth necessitated the positing of a strictly non-violent environment as 
its potential condition of realisation, hence the paramount importance of 
the notion of Ahimsa or non-violence.46 We will see shortly how this 
doctrine had a particular relevance to addressing caste conflict. Here, we 
note further that it brilliantly inverted the British perception of the Indi-
an as passive and lazy: 
There is a charge laid against us that we are a lazy people and that Europe-
ans are industrious and enterprizing. We have accepted the charge and we 
therefore wish to change our condition. Hinduism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, 
Christianity and all other religions teach that we should remain passive 
about worldly pursuits and active about godly pursuits, that we should set 
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a limit to our worldly ambition and that our religious ambition should be 
illimitable. Our activity should be directed into the latter channel. (1997 
[1909]: 42-3) 
The charge of passivity is inverted into the superior moral position of 
non-violence, and that of laziness into the quest for spiritual goals. Not 
only does this wrest moral superiority out of British hands, it recasts the 
terms of assessment, so that it is now the conqueror and his actions that 
stand under scrutiny, rather than the conquered. The doctrine of Ahimsa 
thus served simultaneously as a means to reign in the fissiparous tenden-
cies within the nationalist movement, and to throw the onus of explain-
ing himself on the coloniser. Furthermore, it cast the coloniser as materi-
alistic and rapacious, and thereby, the entire enterprise of colonialism as 
violently exploitative, in contrast to the peaceful and spiritual civilisation 
thus exploited. This was a complete inversion of the earlier nationalist 
position, that for India to be strong it needed to emulate the coloniser: 
Gandhi instead invited the coloniser to emulate the colonised. The bold-
ness of this discursive move cannot be underscored enough: it went in 
the face of the entire Hindu nationalist attempt to project the ‘Hindu’ 
community as virile, martial and itself descended from a glorious imperi-
alist past. By inverting the terms of assessment, Gandhi entirely recon-
figured the gendering of the community – in fact, reconfigured the pro-
cess and meanings of gender itself. Gandhi thus drew from within the 
same discursive streams as Hindutva – that propounded a long-standing 
and uniform ‘Hindu’ religion, a glorious and accommodative ‘Hindu’ 
civilisation, the spiritual and moral superiority of the colonised, even the 
idea of a consequent and putative ‘Hindu’ victimhood in the face of 
Muslim and British imperialism – but generated an alternate discourse 
that was apparently at complete odds with that of the Hindu nationalists, 
not only effectively stealing their thunder, but as it turned out, achieving 
far greater success in his enterprise than they. But this particular and un-
easy relation is more complex than it appears, and in order to grasp its 
fuller implications, we need to first comprehend the remaining themes of 
Gandhian thought. 
The Gandhian idea of Swaraj was the crucial conceptual link between 
the community of individuals in pursuit of the Truth and the individuals 
themselves. For Gandhi, true swaraj was not freedom from British rule 
but the governance of the self. Again, while this is a necessary element in 
the sustenance of Ahimsa, it also receives a conceptually and theoretical-
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ly distinct treatment. Integral to swaraj are the practices of celibacy and 
abstinence, the spurning of modernity and its amenities, the espousal of 
the village industry, and hands-on participation in menial labour. Gandhi 
recognised the practical difficulties with this demand, particularly in 
terms of the caste-defined resistance to menial labour, but insisted that 
true swaraj lay in the struggle to master the self. In the specific context of 
the demands for modernisation and westernisation – i.e. the emulation 
of the British – true swaraj thus came to mean, not countering the Brit-
ish as a people or as an imperial regime, but opposing the modern civili-
sation that they bore and represented.47 Evidently then, Gandhi is aligned 
here with the nationalist elite that (at least initially) chose not to oppose 
the British; where he parts ways with them is in refusing to acknowledge 
that they were worthy of emulation, in their technological and industrial 
achievements. Gandhi’s agenda was to counter British imperialism symp-
tomatically, i.e., as a symptom of a corrupted and de-spiritualised western 
civilisation, with the moral and spiritual strengths of ‘Hinduism’. Inevita-
bly, such a stand fell foul of the nationalist elite’s economic and industri-
al agenda for the country, but it did serve a very important purpose: it 
completely inverted and cast back on the European coloniser the Orien-
talist discourse of a corrupt and degenerate Hindu civilisation, recast the 
nationalist struggle for independence as a civilisational one, and cast an 
inclusive net that sought to cover and neutralise the multidimensional 
contradictions of the subcontinent under the single rubric of spiritual-
ism.  
This leads us to another dimension to Gandhian thought. If the ideas 
of Truth and Non-violence were born in response to specific ideological 
contestations underway in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
they were also moulded by those very contestations. As I argued earlier, 
these contestations were founded on the recasting of gender, and took 
shape around the problematic of the ‘woman question’. Some scholarly 
work already exists on how Gandhian ideas actively partook of this pro-
cess of recasting gender – Ashish Nandy’s (1983) work, for instance, on 
Gandhi’s feminisation of himself (also see Kamlesh Mohan 2008) – but 
this, to my mind, merely scratches the surface. What needs to be taken 
into account is what we have noted above as the transformation of 
Brahmanical hegemony into a ‘new patriarchy’. By instituting Brahmani-
cal social practices as the personal law of the community, and by insist-
ing that all lower castes were necessarily subject to these laws as part of 
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the ‘Hindu’ fold, Brahmanical patriarchy transformed and extended its 
social reach, without ever actually relinquishing the hierarchies that had 
sustained its dominance. Nandini Gooptu notes for instance, how the 
Arya Samaj’s efforts in the second decade of the twentieth century to 
ritually purify and reintegrate the ‘untouchable’ castes, was essentially ‘to 
achieve orderly homogeneity in the Hindu community, and the attendant 
denigration of lower-caste practices, in effect amounted to a perpetua-
tion of the prejudices against pollution and inferiority in ritual status that 
the Arya Samaj was supposed to undo.’(2001: 156) Gandhi’s own atti-
tude toward caste was even more conservative, drawn from the Sanatan 
Dharmists, and of profound significance for us here: drawing a distinc-
tion between caste and varna, he openly averred that it was the varna 
system that had stabilised and prevented the disintegration of Hinduism 
as a religion, but denounced its corruption into the contemporary caste 
system and its attendant rituals of pollution. His resistance to lower caste 
separatism from ‘Hinduism’, as propounded by Ambedkar and Phule for 
instance, was partly political compulsion and partly a genuine belief that 
without the lower castes functioning to service the upper castes, ‘Hindu-
ism’ would collapse.48 Gandhi’s characterisation of the Dalits as Harijan 
(‘people of God’) was in this sense understood by lower caste leaders as 
just another manifestation of upper caste attempts at cooption. Of great-
er consequence here is the fact that such a cooption was also sought to 
be founded on the principle of Ahimsa, thereby deliberately subverting 
any potential for revolutionary (or even dissenting) action on the part of 
the lower castes, contributing to the famous stand off between Gandhi 
and Ambedkar on separate political representation for lower castes. Fur-
ther, since Gandhi himself viewed Ahimsa and Swaraj as ‘feminine’ pur-
suits, and strove to promote the principle of shakti, valourising women 
as innately gifted practitioners of Ahimsa and Swaraj,49 arguably the end 
effect (if not the intent) of this cooption was the feminisation (in the 
specific sense of disempowerment) of the lower castes in relation to the 
entrenched upper caste patriarchies. But even apart from such a symp-
tomatic gender-reading of the deployment of these ideas, it becomes 
clear that, in the very insistence on Brahmanical patriarchal codes and 
norms like the varnashrmadharma, there is inherent a promotion of up-
per caste masculine hegemony – a promotion that is made even clearer 
when we look firstly, at the ideas of Sarvodaya and Trusteeship, and sec-
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ondly, at the response to Gandhi’s insistence on Ahimsa in Hindu-
Muslim relations. 
It is in this context that Gandhi’s notions of Sarvodaya and Trustee-
ship are rendered suspect. When he argues in the Hind Swaraj that  
We cannot condemn mill-owners; we can but pity them. It would be too 
much to expect them to give up their mills, but we may implore them not 
to increase them. If they would be good they would gradually contract 
their business. They can establish in thousands of households the ancient 
and sacred handlooms and they can buy out the cloth that may be thus 
woven. Whether the mill-owners do this or not, people can cease to use 
machine-made goods. (1997 [1909]: 109) 
Gandhi’s disingenuity is patent, suggestive in fact, of the active pres-
ence of a class interest at work. Whether or not that be the case, it is def-
initely dubious that Gandhi can and does condone the lack of application 
of Ahimsa and Swaraj on the part of the petty and large capital bourgeoi-
sie, while stridently demanding it in the case of the lower castes (as for 
instance in his fast to death over the issue of caste based electorates.) 
The contradictions can only make sense in being situated in a gender 
framework: the lower castes were (and are) traditionally feminised and 
hence the demand of the practice of Ahimsa from them; the same can-
not be expected of the ‘mill-owners; we can but pity them’. It is in this 
sense that the economic scheme of Sarvodaya, with its village based 
economy, is essentially an argument for the domesticisation and thereby 
the feminisation, of labour, in a context when local capitalism is just set-
ting to establish itself. A similar disingenuity is evident when Gandhi 
proposes his theory of Trusteeship as a means to achieve the equal dis-
tribution of wealth in society: 
Indeed at the root of this doctrine of equal distribution must lie that of the 
trusteeship of the wealthy for the superfluous wealth possessed by them. 
For according to the doctrine they may not possess a rupee more than 
their neighbours. How is this to be brought about? Non-violently? Or 
should the wealthy be dispossessed of their possessions? To do this we 
would naturally have to resort to violence. This violent action cannot ben-
efit society. Society will be the poorer, for it will lose the gifts of a man 
who knows how to accumulate wealth. Therefore the non-violent way is 
evidently superior. The rich man will be left in possession of his wealth, of 
which he will use what he reasonably requires for his personal needs and 
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will act as a trustee for the remainder to be used for society. In this argu-
ment honesty on the part of the trustee is assumed.50 
Again here we notice the exhortation to non-violence of the poor, 
while no concomitant insistence to moral action is made on the rich – it 
is simply assumed.51 Arguably, these ideas are oriented toward facilitating 
‘the gifts of a man who knows how to accumulate wealth’, i.e. the estab-
lishment and protection of local capitalism. Taken individually, the con-
cepts and practices espoused by Gandhi have an idealism and a spiritual 
appeal that thus dissipate when they are taken in totality. 
To this extent, his ideas of Ahimsa and Swaraj, and through them the 
perpetuation of Brahmanical patriarchy as ‘Hinduism’, were perfectly in 
consonance with upper caste Hindu nationalist thought, as well as the 
economic interests it stood for. It was when Gandhi extended the prin-
ciple of Ahimsa to Hindu-Muslim relations that he ran foul of the latter. 
It is here that the gendering of this discourse becomes most evident. As 
long Ahimsa and the asceticism of swaraj were demanded and expected 
of the poor and the lower castes – as integral to their spiritual commit-
ment to being Hindu – they were approved of as lofty ideals by the Hin-
du nationalists. However, when Gandhi began openly courting Muslim 
support for the INC, and advocating Hindu non-violence in relation to 
Muslims even during communal riots, he was severely criticised and even 
denounced by the Hindu nationalists, as emasculating the Hindu com-
munity52 – the charge, in fact that led to his assassination. Clearly, the 
gendered nature of the understanding of Ahimsa – buried as long as it 
was in relation to the lower castes – became explicit in relation to the 
Muslims. Gandhi’s own vacillation between understanding Ahimsa and 
the disciplinary regimes of Swaraj as masculine first (in the Hind Swaraj 
for instance) and feminine in his later writings only emphasises the un-
stable relations between gender and power that obtained in this shifting, 
transforming terrain of gender relations.53  
Gandhi, Violence and Hindu Nationalism 
The emergence of Satyagraha as a concept with unstable gender configu-
ration then was inevitable. Gandhi himself identified women as the best 
teachers of this concept, and also advocated that it be used sparingly. Yet 
he was absolutely clear that women belonged in the domestic realm, even 
if the demand of the nationalist movement was to bring them to the 
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streets. Gandhi’s nationalism here seeks to fix the unstable and shifting 
terrain of gender, doubly: firstly through the ideological appropriation of 
the terms of femininity as domestic, nurturing etc, to further a larger 
seemingly ‘spiritual’ agenda; and second, in that very move, fixing these 
terms by yoking them onto a national communal identity, so that to be-
long either as lower caste, lower class or women in the ‘Hindu’ fold, is to 
be domestic, nurturing, etc. But in the logical extension of this to Hindu-
Muslim relations, the entire edifice of upper caste interests that it had 
sought to protect apparently became seriously threatened. In the event, it 
was one of the more significant causes of the creation of the RSS, set up 
in response to upper caste Hindu anxieties about the emasculation that 
Gandhi’s policies of non-violence would wrought, given their popularity. 
It is worth noting here that Hindu nationalist ire was provoked mostly by 
the call to practice Ahimsa toward Muslims; the similar call of Ahimsa 
toward the British, while criticised, did not cause the kind of vituperative 
anxiety – articulated repeatedly as a fear of emasculation – that was 
roused by Gandhi’s so-called ‘appeasement of the Muslims’. The expla-
nation for this lies partly in the impulse to emulate the British amongst 
the Hindu nationalists, which therefore did not enter into direct conflict 
with the call to non-violence; but it was also partly a direct reaction to 
the consolidation of the Muslim patriarchate as separate from and im-
pervious to the codes of control that Brahmanical patriarchy was estab-
lishing.54 Gandhi’s call to non-violence was understood in this context as 
a delimitation and disempowerment of Brahmanical patriarchal self-
perception, rights and power. Further, there was another contradiction 
inherent to the Gandhian project of Ahimsa and Swaraj: it insisted on 
restraint even as it incited the people to non-cooperation, itself a viola-
tion of the law (rendering ‘non-violent non-cooperation’ a contradiction 
in terms), but more importantly, legitimising the logic of violence, even as 
he explicitly repudiated its practice, thereby permitting an always-
possible and subversive backdoor entry for actual violence to undo the 
discourse of non-violence.55 As we noted above, this was effectively and 
inevitably what happened with the rupture of Partition.56 Ironically then, 
Gandhi’s attempted epistemic shift in articulating together gender, nation 
and ‘Hinduism’ by relocating gender lines and meanings in a discourse of 
spirituality, served to consolidate them in their orthopraxes even more – 
and it is in this sense that we can understand the Gandhian conceptual 
and ideological universe as serving, in a classic Foucaultian paradox, to 
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incite a more aggressive Hindu nationalism than had been hitherto in 
existence.  
This is not to argue that Gandhi was a closet Hindu nationalist, actu-
ally working to serve its interests while ostensibly set against it. Rather, in 
the unfolding of upper caste power dynamics, through the debates, con-
testations and controversies over how to define and understand ‘Hindu’ 
and ‘Hinduism’ as well as through organisational and practical activities, 
the positions and potentials of the different and divergent schools, sects 
and discourses were defined as much by their playing off against each 
other as by their own internal, ideological and political dynamics. This 
‘war of position’, to use a felicitous Gramscian phrase, was different in 
that it took place within the Brahmanical patriarchate as it sought to de-
fine and consolidate itself. Gandhi’s ideational system emerged as one 
such position, and in that emergence, forced certain accommodations 
and alterations in the other positions extent at the time, specifically the 
Hindu nationalist (even as, for sure, his ideas were themselves moulded 
by the other currents of upper caste thought). It is evident that upper 
caste anguish about inadequacy, effeminacy and impotence helped define 
and determine, albeit inversely, the Gandhian theory of non-violence; 
but arguably, in that very inversion, and in the concomitant insistence on 
the spiritual strength of a putative transcendence of orthodox gender 
constructions – a transcendence that struck at the very core of the mas-
culine hegemony of Brahmanical patriarchy – Gandhian ideas functioned 
as the catalyst that generated a counter insistence on orthodox gender 
constructions and practices. Again, it cannot be emphasised enough that 
Gandhi’s ideas of Ahimsa, Swaraj, Sarvodaya, Trusteeship, etc did enjoy 
success nationally and internationally – as long as they were denuded of their 
gender component. It is here that we can locate the reaction of upper caste 
liberal nationalists to Gandhi. His spiritual nationalism and his mass ap-
peal lent enormous strength to the nationalist movement: but his attempt 
to transform gender meanings in and through his political ideas were 
tactfully ignored or outrightly spurned. History is witness to the failure to 
take root of specifically the gendered aspects of Gandhian ideas; but it 
does show how Hindu nationalist ideas grew in strength precisely in re-
action to this inverted gendering, as the ideological position that best 
represented upper caste patriarchal interests – and it is in this that their 
proximity to the liberal nationalists lies. It is in this that we see also the 
continued and insistent focus on upper caste strategies and goals as the 
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dominant concerns of the nationalist movement, with the gendered bo-
geys of violence and non-violence serving as the lens through which this 
focus was successfully maintained, right through till independence and 
the holocaust of Partition.  
4.11 Conclusion 
It may seem a trifle odd that, in a chapter devoted to the rise of Hindu 
nationalism in the early part of the twentieth century, there is no discus-
sion of either the key figures of the movement, or of the organisations 
that came up, like the RSS or the Hindu Mahasabha; it may seem odder 
further, that instead there is a fairly lengthy discussion of Gandhian ideas 
in their relation to Hindu nationalist thought. But the intention in this 
chapter has not been to simply review these historical developments, 
which have been sufficiently and competently covered by a whole host 
of scholars to require yet another telling. Rather, in this chapter I have 
tried to provide a history of the growth of Hindu nationalism from a 
perspective that attempts to weave together the frameworks of gender, 
caste and community formation from colonial times to Partition and the 
iconic figure of Gandhi. I have tried to examine patterns of processes 
and trends, rather than confine myself to individuals, events or institu-
tions. I have tried to show that Hindu nationalism was not just a direct 
outcome of colonial policies with regard to the administration of the In-
dian territory, but the consequence of struggles between upper caste pa-
triarchates over the right to represent the now concretised ‘Hindu’ 
community. I have argued that this struggle was partly determined by a 
drive to emulation of the coloniser, but also and importantly, a conse-
quence of diverse attitudes towards violence as concept and as means. In 
this context, the chapter examined the figure of Mohandas Gandhi, his 
ideas of non-violence in particular, and the course of gendering that he 
charted politically. It concluded that ironically, Gandhi’s ideas were in 
some crucial ways instrumental to the turn to aggressiveness and vio-
lence that marked Hindu nationalism by the time of independence and 
Partition. In the following chapter I will continue to outline the trajecto-
ries and trends of Hindu nationalist thought and its socio-economic and 
political bases, from independence to the present. 
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Notes 
 
1 The distinction between the terms ‘private’ and ‘personal’ as used specifically in 
opposition to ‘public’ indicates not only the different historical trajectories fol-
lowed by these terms in Europe and South Asia respectively, but also the differ-
ence in meaning that they consequently imply for the understanding and use of 
the term ‘public’, in the two respective contexts.  
2 I use the term ‘Brahmanical’ throughout this chapter, and (unless otherwise 
specified) elsewhere too, less as referring to a particular caste, and more as refer-
ring to the caste-scheme that was constructed and maintained by the upper castes 
in general, and particularly defended by the Brahman caste.  
3 The historical and conceptual dynamics of the term ‘private’ are exceptionally 
well-revealed in P Chatterjee’s account of Rammohun Roy’s dual lifestyle, in the 
maintenance of two homes, one Indian and the other western, the one private 
and the other public – as if embodying in his very lifestyle the schism that was 
becoming institutionalised in the socio-polity. See Chatterjee 1986. 
4 Referring to the contestations over personal law in India, Sandra Freitag notes 
that in the Indian case, it is less a public sphere that has evolved (as with Europe) 
than a public arena. See Freitag 1996. 
5 This partly explains the insistent backward projection of the Hindu identity by 
members of the Hindu elite from the nineteenth century onward, attempting to 
establish public, governmental, and/or imperial histories to the identity beyond 
the personal law confines of the present. 
6 There is a large corpus of literature documenting and analyzing this, including 
Chatterjee (1986), Nandy (1983), Sangari and Vaid (1989), Sangari (1995), Mani 
(1987), etc. 
7 I will confine myself in the discussion that follows with the ‘Hindu’ community, 
both for lack of space to go into the details of the reform movements in other 
communities as well as to stay focused on the developments leading to the rise of 
Hindu nationalism. 
8 As for instance with the more liberal Arya Samaj or the conservative Sanatan 
Dharma Sabha. See Zavos 2000 for an extensive analysis of the ways in which 
caste issues were negotiated by the upper caste nationalist organisations. As 
Nicholas Dirks has noted, ‘it is striking that most explicit critiques of caste con-
demned it for its divisiveness, portraying it as a barrier to the gradual unification 
of the Indian people under the essentially beneficent, modernising rule of the 
British.’ (Dirks 2003: 232) 
9 See Burton (1998) and Sarkar (1993) for analyses of how caste and race came 
into intense and controversial contestation in determining what constituted a 
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‘Hindu’ practice in the personal realm – here, in the specific case of the discus-
sions leading to the Age of Consent Bill. 
10 But in the final analysis remained fundamentally unable to dismantle it. The 
reason for this could only have been, and was, the gradual acquiescence of lower 
caste groups to the hegemonic hold of Brahmanical patriarchy – or what was lat-
er to be termed ‘Sanskritisation’. For detailed analysis of this transformation, see 
Dirks 2003. For an account of lower caste resistance to Brahmanical patriarchy, 
see also V Geetha (2003). 
11 "The [materialistic world] was a place where the European power had chal-
lenged the non-European peoples and by virtue of its superior material culture, 
had subjugated them. But it had failed to colonize [India's] inner, essential, identi-
ty of the East which lay in its distinctive and superior spiritual culture. That is 
where the East was undominated, sovereign, and master of its own fate. For a 
colonized people the world was a distressing [and embarrassing] constraint [espe-
cially for Indian males attempting to maintain their masculinity] forced upon it by 
the fact of its material weakness. It was a place of daily humiliation, a place where 
the norms of the colonizer had to be accepted…No encroachments of the colo-
nizer must be allowed [by Indian males if they were to maintain dignity under 
colonial oppressive conditions] in that inner sanctum. In the world, imitation and 
adaptation to Western norms was a necessity; at home, they were tantamount to 
annihilation of one’s very [Indian male identity]." Chatterjee, (1993a: 238-239). 
12 She goes on to note that the caste specificity of the reform movements – upper 
caste, primarily Brahmanical – has been largely ignored, thereby eliding the 
trenchant critique of Brahmanical patriarchy offered by lower caste leaders like 
Jyotiba Phule (Sethi 2002). While this is arguable, her observations serve to un-
derline the ways in which gender is cross-cut by caste in the colonial context. 
13 See Chatterjee (1993a). Of course, the same would hold for the Muslim and 
Sikh communities of the time. 
14 Sudipta Kaviraj draws attention to the double strategy of legitimation that the 
colonial state frequently drew on, one based on existent structures of power and 
feudal discourses of legitimation in the subcontinent, and the other based on the 
Enlightenment discourses of rationality that they brought with them. (Kaviraj 
1999: 142-150) 
15 See specially Dadabhai Naoroji’s magnum opus Poverty and Un-British Rule in 
India (1901). 
16 I will return later to the specific mechanics of this restructuring and how it oc-
curred.  
17 Jaffrelot (1996) and Zavos (2000), in their respective works have both demon-
strated the ways in which Hindu reform organisations in particular battled for 
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numerical supremacy through the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth 
century, especially in north India. 
18 See Manu Goswami’s (2004) exposition of this point. AR Desai’s (1976 [1948]) 
classic study of Indian nationalism had pointed out the importance of print 
communication to the emergence of nationalism in the subcontinent (Benedict 
Anderson was of course to later elaborate this as a theory of the formation of the 
imagined community known as the nation, in his famous work). The Indian elites 
were now increasingly aware of themselves as a more or less uniform class with 
similar backgrounds and common interests, spread across the subcontinent. 
19 Nandy’s (1983) is in many ways the pioneering (albeit highly problematic) work 
on this point. 
20 In her very brief critique (2001) of Partha Chatterjee’s essay ‘The Nationalist 
Resolution of the Women's Question’. See her footnote 6. See also Himani 
Banerjee’s (2000) trenchant critique of Partha Chatterjee. 
21 This is not the space to go into these terms and their meanings, and I will con-
fine myself to a discussion of their relevance to our understanding of the growth 
of Hindu nationalism. For a discussion of the terms, see Judith Brown (1985), pp. 
74ff, 90ff. Also see Peter Robb (n.d.). 
22 See for instance the ‘Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act 1856’, excerpted in 
Chakravarti and Gill (2001: 60-2) 
23 Kaviraj refers to this as the move from adopting indigenous forms of the legit-
imation of power, to the imposition of European Enlightenment modes of the 
same (Kaviraj 1999). The basis of the gathering or throwing together of these 
diverse communities was exclusionary – all those that were not distinctly Islamic, 
Sikh, Parsi, Christian or Jewish. Arguably, these two modes of the legitimation of 
power continued – and continue – concurrently, with varying emphasis at differ-
ent times and places. Of course, this then necessitated a similar move with re-
spect to these other communities – what we have noted above as the communali-
sation of the socio-polity through the public-personal divide. 
24 It need hardly be added that these developments remained confined for the 
most part to upper caste, upper class women. Some of the most complex en-
gagements with these questions are evident in the thought and practice of figures 
like Rammohun Roy, Swami Vivekananda, and perhaps most influentially, Ma-
hatma Gandhi. See Chatterjee (1993a), Nandy (1983). 
25 While this came about in several ways, the most effective programmes were 
those undertaken by the Arya Samaj – with its fundamentalist and purificatory 
return to the Vedas – and the Sanatan Dharma – with its attempts to consolidate 
existing social structures as eternal givens. 
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26 The argument here is not new, and has echoes of Karl Marx’s conception of 
the cellular organisation of pre-colonial Indian society, later developed by Bar-
rington Moore, Satish Sabharwal and others. See Corbridge and Harriss (2000: 
32-7) for a discussion of these understandings. The difference here is that I have 
tried to understand this fragmented or cellular organisation as it affected – and 
was affected by – the consolidation of Brahmanical patriarchy. 
27 See V Geetha (1999) for the marginalisation of the Brahmanical elite, the con-
sequent discourse of de-masculinisation that emerged, and the attempt to resolve 
this problem in the realm of sexuality. 
28 Sumit Sarkar notes that it was essentially an upper class, upper caste national-
ism aimed at protecting and advancing the interests of this minority, through de-
mands for instance for greater participation in the Indian Civil Services, which 
only the educated elite could have. (1983: 96ff).  
29 The notable exceptions were figures like Chandrashekar Azad and Bhagat 
Singh, but they came in the 1930s.  
30 It helped that its leadership was frequently and largely in the hands of commit-
ted liberals like Pherozeshah Mehta, the Nehrus, etc. 
31 This point, without the larger theoretical implications regarding Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony that I am striving to elaborate here, has been made by sev-
eral other scholars; William Gould’s (2004) is to my knowledge the first book 
length study to focus on this. 
32 The dominant view amongst lower caste leaders was that while British rule, 
with all its problems, still offered opportunities to break out of the stranglehold 
of the caste system, independence won on the terms of the INC would only ben-
efit the upper castes, and ensure a return to the subservience of caste Hindu soci-
ety. (Aloysius, 1998) 
33 G Aloysius notes that because the vast majority of Muslims were converts 
from the lower castes seeking an escape from the caste system, in most regions 
they shared a (horizontal) solidarity of interests across religions that bound them 
together more than the more abstract (vertical) religious solidarity across regions. 
(Aloysius, 1998: 84-5) 
34 G Aloysius (1998: 122) makes a similar point, without referring to the trans-
formation specifically in terms of it being the transformation of a patriarchy. 
35 Even the almost notorious and deliberate self-feminization of MK Gandhi did 
not extend to relinquishing control over his wife Kasturba or, infamously, over 
his children, whom he ruled with an iron fist. See Chandulal Dalal’s (2007) biog-
raphy of Gandhi’s son Harilal Gandhi. 
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36 Guha gives, amongst others, the examples of the army managing health and 
sanitation, as in the case where it stepped in to fight plague in Pune; or the ad-
ministration mobilising labour for tea plantations in Assam; etc. 
37 Guha goes on to identify other conceptual pairs – ‘Improvement/Dharma’, 
‘Obedience/Bhakti’ – that were operational in the attempt to establish a colonial 
hegemony, which he argues, failed – but these are not of immediate concern to 
us. 
38 And this was never independently, but as part of larger incidents of violence 
involving masses of lower caste and class people. 
39 G Aloysius (1998) notes that it is important to see these movements not as 
attempts to subvert the nationalist cause, as has sometimes been seen particularly 
by nationalist historians, but as instances of early, localised self-determination 
movements, that differed from the mainstream nationalist movement only in that 
they were localised anti-imperial struggles. 
40 In a rare instance of unison between the Arya Samajists and the Sanatan 
Dharmis. See S Sarkar (1983: 59-63, 79-80), J Brown (1994: 178-80), G Pandey 
(1999: 305-17), among others, for details of these incidents of violence. 
41 The most well-known of these was the infamous Chauri Chaura incident of 
1922 incident when anti-imperialist protestors picketing liquor vends turned vio-
lent and torched a police station, killing 22 policemen.  
42 While this does appear a conspiracy theory, in suggesting that the otherwise 
antithetical operations of the moderates and the extremist Hindu nationalists 
were basically oriented to the same end, it would be more accurate to read it as 
the historical compulsion to self-preservation of the caste system, or at least, of 
those who benefited from it. See G Aloysius (1998) for a similar reading. It is also 
important to clarify that this scheme is more indicatory of trends in, than defini-
tive of, the politics of the period: exceptions to it – as with the secular extremists, 
or the non-nationalist socio-political lower caste movements that resisted the 
spread of the upper caste patriarchate – only serve to prove the general rule, in 
their inability to make any significant impact on the dominant political trends.  
43 Such an explanation would be circular, even tautological: ‘the moderates es-
chewed violence because they were moderates, and they were moderates because 
they eschewed violence’, and so on. 
44 Gandhi: ‘Nobody in this world possesses absolute truth. This is God's attribute 
alone. Relative truth is all we know. Therefore, we can only follow the truth as we 
see it. Such pursuit of truth cannot lead anyone astray’. (Harijan, 2 June 1946, 
p167) 
45 Gandhi: ‘My Hinduism is not sectarian. It includes all that I know to be best in 
Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism....Truth is my religion and 
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ahimsa is the only way of its realization. I have rejected once and for all the doc-
trine of the sword’. (Harijan, 30 April 1938, p99) 
46 Of course, Gandhi elaborates this far beyond such a functionalist understand-
ing, as a discipline in itself, as a way of approaching everything from the quotidian 
to the other-worldly. But this is only to be expected, if the doctrine of a transcen-
dental Truth is to be maintained unexceptionably. It is worth noting in passing 
the striking similarity of such a conception to the individual-centred (as opposed 
to church-centred) quest for salvation in much Protestant thought. Similarly, the 
consequent notion of the Protestant work ethic no doubt appealed very much to 
Gandhi, as much for its emphasis on individual abilities and merits as for its easy 
applicability in the business community – the banias – that he belonged to. What 
is striking about this conception is thus its definitive modernity, looping around 
the communitarian dynamics of the period to propose a notion of identity and 
self that is centred on the relation of the individual (rather than of the communi-
ty) to state/society/religion, based on a transcendent notion of Truth, even as it 
maintains a strongly ‘Hindu’ frame of reference. 
47 The well-known story of how Gandhi, when asked by a western reporter what 
he thought of western civilisation, replied that he thought it would be a very good 
idea, is a particularly apt illustration of this point.  
48 Gandhi saw no contradiction between his beliefs on the one hand, that all pro-
fessions, and therefore all castes, were innately noble and dignified, and on the 
other, that the lower castes should endure their status with humility, as predeter-
mined and religiously sacrosanct. For a very quick overview of Gandhi’s views on 
caste, see the brief compilation by Shiva Shankar at http://www.mail-archive. 
com/zestalternative@yahoogroups.com/msg00151.html, accessed 12 Dec 2005. 
49 I have suggested…that woman is the incarnation of ahimsa. Ahimsa means 
infinite love, which again means infinite capacity for suffering. Who but woman, 
the mother of man, shows this capacity in the largest measure? She shows it as 
she carries the infant and feeds it during nine months and derives joy in the suf-
fering involved. What can beat the suffering caused by the pangs of labour? But 
she forgets them in the joy of creation. (H, 24 February 1940, pp. 13-14) For a 
review of Gandhi’s engagement with ‘the woman question’, as well as of feminist 
responses to this engagement, see Sujata Patel (1988) 
50 From http://www.mkgandhi.org/trusteeship/chap06.htm accessed 12 Dec 
2005 
51 Gandhi does acknowledge that if the rich refuse to honour their part of the 
ethical contract, it poses problems but insists that non-violent non-cooperation 
and civil disobedience by the poor will suffice to rectify matters (ibid.). 
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52 See in particular Gandhi’s assassin, Nathuram Godse’s writings in his journals 
to this effect. Gandhi himself was provoked by the criticism into offering defenc-
es at various points on his attitude to violence and cowardice. See http:// 
www.mkgandhi.org/nonviolence/phil8.htm  
53 Gandhi’s re-engineering of gender and sexuality goes further than this, to ad-
vocate what Ashis Nandy has termed a ‘dissident androgyny’ as a transcendent 
gender, incorporating the masculine and the feminine – but this is not the space 
to go into a discussion of that. For an interesting analysis, see Gayatri Reddy 
(2003).   
54 This is apart from the dominant narratives of Muslim rapacity and lascivious-
ness that Hindu society needed to be shielded from. Such narratives tend to ig-
nore the many instances of British rapacity with regard to ‘Hindu’ women (Ball-
hatchet 1980), or the repeated British interventions in what were perceived as 
definitive customary practices for ‘Hindus’ (sati, child marriage, proscriptions on 
widow-remarriage, women’s non-entitlement to inheritance, etc.) and for this 
reason cannot be considered a sufficient reason for the hostility toward Muslims. 
55 For a thoughtful engagement with Gandhi’s ideas of non-violence, see Bilgrami 
(2003) 
56 This is neither the space nor the argument to discuss the appropriateness of 
Gandhi’s strategy, here and as a political strategy in general. But it may be noted 
in passing that Gandhian non-violence probably works best if understood as a 
political strategy of ethical inversion, rather than as an ideology of the self. 
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5 From Independence to the Emergency 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the continuing evolution of Hindu national-
ism through the period from independence to the period of the Emer-
gency (1975-77). Again, as in the previous chapters, the intention here is 
not to offer yet another narrative of events in the contemporary history 
of India, but to attempt to discern trends and patterns in the social, polit-
ical and economic dynamics of this period, that were conducive to, or 
encouraged the growth of Hindu nationalism. In particular, I will exam-
ine the effects of post-independence political and economic policies on 
the further and continuing modifications of Brahmanical patriarchy, and 
the consequent impact on the rise of Hindutva. Broadly, one may speak 
of three stages in the period after independence: the Nehru period 
(1947-64), the Congress-I period (1966-96, referring to the period when 
Indira Gandhi for the most part, followed by Rajiv Gandhi and then 
Narasimha Rao, were prime ministers) and the period of coalition poli-
tics (1996-present).1 The stages chart, in one sense, a process of increas-
ing democratisation in the Indian polity; in another, they also mark the 
gradual abandonment of the principles of socialism – and some would 
argue, of secularism too – as well as witness the increasing volubility of 
discourses of caste, on the one hand, and of nationalism and sub-nation-
alisms on the other. Additionally, and perhaps most relevantly for our 
purposes, a new term is introduced into our attempt to track the growth 
of Hindutva, which is the discourse of development. Prior to independ-
ence, the themes and issues that constitute what is today broadly under-
stood in the term development had been of secondary (but related) con-
cern to the quest for independence; when this was achieved, it almost 
immediately became the most important focus of the new post-colonial 
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government. In this chapter then I will attempt to track a history of, and 
therefore a perspective on, the dynamics that obtain between the various 
issues noted above, and their consequences for the subsequent directions 
in the construction of gender and Hindu nationalism in India, specifically 
up to the declaration of the Emergency in 1975. This date interrupts the 
three-stage periodisation I have noted above; however, in itself it marks a 
momentous shift in the trajectories of politics in the country – and 
serves therefore, as a useful narrative node around which the analyses of 
all three stages may be articulated.  
5.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this chapter may be stated as follows: 
1. To identify some of the economic, socio-political and historical fac-
tors that operate in this period and determine our understanding of 
its political and cultural configurations. 
2. Specifically, to examine the issue of ‘development’ – its meanings, 
programmes, ideological bases and its implications and consequences 
– as it has affected the formation of gender in India, and of Hindut-
va. 
3. I will argue that the discourse of development, despite undergoing 
several mutations, even today remains a strong and determining fac-
tor in the understanding of the (future of the) nation, and conse-
quently of Hindu nationalism.  
4. To produce an analytical narrative of the gendered dynamics unfold-
ing within Brahmanical masculine hegemony, in its relations to the 
various forces that are in political play in this period. 
5.3 From Colonial ‘Modernity’ to Post-Independence 
‘Development’ 
The links between colonial conquest and industrial-economic growth in 
Europe are today common knowledge, as are the effects of colonial con-
quest on colonised societies. However, the effects of colonial conquest 
on the formation of the nation-state in Europe, on the one hand, and on 
its social and cultural dynamics on the other, are less well known, and 
have been less easily discernible. This is partly because of the fact that 
the most visible current of colonialism was the ‘exporting’ of Europe to 
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the colonies: the site of engagement between coloniser and colonised 
was predominantly the latter’s society, not the former’s. This has allowed 
for the presumption that European society itself remained largely re-
moved from the scene of the action, its history therefore charting a 
course substantially independent of this process. As Edmund Burke, III, 
remarks: 
we tend to see colonial histories as taking place in a space that is separate 
from that in which European history occurs. Accordingly, colonial histo-
ries appear as derivative histories, rather than shaped by the same world 
historical processes as modern Europe. In this "sleeping beauty" theory of 
modern history, agency resides alone with Europe, while the non-West is 
seen as without history, fatally blocked from change because of its alleged 
cultural defects (eg., Islamic obscurantism, oriental despotism, the Asian 
mode of production) until awakened from its millennial slumber by the 
kiss of the West. (1998) 
There were, however, inevitable reverse currents, less easily discerni-
ble, by which the fact and process of colonialism also affected the colo-
nising powers.2 One such current was controversially highlighted by Ed-
ward Said in Orientalism (1978), the (somewhat sensationalist) basic thesis 
of which was that European knowledge of its colonial subjects was cod-
ed within an ideology of ‘Western superiority’, resulting in a severe Oth-
ering of the ‘East’. While severely critiqued from several quarters (e.g. 
Ahmed 1993; Cohn 1996) for being variously unoriginal, essentialist, in-
sufficiently substantiated, lacking in nuance, sweeping to the point of 
caricature, and historically sometimes wildly inaccurate (to name just a 
few), Said’s book did draw attention to the terms in which the self-
perceptions of the European ruling classes were being constructed 
through the period of imperial expansion. Simply put, what has variously 
been referred to as Europe’s ‘civilising mission’ or ‘the white man’s bur-
den’ – combined with the ideas of progress, historical advancement and 
the eradication of backwardness and barbarity – were not just justifica-
tions for conquest (as they have routinely been understood) but often 
fervently held ideologies that were, in their essence, vocational commit-
ments to a recasting of the European self. The moulding of the Europe-
an psyche by the colonial encounter has been convincingly demonstrated 
for instance in Franz Fanon’s (1967) searing analyses of colonial rela-
tions. 
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Closely related to this current was another, which was the eventual ef-
fect on European nation-state formation of the complex, often treacher-
ous manoeuvres and battles that were played out between the different 
powers (European and non-European) on colonial terrain. The relative 
powers of the different European states – wealth, economic and territo-
rial size, industrial and infrastructural programs, military capabilities, po-
litical and administrative constitution – all came to be negotiated and de-
termined substantially (albeit indirectly) by the outcome of their repeated 
engagements in the colonial theatre. This and the establishment and con-
solidation of the colonial administrative machinery that followed, be-
cause of its particular requirements – intellectual, physical, social – insti-
tuted fundamental changes within European social space in terms of 
education, professional opportunities, occupational and vocational sta-
tus, recruitment procedures, and related to these, the very important 
process of the gendering of functions and roles within the imperial ma-
chinery (Ballhatchet 1980, McClintock 1996, R Hyam 1990, Sinha 1995, 
Stoler 1997). For instance, specifically feminine (or rather, feminised) 
occupations evolved like nursing, or the governess; the ideal of the 
housewife as mother, home-maker and charitable social activist evolved 
especially in the colonies (Burns 1998; Reidi 2002); but in particular, it 
inculcated a definitive relation of masculinity to power that was troped in 
an industrial language:  
In the later half of the nineteenth century…self-control was often ex-
pressed through industrial or mechanical analogies; manliness represented 
disciplined control over natural forces, just as the steam engine and other 
industrial technology managed "the natural energy of water and fire" (....). 
The Empire was a natural place for such masculinity to be expressed and 
to be textualised in stories of adventure …which would then reproduce 
manliness as an object of desire for young readers. (Holden 1998: 2) 3 
We have already seen how, in the encounter between the colonisers 
and the upper-caste colonised these gender ideologies in particular 
played out; by the time of independence, they become the ideological 
and political terms in which the leadership of the upper-castes begins to 
frame its agendas. Franz Fanon puts it in acerbic, if somewhat overstated 
terms: 
Before independence, the leader generally embodies the aspirations of the 
people for independence, political liberty, and national dignity. But as soon 
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as independence is declared, far from embodying in concrete form the 
needs of the people in what touches bread, land, and the restoration of the 
country to the sacred hands of the people, the leader will reveal his inner 
purpose: to become the general president of that company of profiteers 
impatient for their returns which constitutes the national bourgeoisie. 
(1967: 166) 
Fanon’s words point to the regularity with which, in post-indepen-
dence contexts, there is a replication of the colonial intent (perhaps inev-
itably) – as if, post-colonially, the only way to possess (to claim or reclaim) 
an identity that was destabilised by colonialism itself, was through a se-
cond, ‘colonising’, appropriative move. Certainly for the early Hindu na-
tionalists, independence offered an opportunity to gain a sense of power 
by redefining and re-enacting the imperial 'civilising' process as the 
(re)construction of the Hindu nation itself. Combined with the drive to 
emulate the economic, industrial and infrastructural achievements of the 
coloniser that we had noted in the previous chapter, this complex, potent 
epistemic configuration that germinated in Europe’s encounter with its 
colonies, then finds a new medium of return to the colonies after inde-
pendence: the discourse of development.  
5.4 The Politics of Development:  
Nationalism-Development-Modernity4  
Satish Deshpande in an overview of the political economy of modern 
India, writes,  
At its most fundamental level, the rhetoric of development provided the 
former colonies with a dignified and distinctive way of obeying the imper-
ative towards a modernity already indelibly marked as western. Thus, de-
velopment acquired a powerful emotive-nationalist charge in the non-
western world, because the West is “always-already” the norm for most 
modern institutions and ideas, including those of the nation, development 
and progress…. [D]evelopment comes to be seen as a national mission and 
not only as a world-historical process of the modern era. (1998: 149) 
The extent to which this is to be seen as an ‘import’, however, is de-
pendent on the extent to which the tradition-modernity dichotomy is 
operationalised in the analysis of the colonial and post-colonial situation. 
That is, once we understand the intricate, even intimate dynamic of the 
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colonial encounter, its formative effects in the shaping of ‘modernity’, 
and the manner in which it renders the discursive split of traditional-
modern as homologous with indigenous-western, it is clear that the pro-
cess of modernisation under colonialism – whether in the ‘west’ or in the 
colonies – already contains within it the seeds of the ideology of devel-
opment, then coded as the civilising mission. Modernity is in this sense 
very much a product of the colonial encounter, as much as the idea of 
‘tradition’ and no more alien to the colonies than the idea of ‘indige-
nousness’. It was as familiar to the colonies as the coloniser, and as ex-
clusively possessed by him as his power – in fact, was the secret of his 
power. Its manifestations were not just scientific and technological so-
phistication, or level of industrial development, or complexity of eco-
nomic organisation, but in the entire apparatus of governance that was 
required for and deployed in the control and administration of these.  
This is a key point, because as in the case of India, many ex-colonies 
inherited and continued with this apparatus and its concomitant ideolo-
gies of governance – a democratic constitution, guarantees of civil and 
democratic rights, a secular state, electoral politics, a complex bureau-
cratic machinery, etc.5 Yet ‘modernity’ was always, and still remains, a 
condition of the ‘West’, while ‘development’ was always, and still re-
mains, that for which the former colonies must aspire – their ‘national 
mission’ in Deshpande’s words. The actual distinction then, between the 
two intimately related ideas – modernity and development – is not that 
they are two stages in a neutral continuum in the objective world (devel-
opment leading to modernity) but that they are ideologically loaded 
terms instituted to signify an insurmountable geographical separation, 
with two projectedly divergent historical paths. In this projection, devel-
opment will never – and was never intended to – evolve into modernity, 
being indelibly marked by the ineradicable alterity of ‘indigenousness’, 
whether understood in terms of race, ethnicity, religion or even lan-
guage-family – just as European nations will never be spoken of as being, 
or ever having been, developing countries, at any point in their histories.6 
The entire discourse, practice and project of development is thus in the 
direct lineage, and probably the most lasting legacy, of the ‘white man’s 
burden’. But the imagined historical trajectories of the two – modernity 
and development – though germinating in the same historical moment 
of colonial encounter, have branches that will never meet. 
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The significance of all this for us lies specifically in the emergent im-
agination and discourse of the nation-state under colonial rule. At the 
risk of being slightly repetitious, as we had pointed out in the previous 
chapter, the coincidence of views of Brahmanical and Victorian codes in 
the process of framing Hindu personal laws – on the issue of the pub-
lic/private divide and its deep gendering – though arising out of different 
histories and intended somewhat differently, translated into the common 
law/ personal law divide and the differential construction of masculine 
hegemonies within each community thus reorganised by these new social 
realms. The common law realm being the realm of control of economy 
and the industry, the drive to emulation attendant on the emergent mas-
culine hegemony of the upper castes was as much about the re-casting of 
Indian society to meet the prescriptions and demands of the coloniser’s 
modernity – as a means to power – as it was about the consolidation of 
Brahmanical patriarchy into the ‘Hindu’ community. It was thus an es-
sential prerequisite for negotiating with the new apparatus of govern-
ment and its mechanisms of representational politics. The achievements 
of the various reform movements – in the education of women, in the 
protection of their rights to life (after widowhood) and property, in the 
repudiation of child-marriage and the promotion of widow-remarriage, 
etc. – are recognisable then as the endowments of a protectionist and 
benevolent ‘new patriarchy’, not as the consequences of women de-
manding and claiming them in large numbers, and/or through organised 
movements (Tambe 2000). Besides, they were too few in number, and 
too confined to upper caste women, to be understood as organised 
women’s movements. Further, the notion of women as a (political) 
community, remained completely subsumed (if at all it had formed)7 by 
the intense battles of community formation along caste and religious 
lines. As the previous chapter argued, these were in fact founded on 
gender reorganisations that, by explicitly shaping public space as mascu-
line, effectively foreclosed the possibility of women’s issues emerging in 
it, except as means and markers of community distinction and definition, 
and mediated through male interventions. The emergent understanding 
of the modern nation-state, especially for the Hindu nationalists, was 
thus fundamentally gendered by that very modernity, although it was 
continually rendered in the discourse of tradition. Inscribed in the for-
mation of the new nation-state then, was the language of rights born of 
individualism, but articulated in the grammar of community and com-
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munity formation, essentially bespeaking the interests of the Brahmanical 
patriarchate. In sum, the gendering of spaces and communities according 
to the new patriarchy was also informed by the drive to be modern – or 
to emulation, as was pointed out earlier – that, post-independence, 
merges neatly with emergent discourse of ‘development’.  
Gender and Development, Post-Independence 
The Indian case is thus interwoven by the complexities of, on the one 
hand, colonial modernisation which was to eventually translate into the 
development process, and the transformations in social and economic 
relations demanded by this process; and on the other, by the adoption of 
a political system that was originally designed to enshrine the rights of 
individuals over communities.8 Its subsequent adaptation to the colonial 
and post-colonial imperative to acknowledge the rights of communities 
to safeguard their ‘Cultures’, over and above the claims of the abstract 
universal individual, is symptomatic of the mutations that ‘modernity’ 
undergoes in the colonial context – but more significantly, it is a mark of 
the complex struggle to integrate the post-colonial state’s modernity with 
the ‘other’ modernity of the newly emergent nation and its communities. 
In practice then, even as the Westminster model of liberal democracy, 
with its material roots in a capitalist dispensation and its ideological roots 
in individualism, was adopted as the form of post-colonial government 
by the newly independent nation, the rights of its individuals remained 
frequently tangled in the issue of community rights – and rooted in a po-
litical economy that cannot be described as solely feudal, capitalist or so-
cialist, but a nebulous amalgamation of all three. Partha Chatterjee offers 
us an insightful theoretical formulation for this amalgam: 
[I]n situations where an emergent bourgeoisie lacks the social conditions 
for establishing complete hegemony over the new nation, it resorts to a 
‘passive revolution’, by attempting a ‘molecular transformation’ of the old 
dominant classes into partners in a new historical bloc and only a partial 
appropriation of the popular masses, in order to first create a state as the 
necessary precondition for the establishment of capitalism as the dominant 
mode of production. (1986: 30). 
We will return to the idea of the ‘molecular transformation’ suggested 
above later: for now, it is necessary to briefly examine the idea of the 
state that emerged through the debates immediately after independence. 
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Corbridge and Harris, following Kaviraj and Chatterjee, indicate the dif-
ficulties faced by the Nehruvian Congress in seeking to establish a strong 
state that could initiate and guarantee the social and economic reforms 
required to ensure secular and equitable development, in the face of re-
sistance from ‘big business and landlordism’ (2000: 29, 32-8); to this we 
can add the resistance of the communal and caste patriarchal elites. The 
then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru’s response was to seek a function-
ing compromise on all contentious issues, and nothing expresses this 
more clearly than the controversy surrounding the passage of the Hindu 
Code Bill in the 1950s, eventually passed as a series of fragmented bills 
dealing with marriage, inheritance, adoptions, etc.  
Nehru considered it a priority for his government to have this Bill 
passed, immediately after independence, precisely because it would index 
the modernity of the new nation-state. However, the arguments centred 
not on the substantial question of women’s rights, and their implicit mo-
dernity; the proponents of the Bills used the question of women’s rights 
to argue that their passage was vital to reform and modernise Hinduism 
itself – was vital in fact, for maintaining the unity of Hindu society. Op-
ponents of the Bill(s) maintained firstly, that every community (and es-
pecially the Muslims) would have to undertake legislative reform, and not 
just the Hindus; and secondly (and rather contradictorily), that matters of 
marriage, inheritance, etc had clear scriptural directives, and therefore 
belonged in the realm of personal law, not to be tampered with by secu-
lar-constitutional injunctions – which the proponents of the Bill(s) be-
lieved would lead to the fragmentation of Hindu society, and therefore 
of national unity.  
Crucially, discussions about the modernity of India, at nearly all levels, re-
lated to concerns about national unity. Projects for modernisation, wheth-
er based in a traditionalist framework of ancient Indian values, or a Neh-
ruvian model of economic development all shared a common assumption 
that the critical obstacle to India’s modern identity was ethnic and religious 
divisiveness. So, Congress traditionalists, attempting to promote the values 
of a united India through the advocacy of Sanskrit studies, connected 
modernisation to ideas of an ancient Indian unity that had overcome caste 
and religious difference. (Wiliam Gould, ‘Violence, Modernity and Tradi-
tion’, n.d.) 
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The progressives eventually won, despite being in a minority, but only 
because Nehru made so many concessions to the opponents of the Bill 
even within the Congress, that its substantive ameliorative content for 
women was little more than token, succeeding in creating a myth that is 
today dear to the Hindu nationalists – that the ‘Hindu’ community has 
modernised its personal laws and liberated its women from oppressive 
customary injunctions, while others, specifically the Muslims, have yet to 
do so.9 The entire episode makes amply clear the intimate relations be-
tween conceptions of nation, modernity and gender: the final legitimacy 
for the Bills was not the substantive issue of the suppression and oppres-
sion of women in the ‘Hindu’ community, but the need for national uni-
ty in the making of the modern Indian nation-state. Further, it serves as a 
striking example of the way in which the masculine hegemony of the na-
tional Brahmanical patriarchate used (and continues to use) the discourse 
of the nation-state – as well as the state itself – to undermine and neu-
tralise any attempt to contest its power. It would be a complete miscon-
ception of the dynamics of this incident to see the ‘progressives’, Nehru 
included, as seeking to challenge or dismantle Brahmanical masculine 
hegemony. The ‘challenge’, such as it was, was a logical effect of the dis-
course of modernisation – specifically, a semantic by-product of the con-
stitutional adoption of the language of rights. The promptness with 
which it was diluted, and large concessions to opposition granted, indi-
cates the extent to which ‘progressive’ sentiment on it was – in substan-
tial terms – not so very much in disagreement with conservative Hindu 
traditionalist and nationalist views, and thus the fundamental coherence 
of masculinist allegiances or homosociality (Gabriel 2010) within an oth-
erwise fairly heterogeneously constituted Brahmanical patriarchate. We 
will return to these issues later, when we examine the relations between 
the growth of the women’s movement in India and Hindu nationalism.  
If one reflects further on the probability that Nehru would have had a 
very good idea of the kind of resistance he would have had to overcome, 
then in one Machiavellian sense, it could even be argued that the episode 
served wholly another purpose: to win Nehru support on another project 
altogether. This project was the emphasis on planned heavy industrialisa-
tion that he (along with Subhash Chandra Bose) had been working on 
and been enamoured with from the 1930s, and which had met with stiff 
resistance from Gandhi and his followers. The Congress as a whole had 
manifested a mixed reaction: from the establishment of the first National 
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Planning Commission in 1938, in spite of strong scepticism, to the grad-
ually increasing interest (within the less conservative and bourgeois sec-
tions of the Congress) that led to the initiation of the First Five-Year 
Plan in 1951, the idea of planning was in many ways ‘a prelude to an in-
tra-Congress tension reinforcing the multi-class character of the party’ 
(Bidyut Chakrabarty 1992: 280). Given that Nehru had been promoting 
the idea of planning since 1938, it is probably safe to argue that by 1951, 
he must have known that compromises and bargains, as much as rational 
persuasion, would be required to push it through – hence possibly, the 
ease with which he conceded ground on the Hindu Code Bills. In spite 
of this, as Chakrabarty makes clear, he also had to sacrifice Bose and ac-
commodate staunch Gandhians and other conservatives in the Planning 
Commission, in order to appease the stiffer resistance to planning within 
the Congress. That Nehru nevertheless succeeded in pushing the idea of 
planning through is testament to the intensity with which he believed 
that social transformation was necessary; but also that it was necessary 
that it ‘be achieved by administrative fiat’ (Corbridge and Harris, 2000: 
38), top-down, and not by the vagaries of unguided social and economic 
processes.  
Nehru’s major achievement in this was in successfully drawing private 
big business interests into supporting the idea of planning, principally by 
using the threat of imminent social unrest and possible violence. It is 
worth noting that after independence, Nehru’s opinion of the same agi-
tational politics that had been central to the freedom movement – and 
that remained a prominent feature of the Indian political scene – now 
saw a complete volte face. ‘Politics, for Nehru, had become a question of 
negotiating the day-to-day problems of development: “…The problems 
facing the country are mainly economic and in a sense the biggest issue is 
the Five-Year Plan…”.’ (Dipesh Chakrabarty [quoting Nehru] 2005: n.d.) 
Chakrabarty also notes that the issue of maintaining public order in the 
face of disruptive agitational politics remained debated well into the 
1960s, before it ‘lost all political utility (i.e., the ruling classes lost the ca-
pacity to impose discipline)’ (Dipesh Chakrabarty 2005: n.d.).10 But Neh-
ru’s own obvious disgruntlement with agitational politics resulted in his 
repeatedly emphasising the need for a strong and disciplinary state, if 
economic development was to follow. 
By identifying the state as a supra-institution, not only did Nehru per-form 
a historic task; he also created a congenial atmosphere for the capitalist 
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state to thrive which emerged not through a bourgeoisie victory over feu-
dalism but through an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the dominant 
feudal classes – thus making passive revolution triumph in a context preg-
nant with the possibilities of a civil rebellion. (Bidyut Chakrabarty, 1992: 
286) 
What both Chatterjee and Chakrabarty refer to as a ‘passive revolu-
tion’ in this instance may be understood as the process by which the 
masculine hegemony of the Brahmanical patriarchate was both consoli-
dated and extended, specifically through the machinery of the state. In 
the previous chapter we had referred to what Thomas Blom Hansen 
terms the ‘double discourse’ of colonial governmentality, which had al-
ready instituted an Indian administrative class, essentially middle class 
and upper caste in constitution, that remained very much in place even 
after independence (Hansen 1999: 46). After independence, they were 
therefore well positioned to further and consolidate the interests of the 
Brahmanical patriarchate.  
As we have already seen, this was a heterogeneously constituted patri-
archate whose interests were in no sense always unified, and Hansen’s 
idea (noted in the previous chapter) of the double discourse serves as 
one way to index this heterogeneity. Of equal significance here is the 
other, related dichotomy mentioned in the previous chapter, the tension 
between ‘Order’ and ‘Danda’ that evidently remained a factor in govern-
ance even after Independence. We will shortly elaborate on how these 
terms may be usefully deployed in analyzing this heterogeneity: but for 
now, we may propositionally argue that the ‘passive revolution’ noted by 
Chatterjee and Chakrabarty was the process of establishment of ‘Order’ 
(through a “molecular transformation” of the ruling elites, specifically 
through the gender issues thrown up by the Hindu Code Bills), in and as 
the consolidation of Brahmanical masculine hegemony. However, this 
transformation was not so much an attempt to erase the hold of Danda, 
especially in the large non-metropolitan areas of the country, as to grad-
ually establish a hegemonic alliance – even if, arguably, the process of 
transformation predated the moment of independence, with its origins in 
the great caste and gender reform movements of the nineteenth century. 
The arguments of the previous chapter have already made clear the 
manner in which the emergent bourgeoisie gradually allied with the older 
feudal elites – characterized there as liberal-western versus conservative-
traditionalist ‘Hindu’ tendencies – rather paradoxically, through the con-
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tested terrain of these movements, with the end being essentially to pre-
serve and protect upper caste interests. It is this alliance – more implicit 
than explicit, more tacit than stated – that was characterized as the ‘new 
patriarchy’ of a reorganized Brahmanical masculine hegemony. In the 
post-independent context, it is the shifts in balance in this alliance, and 
its interruptions by caste movements and other processes of social 
change (development, the vagaries of agriculture, war, economic liberali-
zation, etc) that eventually made possible the political rise of Hindu na-
tionalism in the late eighties and early nineties – as we shall shortly see. 
5.5 The Early Directions of Hindu Nationalism 
It is nevertheless important to recognise the fundamentally common ori-
entation – of preserving and protecting upper caste interests – of this 
newly independent Brahmanical masculine hegemony.11 It is true that its 
explicitly Hindu nationalist component had become substantially dis-
credited after the violence of Partition and particularly after the assassi-
nation of Gandhi, leading to the ban on the RSS in 1948. The latter’s 
consistent opposition to the ostensibly secular politics of the Congress 
allowed it to be readily branded a communal organisation, with Hindu 
nationalism itself becoming consequently marginalised as a communal 
ideology. ‘Hindu nationalism developed into a kind of trope, which acted 
to define or affirm the non-communal credentials of the INC’.12 These 
schisms however belie and distract from the latent patriarchal continui-
ties, based on class, caste and gender affiliations, within this hegemonic 
formation.13 From the time of the (albeit brief) ban on the RSS to its 
‘opportune’ re-emergence to prominence as part of the opposition to 
Indira Gandhi during the Emergency, Hindu nationalism seemingly dis-
appears politically, and reappears just as magically, if anything even 
stronger than it had been. The most widely accepted explanation for this 
disappearance is that it was the effect of Congress dominance and the 
early popularity of secularism; the concomitant explanation for the sud-
den reappearance is that, although the RSS was almost invisible at this 
time, it continued to work and spread incrementally and inconspicuously, 
creating a network that sprang into action with the Emergency.14 While 
both of these factors may indeed be true to some degree, as explanations 
in themselves they are both insufficient and fallacious: firstly, they are 
premised on the belief that Hindu nationalism and secularism are entirely 
incompatible as political stances, which need not be the case; arguably the 
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ban on the RSS was a consequence of the assassination of Gandhi, more 
than of any fundamental ideological difference between the avowedly 
secular sections in the INC and the Hindu nationalist ones, or of any 
inherently greater strength in, or popularity of, the former. Secondly, the 
argument assumes these positions (secular vs. Hindu nationalist) to be 
no more than political programs, so that the banning of a program was 
understood as sufficient to erase its ideology and its politics; this is in 
fact a misconception arising from the first fallacy. In actual fact, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, there were large areas of overlap between 
the avowed Hindu nationalists on the one hand and the Hindu tradition-
alists, the conservatives and the Hindu liberals on the other, that togeth-
er constituted the bulk of the Indian National Congress. This meant that 
banning the RSS did not in fact much damage Hindu nationalism as 
such. Rather startlingly, it also implies that of the two – secularism and 
Hindu nationalism – it was the first that was actually no more than polit-
ical program: the second was evidently much more deeply embedded in 
the socio-polity than its institutional manifestations indicated. And third-
ly, these explanations do not account for how the RSS managed to sur-
vive and expand in the ‘secularist’ years after independence – especially 
given that, even though the ban was revoked after a year, the RSS had to 
accept very stringent terms whereby it would desist from any political 
activity. Further, as Basu, et al (1993), point out, ‘[t]he decade that fol-
lowed lifting of the ban was not, on the whole, a happy one for the RSS 
or other right-wing groups’ (p. 32), given that it saw the Communists 
form the main political opposition to the Congress, and that its own or-
ganisation was substantially in disarray. Understood thus, it is difficult to 
accept easy explanations that Hindu nationalism had been temporarily 
defeated by the secularism of the Congress in the post-independence 
decades, but continued to work in the shadows to re-emerge with the 
Emergency (given its own state of disarray). While its apparent disap-
pearance as a mainstream political project no doubt owed substantially to 
the ban, its re-emergence cannot be explained by the work of the RSS 
alone, but by the fact that it never really lost its hold as an ideology outside 
mainstream politics in this period, where the continuities of Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony, based on a host of issues and concerns other than 
the communal/secular divide, remained intact (indeed, to understand 
Hindu nationalism as essentially premised on the communal/secular di-
vide is the problem). As John Zavos puts it, ‘The shapes of Hindu na-
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tionalism, in this sense, are not the shapes of Hindu nationalism neces-
sarily constrained by the limits of the Sangh-Parivar and other overtly 
Hindu nationalist organisations.’15 
This is in fact one of the fundamental arguments of this chapter: that 
the apparent political ‘resurgence’ of Hindu nationalism from the seventies onward is 
in fact no more than the political re-articulation of the Brahmanical masculine hegem-
ony that it always had been, and remains, founded on, and that this hegemony in fact 
had never really either weakened or diminished, even while it has mutated and contin-
ues to do so. This is not to argue that the secularism of the Indian National 
Congress (or of any of the other smaller political formations) was cos-
metic, or only a political slogan, but that it had to contend with a hege-
monic formation that had existed for centuries, and that – while it had 
obviously mutated – remained the most dominant and pervasive socio-
political condition. We will return to these considerations later; to com-
prehend them fully, it is necessary to first return to the condition of this 
formation at the time of independence. 
With independence, it was inevitable that this broad hegemonic for-
mation should seek to consolidate its position by appropriating the in-
strument of the state. However, as Hansen notes, ‘[o]ne of the paradoxes 
confronting the new nationalist leadership was that it had to reverse its 
own critique of the practices and governmentalities of the colonial state 
and make these same, often unreformed, practices and rationalities into 
an instrument of social transformation.’ (Hansen 1999: 46) The unrest 
that had proved so useful on the one hand, in destabilizing the imperial 
state, and on the other, in strengthening this hegemony’s position as me-
diator between that state and the mass of its colonial subjects, now 
proved not only inconvenient, but threatened to destabilize the newly 
acquired institutional powers of this hegemonic formation. Where it had 
functioned as a buffer between the state and its subjects pre-
independence, with the shifting of political and power alignments post 
independence, it now occupied a new and somewhat awkward position 
in relation to the masses it had represented (or at least claimed to repre-
sent) under empire. Specifically, it now had the paradoxical function of 
representing the masses to itself. Further, the dynamics within the alli-
ances that constituted this hegemony in the first place, were now differ-
ent: once state power had been acquired, it was no longer required to be 
united (as against the empire). Instead, the various constituent factions 
of the alliance16 – within and outside the Congress, the dominant politi-
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cal persona, as it were, of this hegemonic formation – began contesting 
for the domination and control of state resources. In the early years after 
independence this contest was substantially controlled by the institution-
al bonds of the enormous Congress party machinery; where such control 
was not possible or viable, or where there was resistance to the Congress 
itself, the state machinery was mobilized, resulting in the passage of a 
series of repressive Acts.17 But even by the late sixties it was evident that 
these measures were not going to hold; dissent – both within and outside 
the Congress – was proving instrumental in the subsequent and steady 
dismantling of its structure (of which more later). It is in this context that 
we can understand Nehru’s emphasis on planning as, among other 
things, also an attempt to simultaneously address, deflect and defer the 
response to the myriad demands, at various levels and in diverse regions, 
of the factions of the alliance – which, interestingly, were now increas-
ingly positioning themselves as the mediators and buffers between the 
new Indian state and their respective agitating populaces.18 Planning, in 
this sense, was offered to India as a scientific, rational and impersonal 
(and therefore just) program of action, unprejudiced by history or com-
munity affiliations, that could and would satisfy all constituencies. It was 
Nehru’s template for the further transformation of the existing Brah-
manical hegemony into a new hegemonic order, an invitation to consoli-
date the alliance based, not on a common enemy, but on the possible 
realization of a common future. In what follows, I will attempt to sketch 
the social and political trajectories that emerged out of this consolidation 
into the present. 
5.6 Fault Lines of the Present19 
Broadly, in the period immediately after 1947, dominated by Nehruvian 
development policies in economics and the Congress Party in politics, 
two small ruling elites, consisting of an urban, upper-caste, national elite, 
and a rural social elite of the dominant peasant castes and rural upper-
castes, together constituted a small middle class.20 The dominance of 
Nehru in the Congress up to the 60s meant that even here, it was the 
urban elite that, being pan-Indian and English-proficient, controlled the 
state. Writing of this formation as ‘the Nehru settlement’, Rudolph and 
Rudolph note:  
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The Nehru settlement had been based on a coalition of urban and rural in-
terests united behind an essentially urban-oriented industrial strategy. Its 
senior partners were India’s proportionately small but politically powerful 
administrative, managerial, and professional English-educated middle-
classes and private sector industrialists. (1987: 51) 
Pavan Varma (1998) also lucidly describes the infatuation of this class, 
particularly its English-educated component, with the Nehruvian imagi-
nation of a socialist, industrialised and modern Indian future, even as it 
almost unconsciously worked to dilute this vision through its ceaseless 
consolidation of its own hegemonic position and character. Until the 
early sixties, this elite was convinced it was undertaking the project of 
nation-building selflessly, when in fact it is now evident that it had actu-
ally been a process of systematic consolidation of its control over the 
state and over the resources the state could mobilise for it. It was a pro-
cess by which this broad class-formation accrued a social, cultural and 
economic capital base for itself, referred to by Barrington Moore as a 
‘bourgeois revolution’ (cited in Robert Stern, 1993: 3). Nevertheless, at 
this point in time, immediately after independence, it would be fair to say 
that the political disposition was in fact a secular one: not so much be-
cause of a weakening of religion in the public sphere, as the preoccupa-
tion with nation-building that had fired the imagination of this particular 
class, with the Nehruvian vision of dams and heavy industries (and their 
metonymic expressiveness of progress, redistribution of largesse, and the 
generation of power) as the ‘temples of modern India’. Not only had the 
Hindu Right been driven underground and lost substantial credibility for 
its role in the assassination of Gandhi; but more pertinently, this hege-
monic class was still dominantly a westward-looking one, seeking the 
economic fruits of their ‘independent’ control over industrialisation and 
technological growth promised by Nehru. Further, it established itself as 
a pan-Indian ruling class that, until the 60s, maintained a lid on regional 
unrest, partly through the Congress system of accommodation and pat-
ronage politics – which however, was arguably in a steady process of de-
terioration right from independence – but substantially also through the 
famed ‘steel frame’ of the Indian bureaucracy (Khilnani: 2004 [1997], 
38). But the logic of the democratic electoral process was to ensure that 
the rural elites could in due course begin to mobilise numbers, as the po-
litical counter to the systemic power of the urban elite. 
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The social tensions that emerge in the sixties are, as it were, symp-
tomatised by the political transformations that occur then. Even as the 
urban bourgeoisie was consolidating itself, this was the period that saw 
the emergence into political visibility of the rural elite, rising to power 
through the electoral process itself, banking on the demographic 
strengths of caste and regional communities. Bhikhu Parekh notes Neh-
ru’s inability to impose organisational control in the Congress party lead-
ing to its becoming ‘a loose and flabby organisation, a party of parties 
permitting a wide variety of factions, bound by nothing more than a 
vague commitment to “national ideology”’ (1995: 39). This is the period 
when the Congress begins to visibly weaken as a pan-Indian party, and 
caste and regional political formations gain strength in the states. What 
contributed substantially to this process in the late 1960s was the massive 
and often violent political unrest that followed Indira Gandhi’s coming 
to power in 1966 – a result of a combination of crop failure, food short-
age, escalating food prices, a severe foreign exchange crisis leading to 
devaluation of the rupee, increased defence expenditure following the 
Indo-China war of 1965 – leading to an important and irrevocable em-
phasis on militarization – and a general slowing down of the economy. 
Additionally, the language debate and the popular assertion of the ver-
naculars in opposition to English (and in the southern states, to Hindi as 
well) led to the linguistic reorganisation of the states. Arguably, this 
served to enhance the gradually increasing power of the regional elites. 
Further, the third Five Year Plan saw a turn toward agriculture-centred 
policies initiated after Nehru, under and after Lal Bahadur Shastri, partly 
due to successive years of drought (1966-7) and food grain shortage, 
partly to pressure from the World Bank. This was accompanied by the 
increasing powers of the Cabinet and the ministries, as well as of the Na-
tional Development Council (constituted of the Chief Ministers of the 
States), at the expense of the influence of the Planning Commission 
(Corbridge and Harris, 2000: 69-70). But as Francine Frankel (1978) has 
shown, agricultural reform, which was key to the success of the heavy 
industrialisation charted in the first stages of planning, was strongly re-
sisted at the state level because electoral and financial support in state 
politics came from the rural rich peasants and merchants, and under the 
federal structure agriculture was controlled by the states.21 Thus on the 
one hand, there was increased political attention to agriculture, with 
power shifting from the Planning Commission to the NDC, while on the 
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other, precisely because of poor implementation of land reforms, the 
beneficiaries of this attention remained the rural elite. Pavan Verma 
notes that these policies ‘changed the status quo only to the extent that 
they shifted power from a handful of very rich upper-caste farmers to a 
broad band of middle-level cultivationalists of the intermediate castes…. 
And it was they who benefited the most from the Green Revolution’ 
(1998: 93).22 The federal structure thus contributed to the centre-states 
divide, as regional elites began to defeat the Congress and come to elec-
toral power in the states, with the 1967 national elections. With the frac-
turing of the Congress in 1969, it became clear that Indian politics would 
no longer be determined by the sense of homogeneity that the Congress 
had provided as an organisation. It is increasingly evident then that this 
period is marked by a process of the visible heterogenisation of the body 
politic. Yet, it was still a somewhat limited heterogenisation, essentially a 
consequence of rural elites laying claim to and gradually wresting power 
from the urban elite.  
In many ways, these ‘bullock capitalists’ (as the Rudolphs termed 
them) constituted the social and political base for the dramatic transfor-
mations in politics that took place in the late sixties and into the early 
eighties. New, locally strong political parties emerged, representing, dif-
ferently, the interests of regional elites and of caste and religious minori-
ties; as this tendency intensified, even by the late eighties it became in-
creasingly evident as a trend towards alliance politics at the regional, and 
later, national levels. The state’s affirmative action – or reservation – pol-
icies, though tardily implemented, also began contributing to the emer-
gence of a new, small but vocal political leadership for the lower-castes. 
Together, they represented newly economically empowered groups that, 
even by the late sixties, were laying claim to middle class status in terms 
that refused to acknowledge anymore the old caste affiliations and sta-
tuses. Most of these new arrivals to middle class status were the interme-
diate caste, land-owning peasants, like the beneficiaries of the Green 
Revolution noted above. But as Yogendra Singh notes, their new status 
was not economically sustainable in the long term through continued 
dependence on agriculture, and the lack of investment in business and 
industry.23 The new agricultural policies may have succeeded in creating 
wealth – and that too in an uneven distribution pattern – but this was 
coupled with the anxiety that it could not sustain, because of its depend-
ence on the vagaries of seasons, quality and quantity of produce, pests, 
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etc. What were desired were the security and the prestige offered by state 
employment. The state as chief agent of development, and therefore of 
resources, became the field of competitive rivalry between these various 
groups (Deshpande 1998: 157). 24  
We may now broadly identify the different axes along which various 
divides emerge within this historical bloc, especially from the late sixties. 
We have already identified the first as the rural-urban divide among the 
elites; this subsequently takes on the shades of a divide between the cen-
tral state and the regional states, in one sense, and into an opposition 
between diverse coalitions of regional parties and the Congress, at the 
state and the central levels, in another. (Coalition politics in this sense – 
as we noted earlier – came into existence in India fairly quickly, albeit at 
the state levels, with the results of the 1967 elections. At this stage how-
ever, it is pertinent to note, the Hindu-right Jan Sangh – the precursor of 
today’s BJP – was part of very few of these coalitions.) This in turn sug-
gests another kind of vertical divide – that between the regional parties 
themselves, which remains a powerful divisive force even till today. This 
divide works to separate parties of one region from another, as well as 
between different parties in the same region. While commentators like 
DL Sheth (1999) locate the source of this divide in the inability of the 
regional elites to agree to an alternative language, say Hindi, to replace 
English as the language of power (which explains region-wise separa-
tions), we need to note the importance of other political and ideological 
differences between and within the regional elites that contributed to the 
maintenance of the divide till well into the eighties. Among other issues, 
one can list differences on sharing of river waters, migrants and migra-
tion between states, differences in caste and culture, claims on shared or 
common land resources like forests, sanctuaries, pasture land, etc. Addi-
tionally, there were (and continue to be) ideological affiliations and pro-
grammatic differences within the same region, that could register hori-
zontal divides of caste or class – as for instance with the increasing 
influence of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu or the 
emergence of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and subsequently 
the left-extremist Naxalites, out of the original CPI – as well as sect-
based vertical divides, as with the Muslim League in Kerala or the Akalis 
in Punjab. 25  
Having said this, it is important to note that the political impact of 
this increasing heterogenisation of the body politic was to be felt only 
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much later – specifically, about two years after the 1971 elections and 
following the increasing social unrest against Indira Gandhi’s Congress. 
Till then, several factors worked to prevent this nascent heterogeneity 
from emerging into full political visibility. Firstly, while the Congress was 
already showing signs of breaking up by 1969, it was still too extensive, 
structurally resilient and politically coherent an organisation to be dis-
mantled by uncoordinated, isolated and localised factionalism; only with 
the concerted efforts of the various smaller parties, combined with the 
strong rejection of the Emergency by the electorate, did the coalition of 
1977 manage to oust the Congress. Secondly, it remained for a while the 
primary instrument for the maintenance of Brahmanical hegemony; and 
even through and after Indira Gandhi’s massive ‘leftist’ phase from 1969 
to 1975, when the patronage system – which was essentially a modern, 
state-managed version of feudal benefaction – that had been in place in 
the Congress was thoroughly and comprehensively subverted, the prin-
ciple of patronage itself was not; it was merely redirected, concentrated 
and centralised in the figure of Mrs Gandhi herself (see P. Brass, 1984; 
Corbridge and Harris, 2000: 74-8). This ensured that the actual social 
mechanics of Brahmanical hegemony remained unaffected by the larger 
institutional changes of nationalisation, bureaucratisation and subsidisa-
tion; rather, it became even more patently self-serving and governed by 
sycophancy. Thirdly, when Indira Gandhi’s strategy of subversion began 
in the late sixties, it was already feeding into a social erosion that was un-
derway: Corbridge and Harris note that, following the Green Revolution, 
the  
increasing power of the rich peasantry, and of their capacities to mobilize 
support across rural classes because of the connections of kinship, caste 
and patronage…was tied up also with the horizontal mobilization of 
Backward Classes, eroding the hold of the historically dominant high-caste 
local elites and…that of the Congress party (Corbridge and Harris, 2000: 
82).  
So, even as she managed to bypass the regional party bosses and 
score triumphantly through local satraps in the 1971 elections, on the 
explicitly ‘socialist’ (read populist) political planks of nationalisation, 
poverty alleviation, land reform, etc, her own strategy turned against her 
when she proved unable to deliver on the election promises.26 In the 
event, the resultant unrest had no institutional political mechanism of 
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containment, and instead fed the process of caste, language and religion 
based political formations that emerged in opposition to the Congress. 
One important consequence of these divides was the emergence of 
strong regional chauvinisms amounting in some cases to sub-
nationalisms in several regions that fed off the federal structure and the 
already existing divide between the national mainstream and the various 
regional polities.27 Apart from the already troubled regions of the North-
east28 and Kashmir, nationality questions that were already nascent 
around issues of language and culture evolved into full-fledged linguistic 
chauvinism, marked by the language riots of the sixties in Kerala, Tamil 
Nadu, Maharashtra and elsewhere, with the linguistic reorganisation of 
the states – recording the transformation of one kind of divide into an-
other (language to nation). Evidently then the discourse and practice of 
nationalism did not subside with independence but were in turn appro-
priated by heterogeneous groups within the nation to later turn into full-
fledged nationality movements. These differences were not always articu-
lated as differences of language: by the mid-seventies Kashmir had 
emerged as a distinctly ethnic nationalism (based on perceived differ-
ences in language, religion and history), and Punjab was emerging as the 
base of an international Sikh nationalism based on religion.29 The pur-
pose and focus of this research precludes addressing these issues in full: 
but it must be noted here that, whatever the differences between them, 
these various sub-nationalist movements were neither autochthonous, 
nor independent of or unrelated to the other forms of social and political 
unrest that emerged in the sixties and seventies. In short, even as emer-
gent elite formations were taking shape in reaction to the pan-Indian he-
gemony of Brahmanical patriarchy, they remained substantially divided 
and disparate, inflected by lines of division both internal to them – of 
caste, region, language, interests – and external – the federal structure of 
the polity, the interventions of central institutions like the bureaucracy 
and the judiciary – till well into the eighties. Paul Brass schematises this 
nicely when he notes it as  
…[A] vast difference between the politics of national integration, of gov-
ernment and opposition, of planning, of secularism, and of rapid industri-
alization which Nehru symbolized and the politics of faction, caste, pat-
ronage, nepotism, communalism, and mixed subsistence and cash crop 
agriculture that operated at the state and district level’. (P Brass, 1984: 90) 
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Again here, Brass’s schematisation resembles Guha’s conceptual bina-
ry of Order-Danda, as well as Hansen’s spatialization of it noted in the 
previous chapter.  
‘Order’ and ‘Danda’, Post Independence 
It is necessary at this point to examine the analytical utility of these terms 
in relation to the socio-political context we are referring to. Where we 
had earlier discussed these terms as indexing the different orders of the 
practice of violence in the nineteenth century, here – while retaining the 
emphasis on violence – these terms may also be used to discuss the 
transformations in the hegemonic order underway in this period. It is 
clear that the idea of ‘Order’ remained (and remains) a principal trope for 
the governmentality sought to be established by the post-independence 
state. Under Nehru, this Order was envisaged as being delivered through 
the five-year Plans and the bureaucracy; Nehru’s reluctance to actively 
involve the Congress in the process marks his awareness that, while as a 
party it was participating in the political process of ‘Order’ (multi-party 
democracy), as an organisation it was already governed by processes and 
principles that lay (and lie) outside the modernist idiom of ‘Order’ and 
that may best be expressed through the countervailing trope of ‘Danda’. 
‘Danda’ then is understood here, not just as the principle of violent au-
thority (as understood by Guha), but as shorthand to refer to the variety 
of regional and local conventions and codes of authority and governance 
that, on the one hand, sought to use the new political mechanisms of 
‘Order’, but on the other, also resisted its superior Constitutional author-
ity, prerogatives and its unifying centripetal force. These could include 
the entire gamut of ‘non-rational’, ‘pre-modern’, ‘traditional’ arrange-
ments of power and control: existing caste and gender hierarchies, lan-
guage and dialect relations, religious, sect and cult affiliations, village or 
other regional affiliations, ethnic bonds, the panchayat system, landlord-
tenant relations, formal and informal kinship ties and networks, patron-
age systems, clientelist arrangements, etc.30 The emergent nationality 
movements, caste movements, agrarian uprisings, trade union agitations, 
language, ethnic and communal riots, all index the engagement of ‘Dan-
da’ in this sense with ‘Order’; while the converse – the engagement of 
‘Order’ with ‘Danda’ – is revealed especially in Indira Gandhi’s transfor-
mation of the political theatre in India during the late sixties and early 
seventies. In particular, her cultivation of local satraps, her subversion of 
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the organisational structure of the Congress party, her implicit and some-
times explicit endorsement of nepotism, and indeed, her own political 
promotion of her son Sanjay Gandhi and of herself as an icon (in the 
slogan ‘Indira is India’, first coined by the then Congress President Dev 
Kant Baruah) – all index an acquiescence of the political processes of 
‘Order’ to the demands of ‘Danda’.31  
But of significance for us is the registering of these as contesting con-
stituents within Brahmanical hegemony, transforming the nature of that 
hegemony through the process of contestation itself. If the realm of 
‘Danda’ was governed by varieties of ‘non-modern’ notions and systems 
of authority, its principles of legitimation – irrespective of the variety – 
drew ultimately (directly or indirectly) from the orderings and injunctions 
of Brahmanical patriarchy; conversely, the realm of ‘Order’ (represented 
by the bureaucracy, the professional and mercantile classes, the industri-
alists, the leadership and the constituencies of most political parties), 
simply by virtue of the fact that it was dominated by the upper castes, 
was already a Brahmanical (masculine) hegemony, which tended to draw 
its legitimacy as much from this hegemonic position as from its affilia-
tions with (or at least, proximity to) the Indian state. The contestations 
between these two realms must then be understood not so much as con-
flicts between opposing socio-political factions, as negotiations (with 
varying degrees of intensity, vehemence and violence) between constitu-
ents of the same broad political field. This will be clearer when we re-
member that the inhabitants of one were almost invariably also inhabit-
ants of the other, especially in the realm of ‘Order’, and that the terms 
themselves (‘Order’ and ‘Danda’) are more analytically than substantially 
discrete. The negotiations between these realms, then, must be under-
stood as a continuous and unstable process, definitive of the specific dy-
namics of this hegemony, as well as its shifting balances of power. Given 
this instability of power, it was inevitable that this hegemonic condition 
would open up, allowing the formation of forces resistant to it. But what 
is remarkable about this particular hegemony is the ability that it has his-
torically displayed to accommodate and absorb such resistances – a point 
I will shortly make clearer. 
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5.8 The Curious Case of Indira Gandhi 
The dramatic changes that took place in the Indian socio-polity in the 
late sixties and early seventies were thus critical moments in the shifting 
power-relations of this (masculine) hegemonic formation. It is not coin-
cidental that they occurred when Indira Gandhi was in power. It is now 
well known that she came to power almost accidentally, in the sense that 
she was supposed to have been a stop-gap prime minister, till the power 
struggle between the old guard – known as ‘the Syndicate’ – in the party 
was sorted out. Her political isolation began, in this sense, at the very 
beginning, and was explicitly a consequence of her being both young and 
female. But her transformation of herself and her political condition, 
from being a ‘shy and inexperienced girl’ into ‘the only man in the cabi-
net’,32 is an index also of the extent to which she had necessarily to ap-
propriate the trappings of power specifically as gendered. In order for 
her to be taken seriously by the party, she first had to dismantle the un-
derlying structure of the hegemonic order of the party itself. In 1966, 
when she was promoted to Prime Minister-ship, the party was controlled 
by the Syndicate – a laterally networked alliance between men of more or 
less equal political stature and power from across the country, and from 
across the ideological spectrum within the Congress.33 Their structural 
controls over the party – particularly at the grass-roots level – meant that 
she either had to depend on them to carry her politically, or dismantle 
and reorganise the structure itself to suit her. As it turned out, her deci-
sion to follow the latter strategy led not only to the splitting of the Con-
gress, but forced her also into separating the state elections from the 
general elections, thereby affecting the very political structure of the 
country. Arguably, it may have even forced her into the 1971 war with 
Pakistan as a means to prove herself a ‘strong’, ‘masculine’ leader, and 
eventually also contributing to her dictatorial mode in instituting the 
Emergency of 1975.  
But encoded in these dynamics is also the continuing confrontation 
of the themes of ‘Order’ and ‘Danda’. As we have already noted, this was 
the period when the contest between the two realms was reaching criti-
cality, given the multiple fronts on which tensions were unfolding, inside 
and outside the Congress – indeed, some of the external tensions actually 
feeding into the internal ones. With the Syndicate hampering her hold on 
the party, and the party itself showing signs of losing its ability to medi-
ate and contain social tensions, Indira Gandhi was perhaps left with no 
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choice but to use the institutional power of the state to address these 
diverse tensions. But in using the structural and institutional power of 
the Indian state to centralise and consolidate her own political power, 
Indira Gandhi both strengthened and weakened the realm of ‘Order’: 
strengthened, by centralising political power in the institutional mecha-
nisms of the state, especially the police and the administrative services; 
and weakened, (a) by dismantling those non-state institutional mecha-
nisms that served to mediate between the realms of ‘Order’ and ‘Danda’ 
– the party networks in particular; and (b) by employing the principles of 
‘Danda’ within the realm of ‘Order’ – as in the appointments of judges 
favourably inclined to her in the judiciary, the promotion of sycophancy, 
the establishment of coterie rule, the protectionism towards her son San-
jay Gandhi, even the actual misuse of her own powers of office, etc.34 
The point of significance for us though, lies not in the details of this dy-
namic, but in (a) the persistence of the gendered nature of hegemonic 
power, through these transactional changes; and (b) the gradual blurring 
of the line of clarity between what constituted the realm of ‘Order’, and 
what the realm of ‘Danda’. Taken together, these two points of signifi-
cance suggest that, even as masculine hegemonies entered into contesta-
tion and/or negotiation, the fundamentally gendered quality of the he-
gemonies (as masculine) were never challenged or questioned, but even 
remained the basis of the contestation/negotiation – hence Mrs. Gan-
dhi’s acceptance as a leader at precisely the moment when she began ap-
propriating the language, style and strategies of power as gendered – i.e., 
as masculine. Even when she was promoted – and promoted herself – as 
‘Mother Indira’, she was arguably employing a trope from the affective 
realm of ‘Danda’, wherein the figure of the (widowed) mother is mythi-
cally and hierarchically endowed with great power35 – but within and by 
the patriarchal discourse it is derived from. In other words, this figure, 
rather than challenging the masculine hegemony of patriarchy, is ulti-
mately and paradoxically, its affirmation. And the confirmation of this is 
to be found in the RSS’s approval of Indira Gandhi as a hero(ine) of the 
country.36  
With the imposition of the Emergency in 1975, Indira Gandhi tried to 
reassert the principles of ‘Order’ in a socio-polity that had obviously be-
gun to disintegrate.37 But well before this move, it had become clear that 
the principles of ‘Order’ that underlay the mechanisms of the state, had 
become inextricably intertwined with those of ‘Danda’ – not just through 
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Mrs. Gandhi’s various subversions, but in the unfolding dynamic of de-
mocratisation itself. A substantial part of the social tensions that chal-
lenged Indira Gandhi’s reign was the emergence into political visibility 
and audibility of previously marginalised and invisibilised sections like 
the emergent middle peasantry. With the continuing deterioration of the 
Congress’s ability to reign in dissent, and to accommodate difference, the 
Brahmanical hegemony that it represented was inevitably exposed to 
pressures from these vocal and intensely charged emergent groups – the 
very groups that initially supported Mrs. Gandhi, and then rose against 
her when she could not deliver on her promises. In terms of social pro-
file, Mendelsohn argues that it was composed primarily of the urban 
‘lower middle class’, who identified the Congress with the ‘westernised’ 
urban elite, and formed the basic constituency of the Jana Sangh; dis-
gruntled and restive students and workers who rallied under Jayaprakash 
Narayan; and the emergent kulaks or middle peasantry, who, like the ur-
ban lower middle class of clerks and petty traders, disliked the strangle-
hold of the urban bureaucratic elite (Mendelsohn 1978); and according to 
Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi’s biographer, the Sikhs of Punjab too 
formed an important part of the resistance (Malhotra 1989).38 (Arguably 
though, the last category – i.e., the Sikhs – overlapped substantially with 
the category of the middle-peasantry, in terms of the benefits accruing 
from the Green Revolution; nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the categories because neither were all middle peasants Sikhs, 
nor did the Sikh resistance arise purely as a class issue, but also as an is-
sue of religio-ethnic identity.) It is thus a curiosity of the history of the 
period that apart from the middle peasantry, the strongest resistance to 
the Emergency came from the Sikhs, the RSS and Jayaprakash Narayan’s 
movement: one a religio-ethnic nationalist movement, the second a 
right-wing nationalist organisation and the third a Gandhian-socialist 
peasants’-and-students’ movement. What is of significance for us is the 
confluence of these movements in ideological terms, on the site of re-
sistance to the Congress: it was a confluence that renewed and re-
oriented the discourse of nationalism in specifically religious and ethnic 
terms, linked to the moral discourse of Gandhian socialism, and ad-
dressed to a mixed constituency. This constituency was not only disgrun-
tled and restive with the failure of the developmentalist paradigms spon-
sored by the Nehruvian Congress (and by Indira Gandhi’s populism), 
and with the aura of corruption associated with the Congress by the 
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middle of the 1970s, but profoundly receptive to these renewed dis-
courses (Verma 1998; Corbett and Harriss 2000). In other words, the 
nationalist discourses that remained disparate and disbursed along lines 
of ethnicity, region, language, etc. in the sixties now began to coalesce 
under the dominant articulations of Hindu nationalism. It is important to 
recall here again that the discourse of Hindu nationalism is not confined 
to its institutional forms (i.e., the RSS, the BJP, etc.) and that it can and 
does manifest in other political and social bodies as well – as we shall 
shortly see. 
5.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tracked the growth of Hindu nationalism in the 
political sphere, as well as the factors that permitted, aided or incited this 
growth. I have shown that the ideology of ‘development’, insofar as it 
was a direct product of modernist nationalisms, served substantially to 
strengthen and consolidate the forces of Hindu nationalism that had, till 
independence, remained relatively less organised, less influential and 
more disarrayed than the forces that promoted an ostensibly secular na-
tionalism, under the banner of the Indian National Congress. In the 
postcolonial contestations over the meanings and practices of modernity, 
too, Hindu nationalism initially gave way before the Nehruvian insistence 
on a planned, secular path to modernity. But the failure of this project 
was itself at least partly the result of the persistence of Hindu nationalist 
currents that eventually came to the fore in the aftermath of the imposi-
tion of Emergency. Intimately connected to the persistent (albeit glacial) 
growth of Hindu nationalism through the sixties and seventies, was the 
caste factor: as we have seen, the gradually increasing political visibility 
of middle and lower caste political organisations contributed substantial-
ly to the weakening of the political base of the Congress. In addition to 
this, though, there was a consistently active discourse of gendered power 
that became especially visible around the figure of Indira Gandhi. Of 
particular significance here was the way in which Mrs. Gandhi tried to 
mobilise themes and tropes from the realm of ‘Danda’ – specifically the 
invocation of the figure of the nation-as-mother-goddess in her public 
self-projections – in the more secular domain of ‘Order’. Arguably, this 
too opened the way for the greater acceptability of Hindu nationalist dis-
courses in the public domain. In the following chapter, we will explore 
the unfolding of these multiple processes – the ideology of development, 
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the dynamics of caste, the transformations in the articulations of gender, 
and the further evolution of Hindu nationalism. 
Notes 
 
1 Strictly speaking, national coalition politics goes back to the formation of the 
Janata Party and its coming to power in 1977. Kaviraj (1998) argues convincingly 
for understanding the coalition politics at the state level during the sixties, as in-
dexing a necessary condition of Indian politics, based on coalitions within the 
ruling bloc, rather than an evolved choice.  
2 I am not concerned at this point with what might be termed the molecular level 
of the impact of colonialism on Europe: changes in cuisine, architecture, furni-
ture, sartorial styles and materials, additions in and modifications of vocabulary, 
modes and styles of representation in the arts and literature, the knowledges and 
practices of medicine and hygiene – all of which were immense – since this is 
neither the space nor the specific argument to detail those.  
3 See also Herbert Sussman (1995). 
4 It goes without saying that this trio does not have a necessary relation so much 
as a contingent, historical relation. They therefore do not automatically imply 
each other. 
5 That these may have subsequently been rejected, destroyed, modified, or re-
placed in many instances – Pakistan, Algeria, Mexico, to name a few – with the 
vagaries of each individual nation’s local history, does not affect the primary case. 
6 Admittedly, the discussion here is dominantly with reference to modernisation 
theories of ‘development’; but as long as the ideology of development remains 
tied to that of modernity, in the manner outlined above, it matters little whether 
we are looking at modernisation theories, dependency theories, or theories of 
globalisation and development: the argument remains the same. Recent initiatives 
to think of development in more ‘holistic’ terms – paying attention to grassroots 
requirements, local socio-cultural conditions, ecological and environmental fac-
tors, etc – or in terms of rejecting macro-industrial developmental paradigms in 
favour of a focus on human welfare, human resource development, etc. while 
laudable, remain haunted by the comparative normativity that possesses ‘devel-
opment’. Again, this is not the space to elaborate on this – a thesis in itself. 
Japan is in many ways the exception that proves the rule here: while for all eco-
nomic and industrial purposes, it is considered a ‘developed’ nation, it remains an 
uneasy member of that club. Never having been officially colonised, it related to 
modernisation and modernity in almost purely instrumental terms, as ‘imports’ 
that were necessary evils. Further, it was historically guilty of imperial ambitions 
that ran dangerously counter to European (and by the 20th century, Euro-
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American) hegemony – ambitions that were perceived to be rooted in its vaunted 
and utterly alien ‘traditions’. The unspeakable barbarism of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki is in this sense a metaphor for the shattering of those ‘incorruptible’ tradi-
tions by the acme of modernity, the atom bomb – for it was after this that the 
Japanese polity was subjugated, tutored and transformed into the ‘modernity’ of 
electoral democracy. See Andrew Gordon (2008). 
7 There was, in Bengal and in various other parts of the country, a series of 
movements of women organizing for change, but essentially restricted to the 
middle class, and very limited in its brief. See Borthwick (1984). 
8 Corbridge and Harriss for instance, note that ‘the institutions of a modern state 
are not rooted, in India, in a civil society of freely associating individuals sharing a 
common set of beliefs and a common moral code’ (2000: 37). 
9 This is not to suggest that the Bill served no useful purpose – in fact, it probably 
did initiate the long (and unfinished) legal process of establishing women’s rights 
in India – but that it was seen by both its opponents and proponents as a matter 
of significance not in itself, but as it reflected on the community and the nation. 
See Jaffrelot (1999) pp. 102-106 for a discussion of this debate and its outcome. 
See also Rina Williams (2005). 
10 Chakrabarty obviously overstates the case; but the implicit perception of a 
growing ‘indiscipline’ in civil society that eventually led to the imposition of the 
Emergency is important, and will be addressed shortly. 
11 A polemical point can be made here: that independence was of real conse-
quence only for this powerful minority, insofar as it left them with a state system 
and an economic and industrial infrastructure that offered real possibilities of 
reinforcing hegemonic control over the rest of the populace. Arguably, the vast 
masses of the Indian populace continued and continue a miserable and poverty 
stricken existence that remains unaffected by whether it was under exploitation 
by the British or by this new elite. While it would be inaccurate to state that noth-
ing has changed since then, given the emergence of various kinds and formations 
of counter-hegemonies particularly in rural and provincial India (caste-based par-
ties, regional parties, militant class movements like the Naxalbari movement), 
leading to some land reform and redistribution programs, the Green Revolution, 
some statistical evidence of decreasing poverty and mortality, increasing literacy 
and savings and consumption patterns, etc – nevertheless, to argue that therefore 
independence has transformed the political economy of exploitation in India to-
wards a more egalitarian and equitable mode of production, would be an enor-
mous overstatement. See also G Aloysius (1998) for a sophisticated argument 
along these lines. 
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12 From the anonymous group of researchers at World-Journal, at http://soc. 
world-journal.net/governingindia.html, accessed March 18, 2006. Hereafter re-
ferred to as WJ. 
13 WJ’s understanding of Hindu nationalism is one of the very few to recognise 
that it is about much more than its manifest institutions or organisations. ‘This 
process has done much to obscure the embeddedness of Hindu nationalism in 
developing ideas about Indian culture and social relations among political elites. 
Recognising the shapes of Hindu nationalism, then, means looking beyond the 
discourse of communalism and acknowledging the network of contexts in which 
key ideas emerged.’ (ibid.) However, WJ’s eventual emphasis on studying it as an 
ideological phenomenon restricts their analysis in a different way, preventing the 
examination of Hindutva as generated within and out of specific hegemonic 
alignments and practices, which is what I hope to achieve here. 
14 See for instance, among many, Christophe Jaffrelot (1996), Sunil Khilnani 
(1997), Achin Vanaik (1997: 45-6), Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), etc. 
15 In an article that is part of WJ (n.d.). While Zavos is able to identify this prob-
lematic, he attempts to analyse it as a boundless seepage of idioms and symbols, 
ideological forms, systems of representation, which I believe is an insufficient 
analysis, because of the networks of economic and social practices that are made 
sense of through these representations. 
16 Pranab Bardhan ([1985] 1998) has identified the main constituencies of this 
alliance as industrial capitalists, rich farmers and professionals (particularly in the 
bureaucracy).  
17 In 1947 and 1948, the Indian government, maintaining that it was fighting 
communalism and maintaining internal security, passed several laws such as the 
Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, Bombay 
Public Safety Act, and Madras Suppression of Disturbance Act. These laws gave 
wide-ranging powers to the security forces to detain and arrest anyone in the 
name of national security and upholding public order. In 1950, Jawaharlal Neh-
ru’s Congress government passed the Preventive Detention Act which was then 
used to arrest trade union activists. 
18 Rudolph and Rudolph’s (1987) characterisation of the Indian state as a ‘weak-
strong’ one may be understood as a direct consequence of this tension – between 
the ‘weakening’ pull of the institutional fragmentation, rural unrest, and later, ris-
ing communalism; and the ‘strengthening’ centrist orientation, the extensive ma-
chinery of the bureaucracy and the establishment of a heavy-industrial base di-
rectly controlled by the state.  
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19 For a succinct account of the politics of the period since independence, see 
Partha Chatterjee’s (1998) introductory essay ‘A Political History of Independent 
India’. 
20 For a compact and incisive examination of these issues, see D L Sheth (1999) 
from which I draw for the immediately following remarks. 
21 See also Corbridge and Harris (2000: 56-65) 
22 While the Green Revolution is usually associated with Punjab, firstly, the over-
all impact of the new agricultural policies was felt all over the country, but espe-
cially in north India, with more or less the same consequences; secondly, national 
politics was and still is hegemonised and substantially determined by the preoc-
cupations and dynamics of the “Hindi belt”; and thirdly, for the purposes of this 
research as well, this area was most influential on the eventual emergence of Hin-
dutva to political power. 
23 'In a generation or two even a land holding of a size within the ceiling limit 
permitted by the state…gets fragmented. And without avenues for mobility to 
non-agricultural employment the younger generation of peasants finds itself ex-
posed to unavoidable downward mobility or even pauperization.' (Quoted by 
Pavan Verma, 1998: 116-17) 
24 Deshpande goes on to argue that this eventually leads, rather ironically to the 
failure of development as ideology. 
25 This also explains for instance the more recent emergence of the Bahujan Sa-
maj Party alongside the Samajwadi Party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, and the Janata 
Dal in UP and Bihar, all claiming to represent the interests of the entire region, 
but essentially representing caste or religious communities. But see also KC Suri’s 
(n.d.) contention that, especially since the eighties, ideological differences be-
tween parties have increasingly become postural and even irrelevant, since all par-
ties must proclaim to be ‘secular, socialist and democratic, as it is mandatory for 
the parties to proclaim true faith in these principles while they register with the 
EC’ (Suri, n.d.: 19). The determining factor according to Suri, is political conven-
ience and personal predilection. 
26 Partly due to the successive failure of rains and consequently crops, in the early 
seventies, but also to ill-conceived policies on nationalisation of the food grain 
trade, leading to hoarding, black marketeering, and food riots. See P Verma, 1998: 
79-82. See also Brass (1984) for an on-the-ground account of how the changes in 
the Congress’s strategies affected its social base and vice versa. 
27 See Atul Kohli (1997) for a useful, if rather optimisitic, analysis of ethnic na-
tionalisms in the Indian context. 
28 Here the colonial and highly repressive Armed Forces Special Powers Ordi-
nance was, in 1958, regularised into an Act and extended from Manipur to apply 
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to the entire north-eastern region, and has since then never been revoked – a 
sharp, but often overlooked reminder of the racist, exclusivist stance of the Indi-
an state towards the entire region. 
29 Individual cases vary: Kashmiri and Sikh nationalisms were unresolved issues 
from before independence, while Naga and Assamese nationalism evolved after 
independence. Again, while Kashmiri and Sikh nationalisms had strong religious 
dimensions, Naga, Assamese, Marathi, and Kashmiri nationalisms demonstrate 
strong ethnic components. Some of these nationalisms have subsided almost to 
the point of irrelevance, as with Sikh nationalism, and some were never articulat-
ed as anything more than regional-ethnic chauvinisms, like the Marathi and Tamil 
nationalisms. These differences however, only reinforce the larger point: that na-
tionalism may have mutated into diverse forms post-independence, but did not 
disappear. For a concise overview of the Punjab issue, see the special issue on 
‘Re-imagining Punjab’ (Seminar 567, Nov. 2006). For both Kashmir and Punjab, 
see Larson 1995. 
30 The problem with unqualifiedly labelling these as ‘non-rational’, ‘pre-modern’, 
‘traditional’ is of course, that they came to be labelled as such precisely through 
(and at the point of) their engagements with the countervailing ‘modern’; in this 
sense they are as constructed by ‘modernity’ as the very idea of ‘Order’. Never-
theless, even these constructions do draw on certain pre-modern understandings 
of power, sometimes expressed in the understanding of politics through the term 
‘dandi-niti’(or the politics of Danda). 
31 These were not phenomena introduced by Mrs. Gandhi into the political thea-
tre; the processes of engagement of both, ‘Order’ with ‘Danda’ and vice versa, 
were already underway under Nehru. But the point here is not to judge or pin 
responsibility so much as to identify and understand the process itself. 
32 ‘Goongi Gudia (Dumb Doll) and Woh Chokri (That Girl) were the derogatory 
nicknames addressed to the PM behind her back.’ Anonymous, at http://www. 
experiencefestival.com/a/Indira_Gandhi/id/1895543, accessed 15-05-2009 
33 The key players in this alliance were Babu Jagjivan Ram, Kamaraj, Nijalingappa, 
S.K. Patil and Atulya Ghosh. 
34 For an interesting attempt to analyse these developments in terms of the prob-
lem of what they call ‘securitisation’ (or the compromising of democracy through 
the imposition of Emergency) see Mallick and Sen (2006). 
35 See Kosambi (1962), Berkson (1995). Although this power is essentially sym-
bolic and often without any substantial agency, it is interesting that Indira Gandhi 
managed to endow it with precisely that agency, but sought to legitimise that 
agency through this figure, thereby signalling that agency as drawn from within 
masculine hegemony and not posed as a threat to it. 
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36 See The Hindu’s editorial ‘Indira Gandhi as parivar heroine’ for an account of 
this (Thursday, Jun 23, 2005) 
37 There is a substantial volume of literature on the Emergency: see for instance, 
PN Dhar (2000), but also the relevant sections in Jaffrelot (1995) and Corbett and 
Harris (2000). 
38 Mendelsohn also draws attention to the point that the resistance to the Emer-
gency was predominantly a north-Indian phenomenon, with the southern states 
voting for the Congress in the 1977 elections (Mendelsohn, ibid.). 
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6 The Present 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will cover the period after the Emergency, into approxi-
mately the last decade or so of contemporary India. While continuing to 
trace the political, social and economic factors that shape the consolida-
tions of Hindu nationalism in this period, this chapter will also identify 
and explore some other forces at work in the calibrating of its discursive 
and practical dimensions. Specifically, it will undertake an examination of 
the relations between Hindu nationalism on the one hand, and the Mus-
lim and Christian communities and the women’s movement in India, on 
the other. The chapter will further the analyses of the links between the 
political developments identified and examined in the previous chapter, 
and elaborate on the tensions that result from these in Brahmanical mas-
culine hegemony. It will then use this discussion as the basis for the 
analysis of some significant events of this period, that were to prove crit-
ical to the consolidation of Hindu nationalism. In order to comprehend 
the operations of this hegemony from, as it were, a point of extreme his-
torical proximity, this chapter also glosses (wherever possible) the mac-
ro-level analyses with more immediate accounts of and perspectives on 
Hindu nationalism drawn from the field, thereby providing the streams 
and flows of the larger picture with the more concrete graininess of em-
pirical detail. The intention is to provide a macro perspective on the cur-
rent status and workings of Hindu nationalism as well as of the Brah-
manical masculine hegemony that it is founded on. But in order to do all 
of this, it is necessary to first continue the analysis of new social configu-
rations in caste-based political formations, and their implications and 
consequences for the consolidation of Hindu nationalism. 
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6.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this chapter are: 
1. To trace the historical culmination, in the present, of the political 
processes set in motion since independence, and particularly since 
the Emergency. 
2. To explore some key events in the period after the Emergency, and 
their consequences for the growth of Hindu nationalism. 
3. To analyse the relationship that has evolved over the last few dec-
ades, between Hindu nationalism on the one hand, and the Muslim 
and Christian communities. 
4. To examine the uneasy relation between the growth of the women’s 
movement and Hindu nationalism in this period. 
5. To provide an analytical outline of the gendering of events and pro-
cesses, in the formation of the Indian present.  
6.3 New Social Configurations and Hindu Nationalism 
We have already noted earlier the economic anxieties of the emergent 
middle peasantry. The emergence in itself did not have uniform effects 
across the country: its regional variations and responses to local politics 
indicate rather, that the various axes of division noted earlier substantial-
ly influenced the kind of political positions and dispositions that were 
adopted.1 Moreover, it is important to note that it was less the case of 
the emergence of a new class than the formation of an alliance between 
an older rural elite of ‘rich and capitalist farmers...with rich, middle and 
even poor peasants’ (Lindberg, 1995: 840), thereby disrupting the older 
hegemonic understanding between the rural and urban elites, and con-
cretising a new bloc based essentially on the sense of economic anxiety, 
coupled with regional affiliations (themselves often coloured by local 
economic conditions). Nevertheless, despite regional variations, one may 
broadly argue that this economic anxiety coupled with the sense of arri-
val into middle class status created conditions ripe for the political resur-
gence of right-wing Hindu nationalism in three ways. Firstly, the new 
arrivals came – rather paradoxically – with a sense of the failure of the 
state to deliver on its promises of a developed industrialised economy 
that could afford to indulge the vagaries of agriculture: if heavy agricul-
tural subsidies (undertaken increasingly for populist reasons) had gener-
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ated wealth for them, it could not sustain the generation of this wealth, 
as we noted earlier, because of the dependence of this kind of agricultur-
al wealth, on both, political whim, as well as, in the final analysis, on the 
weather. This became increasingly clear in the early seventies, as the 
economy under the Indira Gandhi regime reeled under spiralling infla-
tion and the weather played truant with the harvests. Consequently, this 
class sought greater control over the political and administrative power 
that had hitherto been in the hands of the urban elite, to which it had 
been subordinated through the bureaucracy and the Congress machinery. 
With the weakening of the Congress and the emergence of regional par-
ties, this emergent constituency was also effectively seeking alternative 
political mechanisms and means to articulate itself.  
Secondly, as noted earlier, this new constituency came into a public 
sphere – or, more accurately, sought access to the sphere of political and 
economic power – that was till recently under the hegemonic control of 
English-educated ‘westernised’ industrial bourgeoisie, professionals and 
bureaucrats, and which was dominantly upper-caste. It is of some signifi-
cance that the political phrase so favoured by the Hindu Right today, 
posing ‘Bharat’ against ‘India’,2 with the former carrying connotations of 
authenticity (as opposed to the averred alien-ness of the latter construct), 
came into being at this moment of confrontation, with and through the 
farmer’s movements of the seventies (S Lindberg, 1995: 840). Much as 
this new class aspired to the lifestyles of these sections of the urban elite, 
they remained largely excluded from it by virtue of education, occupa-
tion and caste. But there was now available to them another legitimating 
discourse that they could lay claim to, in opposition to the vaunted social 
superiority of the existing elite, and as moral critique of it, from an ideo-
logical position of ostensibly greater authenticity. Hindu nationalism as a 
political program now found an extended and susceptible constituency 
to begin taking root in.3 Indeed, there can be no clearer testimony to the 
argument made earlier, that Hindu nationalism in this sense is not just 
the programmatic ideology of a specific political party, but is constituted 
of and draws from the hegemonic condition that forms the basis of the 
political program.  
It is in this sense that, in the final analysis, the regional variations in 
responses to local political conditions get evened out: whether the mid-
dle peasantry were indifferent to, actively supporting, or actively oppos-
ing the communal politics of the Hindu Right, they were all at one with it 
 The Present 181 
in its opposition to the hegemony of the urban elite, and in their posi-
tioning of themselves as the more authentic voice of ‘Bharat’. For obvi-
ous reasons, this also came to be articulated in terms of an opposition 
between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ – an opposition that was very often 
sited on the body of women, as the infamous cases of Shah Bano, and 
subsequently of the Sati of Roop Kanwar, exemplified (we will return to 
these shortly). In any event, these changes were given political grammar, 
articulation and legitimacy by the discourses of the Hindu right. Thirdly, 
in the process of heterogenisation that was thus effected in the body pol-
itic, especially after the elections of 1977, the formation of alliances be-
came an important means for countering the Congress. In the course of 
alliance formation, the Hindu nationalist Jana Sangh became an im-
portant part of the Janata Party, but by 1980, broke away to form the 
Bharatiya Janata Party. By exchanging ‘Sangh’ for ‘Party’, by bringing Si-
kander Bakht (a Muslim) on board its working committee, and by claim-
ing the more social-democrat lineage of the Janata Party through the 
term ‘Janata’, the BJP distanced itself from the direct nominal association 
with the RSS and announced its interest in promoting itself as a more 
inclusive, even ‘secular’ organisation that aimed to ally the diverse inter-
est groups that were emerging, even as it maintained itself as ideologically bound 
to Hindu nationalism. In fact, the primary cause for the separation from the 
Janata Party was the issue of ‘dual membership’, i.e., protests from other 
constituents of the Party about the Jana Sangh’s members also being 
members of the RSS. Thus, the process of political heterogenisation 
proved crucial to the political resurgence of the Hindu nationalists – 
which several commentators have remarked on as the paradoxical phe-
nomenon of deepening democracy giving rise to anti-democratic forces 
in India.4  
The separation of the BJP from the Janata Party was thus effected by 
the failure of these alliances to consolidate; this in turn was partly due to 
power-tussles between senior leaders like Morarji Desai and Charan 
Singh, but partly also to the inability of the counter-hegemonic forces 
that were thus emerging within Brahmanical hegemony, to accommodate 
and unify the diversity of social interests and groups that constituted 
them. One consequence of this was what came to be called vote-bank 
politics, with parties vying to address the specific concerns of individual 
interest and pressure groups. The conversion of the Bharatiya Jana 
Sangh into the Bharatiya Janata Party was obviously one such venture, 
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targeting the majoritarian ‘Hindu’ community, but evidently with a much 
clearer awareness of its (caste) diversity, and a willingness to engage with 
this that had not been evident with the more (upper) caste-bound Jana 
Sangh. Two clarifications are required here: one, that this is not to imply 
that caste and communal differences were no longer issues in the BJP: 
rather, it was an acknowledgment that the Party had to take on board 
other castes, even other religious communities, as well as address their 
interests (at least nominally), if it was to gain any political success. The 
strategy that it adopted to deal with this requirement was threefold: (a) it 
raised the bogey of ‘Muslim appeasement’ by the Congress – with which 
it had consistently attacked Gandhi, Nehru and other Congress leaders 
earlier – yet again, but this time as an issue of concern to lower castes as 
well, insofar as the alleged policy of appeasement was both a temptation 
to conversion to Islam, and was simultaneously at the expense of re-
sources that could have (and should have) been disbursed among the 
lower castes. This anxiety was given an enormous boost by the contro-
versy over the Meenakshipuram conversions of 1981.5 (b) It began a 
campaign against castism and untouchability, both within its organisa-
tions as well as in the public sphere – as for instance, with the proclama-
tion by Hindu Sants and leaders at the 1979 World Hindu Conference 
that neither castism nor untouchability has sanction in the Hindu scrip-
tures.6 (c) It simultaneously initiated an active process of ‘sanskritization’ 
that essentially ensured the cultural hegemony of the caste elite. This was 
undertaken formally – through the setting up of educational institutions 
like the Vidya Bharati institutes (from 1977), the Saraswati Shishu Man-
dir for small children (begun 1967, affiliated to Vidya Bharati 1978) and 
social welfare institutions like the Sewa Bharati (from 1984) – as well as 
informally – through social and community interactions, subtle pressures 
of prescription and proscription, and perhaps most importantly, through 
redefining the terms, meanings and values of elitism. The second clarifi-
cation required here is that the BJP was not either the first or the only 
political organisation to perceive and pursue the advantages of vote-bank 
politics, whether of caste or religion: the Congress and other parties too 
followed this policy – in fact one may even argue that the Congress pre-
ceded the other parties in this direction. In the early seventies already the 
Congress was openly soliciting the Muslim community; by the early 
eighties, it found this traditional support weakening, and began targeting 
the (Hindu) community – partly also as a necessary consequence of its 
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policies in Punjab, which led to the alienation of the Sikhs. By the time 
of Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, the discourses of communal 
nationalism were in high visibility in the political space, with Mrs. Gan-
dhi herself falling victim to it.  
Indeed, it is possible to argue that Indira Gandhi’s death served to in-
tensify communal discourses, and the separation of communities specifi-
cally along religious lines, especially through the violent backlash that 
was unleashed on the Sikh community after it. If, prior to this event, the 
‘Hindu’ political identity had been somewhat subsumed by community 
formations along the lines of class, caste and language, and fragmented 
by other ethnic identifications as well, these heterogeneities were jolted, 
so to speak, into homogeneous alignment as ‘Hindu’ by the pan-Indian 
magnitude of the response to her death, and more specifically, in its ar-
ticulation along communal lines – in ‘the assertion of a pan-Indian Hin-
du identity in response to a weak centre’ (Subrata Mitra 1991: 776). Irre-
spective of whether this response was spontaneous or machinated,7 in 
this particular instance, the coalescing of the ‘Hindu’ identity was a reac-
tion, not to the Muslim community (its usual target), but to the Sikhs – a 
community that, rather ironically, political Hinduism has traditionally 
seen as part of its own constituency. What is of particular significance for 
us is that the ‘Hindu’ community came once again to be defined in vio-
lently masculinist terms, not through or from the conservative or ex-
tremist margins of ‘Hindu’ society but from the ‘liberal’ centre, from 
within the Congress party. The entire episode serves as yet another in-
stance of the extent of sway of Brahmanical masculine hegemony, and of 
the gradual but increasingly unmistakable clarity with which it is articu-
lated politically as Hindu nationalism – irrespective of the actual political 
party it emerges in.8 
6.4 The Tensions in Brahmanical Masculine Hegemony 
It is possible to observe in the above processes a repeat of the patterns 
of representation-politics of the 19th century that we discussed in the 
previous chapter. The significant difference here of course is that the 
gendered delineation of communities that took place in the nineteenth 
century is here substantially modified. The 19th century dynamics of the 
emergence of Hindu nationalism had been crosscut by the colonial en-
counter, emergent caste identities and the redrawing of the pub-
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lic/private divide; in the present scenario, the dynamics – while still 
crosscut by caste – are also shaped by the processes and dynamics of de-
velopmentalism – what we referred to earlier as the legacy of colonialism 
– and its implicit promises of modernity. It is neither coincidental nor 
surprising then, that the sense of disillusionment with the Nehruvian 
paradigm, particularly amongst the urban middle classes, that is evident 
from the seventies crystallised into the turn to liberalisation – as a 
shortcut to the sought-after modernity – in the eighties; but this immedi-
ately incited the oppositional discourse earlier remarked on between tra-
dition and modernity, with the former being articulated by the growing 
assertion of communal and caste lines. Through the eighties, this ten-
dency was only exacerbated as parties jockeyed with each other to con-
solidate communal and caste vote banks, while trying to maintain the 
interests of both sides of the tradition/modernity divide. The resultant 
tensions within Brahmanical hegemony played out in various ways in this 
decade, the dynamic of this playing out being watermarked by several 
crucial events. The first of these is a cluster of Supreme Court judge-
ments directly impinging on the relations between communal identity, 
women’s rights and masculine hegemony and was catalysed by the Su-
preme Court judgement in the Shah Bano case of 1985.9 While the Court 
had decided in favour of Shah Bano, the conservative leadership of the 
Muslim community saw this decision as interference in the (traditional 
patriarchal) rights of the community over its women, and the Rajiv Gan-
dhi government, buckling under pressure from them, overturned the de-
cision and legislatively sanctioned the sanctity of the shariat in Muslim 
personal matters. Similarly, in the Mary Roy case, again the Supreme 
Court superseded the Syrian Christian customary laws of inheritance for 
women and decided in favour of the (woman) plaintiff.10 However, in 
this instance, similar protests from the patriarchal elite of the Syrian 
Christian community were ignored by the government. The third inci-
dent in which communal identity, patriarchal power plays and women’s 
rights intersected was the Deorala sati of Roop Kanwar, which, when it 
came to court, was dismissed as sanctioned by law:  
The Supreme Court in its judgements in the Mohammed Ahmed Khan 
versus Shah Bano Begum ((1985) 2 SCC 556) and the Mary Roy versus 
State of Kerala ((1986) 2 SCC 209) and their fall out, contrasted to the Su-
preme Court's April 29, 1992 order in the sati issue dramatise [sic] the 
women-law-tradition nexus in a political situation that is blatantly commu-
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nal. In the former the scales were tilted in favour of women while in the 
latter, the court invoked Article 25 [which guarantees the fundamental 
right to worship] (Abraham 1997: 7).11 
There are several complex shifts in the accommodative dynamics of 
Brahmanical masculine hegemony evident in the three instances provid-
ed here: on the one hand, the discourses of ‘Order’ embodied in the ju-
diciary are deployed (in the Shah Bano and Mary Roy cases) to reinforce 
the perception that Brahmanical masculine hegemony is progressive, be-
nevolent and benefactorial, and more concerned with protecting the 
rights and liberties of minority women than their own patriarchies; on 
the other, the discourses of ‘Danda’ evidently informed and shaped the 
stance of this same hegemony (even in its ‘Order’ avatar), in its exonera-
tion of the accused in the Deorala Sati case, on the grounds of the sancti-
ty of religious rights. Further, the government’s overturning of the Su-
preme Court decision in the Shah Bano case, while clearly an instance of 
vote-bank politics, indicates how institutional arrangements of power (in 
this instance, electoral democracy) can determine the direction of trans-
formations in hegemonic alliances, even as the fundamentally gendered 
character of the hegemony is retained. In one sense, the shift takes place 
precisely to protect the gendered character of the hegemony, as the case 
indexes the possibilities by – or circumstances and conditions under – 
which masculine hegemonies otherwise posed as oppositional (on 
grounds of religion and/or community) can come into alignment or con-
sensus, on the grounds of gender. This event however, in turn led to ac-
cusations of ‘Muslim appeasement’ by the Hindu right, threatening yet 
another fissure in the increasingly concretising Hindu polity. This, the 
government then sought to counter by allowing Hindus access to the 
Ramjanmabhumi shrine in Ayodhya (which had remained under lock 
since 1950, due to litigation on communal rights over the property) – a 
move with far-reaching consequences, since it gained little for the Con-
gress, but served to legitimise and boost the claims of the Hindu right. In 
the 1989 elections, this was an important factor in the defeat of the Con-
gress and the hung parliament that resulted. 
There were obviously other factors as well – and these form the se-
cond cluster of events determining the play of tensions within Brahman-
ical masculine hegemony: they include the Bofors scandal that hit the 
Gandhi family in particular, reviving the allegations of corruption in the 
Congress that had led to its earlier debacle in 1977; the stark contrast of 
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this with the steep fall in the performance of the Indian economy under 
the liberalisation policies of the Rajiv Congress, and the attendant crisis 
that was looming in the industrial, agricultural and the market sectors; 
the fiasco of Indian military intervention in the ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka that eventually led to the ‘humiliating’ recall of the Indian forces, 
thereby initiating a discourse of shamed masculinity in a failed imperialist 
venture; the continued intractability of the ethnic conflicts in the north-
east and in Kashmir in particular, which the Hindu right repeatedly 
raised as the ‘weakening’ of the Indian state under the Congress; and all 
of this framed in a public discursive space opened out (from 1984) to 
private producers and broadcasters, leading to an explosion of television 
channels, many of which were owned and/or controlled by the various 
political parties.  
This last is of particular significance because of the way in which it 
transformed both the content and the reach of discourses in the public 
sphere. But this is not the focus of this thesis; besides, Arvind Rajagopal 
(2001), among others, has written extensively on the impact of media, 
especially television, on the growth of the Hindu right in the eighties. 
Here, we will confine ourselves to observing the following: one, the 
boom in television brought televisual, serialized adaptations of the two 
Indian epics, the Ramayan and the Mahabharat (in that order), into almost 
every home in India; the former in particular served as a powerful narra-
tive of Hindu martial valour that was thoroughly exploited by the Hindu 
right in the Ramjanmabhumi campaign that was initiated, eventually to 
culminate in the destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992 and the subse-
quent wave of anti-Muslim riots that broke out across the country.12 This 
was followed by a spate of serialisations of Hindu legendary figures and 
heroes, the most important of these being the controversial serial on 
Chanakya, often referred to as the ‘Machiavelli of India’ (Herbert Gow-
en, 1929: 178).13 Taken together, these served to reshape the public imag-
ination of Indian history along strongly ‘Hindu’ lines that emphasised 
upper caste hegemony and masculine valour as integral to it. Inevitably, 
these tales of (past) Hindu glory served as a stark contrast to the every-
day narratives of corruption, poverty, political deceptions, etc., that were 
also becoming more easily and extensively available to the public 
through this same media – which is why, through the nineties, an im-
portant campaign plank for the BJP as it grew politically, was ‘clean gov-
ernance’. This is also why, with the explosive economic growth of the 
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Indian middle classes in the nineties, bringing with it a sense of ‘Indian’ 
resurgence in the global comity of nations, the utility of ‘past glory’ (with 
its associations of martial valour) as a mobilisational theme faded, to be 
replaced by the media slogan of (contemporary) ‘India shining’ (and its 
associations of economic prosperity and progress) by the time of the 
2004 elections. The dramatic failure of the latter indexed both, the extent 
to which the Hindu right and its dominantly middle class constituency 
had deluded themselves; as well as the difficulty, if not the impossibility, 
of returning to the former theme. We will return to these issues in a 
moment; for now, it is necessary to understand them as they unfolded – 
which brings us to our second observation regarding the media and the 
Hindu right.  
Two: Rajagopal notes the coincidence of liberalisation, media expan-
sion and the rise of the Hindu right as, in fact, not coincidental but feed-
ing on each other. Referring to Hindu right interpretations of liberalisa-
tion, he writes: 
With the lifting of socialism or state interference...and the liberalization 
this implies, democracy springs forth, and the psychic transformation pro-
ceeds. From being seen as a burden, events seemed to suggest that “Hin-
duism” too was a part of the repressed truth of society, released by the lift-
ing of state controls and the mobilization of latent popular forces...’. 
(Rajagopal, 2001: 36) 
Rajagopal goes on to argue that in fact, the broadcasting of the epic – 
even while accelerating Hindu revivalism – served also to consolidate the 
regimes of liberalisation (2001: 242-3); it would probably be more accu-
rate to say instead that the epic offered a triumphalist narrative of good 
over evil, in which the evil, in this instance, was the old regime of social-
ist secularism and the good, by extension, Hindutva itself. The implicit 
sense of a suppressed political unconscious being released, that Ra-
jagopal draws our attention to in the Hindutva understanding of liberali-
sation, suggests, in our terms, that for the Hindu right, the ‘Order’ of 
Nehruvian planned governance was the repressive mechanism on the 
‘Danda’ of right wing politics that was released by liberalisation. Howev-
er, it would be more accurate (again) to say that these events signified 
less the resurgence of a repressed political unconscious than a shift into a 
new set of power alignments within Brahmanical hegemony along the 
lines of Order/Danda. But there was another aspect to this same Danda 
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politics that had been “released” by the failure of the Nehruvian pro-
gram and the espousal of neo-liberalism, through Rajiv Gandhi’s New 
Economic Policy: the politics of caste – and this is the third set of fac-
tors that we noted earlier as determining the play of tensions within 
Brahmanical masculine hegemony.  
Although the recommendations of the Mandal Commission (on af-
firmative action for ‘Other Backward Castes’) were announced as early as 
1980, its translation into law was delayed till the coalition government of 
VP Singh passed it in 1989, in the face of stiff political opposition and a 
violent upper-caste backlash that led to the fall of his government. (Its 
implementation remains tardy till date.) Curiously, it required an upper 
caste leader (VP Singh – albeit with lower caste backing) invoking the 
discourses of ‘Order’– that rational governance and social justice re-
quired the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations – 
promoted in the first instance by the upper castes, for this change to oc-
cur.14 That it was legislatively passed at all was thus another indication of 
political power shifting into a new configuration, and of the increasing 
political visibility of the lower castes – but within that same hegemonic for-
mation: for, it must be remembered that the discourses of both, ‘Order’ 
and ‘Danda’ are in the final analysis, both legitimising discourses of – and 
emerging from within – this same hegemonic formation. In other words, 
the fact that the shift in power took place legislatively, without significant 
change to the systems of either ‘Order’ or ‘Danda’ indicates the extent to 
which this masculine hegemony – of Brahmanical patriarchy – itself re-
mained intact. Indeed, in some ways it was reinforced by the now open 
mobilisation of large sections of the ‘Hindu’ community, across caste 
lines, for the Ramjanmabhumi movement (noted above) – a campaign 
that sought to ‘heal’ the damage done by the announcement of the im-
plementation of the Mandal commission, by ‘uniting’ Hindus against the 
‘common enemy’, viz. the Muslim community. Both, in the campaign 
itself and in the media’s representation of it, this came to be discoursed 
on as the battling of ‘mandal’ with the ‘kamandal’ (the Hindu ascetic’s 
pot), indicating what Rajagopal (2001) argued as the mobilisation of 
symbols from popular religiosity in the construction of the campaign. 
This was arguably part of the larger agenda of sanskritisation whereby 
the Hindu right (specifically) sought to expand its base, and Brahmanical 
hegemony (in general) sought to maintain its hold. These manoeuvres 
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and their actual consequences were noted succinctly (and with noticeable 
contempt) by a leading right-wing columnist: 
Over the next decade, Mandalism was made irrelevant by India's intel-
ligent political class that decided co-option was better than confronta-
tion. Today, they [the lower castes] are aggressively bidding comptetively 
[sic] to expand the arena of job reservations, but it doesn't evoke a reac-
tion because there are no sarkari [government] jobs going. (Chandan Mi-
tra, 2004) 
It is thus significant that the process of economic liberalisation took 
off almost simultaneously with the implementation of reservations. The 
withdrawal of the state from the production and market sectors meant 
that the state would, in the course of time, have fewer jobs to provide, 
and employment would be determined by the market and the policies of 
private corporations15 – i.e., while Brahmanical masculine hegemony it-
self remained (and remains) intact, it was manoeuvring to shift the politi-
cal economic basis of its sustenance.  
6.5 Muslim Communities and Hindutva 
The Hindu right’s engagement with Islam, as we have noted earlier, was 
mediated by colonial perceptions of the latter – derived from Orientalist 
scholarship – as a violently masculinist, patriarchal and aggressively pros-
elytising religion.16 We have already seen how, in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth, Brahmanical 
hegemony employed the sense of external threat to consolidate its hege-
monic power in the new politics of representation. The formation of the 
Muslim League and the demand for a separate Muslim nation that fol-
lowed produced a mixed reaction in the Hindu upper caste leadership of 
the Congress: on the one hand, they saw this as playing into the colonial 
strategy of ‘divide and rule’, and as a violation of the territorial integrity 
of the country, and strongly resisted it; on the other, the more radical 
factions, interested in establishing India as officially ‘Hindu’, welcomed 
the idea of the Muslims leaving India to the Hindus. The trauma of parti-
tion only fuelled the sense of antipathy; nevertheless, after independence 
there was a general decrease in the number and frequency of communal 
incidents – partly because of the developmental agenda of the Nehruvian 
state, partly because the Muslim elite (that had sought partition and were 
able to make the migration out of India) had left, and partly because of 
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the ban on the RSS in the decade immediately after. The poorer Muslim 
communities that remained were (and had been for long) economically 
and socially bound to the larger body of agrarian and artisan communi-
ties that they were a part of, in ways that superseded religious affiliation. 
Incidents of communal violence began escalating again from the late 
seventies and into the eighties, at precisely the time that the Hindu right 
was beginning to gain greater political visibility – but importantly, also at 
a time when anti-Islamic sentiment across the world was beginning to 
escalate. This is not to suggest a global conspiracy so much as a conflu-
ence of global ideological tendencies with local ones in India. With the 
deposition of the Shah of Iran in 1979, a new kind of politically radical 
Islam had emerged that drew approval, if not adherents, from across the 
Islamic world.17 it was distinguished by being simultaneously revolution-
ary and reactionary, thereby raising both, the anti-communist and the 
anti-Islamic anxieties of the north/west; and its appeal lay in its procla-
mation of austerity, militancy and a jihad on the corrupting influence of 
the north/west, that was understood to characterise the US-supported 
reign of the Shah. This was particularly appealing to male youth in the 
poorer Muslim nations and societies, in its offer of both, a spiritual legit-
imisation of their poverty and an agenda for heroic action. It was also 
thus instrumental in creating the media figure of the jihadi – as fanatical, 
fundamentalist, virulently anti-‘western’ and violently masculinist – in the 
Anglo-American media and press (Liaquat Ali Khan, 2005).  
While Hindu relations with Muslims in India was not directly deter-
mined by this event, the influence of global media representations were 
already being felt in India with the liberalisation of television in the eight-
ies (Rajagopal 2001). The public imagination of the Muslim as fanatical 
and fundamentalist was substantially bolstered by the controversy over 
the Shah Bano case in the mid-eighties. ‘The Shah Bano case was con-
verted by the BJP and a broad section of the print media into a symbol 
of the supposed Otherness, separatism and backwardness of the Mus-
lims.’ R Sengupta (2005: 25) The organisations of the Hindu right capi-
talised on this as well as on the more regional history of hostility arising 
out of gendered and sexualised colonial and Orientalist perceptions and 
histories (outlined in earlier chapters), followed by partition, the wars 
with Pakistan, post-independence communal violence, anxieties over 
conversion incidents like those at Meenakshipuram and even allegations 
and rumours of Muslims always supporting and cheering for Pakistani 
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cricket teams. What is of significance here however, is that the Brahman-
ical-hegemonic perception of the Muslim as savage outsider (the ‘mleccha’ 
noted in Chapter III) dovetailed neatly, on the one hand, with the lower 
caste origins and affiliations of the majority of Muslims remaining in In-
dia; and on the other, with the increasing tendency in the north/west 
media to see the Muslim in similar terms, thereby presenting the Hindu 
right’s antipathy to Muslims with a sense of global legitimacy. The entire 
anti-Islamic discourse of the early Hindu nationalists – Savarkar, Gol-
walkar, Hedgewar – began to concretise in actions that were not the con-
fined, sporadic violence of communal riots but the organised, pan-
national political mobilisation of the late eighties, that culminated in the 
Rath Yatra and the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya. The 
series of major communal incidents that followed – the riots in Mumbai, 
the bomb blasts, repeated and frequent incidents of communal violence 
across the country, culminating in the savage attack on Muslims in Guja-
rat in 2002 – took place when the Hindu right had come to dominate 
political discourse in the country, in the nineties and into the first decade 
of this century – a period that was marked in the north/west first, by the 
Gulf war and its consequences, and second by the vehemence of the US 
response to the attack on the twin towers in New York on the 11th of 
September 2001, the subsequent concretisation of the figure of the Is-
lamic terrorist, and of the international perception of Islam as an ideolo-
gy of terror.18  
6.6 Women’s Movement and Brahmanical Masculine 
Hegemony 
There is another important set of factors that I will touch upon, as af-
fecting and informing these transformations in Brahmanical masculine 
hegemony: this is the growth of the women’s movement(s) in India, and 
its complex interactions with this hegemonic formation. From the re-
form movements of the nineteenth century, women had begun gaining 
significant presence in public life in India, and participated strongly in 
the freedom movement. While they remained active and visible even af-
ter independence, it was in the political upheavals of the 1970s that the 
women’s movement began to really take shape, participating in the anti-
Emergency programs and demanding equal involvement in the political 
and developmental process.  
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In 1974 Indira Gandhi, India’s prime minister, told reporters: “I do not 
regard myself as a woman. I am a person with a job to do” (The Asian 
Student, 23 November 1974). A year before, a popular magazine for 
“modern” women released a special Independence Day issue with Indira 
Gandhi portrayed as Goddess Durga on the cover. It said, “to be a woman 
– a wife, a mother, an individual – in India means...that you are the store-
house of tradition and culture and, in contrast, a volcano of seething ener-
gy, of strength and power that can motivate a whole generation to change 
its values, its aspirations, its very concept of civilised life (Femina 14, 17 
August 1973). Women in Indian politics have always negotiated these two 
extreme poles: as the unsexed equal or the highly feminised goddess or 
queen. (S Sen, 2000: 57) 
Apart from the instance of Mrs. Gandhi (which we have already dis-
cussed), Sen draws attention to the paradoxes that underlay and were to 
continue to confront the Indian women’s movement. It was in this peri-
od (the seventies) that the various factions of the movement began to 
consolidate organisationally, and through the eighties and into the nine-
ties, a variety of organisations addressing a variety of issues and at vari-
ous levels took shape across the country. However, this also reflected the 
growing awareness of being heterogeneous, if not actually fractured and 
fragmented: as Mangala Subramaniam noted, ‘[t]he inability to accom-
modate intersecting systems of class, caste, ethnicity, and religious power 
relations in organization building created tensions and divisions’ (2004: 
637). One reason for the fragmentation has been cited as the growing 
power of Hindu nationalist discourses in the polity, and its appropriation 
and transformation of the discourse of women’s rights (see Subrama-
niam, 2004, but especially Butalia and Sarkar 1996, on this). While this 
cannot be denied, it is possible to identify deeper and more fundamental-
ly significant historical processes at work here. One of the consequences 
of the nationalist movement’s locating of Indian-ness in the domestic 
realm, was that women and femininity came to be closely linked to the 
conception of national identity, as we have noted earlier. Throughout the 
independence movement and even under the impact of the communist 
and socialist movements of the thirties and forties, this association re-
mained strong. It persisted even after independence (in some ways grew 
even stronger), and women’s activism was subordinated to political activ-
ism focusing on class, caste and language issues, especially in the 1960s. 
Women’s issues were either understood and organized as extensions of 
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activities in existing political parties, or (often even within such exten-
sions) neglected altogether. While women organizing under the aegis of 
larger political organisations continue to work on women’s issues in as-
sociation with the work of the larger organisation,19 the seventies there-
fore also saw a demand for autonomous focus. This eventually took 
shape in the emphasis on independently organized activity, especially af-
ter the government report of 1974, Towards Equality, demonstrated that 
women’s condition had deteriorated, not improved, since 1911 (Gandhi 
and Shah, 1992).  
However, the legacy of the association of femininity with culture and 
domesticity in the nationalist movement, especially with regard to hege-
monic understandings of femininity derived from within Brahmanical 
patriarchy, had left a lasting impact: on the one hand, it placed many 
feminists in the cleft between appearing anti-national if they displayed 
affiliations of any kind with non-Indian feminisms, and traditional-
ist/culturalist if they drew from or constructed ‘Indian’ feminist posi-
tions, or denied the label altogether,20 on the other, the association of 
femininity with maternality – the Mother India complex of the national-
ist movement – effectively sabotaged, or at least made very difficult, the 
addressing of various issues crucial to the empowerment of women, es-
pecially those relating to sexuality, the articulation of desire and the exer-
cise of choice. ‘The good woman, the chaste wife and mother empow-
ered by spiritual strength, became the iconic representation of the nation’ 
(S Sen, 2000: 10; see also Karen Gabriel, 2009 for a detailed analysis of 
the iconography of Mother India). The idealization and concomitant de-
sexualisation of women as national mothers in and during the anti-
colonial nationalist movement, while certainly empowering insofar as it 
created a discursive space, and within that an identity, for (especially up-
per caste) women to enter into and participate in the public domain, also 
rendered that same discursive space inflexible, stultifying and fundamen-
tally hostile to more genuinely democratic understandings of women as 
desiring, thinking, able and sovereign subjects.  
It is possible to argue that, given the extent of the often barbaric op-
pression and subjugation of women in Brahmanical patriarchy – includ-
ing both, formal conventions like child marriage, sati, dowry, denial of 
property rights, denial of the right to divorce, etc., and tacitly condoned 
practices like denial of education, denial of choices, sexual exploitation of 
lower caste women by men from their own and higher castes, sexual vio-
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lence on women in general,21 ill-treatment and abuse of widows, domes-
tic exploitation of labour, etc. – the early women’s movement found 
even the limitations of iconizing acceptable, if it empowered them to 
deal with these more pressing issues. This was however, a tenacious and 
insidious legacy, insofar as it then became difficult to break out of this 
mould, as the representation of Indira Gandhi as Durga (referred to in 
the previous chapter) so clearly demonstrates. Further, the emergence of 
feminism and the women’s movement in the Indian context, as well as 
the weakening of the very construct of the public/private divide – all 
indicate the extent to which modernisation (or its ‘developmental’ avatar) 
proved enabling for women and for those disempowered by the caste 
system, and counter-active to the masculinist biases – the masculine heg-
emonic dispositions – of that very developmentalism. Yet, in practice, it 
also meant a dispersal of masculinism into other spheres of human activ-
ity, with a concomitant gaining of masculinist control over these.22 (One 
thinks of the masculinisation of technological and scientific knowledge, 
and of the social power that these represent, possess and give access to 
in modernity.) Thus, these currents of assertion, claim to power and so-
cial change – these counter-hegemonic flows – are themselves subject to 
the forces of, for instance, privatisation and technologisation fundamen-
tal to modernisation. But they are also not complete or coordinated: they 
are to a large extent reflexive responses to each other, and to the larger 
shifts in the organisation of Brahmanical masculine hegemony. 
After independence, upper caste women in particular continued to 
find this Brahmanical patriarchal discourse of chastity and maternality 
the most enabling figuration of femininity, within the confines of Brah-
manical patriarchy, even when they chose to challenge its oppressions. 
This however, indexes another problem: the acceptance of this hege-
monic femininity within the women’s movement also implied the mar-
ginalization, disavowal or outright rejection of gender practices (especial-
ly of femininity) from outside the Hindu upper castes – especially with 
regard to practices pertaining to sexuality, like informal sexual alliances, 
inter-caste or inter-community marriages, divorce, multiple partners, etc.; 
but also to real or perceived attempts to mobilize women on specific 
caste or communal issues, along caste and/or communal lines. The 
movement was and remains haunted by the bogey of being dominated 
by Hindu upper caste, middle class women, signaling the difficulties of 
negotiating issues of caste and community even in the relatively critical 
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spaces of the women’s movement – and thereby, the hegemonic (and 
clearly, profoundly co-optive) power of Brahmanical masculine hegemo-
ny.23 Consequently, the response of the Indian women’s movement to 
major issues concerning women in particular – the question of commu-
nal personal laws, the incidents of sati, the escalation of dowry deaths, 
the escalation of violence against women in general, female feticide and 
infanticide – was compromised by the uneasy relations within its hetero-
geneous components, and by its own investments in the discourses of 
Brahmanical patriarchy. Additionally, issues like beauty pageants and the 
uniform civil code created much dissonance in the ranks of the move-
ment, because the dominant response was easily perceived – however 
mistakenly – to be approximating that of the Hindu right. 
Women’s complex relation to Brahmanical masculine hegemony has 
also dogged one of the major concerns of the women’s movement, 
which is the question of personal laws. On this vexed question, there 
have been some very constructive suggestions regarding the shape and 
character of a Uniform Civil Code (to replace Personal Laws) from with-
in the women’s movement, but the diversity of suggestions themselves 
indicate the multiple dimensions inherent to the Personal Law question, 
and the multiple affiliations that come into play in determining the em-
phases in the suggestions. Rajeshwari Sunder Rajan, citing Nivedita 
Menon’s outlining of these positions, summarises them thus: 
1. Compulsory egalitarian civil code for all citizens; 
2. Reforms from within communities, with no state intervention; 
3. Reform from within as well as legislation on areas outside the per-
sonal laws; 
4. Optional egalitarian civil code; 
5. Reverse optionality, i.e., all citizens to be mandatorily covered by a 
gender-just code across “private” and “public” domains, but with the 
option to choose to be governed by the personal law of their reli-
gious community. (2003: 157-8) 24 
She goes on to note that the first option ‘has been more or less given 
up as a feasible or even desirable demand and ceded to the Hindu right’ 
(ibid.: 158) – meaning that, in effect, the women’s movement has recog-
nized that it cannot confront the question of personal law from outside 
the question of community identity, but must find options that negotiate 
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the question through the community and the state, even as it must ensure 
that the former in particular does not become the determining factor. 
This is not to suggest that the women’s movement is on the defensive 
before communitarian – specifically Hindu upper caste patriarchal – ob-
duracy and aggression. Brahmanical masculine hegemony did have to 
engage with the movement, and did have to make adjustments in its or-
ganisational patterns to accommodate women’s voices and concerns – 
but it did so in its own strategic ways. The woman question raised by the 
nationalists remained foundational to the inscription of the nation as 
‘modern’ – a condition that was as unavoidable as it was desirable. 
Brahmanical masculine hegemony sought to engage with this disconcert-
ing modernity that was sited on the bodies of ‘its’ women firstly, by 
promoting the nationalist discourse of (Hindu upper caste) women as 
good, chaste and maternal, so that the focus of women’s issues and con-
cerns shifted from the political pursuit of genuinely and democratically 
available agency and autonomy, to a concern with living up to this ideal. 
U. Kalpagam (2000), using Pierre Bourdieu’s theories of habitus and doxa, 
has analyzed the ways in which women internalize patriarchal prescrip-
tions and expectations, rather than resist them. She shows the multiple 
levels at, and the ways in which, women have to engage with patriarchal 
injunctions, conforming to them often even while using those to their 
own ends: internalization and resistance can both happen, if not simulta-
neously, then at different sites, and with reference to the same individu-
al(s). For instance, women who actively resist conforming to patriarchal 
expectations in the workplace, may choose to conform to those prevail-
ing in the domestic space of the family, usually because of the dynamics 
of intimacy and affect that are so crucially mobilised in the constitution 
and maintenance of the family. It is this complex relation of women with 
patriarchy – especially on the site of the family – that proves insidious in 
the latter’s cooption of women and women’s issues.  
The initiation of the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti as early as 1936, as the 
sister organization of the RSS, was arguably one such move, to contain 
what were seen as the deleterious effects on women of ‘western’ educa-
tion and ideas, and to emphasise the domestic function and maternal-
symbolic value of women; the Samiti’s agenda was clearly to reinforce 
the role and function of women in the maintenance of patriarchal power 
through the institution of the family. However, it was ostensibly set up 
to allow women a degree of equal participation in the activities of the 
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Sangh: Laxmibai Kelkar, the founder of the Samiti, is reputed to have 
stated this as her objective, to K B Hedgewar, the then head of the 
RSS.25 This strategy of what Thomas Blom Hansen has referred to as 
‘controlled emancipation’ (Hansen, 1994) is however not just about rede-
fining the relation between the domestic and the public for women: it is 
also about recruiting them into violence. Through organizations like the 
Durga Vahini (set up in 1991), the Sangh parivar indoctrinates young 
girls and women (with a special focus on those from the lower classes, 
lower castes and tribal communities) and trains them in physical combat, 
under the guise of providing self-defense training (Bacchetta 2004; 
Sarkar 1999).  
As in the case of the RSS and other such fascistic organizations, there is 
considerable stress on physical training and the martial arts. Notwithstand-
ing all this outdoor activity, there is an overwhelming stress on domestic 
values. Women can assume activist roles without violating the norms of 
Hindu womanhood challenging patterns of inequality within the home and 
the world (Hasan 2009: 17) 
Whatever the stated objective of this training, the effect is to provide 
women with a sense of apparent ‘equality’ and (masculine) power, which 
is exercised especially during riots against men (and women) of the ‘oth-
er’ (usually Muslim, but also Christian) communities, but without dis-
turbing the patriarchal order within the ‘Hindu’ community itself (Basu 
1999; Hasan 2009; also Chhachhi 1991). Further, the coercive element 
inherent to any hegemonic condition is rendered even more ‘natural’ 
(Sethi 2002) because it is actively inculcated into (and by) both men and 
women: violence is apparently ‘de-gendered’, naturalized, and serves as 
the medium of resolution for the contradictions that emerge between 
upper caste and lower caste, notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’, ‘Or-
der’ and ‘Danda’.  
The success of this strategy was manifestly proven during the Gujarat 
riots of 2002, when upper caste women and lower caste men and women 
participated actively in the violence against the Muslims, with the women 
often goading and taunting the men to greater and more extreme forms 
of violence, including sexual violence. This is not dissociated from the 
phenomenon of increasing incidents of moral policing, whereby, at one 
extreme, films and art dealing with issues of sexuality have been vandal-
ized, and the artists or filmmakers brutally attacked; at another, there 
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have been repeated attacks on couples in public places, women dressed 
‘inappropriately’ or ‘shamelessly’, internet cafes reputed to be promoting 
or providing access to pornography, etc. Indeed, it is possible to argue 
that sexuality, attitudes towards it, the control of speech around it and 
the fundamental consequence of these for the organizations of gender 
relations and identities, is a crucial site of concern and anxiety, and yet 
paradoxically, of silence, denial and censorship, both, within the dis-
courses of Hindu nationalism specifically and in the larger domain of 
public speech in which those discourses are embedded (Hasan 2009). In 
the following section, I will attempt to engage in greater detail with some 
of these issues as they relate to violence, specifically through the lens of 
‘terrorism’, as it manifests in contemporary Hindu nationalism. 
6.7 ‘Terrorism’ and Hindutva 
In the specific context of the Brahmanical masculine hegemony of Hin-
dutva, layered as it is by multiple, intersecting and sometimes contesting 
hierarchies – of region, gender, caste, class, age, language (at the macro 
level) and of the organisation of the community, the family and of sexu-
ality (at the micro or molecular level) – violence (of varied kinds and in-
tensity) is instrumental in the articulating of the multiple hegemonies 
with each other and thereby in maintaining the macro-hegemonic for-
mation of Brahmanical hegemony. Arguably, the Muslim community 
(along with the Christian, which we will discuss shortly) serves as a sin-
gle, apparently homogeneous externality to this hegemony, that helps to 
define it – and the more violently it is externalised (whether by Hindutva 
mobilisations or by ‘Islamic terrorist’ actions), the more intensely this 
hegemony gains definition. This was made explicitly clear in perhaps the 
two most crucial events in recent Hindutva mobilisation: the rath yatra 
leading to the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the Gujarat riots of 
2002. In the first instance, the rath yatra was specifically planned as a 
counter to the perceived divisiveness of ‘Hindu’ society that would result 
from the implementation of the Mandal Commission’s recommenda-
tions on caste-based reservations. The Ayodhya issue had been simmer-
ing for many decades before the Rath Yatra; it gained prominence with 
the opening of the locks and permission being granted for the perfor-
mance of pujas (or ritual prayers) by the Rajiv Gandhi government, as a 
token of Hindu-appeasement following the outcry of Muslim-
appeasement in the Shah Bano case. By 1987, communal riots had bro-
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ken out across northern India, as the VHP in particular intensified the 
campaign for the temple; but despite the VHP’s call for bricks to be sent 
to Ayodhya from every district of the country, and the ritual laying of the 
foundation stone for the temple on 9 November 1989, there was not yet 
in evidence a sense of mass mobilisation towards this end.26 It became 
the focus of a concerted mobilisation to violent action – through LK 
Advani’s Rath Yatra, which commenced on 25 September 1990 – only 
after the implementation of the Mandal Commission’s report (7 August 
1990). ‘Advanis [sic] lawyer told the reporters after his appearance [at the 
Liberhans Commission set up to inquire into the demolition] that the 
Rath Yatra was meant to save the Hindu society from disintegration 
which the Mandal [sic] had unleashed.’ (Rawat 2001) That is, the pan-
Indian mobilisation of sentiment on the building of a Ram temple at 
Ayodhya was implicitly and later explicitly founded on the destruction of 
the existing mosque.27 While the sentiment that the mosque had to be 
destroyed was not new – being part of the VHP’s and the Bajrang Dal’s 
rhetoric of ‘liberating’ the Ramjanmabhoomi (the birth place of Ram) 
through the eighties – it had remained largely implicit in the demand for 
handing over the disputed lands to the VHP. Even through the commu-
nal conflagrations that spread through north India during the demand 
for sanctified bricks – which essentially meant that ostentatious and of-
ten provocative public rituals of ‘sanctification’ of the bricks had to be 
held in every district in the country – there was never any explicit official 
statement of intent to destroy the mosque. By July 1992, however, such 
statements were made openly by VHP and Bajrang Dal leaders (Katju, 
2003: 58); these were tacitly or overtly endorsed by the BJP – which by 
now had begun to associate quite openly with these organisations.28 The 
alignment of the BJP with the more radical VHP and the actively militant 
Bajrang Dal is a telling instance of the way hegemonic formations articu-
late around the issue of violence: in order to prevent the perceived frag-
mentation of ‘Hindu’ society consequent to the implementation of reser-
vation for OBCs – a violence that would (and did)29 arise from within 
that society through opposition, rather than alignment, between its layers 
of caste-based hegemonic formations – the Hindu right sought to divert 
that violence onto the ‘external’ figure of the Muslim. 
Given the extremely backward status of the Muslim community in 
general – as made evident by the recent Sachar Committee Report (2006) 
– their position in relation to the larger formation of Brahmanical he-
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gemony is one of extreme vulnerability to its coercive mechanisms 
(whether of direct action in the form of organised violence, or state-
initiated actions, such as encounter killings).30 Vibhuti Narain Rai, a for-
mer high-ranking Indian Police Service officer, noted in an interview that 
‘if you analyse the history of various riots that have taken place in India 
since 1960 or so, you will find that there has probably been no single riot 
in which less than 90% of those killed have been Muslims’ (Rai 2006). 
He also notes that ‘many of the so-called Hindu-Muslim riots are noth-
ing of the sort – they are simply clashes between Muslims and the police’ 
(ibid.), indicating the extent of state involvement and complicity in the 
targeting of Muslims. He goes on to add that 
an average policeman – and most policemen are Hindus – gets his value 
system from his own society or community. And that is why the average 
policeman often thinks of Muslims in very negative terms. Many police-
men seem to believe the standard stereotypical images of Muslims being 
'dirty', ‘untrustworthy’, ‘violent’ and ‘pro-Pakistani’. And this is what leads 
to them thinking of Muslims as ‘aggressors’ who initiate riots. (ibid.) 
It is in such a context that we must locate the figure of the ‘Islamic 
terrorist’, as he appears in public discourse: it is a matter of some conse-
quence that this figure first makes an appearance on the Indian political 
scene after the destruction of the Babri mosque and widespread commu-
nal violence that followed, with the serial bomb blasts across Mumbai in 
1992-3. These strikes were avowedly retaliatory, the tactics intended to 
cause terror – but what is not noted often enough is that it is no more or 
less terror than is caused by murderous mobs in a communal attack. As 
Subhash Gatade writes, ‘”terrorism” unleashed by the majoritarians is 
easily disguised under the bursting of ‘pent up anger’ against the minori-
ties’ (Gatade 2008). The difference is, that the 1992 incidents indicated 
the availability of technological and financial resources to the ‘Islamic 
terrorists’, and consequently the cold-blooded intention to use them, that 
communal mobs do not either have or openly index: communal attacks 
are almost always treated as spontaneous, and their consequences there-
fore as contingent rather than intended effects. The Mumbai attacks 
were also significant because they were sponsored and undertaken by 
Muslim elements of the Mumbai underworld, rather than by any avow-
edly Islamic-fundamentalist group – thereby reinforcing the perception 
of the Muslim as inherently dangerous and criminal. If on the one hand, 
this and the incidents of ‘Islamic terrorism’ that were to follow were 
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therefore indicators that the Muslim community would not be easy 
and/or passive targets for Hindutva violence, on the other, they served 
to intensify the sense of alterity and externality to Brahmanical hegemo-
ny that was sought through Hindutva initiated communal violence in the 
first instance. 
This is further confirmed when we look at the second of the two 
events: the communal carnage in Gujarat in 2002. The scale and spread 
of the violence, as well as the sheer one-sidedness of it, has led some 
commentators to remark that it was a case of genocide rather than of 
communal rioting, since the overwhelming majority of those killed were 
Muslims.31 What made Gujarat even more significant was that it offered 
proof to the Hindu right that genocide as a strategy could provide posi-
tive electoral results: 
“The Gujarat experiment is a success,” declared Ashok Singhal [prominent 
VHP leader], after the massacre of over 2000 Muslims in Gujarat and the 
election of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) [in the As-
sembly elections that followed]. He and other BJP leaders went on to as-
sert that this ‘success’ would be replicated all over India. (cited in Ra-
jagopal, 2003)32 
The Gujarat carnage was supposedly in retaliation for the alleged at-
tack by Muslims on Hindu sadhus (holy men) and kar sevaks (volun-
teers) returning from Ayodhya, at Godhra, an attack that was character-
ised as a ‘pre-planned’, ‘terrorist’ one by both the Chief Minister 
Narendra Modi and by the Justice Nanavati Commission (appointed by 
Modi) in its interim report (the findings of the Commission were subse-
quently contradicted by a Supreme Court Committee appointed to inves-
tigate the same incident, with the Gujarat High Court also endorsing the 
findings of the latter). The evident and immediate invocation of the ‘ter-
rorist’ stereotype, and the implicit justification it was supposed to offer 
for the carnage that followed, is an index of the apparent credibility it 
had gained by this time in the Indian (read ‘Hindu’) public imagination. 
That in the nine intervening years between the Mumbai blasts of 1993 
and Godhra, 2002, there were few major incidents of communal violence 
and just two incidents of bomb-blasts (in Chennai and Rameshwaram in 
1995) involving Muslims33 (Rajeshwari, 2004: 2, 24-32), is also an index 
of the extent to which the ‘globalisation’ of this figure had permeated 
into national political discourse and the media (especially in English). 
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The only ‘local’ incident that would have contributed significantly to this 
stereotyping was the high-profile attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 
December 2001: the question that arises is, would this incident, which 
was explicitly linked to Kashmiri separatist outfits by the state, have res-
onated in the Godhra case unless there was already a pervasive imagina-
tion of all Muslim-related violence as ‘terrorist’? Irrespective of the an-
swer to this, the stereotyping of the Muslim as ‘terrorist’ has worked like 
a self-fulfilling prophecy: in the six years after the Gujarat carnage culmi-
nating in the attacks in Mumbai on 26 November 2008, there have been 
at least 12 cases of bombings linked to Muslims, and a corresponding 
increase in Muslim-related incidents of communal violence.34 Taken to-
gether, what this indicates is the emergence in this period of a dialectical, 
even a peculiarly dialogic relation, between Brahmanical masculine he-
gemony and its Muslim counterpart, in which the ‘dialogue’ is the articu-
lation of the hegemonic power of each through violence: the conflicts 
and dialectics possible between the layers of internal and subordinate 
hegemonic formations in each case – based on class, caste, gender, etc. – 
are subsumed by this meta-dialectic, denying, as far as possible, any 
scope for the violence to turn inward and implode the hegemonic for-
mation. It is in this sense that right-wing nationalist movements like 
Hindutva on the one hand, and transnational phenomena like Islamic 
fundamentalism on the other, serve to channel and realign the tensions 
internal to their societies, and indeed actively reinforce the sources and 
causes of those tensions.  
The pervasiveness of the stereotype of the Muslim as ‘terrorist’ – 
among many other Muslim stereotypes – is also reinforced by another 
kind of argument. Profiles of arrested and/or convicted Islamic ‘terror-
ists’ are circulated revealing many of them to be educated, often profes-
sionally qualified young men belonging to middle class families,35 this is 
then touted as proof that poverty or lack of education are no longer ade-
quate as explanations for Muslims turning to terrorism, it is rather the 
religion itself. This is obviously an easier explanation to accept than the 
more accurate one, viz., that, through the articulations of communal 
masculine hegemonies (within themselves and in relation to each other), 
differentials of caste, class, gender, region, etc., are subsumed by the de-
mands of the larger hegemonic formation, which then determine the dy-
namics by which its individual subjects relate, to each other and to the 
subjects of other hegemonic formations. It is for this reason that, despite 
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the atrocities perpetrated on the Muslim community being extensively 
covered in the media every day of the Gujarat violence, the public re-
sponse was often characterized as muted, if not indifferent. As Sarmila 
Bose (2002) remarked, ‘[l]ouder than the clamour of the national media 
during the Gujarat carnage was the deafening silence of the absence of 
outrage in the wider society’. There was a definite sense that there was 
no real difference in perception between avowed Hindutva supporters 
and the purportedly secular ‘average Hindu’, on the matter of the legitima-
cy of the attacks on Muslims; disapproval was more explicitly on the scale 
of the attacks.36  
The depth to which this perception of the Muslim has sunk is indexed 
through the emergence of another phenomenon (fortunately, amounting 
to few so far) – viz. the ‘Hindu’ terrorist (see Gatade 2008). While the 
targets of Hindu ‘terrorist’ groups like the Abhinav Bharat have by and 
large been Muslims and Muslim localities, what distinguishes them from 
the earlier communal rioters is that they have adopted the international 
‘Islamic terrorist’ modus operandi: they operate clandestinely, in small 
numbers organized in cells, manufacture bombs in secret and detonate 
them in public places. Their initial successes led Bal Thackeray of the 
Shiv Sena to openly celebrate them and encourage them to outshine their 
Muslim counterparts (Gatade 2003). Most remarkably, there is evidence 
now suggesting that these groups have deliberately and cynically left 
clues of the above modus operandi in several instances of bombing (in-
cluding possibly the Delhi blasts of 2005), thereby exploiting (and exac-
erbating) the image of the Muslim ‘terrorist’: this image is now so en-
trenched in the public imagination that the question of blaming anyone 
but the Muslim ‘terrorist’ did not even arise till these recent revelations.37 
What this indicates is that, on the one hand, the play of hegemonic for-
mations as articulated through violence maximizes degrees of external 
alterity and difference to facilitate the focusing of that violence, thereby 
generating near-monolithic identities that (especially at the point of vio-
lence) do not cognize internal differences, either in themselves or in the 
Other; the hold of Brahmanical masculine hegemony thus ensures that 
the ‘average Hindu’ perception of the Muslim is singular, stereotypical, 
unrecognizing of nuances or complexities and bordering on the mythical. 
On the other, the same dynamic demands the ceaseless generation of 
(the threat of) violences – not just externally directed towards the Other 
but internally, between their constituent hegemonic formations, and ac-
204 CHAPTER 6 
cordingly varying in intensity – in order to sustain the hegemony. Both 
these processes – of incitement to violence and the control of violence – 
are thus foundational to the functioning of these hegemonic formations. 
6.8 Hindutva and Christian Communities 
Hindutva antipathy to Christianity is not new; however, it had not active-
ly and concertedly targeted the Christian community till the nineties. 
Since the attack on Christians began in the late nineties (with the high 
watermark being the murder of Graham Staines, an Australian mission-
ary working in Orissa, in January 1999), this became a pattern, with some 
particularly violent incidents, including the rape of nuns in several cases, 
raising international protest. While it is possible – and not inaccurate – to 
understand these as consistent with the attacks on Muslims, since both 
communities have been explicitly identified by Hindutva ideologues as 
inimical to ‘Hindu’ India, the question that arises is, why at this time, and 
why not before? Christian respondents in Kerala were of contradictory 
opinions: one suggestion was that the Mumbai bomb-blasts of 1993 and 
later, had pushed militant Hindutva onto the back-foot, and that they 
were wary of taking on a fight that would yield harsh reprisals – hence 
the attacks on Christians (especially on weak and isolated pockets of 
Christians like missionaries and nuns) who, being a much smaller minori-
ty, offered easy pickings. The contrary suggestion was that, having 
brought down the Babri Masjid and pushed the Muslim community onto 
the back-foot, as well as achieving real presence in political power at the 
centre through the NDA government, Hindutva forces now felt they 
could push their agenda further: hence the attacks on Christians. Chris-
tian respondents in Delhi generally tended to incline toward the second 
suggestion, but added that it was unlikely to last as a strategy, since pro-
longed attacks on the Christian community would draw international 
(read ‘western’) ire and consequences. The regional variations in the re-
sponses are suggestive also of the relevance of context: the first re-
sponse, which imputed cowardice – and in one instance even gendered 
this cowardice by suggesting that ‘this macho nonsense won’t work in 
Kerala, let them just try it!38 – to the Hindutva attackers, is possibly from 
a perception of the community as strong in numbers, unlike in other 
parts of India. Similarly, the proximity to the centre of national politics 
and to an international community in Delhi, could well explain the se-
cond and third responses from Delhi. The second in Kerala, however, 
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cannot satisfactorily be explained by this immediate understanding of 
context and regional variance; there is nothing in the data either to sug-
gest other variables at work.39 There is however, another possible expla-
nation for this response emerging from the Kerala Christian community: 
this period also saw an intensification of BJP political activity in Kerala, 
and was marked by a series of bloody and violent clashes between RSS 
volunteers and CPM cadre in the volatile district of Kannur in northern 
Kerala, which drew national attention.40 The spate of these incidents was 
suggestive of a newly aggressive strategy that went beyond Muslims to 
target the other two groups identified as enemies by Hindutva – the 
Christians and the Communists (Savarkar 1989 [1923]: 126). 
Apart from this, though, it is important to note that the perception of 
the Christian community outside of institutional Hindutva is not general-
ly a hostile one. Christians are generally perceived to be peaceful and, if 
not as nationalistic as the Hindu, not generally thought of as anti-
national, qua the Muslim. Indeed, among some of my Christian respond-
ents I even observed a willingness to concede to ‘Hindus’ that they had 
‘a natural right’,41 a first claim to the nation that Christians and Muslims 
did not necessarily have. While this speaks volumes for the sense of al-
ienation that the Christian community experiences, it is an equally volu-
ble comment on the extent to which the community has remained non-
confrontational. Further, there is widespread recognition, especially in 
urban areas and especially in the middle and lower middle classes, of the 
importance of Christian missionary contribution to health care and edu-
cation in particular. Sanil Kumar, a pracharak assigned to the Amrutha-
bharathy Vidyapeetham (a series of schools run by the RSS) in Ernaku-
lam, observed with a touch of irritation that ‘Everyone wants their 
children to have an English education, and every Christian who can 
speak two words of English is opening a school and calling it a “con-
vent” and exploiting this desire’.42 The Amruthabharathy Vidyapeetham 
was set up specifically to counter the influence of the Christian schools; 
he informed me, proudly, that even hardcore, card-carrying CPM cadre 
would approach him for admission for their children, because ‘people 
are gradually appreciating the importance of our work, and want their 
children to grow up with an in-depth familiarity with Indian culture that 
we provide.’ Taken together, these remarks are indicative of two, not 
entirely incompatible tendencies in the broader field of Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony: one, the desire for a ‘western’ education, and the 
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other, an equal desire for a strong sense of national-cultural identity. It is 
a dichotomy quite similar to the dichotomy between nativists and mod-
ernisers in the nineteenth century (that we discussed in Ch. IV), and in 
many ways, genealogically derived from that tension. Irrespective of the-
se considerations, the effect is that there is a real tension in the larger 
dynamic of Brahmanical masculine hegemony, between the desire to 
‘modernise’ and emulate the ‘west’, and the desire to intensify the ‘tradi-
tional’ and celebrate and relive the ‘glorious past’. The Christian commu-
nity is caught in the cleft of this tension, in the sense that it, willy-nilly, 
represents the ‘west’ and ‘westernisation’. In this sense, it already occu-
pies a position – albeit an uneasy one – within the multi-layered configu-
ration of hegemonies that constitutes Brahmanical masculine hegemony, 
even if mainstream Hindu nationalism seeks to reject it. 
6.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have drawn the significant political lines of the period 
after the Emergency and the dynamic of the interaction between the so-
cial, the political and the economic (specifically the developmental), lead-
ing to the present. The ideologies and the social and political practices of 
Hindu nationalism have been determined and defined by these dynamics, 
as much as they have been fundamental to the unfolding directions of 
those dynamics. After the Emergency, and under the Janata regime, the 
RSS in particular and the Hindu nationalists in general expanded their 
domains of influence quickly and effectively, posing a serious threat to 
the political dominance of the Congress government. However, both the 
Congress and the Hindu nationalists (who were often indistinguishable 
in their politics and policies) had to contend with two consequences of 
the adoption of the modernist project: one, the rise to power of the low-
er and scheduled castes; and two, the multiple, though sometimes diverse 
and conflicting voices of the women’s movement. Both these challenges 
to Brahmanical masculine hegemony were engaged with and strategies 
were deployed to neutralise them, including the invocation of violence. 
The persistence of masculinist biases through the evolution of the pro-
cesses sketched above seems to suggest that they are constructed into the 
very processes and conditions of modernisation. The chapter also exam-
ined the relations of Hindutva to global and transnational forces,43 in 
particular its relations to Islam and its perceptions of the Muslim com-
munity. By exploring the role of violence in the sustenance of Brahmani-
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cal masculine hegemony’s relations to the Muslim community, I have 
shown how dissensions and differences internal to this hegemony are 
sought to be suppressed and/or channelled into hostility to the Muslim 
as ‘Other’. The chapter also argued that Brahmanical masculine hegemo-
ny works by articulating contraries together, sometimes in consonance 
with Hindutva hegemony and sometimes in tension with it, as in its re-
sponses to the Christian community – but always offering the basis for 
its consolidations. In the last and concluding chapter that follows, I will 
present a summary of the findings of the thesis thus far, examine some 
of its limitations, and offer some concluding remarks on the implications 
of its findings for the future of both, Hindutva and secularism, in India. 
Notes 
 
1 See S. Lindberg (1995) for an account of these differences. 
2 This is another dichotomy that corresponds roughly with Guha’s – and our own 
– distinction between the realms of ‘Danda’ and ‘Order’ respectively, but as I have 
repeatedly argued, these terms are at best analytically counter-posed, with no sub-
stantial separation. The ‘Bharat’/‘India’ divide similarly is a notional one, indicat-
ing realms of political affiliation, rather than substantial territorial or even demo-
graphic difference. As with all binaries, in the case of these two too, the terms are 
mutually dependent and defined against each other. 
3 See Pavan Verma for the same point (1998: 142). 
4 See for instance Kohli (1995).  
5 For this incident and its analysis see Mumtaz Ali Khan (1983). The OBCs in 
particular were sensitive to this issue, as conversion by the lowest castes effective-
ly rendered the latter invulnerable to the social sanctions of the caste hierarchy, 
and therefore to the oppression and exploitation of the OBCs, and gave the low-
er castes a sense of social equality with their caste superiors. 
6 See the VHP website report on this event at http://www.vhp.org/whc2.php, 
accessed 23-05-2007 
7 The debate on this is still raging, given the recent exoneration of Jagdish Tytler 
and Sajan Kumar, Congress leaders charged with inciting murderous masses into 
slaughtering Sikhs during the Delhi riots of 1984 following Mrs. Gandhi’s death. 
8 It is of some significance here that the RSS openly supported the Congress 
against the BJP during the eighties, as the party that was more likely to protect 
‘Hindu’ interests. See Malik and Vajpeyi (1989: 320-21). 
9 ‘The Shah Bano case was a landmark case in contemporary Indian jurisprudence 
on Personal Law. In 1985, the Indian Supreme Court passed an order that inter-
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preted the payment of maintenance in divorce cases as coming under civil, and 
not personal, law; this was in relation to the granting of maintenance in favour of 
Shah Bano, a Muslim woman whose husband had divorced her in 1978. The or-
der was perceived by some sections of the leadership of the Indian Muslim 
communities to be an infringement of the Muslim Personal Law, who then 
threatened countrywide agitations against the judgment. The then Indian gov-
ernment, under the Prime Minister-ship of Rajiv Gandhi, passed the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, in 1986. This Act essentially 
overturned the Supreme Court’s verdict and limited the period of payment of 
maintenance to the customary (brief) period of ‘iddat’ after divorce, when the 
husband is obliged by Muslim personal law to maintain his ex-wife. The response 
of the government raised another kind of controversy, with secular and right 
wing forces, along with the women’s movement, coming together to accuse the 
government of playing communal politics and of ‘appeasing’ the Muslim com-
munity.  
The ramifications of this judgment and the subsequent controversies were signif-
icant. It was instrumental in Rajiv Gandhi’s decision to revive the forgotten issue 
of the ‘liberation’ of the birth-place of Ram – an issue that the BJP happily capi-
talized on and made its campaign plank for the 1989 elections – and was one of 
the major reasons for the dramatic re-emergence of Hindu nationalism. Further, 
it is an outstanding instance of: (a) the confluence of otherwise divergent, even 
inimical, patriarchal formations on the site of the control of women’s entitle-
ments; (b) the multiple mechanisms through which the bases of Hindu nationalist 
sentiment ramify into even purportedly secular organizations and issues; and (c) 
the peculiar, even awkward, position that the secular women’s movement finds 
itself in, in relation to the issue of personal laws, since its strongest ally in the de-
mand for a Uniform Civil Code is the right wing BJP. For an informative account 
of these issues, see Cossman and Kapur (1996). For a different analysis of this 
case – accounting for the presence of women-supporters on both sides of the 
controversy – by understanding it as emanating from the claims of the multiple 
identities present in any individual subject, see Chhachhi (1991) 
10 Mary Roy, an educationist and women’s rights activist, sued her brother for an 
equal share of her father’s property, after the latter’s death in 1965. According to 
laws governing the Keralite Syrian Christian community, Roy, as the daughter, 
was entitled to only a quarter of the property or Rs. 5000/- whichever was less. 
After a 21-years long legal battle, the Supreme Court ordered in her favour, bring-
ing all Christians in India under the Indian Succession Act (1921), which grants 
equal property rights to sons and daughters. 
11 Cited here from http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/grhf/SAsia/forums/sati/ 
articles/judgement.html  
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12 Several of the respondents (upper castes and OBCs; no SCs) during my field-
work who had participated in the campaign in various ways reported an intense 
sense of empowerment and vindication, as well as of belonging. The sub-textual 
narrative was often a replay of the epic itself, with the mosque signifying Ram’s 
expulsion from Ayodhya, and its destruction consequently both the defeat of 
Ravan (the villain in the epic) and the restoration of the victorious Ram to his 
rightful place.  
13 Chanakya was written, directed and the lead role acted by Dr. Chandraprakash 
Dwivedi, who was subsequently accused of providing the BJP with ‘spiritual justi-
fication’ for their communal politics (see Madhavi Irani (1991). Chanakya was 
depicted as the unifier of India, after the Greek invasion. 
14 The extent of the complexity of these dynamics is further revealed by the fact 
that the liberalisation so celebrated by the Indian bourgeoisie was actually initiat-
ed by the same VP Singh, when he was appointed by Rajiv Gandhi as finance 
minister in 1984, before they fell out. 
15 Gail Omvedt (2000) makes a similar point. While I disagree substantially with 
her perception of the current economic reforms as beneficial in the long term, I 
do agree with her on the issue of across-the-board reservation, irrespective of 
class differentials within the backward caste communities. 
16 The irony of this perception is not often enough remarked on, given the sav-
agery of the conquistadores in the name of Christianity in South America or the 
inhuman brutality of the slave trade, that was often condoned because it was also 
seen as a process of bringing ‘heathens’ to Christ. 
17 It must be remembered that the Congress government in India, eager to keep 
its Muslim vote-bank, was the first country to ban Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Vers-
es, which then led to the fatwa against him and the reward on his head, issued by 
the then Ayatollah, Khomeini. 
18 For a particularly vitriolic version of this, see Craig Winn (2004).  
19 For instance, the AIDWA or All India Democratic Women's Association of 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist), for instance, or the Mahila Congress of 
the Congress (I). 
20 One thinks of Madhu Kishwar, for instance, who has gone on record as deny-
ing even the label feminist as non-applicable to her (Kishwar 1990); or somewhat 
differently, the late writer formerly known as Kamala Das, who converted to Is-
lam and changed her name to Kamala Suraiyya. 
21 In the eighties in particular, there was a high-intensity campaign against rape 
and the biases of the rape-laws, which Hindi cinema eagerly participated in, mak-
ing the issue even more public and volatile. 
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22 There are several studies of this, but a useful sketch of the main themes in this 
issue is provided by Gill and Grint (1995). 
23 See Anupama Rao’s (ed.) Gender and Caste: Issues in Indian Feminism (2003b) for a 
set of critiques of this marginalization. 
24 This option was perhaps the most viable of the options to emerge, but remains 
debated. It was first proposed by the Working Group on Women’s Rights (1996). 
25 See the webpage of the Samiti, http://www.sanghparivar.org/wiki/rashtriya-
sevika-samiti. There is a striking difference in the names of the two organisations, 
that is well worth noting: firstly, the word ‘samiti’ is feminine, while ‘sangh’ is 
masculine; secondly ‘samiti’ indicates a somewhat informal gathering or assembly 
while ‘sangh’ indicates a formal organisation; thirdly, and perhaps most signifi-
cantly, ‘sevika’ is a woman/girl who serves, while ‘swayamsevak’ means volunteer, 
or one who exercises a degree of agency in his serving. In other words, there is, 
built into the idea of the Samiti itself, the understanding that women are not ex-
pected to be organised (hence the looser term ‘samiti’), but their service is ex-
pected to be unquestioningly forthcoming, with no agential options in it. Thus, 
the very names of the two organisations index their fundamentally patriarchal 
bent. 
26 Indeed, Vidya Subrahmaniam (2003) suggests that the Ayodhya issue is one the 
Hindu right deliberately keeps perpetually simmering but incomplete, as bearing 
the potential for repeated invocation for mobilisation. 
27 This was despite no clear archaeological evidence that (as was repeatedly 
claimed) the mosque had been built over a pre-existing temple. Indeed, when it 
became difficult to maintain this claim, the rhetoric shifted to asserting that the 
existence of the temple was a matter of faith for the Hindus, not of historical 
proof, and so the temple would be built irrespective of the verdict of the court. 
28 Till this period the VHP and the Bajrang Dal had remained relatively unrelated 
to the BJP, and had in fact, on several occasions openly supported the Congress, 
especially under Rajiv Gandhi; it is only when the BJP began to itself openly es-
pouse the cause of the temple at Ayodhya that these organisations began to work 
directly with it, and in fact, expressly dedicated themselves to cultivating a Hindu 
vote-bank for the BJP (Katju, 2003: 59). 
29 In the agitations over reservation that led to several cases of self-immolation (as 
a form of protest) by upper caste youth, and to caste conflicts across the country. 
30 The infamous Batla House killings of ‘terrorists’ in Delhi on 19 September 
2008 is the most recent of many such incidents.  
31 See for instance, ‘Genocide’, the Special Issue of Communalism Combat (2002), 
and the Concerned Citizens Tribunal Report Vol. II (2002) 
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32 http://www.countercurrents.org/guj-rajagopal260703.htm, accessed 19 Febru-
ary 2004 
33 There were several involving Christian communities, which I will discuss short-
ly. 
34 See http://news.oneindia.in/2008/09/13/chronology-serial-bomb-blasts-in-
india.html, accessed 8 January 2009. 
35 See the apparently sympathetic ‘The New Terrorists’ on http://www.rediff. 
com/news/2003/sep/16spec.htm (accessed 11 June 2006), for an account of 
this. 
36 Umesh, a chartered accountant in Delhi, and a self-professed liberal with no 
explicit Hindutva sympathies, remarked: ‘We need to get a proper perspective on 
this, it’s not just about one community attacking another, but about how much 
provocation was there. How long can you reasonably expect even a tolerant 
community like Hindus to keep quiet? This was going to happen [sooner or later]. 
But yes, the government should have controlled it better….’ (personal conversa-
tion, 19 Feb 2003). 
37 See the news item ‘Radical Hindu terror plot in unsolved bombings?’, at http: 
//www.dnaindia.com/india/report_radical-hindu-terror-plot-in-unsolved-
bombings_1206918, accessed 8 January 2009 
38 Suresh, 22, student, second generation protestant, interviewed on 18 December 
1999. 
39 For instance, if respondents with this view were all from a particular class, or 
travelled more, thereby availing of a less regional perspective; but this is not the 
case, since it was a view held by respondents from diverse classes and with vary-
ing histories and extent of travel. 
40 See for example, news reports ‘3 Killed in RSS, CPM Clashes’ (Hindustan Times, 
6 March 2008) and ‘Kannur Erupts Again, 2 Dead’ (Hindustan Times, 19 January 
2009), which also note that this struggle has been going on for decades. 
41 Fr. Vincent Kundukullam: ‘It is not unnatural that Hindus should feel that In-
dia is their country.’ Personal conversation, 13th September 1999. Fr. Kundukul-
lam (1998) is also the author of a concise monograph on the RSS, in Malayalam. 
42 Personal conversation of 10th January 2000. The allusion in “convent” is to the 
lay expression ‘convent educated’, which signifies English-medium education in a 
Christian school. This has conventionally carried high social premium, with 
Christian educational institutions carrying a reputation for providing quality edu-
cation and discipline. 
43 In this connection, for reasons of space and focus, I have not engaged with the 
significant inroads of Hindu nationalism – institutional and ideological – into the 
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Indian diasporic communities around the world. For an account of these, see for 
instance, Bhatt and Parita (2000). 
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7 Conclusion 
 
 
7.1 Review of Arguments and Findings 
This study has sought to review and then part from, the dominant trends 
in the theoretical and analytical debates on men and masculinity, as well 
as the broad directions of study of Hindu nationalism. In the first case – 
regarding men and masculinity – I have argued that existing attempts in 
this direction still require theoretical elaboration of the relations that ob-
tain between structures and gender-forms. I have critiqued the existing 
literature on men and masculinity for overly focusing on and emphasiz-
ing forms of masculinity, at the expense of the structural dynamics that 
generate and sustain those forms. I have addressed this issue by focusing, 
in the first instance, on the ways in which institutions, organizations and 
structures come to be gendered, and consequently, on the processes of 
gendering that are invoked in the articulation and elaboration of power 
within specific structural, institutional and/or organizational relations. I 
developed this argument specifically with regard to masculinity/ies by 
proposing the idea of ‘masculine hegemony’. Through this term I sug-
gested that – at least in largely democratic societies – uneven power dis-
tribution may be understood in Gramscian hegemonic terms, and that 
this hegemony is usually gendered as masculine. Any given hegemonic 
condition is layered by multiple and intersecting hierarchies of domina-
tion and subordination that determine the access to and exercise of pow-
er – the distribution and possession of its resources and rights – within 
it, as well as the terms within which that power is (to be) exercised. The-
se hegemonic forms extend far beyond conventionally recognised macro 
manifestations – race, nation, region, religion, community, class – to its 
manifestations at the fundamental ‘cellular’ (or in Gramsci’s terms, ‘mo-
lecular’) level of the family and the organisation of sexuality. Thus, the 
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multi-layered hegemonic formations that constitute the given hegemonic 
condition are diversely marked by other signs – of race, class, age, region, 
religion, etc – but are all inflected by the foundational discourse of gen-
der. This is the broad theoretical perspective within which the thesis was 
elaborated – its fundamental theoretical contribution – because it pro-
vided for the multiple articulation of complex phenomena with each 
other, across history as well as across regions. 
Based on this, it sought to approach the issue of Hindu nationalism 
from a historical perspective that takes into account not just its political 
rise in the last two decades of the twentieth century, but the longue du-
rée processes that engendered this politics. The study therefore began by 
examining the various semantic and social transformations of the term 
‘Hindu’, starting with its early derivation from ‘Indus’, through the medi-
eval period to its coalescence into the more concrete religio-social entity 
that emerged through the colonial encounter and the caste and other re-
form movements of the nineteenth century, until its politicization into a 
religio-cultural nationalism in the early part of the twentieth century. 
Crucial to understanding this evolution, the study argues, is the pan-
Indian spread of the Brahmin castes (as opposed to the localized pres-
ence of the lower-castes), and the consequent identification of ‘Hindu’ 
territory with the presence of the Brahmins. The colonial unification of 
India into a single political unit was thus coincidental with the politics of 
caste. In mapping this process, I have emphasized the gender and caste 
dynamics inherent to the construction of this identity, and elaborated on 
the economic, communal and political determinants of this gendered dy-
namic in the construction of the identity ‘Hindu’. The thesis examined 
the outcome of the confrontation between colonizing and colonized pa-
triarchies, as well as the negotiations that came into play within the di-
verse colonized patriarchal formations in this confrontation. It argued 
then that the strongly Brahmanical caste-profile of the anti-colonial na-
tionalist movement indicates the extent to which Brahmanical masculine 
hegemony and its practices came to define the hegemonic understanding 
of the identity ‘Hindu’ as well as ‘India’ – and continued to do so even 
after independence. The argument of the thesis is that, unless one takes 
account of these processes, it is difficult to full comprehend the depth, 
scale and reach of Hindu nationalism – as a latent and as an active ideol-
ogy. 
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Thirdly, the thesis argued the need to examine another factor in the 
understanding of Hindu nationalism – the idea and practice of ‘devel-
opment’ – and briefly historicized the idea of development in its mod-
ernist episteme. It then charted the trajectories of its implementation 
through the Nehruvian emphasis on Planning and state driven social 
change, and the consequent impact on the socio-polity of the country 
after independence. It analyzed this through the gender and caste dy-
namics of this period, arguing that the Brahmanical hegemony of the 
pre-independence period begins to transform in the seventies, as it nego-
tiates with and then accommodates (through the double process of grad-
ual but deliberate sanskritisation and incremental release of state control) 
the increasing visibility and volubility of lower caste presence in the po-
litical domain. Similarly, even as women’s movements successfully 
moved the state to implement policies that actually empowered women, 
the gradual and ongoing process of shifting control of the economy 
from the state to the private sector has ensured that safeguards for wom-
en, labour, lower castes and other marginal groups are almost non-
existent, or at best, remain arbitrary and at the behest of the private sec-
tor. It argued that Hindu right women’s organizations are working to 
ensure that women adopt appropriately secondary and submissive roles 
(legitimized by a nationalist agenda), even as they gain greater presence in 
the burgeoning private sector that requires their labour. Further, as the 
ability of the Congress to accommodate diverse, even contradictory de-
mands began to weaken in the late sixties and into the seventies, a system 
of vote-bank politics was introduced into the political sphere that sub-
stantially aggravated an already sensitive communal history – leading to 
an increase in incidents of communal violence, and to the explicit articu-
lation of identities in sharply gendered (in the sense of violently mascu-
linist) terms. The study proposed that the processes of liberalization and 
privatization were thus crucial to the transformation of Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony, in its strategies to retain hegemonic power.  
Finally, the thesis explored the tensions and relations that obtain be-
tween the multiple dichotomies generated in the thesis – personal/ 
political, upper caste/lower caste, Hindu/non-Hindu, masculine/ 
feminine, modern/traditional – through examining specific identity-
groups, events, as well as accounts of individuals, and attempted to pro-
vide through this an intestinal view (so to speak) of the discursive, prac-
tical and relational field within and from which Hindu nationalism is 
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generated. This was located in relation to relevant major processes of 
national as well as international change, specifically the notion of globali-
sation as it is understood in relation to the formation and consolidation 
of identities, and the phenomenon of terrorism. The thesis suggests that 
these are inextricably interwoven phenomena, and that in order to make 
sense of Hindutva conceptions and practices of masculinity, it is neces-
sary to take into account those processes by which it both defines and 
feeds its notions of power and failure, self and other, masculine and fem-
inine. The thesis thus sought to present the analyses undertaken in the 
preceding chapters as not simply operating at the macro or micro levels 
exclusively, but as drawing from an understanding of Hindu nationalism 
and Brahmanical masculine hegemony that is necessarily arrived at by 
weaving back and forth between these levels, stitching them together. 
7.2 Main Contributions 
This thesis is the first to attempt an analysis of men and masculinities in 
Hindu nationalism in terms of the interplay of subjects and structures, 
through the idea of a Brahmanical masculine hegemony. In fact, it is the 
first work to propose and theorize the idea of patriarchy as masculine 
hegemony, thereby attempting to revive the analytical value of the term 
‘patriarchy’. It has done so not only by offering a detailed theoretical un-
derstanding of the dynamics of ‘masculine hegemony’, but by analytically 
elaborating this understanding through the examination of the historical 
evolution and contemporary dynamics of a specific hegemonic for-
mation – Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism. In doing so, this thesis has 
also contributed specifically to: 
(a) Debates around the history of a ‘Hindu’ identity. Here, the thesis 
is the first to propose that the two extreme positions that dominate the 
debate – one that argues that this identity has ‘always’ existed, and the 
other that asserts that it is a colonial invention – may both be right. The 
thesis has suggested that it is possible to trace the historical presence of a 
socio-religious hegemonic formation, prior to the colonial period, even if 
that formation cannot be identified as ‘Hinduism’. It was later identified 
as the religion of the ‘Hindu’, and subsequently as ‘Hinduism’, in the co-
lonial period, not through its own self-proclamation as such, but as a 
category of the colonial census mechanisms – implying thereby that the 
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identity ‘Hindu’ is the layered product of multiple historical effects and 
interventions. 
(b) Discussions around the question of violence and Hindu national-
ism: the thesis has proposed that violence is not just an effect of histori-
cal hostility between communities but continuously and systemically 
generated through the dual discursive incitements of ‘Order’ and ‘Danda’. 
While these terms were first suggested by Ranajit Guha, this thesis has 
been the first to elaborate them in relation to the violences that Hindutva 
has engaged in. In the process, this thesis has also contributed to a fresh 
understanding of the figure of Mohandas Gandhi and his propagation of 
non-violence as a political strategy. 
(c) The question of the support base for Hindu nationalism: this the-
sis has argued that Hindu nationalism or Hindutva sustains not just on 
the programs and practices of its institutional forms – the Sangh parivar 
(family) and similar organisations like the Shiv Sena – but on the Brah-
manical masculine hegemony that it is founded on, incites and strives 
continually to intensify. While other commentators have noted that there 
is a larger and more pervasive discursive field from which Hindutva 
draws sustenance, this thesis is the first to theorize that process in gen-
dered structural terms. 
(d) The growing discussion on ‘religious’ terrorism: by locating the 
growth of Hindu nationalism in relation to the contemporary global po-
litical stage, this thesis has also sought to cast new light on the phenom-
enon of ‘religious’ – specifically ‘Islamic’ – terrorism. It has argued that 
rather than violence emanating from the prescriptions of a specific reli-
gion or religious ideology, it is the direct effect of conflicting masculine 
hegemonies, in the maintenance of hegemonic control. In this sense, it 
has brought the theory of masculine hegemony to bear on the issue of 
‘terrorism’. 
7.3 Limitations of the Thesis 
The thesis was initially conceived of as a political anthropology of Hindu 
nationalism, with a focus on gender. It was therefore originally planned 
with two phases of fieldwork, in two specific sites – Ernakulam in the 
south and Delhi in the north of India. However, after the first phase of 
fieldwork, and in the course of writing the early parts of the thesis, it 
soon became clear that this methodology would not be appropriate to 
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the direction of the work. It was evident that the focus of the thesis on 
the relations between masculinity and Hindu nationalism demanded an 
initial examination of the latter specifically in historical and discursive 
terms, rather than through immediate empirical analysis. This in turn led 
to elaborating the phenomenon in relation to processes of modernisation 
and development, on a pan-Indian scale, further rendering localised in-
vestigations at best partial and in real terms, rather redundant. The study 
therefore undertook instead to continue to examine Hindu nationalism 
in macro terms, on the scale of the country, and opted to use the materi-
al generated from fieldwork as a general guide to the main argument, ra-
ther than as empirical evidence or even illustration. It was important to 
retain the pan-Indian perspective that the thesis had begun with, and that 
was necessary to comprehend the idea of Hindutva as a masculine hegem-
ony; arguably, if the thesis had instead elaborated on the empirical data of 
the fieldwork, the focus would have shifted from the study of this hege-
monic condition, to its localised manifestations – which may well be a 
future direction of research. Consequently, a minor limitation of the the-
sis is that, while it draws on empirical evidence, and its arguments are 
built from and through the experience of fieldwork, it offers no intensive 
analyses of organisations, events or individuals, as extensive instances of 
Hindutva in operation. 
Another limitation that must be noted is that, because of its attention 
to forms and practices of masculinity, the thesis at times appears to be 
inattentive to corresponding ideas and practices of femininity, and to the 
relations of women to Brahmanical masculine hegemony in general and 
Hindu nationalism in particular. While this has sought to be avoided as 
far as possible, where it does appear to be the case, it has been the result 
of the need to elaborate on and clarify the operations of masculinity in 
the constitution of this hegemony, rather than of a deliberate disavowal 
or ignorance of the significance of women and femininity to these phe-
nomena. Further, the focus and intent of this thesis was to establish the 
workings of Brahmanical masculine hegemony as the bed from which 
the Hindutva tree has grown, and which continues to sustain it. This is 
not to suggest that there have been no counter-hegemonic forces against 
Brahmanical masculine hegemony: these would include Dalit and other 
lower caste organisations and formations; tribal organisations and for-
mations, especially those mobilised by radical left ideologies; sections of 
the women’s movement; and urban, liberal-democratic, usually upper 
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class and upper caste intelligentsia. Even within the broad formation of 
institutional Hindutva, there have been signs of dissonance – as for in-
stance, between the VHP’s hardline approach to promulgating Hindutva 
and the BJP’s softer approach, governed largely by the demands of elec-
toral and alliance politics; or the Shiv Sena’s insistence on yoking Hin-
dutva to localized Maharashtrian chauvinism, against the insistently pan-
Indian perpective of the RSS. On other fronts, the emergence of Maya-
wati as a powerful Dalit leader in the state of Uttar Pradesh has forced 
the Hindutva to negotiate with her Bahujan Samaj Party, and on her 
terms. But dealing with these perfunctorily, formulaically and as adjuncts 
to the central focus, in the interests of producing a more rounded thesis, 
would effectively be tokenism, and politically a disservice to recounting 
the very crucial struggles these counter-hegemonic forces are engaged in: 
any genuine account of these would require another – or more – the-
sis/theses. 
Finally, despite the broad theoretical and spatial sweep of the thesis, it 
has not incorporated several issues – or has only addressed them in par-
tial detail. For instance, it has not explicitly undertaken to examine the 
ideological and political programs of Hindutva ideologues, or party man-
ifestos; it has not analysed the ideological role of key terms in such pro-
grams. Illustratively, the affective pull of terms like matrubhumi and pitrub-
humi (respectively, motherland and fatherland) that yoke the everyday 
familial to the grand narrative of the nation, could be analysed as index-
ing a field of beliefs, actions and relations that constitute the masculine 
hegemony of Brahmanical patriarchy, within and from which Hindu na-
tionalism finds its visceral roots. However, this would have pulled the 
thesis into a specific kind of semiotic and discourse analysis and away 
from its focus on unravelling the constitution of the hegemonic in Hin-
dutva. As such, again, it remains a line of research for the future. 
7.4 Concluding Remarks: Of Endings and Beginnings 
This thesis began as an objective study of the phenomenon of Hindu 
nationalism, with a specific focus (as noted above) on its gender rela-
tions. In the course of undertaking it, however, it became increasingly 
clear to this researcher that objectivity would be a difficult condition to 
meet: as physically male, socially and culturally masculine, nominally 
Hindu and politically inclined towards (broadly) feminist ideas and away 
220 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
from religious-nationalist ones, attempting to undertake a study of Hindu 
(nationalist) masculinities nevertheless cut close to the bone, and de-
manded, in many ways, a radical review and restructuring of notions of 
self, social identity and indeed of social relations. In this sense, this thesis 
has been phenomenally difficult to write precisely because it entailed in 
several ways a radical rewriting of the self. (Theoretically, it could have 
been undertaken without that: but in practical terms, that hypothetical 
thesis would have been substantially weaker.) But it has also therefore 
been a lesson in understanding that political processes are not just about 
the institutions that anchor them – sometimes through the sheer inertia 
of institutions – or the events that manifest them, but about the collec-
tive dynamics of the teeming bodies, the groups of individuals and the 
multiple social relations that constitute them. This is not perhaps a new 
lesson, but a difficult one. Raymond Williams once noted that, ‘The mis-
take, as so often, is in taking terms of analysis as terms of substance’. 
One could conversely (but without contradiction) also argue that it is a 
mistake to treat terms of analysis as disconnected from terms of sub-
stance: that is, especially in matters of gender and sexuality, the analysis – 
however esoteric – must devolve to the practical and the agential: it can-
not be dissociated from the latter. This is almost as true for the study of 
nationalism (indeed, perhaps of any ideological program that addresses 
the construction of individual and social identities). When one argues for 
the understanding of both nationalism and of gender as constituting 
hegemonic formations then, one is drawing on precisely that quality of 
the conception of hegemonies as operating dynamically between micro 
and macro levels, and constituted by each.  
It is in this sense that this thesis, in the final analysis, is about the 
broad base on which Hindu nationalism preys, and which it in turn 
feeds. Unless we take cognizance of this, and look beyond the electoral 
performances of the Bharatiya Janata Party, or the cultural nationalism of 
the RSS, to the ways in which hegemonies are maintained using the very 
tools and structures intended to dismantle them – as with the develop-
mental agenda – we will not truly grasp the magnitude of the struggle for 
secularism. This term may be dismissed – as it often is – as being of 
Western origin, or inimical as a concept to Indian realities (however one 
understands those); but the dismissal itself is a mark of Brahmanical 
masculine hegemony in reaction. It is of the first importance then, to 
understand secularism as not just about the relations between religion 
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and society, or church and state, but about the recognition of the gen-
dered bases of those relations, that resist a genuine separation of terms. 
It is about the production of discourses, programs and practices that tru-
ly comprehend the gendered and sexualised terms on which all relations 
– whether seen through the lens of religion or not – are constituted. It is 
only on such an understanding of the secular that a genuinely effective 
resistance can begin to be organised, to counter the Hindu right or its 
masculinist violences. 
 
  
222 
 
 References 
 
 
Abraham, Susan. ‘The Deorala Judgement Glorifying Sati’. The Lawyers Col-
lective. 12(6) (June, 1997). Pp. 4-12. 
Advani, L. K. ‘Hindutva’. http://www.lkadvani.in/eng/content/view/378/ 
344/. N.d. 
Agnes, Flavia. ‘Women's Movement Within A Secular Framework: Redefin-
ing The Agenda’. Economic & Political Weekly Vol XXIX No.19 May 7, 
1994. 
Ahmed, Aijaz. In Theory. Bombay: OUP, 1993.  
Ahmed, Aijaz. ‘Fascism and National Culture: Reading Gramsci in the Days 
of Hindutva’. Social Scientist, v. 21, no. 3-4. 
Aloysius, G. Nationalism without a Nation in India. Delhi: OUP, 1998. 
Ali, Amir. ‘Evolution of Public Sphere in India’. Economic and Political Weekly. 
30 June 2001. 
Aloysius, G (1999), Nationalism without a Nation in India, Delhi: OUP 
Alter, Joseph S. ‘Celibacy, Sexuality and the Transformation of Gender into 
Nationalism in North India’, The Journal of Asian Studies. 53:1 (Feb. 1994). 
Alter, Joseph S. The Wrestler’s Body: Identity and Ideology in North India. Berkely: 
U. of California Press, 1992. 
Amin, Samir. Eurocentrism, trans. Russell Moore. London: Zed, 1989. 
Andersen, Walter K. and S. D. Damle. The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1987. 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread 
of Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983. 
Bacchetta, Paola. Gender in the Hindu Nation: RSS women as Ideologues. New 
Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2004. 
 References 223 
Ballhatchet, K. A. Race, Sex and Class Under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Poli-
cies and Their Critics 1793-1905. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980. 
Banerjee, Himani. ‘Projects of Hegemony’, Economic and Political Weekly, 
March 11, 2000 
Banerjee, Nirmala. ‘Working Women in Colonial Bengal: Modernization 
and Marginalization’. Sangari and Vaid (eds), Recasting Women: Essays in 
Colonial History. Delhi: Zubaan, 2006 [1999] 
Banerjee, Sikata. “Make me a Man!: Masculinity, Hinduism and Nationalism in 
India. New York: SUNY Press, 2005 
Bardhan, Pranab. The Political Economy of Development on India, Oxford: Black-
well. (1985) 1998. 
Basu, Amrita. ‘Women's Activism and the Vicissitudes of Hindu National-
ism’. Journal of Women's History - Volume 10, Number 4, Winter 1999, pp. 
104-124 
Basu, Amrita and Rekha Basu. ‘Of Men, Women, and Bombs: Engendering 
India's Nuclear Explosions’. Dissent Winter 1999, Volume 46, Number 1 
Basu, Tapan, et.al. Khaki Shorts, Saffron Flags. Tracts for the Times. 1. New Del-
hi: Orient Longman, 1993. 
Baxi, Upendra and Bhiku Parekh (eds) Crisis and Change in Contemporary India. 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995. 
Berkson, Carmel. The Divine and Demoniac: Mahisa’s Heroic Struggle with Durga. 
New Delhi: OUP, 1995. 
Beynon, John. Masculinities and Culture. Issues in Cultural and Media Studies. 
Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002. 
Bhagat, R. P. ‘Census and the Construction of Communalism in India’, Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly, 24 Nov 2001. 
Bharucha, Rustom. The Question of Faith. Tracts for the Times. 3. New Delhi: 
Orient Longman, 1993. 
Bhasin, Kamala. What is Patriarchy? New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1993. 
Bhatt, Chetan. Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths. Oxford: 
Berg, 2001. 
Bhatt, Chetan and Mukta Parita. ‘Hindutva in the West: Mapping the An-
tinomies of Diaspora Nationalism’. Ethnic and racial studies, Vol 23 No. 3. 
2000. 
224 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Bhaskaran, Suparna. ‘The Politics of Penetration: Section 377 of the Indian 
Penal Code’. Queering India: Same-Sex Love and Eroticism in Indian Culture 
and Society. Ruth Vanita (ed.). London: Routledge, 2002. 
Bilgrami, Akeel. ‘Gandhi, the Philosopher’. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
38, no. 39. 27 September 2003. 
Borden, Carla M. (ed.) Contemporary India: Essays on the Uses of Tradition. New 
Delhi: OUP, 1989. 
Borthwick, Meredith. The Changing Role of Women in Bengal, 1849-1905. 
Princeton, New Jersey: 1984. 
Bose, Sarmila. ‘Hindutva’s Willing Executioners’. The Telegraph, Tuesday, 
December 10, 2002. 
Bourdieu, Pierre and Loic J.D. Wacquant. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. 
Cambridge: Polity, 1992. 
Brass, Paul. “National Power and Local Politics in India: A Twenty-Year 
Perspective”. Modern Asian Studies XVIII, No. 1 (February, 1984), 89-118. 
Brass, P.R. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. Delhi: Sage, 1991. 
Brass, P.R. The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. Seat-
tle: University of Washington Press, 2003 
Brod, Harry (ed.) The Making of Masculinities: The New Men’s Studies. Boston: 
Allen Unwin, 1987. 
Brown, Judith. Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1994 (1985). 
Burke, Edmund, III. ‘Theorizing the histories of colonialism and national-
ism in the Arab Maghrib. (Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in 
North Africa)’. Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ) 22 March 1998. http://www. 
encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-21187376.html, accessed 29 April 2003.  
Burns, Catherine. ‘”A Man is a Clumsy Thing Who does not Know How to 
Handle a Sick person”: Aspects of the History of Masculinity and Race 
in the Shaping of Male Nursing in South Africs, 1900-1950’. Journal of 
South African Studies. Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec. 1998). Pp.695-717. 
Burton, Antoinette. ‘From Child Bride to “Hindoo Lady”: Rukmabhai and 
the Debate on Sexual Respectability in Imperial Britain’. American Histori-
cal Review. Vol. 103, No. 4 (Oct 1998). Pp. 1119-1146. 
Butalia, Urvashi and Tanika Sarkar (eds.) Women and the Hindu Right: A Collec-
tion of Essays. New Delhi: Kali, 1995. 
Calhoun, Craig (ed.) Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994. 
 References 225 
Caplan, Pat (ed.) The Cultural Construction of Sexuality. London: Tavistock, 
1987. 
Carrigan, Tim, R. W. Connell and John Lee, ‘Toward a New Sociology of 
Masculinity’. Theory and Society 14. 1985. 
Carroll, Lucy. ‘Colonial Perceptions of Indian Society and the Emergence of 
Caste(s) Associations’. The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 37, No. 2 (Feb., 
1978), pp. 233-25 
Census of India, 1991. Website URL www.censusindia.net/religion.html. 
Chakrabarty, Bidyut. ‘Jawaharlal Nehru and Planning, 1938-41: India at the 
Crossroads’. Modern Asian Studies. Vol. 26, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 275-
287.  
Chakrabarty, Dipesh ‘Sovereignty, Democracy and the Multitudes’, Economic 
and Political Weekly, 23 July 2005 
Chakravarti, Uma. ‘Conceptualising Brahmanical Patriarchy in Early India: 
Gender, Class and State’, Economic and Political Weekly, 28(14): 579–85. 
1993. 
Chakravarti, Uma and Kumkum Sangari (eds). From Myths to Markets: Essays 
on Gender. Delhi: Manohar, 1999. 
Chakravarti, Uma and P Gill (eds), Shadow Lives: Writings on Widowhood. Del-
hi: Kali for Women, 2001 
Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Dis-
course. London: Zed Books, 1986. 
Chatterjee, Partha. ‘The Nationalist Resolution of the Women's Question’. 
Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid (ed). Recasting Women: Essays on Colo-
nial History. New Delhi: Kali, 1993a. 
Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histo-
ries. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993b. 
Chatterjee, Partha. A Possible India. Delhi: OUP: 1997. 
Chatterjee, Partha (ed.) State and Politics in India. Themes in Politics. Delhi: 
OUP, 1998. 
Chhachhi, Amrita. ‘Forced Identities: the State, Communalism, Fundamen-
talism & Women in India’. Women, Islam and the State. Deniz Kandiyoti 
(ed.) Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991. 
Chiriyankandath, James, ‘Hindu Nationalism and Regional Political Culture 
in India: A Study of Kerala’. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. Vol. 2, no. 1, 
Spring 1996. 
226 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Chopra, Radhika, Filippo Ossella and Caroline Ossella (eds) (2004), South 
Asian Masculinities: Context of Change, Sites of Continuity, Delhi: Women Un-
limited. 
Clarke, Sathianathan and Rowena Robinson. Religious conversion in India: 
modes, motivations, and meanings. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003 
Cockburn, Cynthia. 'Technology, Production and Power', in Gill Kirkup 
and Laurie Smith (eds) Inventing Women: Science, Technology and Gender, Mil-
ton Keynes: Polity. 1992. 
Cohn, Bernard. Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
Concerned Citizens Tribunal – Gujarat 2002. Crime Against Humanity: An 
Inquiry into the Carnage in Gujarat. Vols. I and II. Mumbai: Citizens for Jus-
tice and Peace, 2002. 
Connell, R. W. Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics. Oxford: 
Polity, 1987. 
Connell, R. W. ‘The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics’. Theory and Society. 
Vol.19. No.5. 1990. 
Connell, R. W. Masculinities. Cambridge: Polity, 1995 
Connell, R. W. ‘The Politics of Changing Men’. Australian Humanities Review. 
http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-Dec-1996/ 
connell.html 1996. 
Connell, R. W. and James W. Messerschmidt. ‘Hegemonic Masculinity: Re-
thinking the Concept’. Gender and Society, Vol. 19, No. 6. December 2005 
Connell, R. W. Gender. Short Introductions. New York: Polity, 2009. 
Corbridge, Stuart and James Harriss, Reinventing India: Liberalization. Hindu 
Nationalism and Popular Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. 
Corfield, Penelope J. (ed.) Language, History and Class. Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1991. 
Cornwall, Andrea and Nancy Lindisfarne (eds). Dislocating Masculinity: Com-
parative Ethnographies. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Cossman, Brenda and Ratna Kapur. Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with 
Law in India. New Delhi: Sage, 1996. 
Crane, Diana (ed.) The Sociology of Culture: Emerging Theoretical Perspectives. Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 1994. 
 References 227 
Crenshaw, Kimberlé. ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theo-
ry, and Antiracist Politics’. University of Chicago Legal Forum. 1989. 
Dalal, Chandulal. Harilal Gandhi: A Life. Trans. Tridib Suhrud. Delhi: Orient 
Longman, 2007 
Dallmayr, Fred and G. N. Devy (eds). Between Tradition and Modernity: India’s 
Search for Identity. New Delhi: Sage, 1998. 
Dalmia, Vasudha and Heinrich von Stietencron (eds.) Representing Hinduism: 
The Constructions of Religious Traditions and National Identity. New Delhi: 
Sage, 1995. 
Das, R. , 2004-03-17 "Religious Nationalism, Brahmanical Patriarchy, and 
the Politics of Hindutva: Does Ideology Matter in International Rela-
tions?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Stud-
ies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/ 
p72904_index. 
Das, Veena (ed.) Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South 
Asia. New Delhi: OUP, 1990. 
de Beaugrande, Robert. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Ideology, 
Methodology’. Studies in Language and Capitalism I, 2006. 
Desai, A. R. Social Background of Indian Nationalism. Bombay: Popular Pra-
kashan, 1976 (1948) 
Desai, Radhika, ‘Culturalism and Contemporary Right: Indian Bourgeoisie 
and Political Hindutva’. Economic and Political Weekly. March 20, 1999. 
Deshpande, Satish. ‘After Culture: Renewed Agendas for the Political 
Economy of India’. Cultural Dynamics 10(2). 1998. Pp. 147-169. 
Dhar, P. N. Indira Gandhi, the “Emergency”, and Indian Democracy. Delhi: OUP, 
2000. 
di Leonardo, Micaela and Roger Lancaster (eds) The Gender/Sexuality Reader: 
Culture, History, Political Economy. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Dirks, Nicholas B. Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. 
Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003. 
Doornbos, Martin, ‘Linking the Future to the Past: Ethnicity and Pluralism’. 
Review of African Political Economy. No. 52, 1991. 
Doornbos, Martin and Sudipta Kaviraj (eds.) Dynamics of State Formation: In-
dia and Europe Compared. Indo-Dutch Studies on Development Alternatives - 19. 
New Delhi: Sage, 1997. 
228 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Dumont, Louis. Religion/Politics and History in India: Collected Papers in Indian 
Sociology. Paris: Mouton Publishers, 1970. 
Edley, Nigel and Margaret Wetherall, ‘Masculinity, Power and Identity’ in 
Mairtin Mac an Ghaill’s (ed.) Understanding Masculinities: Social Relations and 
Cultural Arenas Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996. 
Engineer, Asghar Ali (ed.) Communal Riots in Post-Independence India. Hydera-
bad: Sangam, 1984. 
Enloe, Cynthia. Bananas, Beaches, Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International 
Politics. London: Pandora, 1989. 
Evans, Mary (ed.) The Woman Question. London: Penguin, 1991. 
Fallers, Lloyd A. The Social Anthropology of the Nation-State. Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Co., 1974. 
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin, (1967) 1985. 
Flood, Michael. ‘Men’s movements’, Community Quarterly, Special issue: Mas-
culinities, No. 46, June 1998. 
Foster, Peter. ‘Observational Research’, in Roger Sapsford and Victor Jupp 
(eds.) Data Collection and Analysis. London: Sage, 1996. 
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock, 1985 
(1969). 
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction. London: 
Penguin, 1990 (1978) 
Fox-Genovese, Elisabeth. Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of Individual-
ism, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1991. 
Frankel, Francine. India’s Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Rev-
olution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. 
Frietag, Sandra. ‘Contesting in Public: Colonial Legacies and Contemporary 
Communalism’. Making India Hindu. David Ludden (ed.) New Delhi: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996. 
Gabriel, Karen. ‘Whose Iconic Mother(land)?: Visualising and Theorising 
National Identity’. Occasional Paper No. 53. Delhi: Centre for Women’s 
Development Studies, 2009. 
Gabriel, Karen. Melodrama and the Nation: Sexual Economies of Bombay Cinema 
1970-2000. New Delhi: Women Unlimited, 2010 
Gandhi, Mohandas K. Hind Swaraj and Other Writings. Anthony J Parel (ed.). 
Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1909].  
 References 229 
Gandhi N. and Shah N. The Issues at Stake: Theory and Practice in the Contempo-
rary Women’s Movement in India. New Delhi: Kali, 1993. 
Gatade, Subhash. ‘Silent Emergence Of Hindu Terrorism’. Countercurrents. 
http://www.countercurrents.org/gatade290608.htm 29 June, 2008. Ac-
cessed 30 June 2008. 
Geetha, V. ‘Gender and the Logic of Brahminism: Periyar and the Politics 
of the Female Body’. From Myths to Markets: Essays on Gender. Kumkum 
Sangari and Uma Chakravarti (eds). Delhi: Manohar, 1999. 
Geetha, V. ‘Periyar, Women and an Ethic of Citizenship’. Gender & Caste: 
Issues in Contemporary Indian Feminism. Anupama Rao (ed.) Delhi: Kali for 
Women, 2003 
Gellner, Ernst. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. 
‘Genocide’. Communalism Combat. Special Issue. March-April Year 8. No. 76. 
2002. 
Geschiere, Peter and Birgit Meyer (eds). Globalisation and Identity: Dialectics of 
Flows and Closures. Development and Change, vol. 29, no. 4. Oct. 1998. 
Gill, Rosalind and Keith Grint (eds). The Gender-Technology Relation: Contempo-
rary Theory and Research, London: Taylor and Francis. 1995 
Golwalkar, M. S. Bunch of Thoughts. Bangalore: Vikrama Prakashan, 1966. 
Gooptu, Nandini. The Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth Century India. 
Cambridge: CUP, 2001. 
Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Pre-
sent. New York: OUP, 2008). 
Goswami, Manu. Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2004 
Gowen, Herbert H. ‘ "The Indian Machiavelli" or Political Theory in India 
Two Thousand Years Ago’. Political Science Quarterly. 44 (2), (1929). Pp. 
173-192. 
Gould, William. Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial 
India Cambridge: CUP, 2004 
Gould, Wiliam. ‘Violence, Modernity and Tradition’, n.d. 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from Cultural Writings. Eds. David Forgacs and 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. Trans. William Boelhower. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1985. 
________________. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Trans. and eds. Q. 
Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1973. 
230 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Greig, Alan, Michael Kimmel and James Lang. ‘Men, Masculinities and De-
velopment: Broadening our Work towards Gender Equality’. 
UNDP/GIDP Monograph No. 10 May 2000 
Guha, Ranajit. Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997 
Guibernau, Montserrat. Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Polity, 1996. 
Habib, Irfan. ‘The Formation of India – Notes on the History of an Idea’. 
Social Scientist, Vol. 25 (7-8), 1997. http://www.ercwilcom.net/ 
indowindow/sad/article.php?child=15&article=7. Accessed 11 October 
2005. 
Hansen, Thomas Blom, ‘Recuperating Masculinity: Hindu Nationalism, vio-
lence and the exorcism of the Muslim “Other”’. Critique of Anthropology. 
Vol. 16 (2), 1996. 
Hansen, Thomas Blom. The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in 
Modern India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1999. 
Hansen, Thomas Blom. ‘Sovereigns Beyond the State: On Legality and Pub-
lic Authority in India’. Religion, Violence, and Political Mobilisation in South 
Asia. Ravinder Kaur (ed.) Delhi: Sage, 2005. 
Hasan, Zoya, S.N. Jha and Rasheeduddin Khan (eds). The State, Political Pro-
cesses and Identity: Reflections on Modern India. New Delhi: Sage, 1989. 
Hasan, Zoya (ed.) Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and the State in India. 
New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1994. 
Hasan, Zoya. ‘Gender, Religion and Democratic Politics in India’. Research 
Report on the Religion, Politics and Gender Equality Project. Geneva: 
UNRISD, 2009 
Hastings, James (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 1913. Edinburgh: T. 
T. Clarke, 1953. 
Hearn, Jeff. ‘Is masculinity dead? A critique of the concept of masculinity/ 
masculinities’ in Mairtin Mac an Ghaill (ed.) Understanding Masculinities: So-
cial Relations and Cultural Arenas. Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1996. 
Heesterman, J. C. ‘Traditional Empire and Modern State’. Martin Doornbos 
and Sudipta Kaviraj (eds.) Dynamics of State Formation: India and Europe 
Compared. Indo-Dutch Studies on Development Alternatives - 19. New Delhi: 
Sage, 1997. 
 References 231 
Heesterman, J. C. The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kinship, 
and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
Holden, Philip, ‘The Significance of Uselessness’, http://social.chass.ncsu. 
edu/jouvert/v2i1/HOLDEN.HTM 1998. 
Horrocks, Roger. An Introduction to the Study of Sexuality. London: Macmillan, 
1997. 
Hyam, Ronald. Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience. Manchester: Man-
chester UP, 1990. 
Ilaiah, Kancha. Why I Am Not a Hindu: A Sudra Critique of Hindutva Philoso-
phy, Culture and Political Economy. Calcutta: Samya, 1996. 
Irani, Madhavi. ‘Saffron for Breakfast’. Times of India. 1 December 1991. 
Jaffrelot, Christophe. The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 
to the 1990s. New Delhi: Penguin, 1996. 
Jaffrelot, Christophe. ‘For a Theory of Nationalism’. Research in Question, No. 
10. http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/question/qdr10.pdf. 2003 
Jeffery, Patricia and Amrita Basu (eds.), Resisting the Sacred and the Secular: 
Women’s Activism and Politicized Religion in South Asia. New Delhi: Kali for 
Women, 1999. 
Jurgensmeyer, Mark. Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. New Del-
hi: OUP, 1994. 
Kalpagam, U. “Life Experiences, Resistance and Feminist Consciousness”. 
Indian Journal of Gender Studies. Vol. 7, No. 2. 2000. 
Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Bargaining with Patriarchy” in The Women, Gender and 
Development Reader. Nalini Vishwanathan, Lynn Duggan, Laurie Nisonoff 
and Nana Wiegersma (eds). New Delhi: Zubaan 1997 (1988). 
Katju, Manjari. Vishva Hindu Parishad and Indian Politics. Orient Longman, 
Hyderabad : 2003. 
Kaviraj, Sudipta. ‘Religion, Politics and Modernity’. Upendra Baxi and 
Bhiku Parekh (eds) Crisis and Change in Contemporary India. New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1995. 
Kaviraj, Sudipta. ‘The Modern State in India’. Dynamics of State Formation: 
India and Europe Compared. Doornbos and Kaviraj (eds.) Indo-Dutch Studies 
on Development Alternatives - 19. New Delhi: Sage, 1997. 
Kaviraj, Sudipta. ‘A Critique of the Passive Revolution’. State and Politics in 
India. Partha Chatterjee (ed.) Themes in Politics. Delhi: OUP, 1998. 
232 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Kaviraj, Sudipta ‘On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Dis-
course, Hegemony’. Politics in India. Sudipta Kaviraj (ed.) Oxford in India 
Readings in Sociology and Social Anthropology. Delhi: OUP, 1999. 
Kakar, Sudhir. Intimate Relations: Exploring Indian Sexuality. New Delhi: Pen-
guin, 1990. 
Khan, Ali. ‘The Essentialist Terrorist’. Washburn Law Journal. Vol. 45, No. 
47, Fall 2005. 
Khan, Mumtaz Ali. Mass-conversions of Meenakshipuram: A sociological enquiry. 
Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1983. 
Khilnani, Sunil. The Idea of India. Middlesex: Penguin, 1997. 
Kimmel, Michael S. (ed.) Changing Men: New Directions in Research on Men and 
Masculinity. California: Sage, 1991. 
Kishwar, Madhu. ‘Why I do not call myself a Feminist’. Manushi. No. 61 
(Nov.-Dec. 1990).  
Knappert, Jan. Indian Mythology: An Encyclopaedia of Myth and Legend. London: 
Diamond Books, 1995. 
Kohli, Atul. ‘Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise 
and Decline of Self-Determination Movements in India. Journal of Asian 
Studies. Vol. 56, No. 2 (May 1997). Pp. 325-344. 
Kosambi, D.D. Myth and Reality. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1962. 
Kothari, Rajni. ‘Pluralism and Secularism: Lessons of Ayodhya’, Economic 
and Political Weekly, December 19-26, 2004. 
Kundukullam, Fr. Vincent. RSS: Enthu? Engott? (RSS: What is it? Where is it 
Going?) Ernakulam: Better Yourself Books, 1998. 
Lannoy, Richard. The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and Society. Lon-
don: OUP, 1971. 
Larson, Gerald James. India’s Agony over Religion. Delhi: OUP, 1997. 
Leoussi, Athena Anthony D Smith (eds.) Encyclopaedia of Nationalism. Ox-
ford: Transaction Books, 2000 
Lindberg, Staffan. ‘Farmers’ Movements and Cultural Nationalism in India: 
An Ambiguous Relationship. Theory and Society. Vol. 24, No. 6 (Dec. 
1995). Pp 837-868. 
Lorenzen, David N. ‘Who Invented Hinduism?’ http://www.gpgrieve.org/ 
courses/f2003rel318/WhoInvented.html 2003. (Accessed 19 September 
2005) 
 References 233 
Ludden, David (ed.) Making India Hindu. New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
Mac an Ghaill, Mairtin (ed.) Understanding Masculinities: Social Relations and 
Cultural Arenas. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996. 
MacInnes, John. ‘Capitalist Development: Creator of Masculinity and De-
stroyer of Patriarchy?’ at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/dppc/gender/ 
mandmweb/jmacinnestext.html 1998 
Malhotra, Inder. Indira Gandhi : a personal and political biography. London : 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1989.  
Madan, T.N. Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in 
India. Delhi: OUP, 1997 
Mahmood, Saba, ‘Cultural Studies and Ethnic Absolutism: Comments on 
Stuart Hall’s “Culture, Community, Nation”’. Cultural Studies. Vol. 10 (1), 
1996. 
Malik, Yogendra and Dhirendra Vajpeyi. ‘The Rise of Hindu Militancy: In-
dia’s Secular Democracy at Work’. Asian Survey 29(3), 1989. 
Mallick, Shabnam and Rajarshi Sen. ‘The Incidence of Corruption in India: 
Is the Neglect of Governance Endangering Human Security in South 
Asia?’ Working Paper No. 103. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Stra-
tegic Studies, January 2006. 
Mani, Lata. ‘Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India’, 
Cultural Critique 7: 119–56. 1987. 
Marcus, George E. and Michael M. J. Fischer. Anthropology as Cultural Cri-
tique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1986. 
Marik, Soma. ‘India’s Communalist Violence Against Women’. Against the 
Current, No. 91. March/ April 2001. http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/ 
983 Accessed 24-Jun-2007 
McClintock, Anne. Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial 
Contest. London: Routledge, 1996. 
McDonald, Ian. ‘Hindu Nationalism, Cultural Spaces, and Bodily Practices 
in India’. American Behavioral Scientist. 2003. 46: 1563-1576. 
McKay, Jim. ‘Masculine Hegemony, The State and the Politics of Gender 
Equity Policy Research’. Culture and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1. Pp. 223-240. 
1993. 
Mendelsohn, Oliver. ‘The Collapse of the Indian National Congress’. Pacific 
Affairs. Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 1978). Pp. 41-66. 
234 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Metcalf, Andy and Martin Humphries’ (ed.) The Sexuality of Men. London: 
Pluto Press, 1985. 
Middleton, Peter. The Inward Gaze: Masculinity and Subjectivity in Modern Cul-
ture. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Mies, Maria. Indian Women and Patriarchy: Conflicts and Dilemmas of Students and 
Working Women. New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1980 
Mitra, Chandan. ‘Why India Forgot a Hero’. The Pioneer. 1 March 2004. 
Mitra, Subrata K. ‘Desecularising the State: Religion and Politics in India 
after Independence’. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 33:4 (Octo-
ber 1991). Pp. 755-777. 
Moghadam, Valentine. Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Mus-
lim Societies. London: Zed, 1994. 
Mohan, Kamlesh. ‘Nationalism and sexuality: exploration in Gandhian epis-
temology’. Pakistan Journal of Women's Studies: Alam-e-Niswan. 15(2); 2008. 
pp. 29-42 
Morgan, David. Discovering Men. London: Routledge, 1991. 
Nagel, Joane. ‘Masculinity and nationalism: gender and sexuality in the mak-
ing of nations’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, v. 21, no. 2 March 1998. 
Nandy, Ashis. At The Edge of Psychology. New Delhi: OUP, 1980. 
Nandy, Ashis. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism. 
New Delhi: OUP, 1983. 
Nandy, Ashis. Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness. 
Delhi: Oxford UP, 1987. 
Naoroji, Dadabhai. Poverty and Un-British Rule in India. London: Sonnen-
schein, 1901 
Negri, Antonio. Time for Revolution. Trans. Matteo Mandarini. London: Con-
tinuum, 2003 
Nicholson, Linda J. 'Feminist Theory: The Private and the Public', in Linda 
McDowell and Rosemary Pringle (eds) Defining Women: Social Institutions 
and Gender Division. Milton Keynes: Polity. 1992. 
Nicholson, Linda and Steven Seidman (eds). Social Postmodernism: Beyond Iden-
tity Politics. Cambridge: CUP, 1995. 
Noorani, A. G. ‘Hindutva Debate: A Shocking Judgment’. The Statesman, 26 
December 1995 
Norbu, Dawa. Culture and The Politics of Third World Nationalism. London: 
Routledge, 1992. 
 References 235 
Oldenburg, Veena. Dowry Murder: The Imperial Origins of a Cultural Crime New 
York: OUP, 2002. 
Omvedt, Gail. Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit 
Movement in Colonial India. New Delhi: Sage, 1994 
Omvedt, Gail. ‘The purpose of reservation’ (I and II). The Hindu, 24 and 25 
March 2000. 
Pandey, Gyan (ed). Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today. 
New Delhi: Viking Penguin, 1993. 
Pandey, Gyan. ‘Communalism as Construction’. Politics in India. Sudipta Ka-
viraj (ed.) Oxford in India Readings in Sociology and Social Anthropology. Delhi: 
OUP, 1999. 
Panikkar, K. N. Culture, Ideology, Hegemony: Intellectuals and Social Consciousness 
in Colonial India. Delhi: Tulika, 1995. 
Parekh, Bhikhu. ‘Jawaharlal Nehru and the Crisis of Modernisation’. Crisis 
and Change in Contemporary India. Baxi and Parekh (eds.) Delhi: Sage, 1995. 
Parker, Andrea, et.al. (eds). Nationalisms and Sexualities. New York: 
Routledge, 1992. 
Patel, Sujata. ‘Construction and Reconstruction of Women in Gandhi’. Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly. 20 February 1988. 
Patwardan, Anand (prod. and dir.) Pita, Putra aur Dharam Yudh (The Father, 
The Son and the Holy War). 1991. 
Rai, Vibhuti Narain. ‘Police and Communal Riots: An Interview with 
Vibhuti Narain Rai’. Interviewer Yoginder Sikand. Communalism Watch. 
http://communalism.blogspot.com/2006/07/police-and-communal-
riots-interview.html 24 June 2006. 
Rajagopal, Arvind. Politics after Television: Religious Nationalism and the Reshaping 
of the Indian Public. Cambridge: CUP, 2001. 
Rajagopal, Arvind. ‘Gujarat’s “Successful Experiment”’. Open Democracy. 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-india_pakistan/article_1056. 
jsp 20 March 2003. Accessed 30 June 2008. 
Rajan, Rajeshwari Sunder. The Scandal of the State: Women, Law and Citizenship 
in Postcolonial India. Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003. 
Rajeshwari, B. Communal Riots in India: A Chronology (1947-2003). IPCS Re-
search Papers. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
March, 2004. 
Rao, Anupama. ‘Interview with Veena Oldenburg’. http://www.asiasource. 
org/asip/dowry.cfm 2003. Accessed 25 April 2007. 
236 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Rao, Anupama. ‘Indian Feminism and the Patriarchy of Caste’. http://www. 
himalmag.com/2003/february/analysis_1.htm. 2003a. Accessed 10 Sept 
2005. 
Rao, Anupama (ed.) Gender & Caste: Issues in Contemporary Indian Feminism. 
Delhi: Kali for Women, 2003b 
Rawat, V.B. ‘Dirty Tricks are Back Again’. http://www.ambedkar.org/ 
News/Dirtytricks.htm Accessed 17 May 2007. 
Reidi, Eliza. ‘Women, Gender and the Promotion of Empire: The Victoria 
League, 1901-1914. The Historical Journal. Vol. 45, No. 3 (Sept. 2002). Pp. 
569-99 
Reddy, Gayatri. ‘"Men" who would be kings: celibacy, emasculation, and the 
re-production of hijras in contemporary Indian politics’. Social Research. 
Spring 2003. 
Robb, Peter. ‘Borders, languages, peasants, nations: colonial concepts in 
India’. http://www.virginia.edu/soasia/symsem/kisan/papers/concepts. 
html n.d. Accessed 25 April 2007 
Roberts, Richard H. (ed). Religion and the Transformations of Capitalism: Compar-
ative Approaches London: Routledge, 1995. 
Robertson, Roland (ed). Sociology of Religion: Selected Readings. Penguin Modern 
Sociology Readings. Middlesex: Penguin, 1969. 
Root, Jane. Pictures of Women: Sexuality. London: Pandora, 1984. 
Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Susan Hoeber Rudolph. In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Po-
litical Economy of the Indian State. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
1987. 
Sachar, Rajinder, et al. Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim 
Community of India: A Report. [Sachar Committee Report]. New Delhi: 
Cabinet Secretariat, 2006. 
Sachar, Rajinder. ‘RSS: A Danger to Hinduism’. The Hindu, 6 April 2001. 
Said, Edward. Orientalism. London: Routledge, 1978. 
Sangari, Kumkum and Sudesh Vaid (ed). Recasting Women: Essays on Colonial 
History. New Delhi: Kali, 1993. 
Sangari, Kumkum. ‘Politics of Diversity: Religious Communities and Multi-
ple Patriarchies’, Economic and Political Weekly 30(51 and 52), 23 and 30 
December 1995, pp. 3287-3310, 3381-3389 
Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India, 1885-1947. Madras: Macmillan India, 1983. 
 References 237 
Sarkar, Sumit. ‘The Fascism of the Sangh Parivar’. Economic and Political 
Weekly. January 30, 1993. 
Sarkar, Tanika. ‘Rhetoric Against Age of Consent: Resisting Colonial Rea-
son and Death of a Child-Wife’. Economic and Political Weekly, 4 Septem-
ber 1993. 
Sarkar, Tanika. ‘Woman, Community and Nation: A Historical Trajectory 
for Hindu Identity Politics’, in Patricia Jeffrey and Amrita Basu (eds.), 
Resisting the Sacred and the Secular:Women’s Activism and Politicized Religion in 
South Asia, New Delhi: Kali for Women. 1998. 
Sarkar, Tanika. ‘Pragmatics of the Hindu Right: Politics of Women’s Organ-
isations’, Economic and Political Weekly Vol. XXXIV no. 31. 1999. 
Sarkar, Tanika. Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation: Community, Religion and Cultural Na-
tionalism. Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001.  
Savarkar, V. D. Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? 1923. Delhi: Bharati Sahitya Sa-
dan, 1989. 
Scott, Joan, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ in her (ed). 
Feminism and History. Oxford: OUP, 1996. 
Seaton, S. Lee and Henri J. M. Claessen (eds). Political Anthropology: The State 
of the Art. World Anthropology. Paris: Mouton, 1979. 
Segal, Lynne. Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men. London: Vira-
go, 1990. 
Sen, Samita. ‘Towards a Feminist Politics? The Indian Women’s Movement 
in Historical Perspective’. Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, 
Working Paper Series No.9. The World Bank. April 2000. 
Sengupta, Roshni. ‘Education, Media and Hindutva’. South Asian Cultural 
Studies. Vol.1 No.1. (Jan 2006). Pp. 17-31. 
Seth, Sanjay. ‘Rewriting Histories of Nationalism: the Politics of “Moderate 
Nationalism” in India, 1870-1905’. American Historical Review. Vol. 104, 
No. 1 (Feb. 1999). Pp. 95-116. 
Sethi, Manisha. ‘Avenging Angels and Nurturing Mothers: Women in Hindu 
Nationalism’. Economic and Political Weekly. 20 April 2002. 
Shapiro, Michael J. (ed). Language and Politics. Readings in Social and Political 
Theory Series. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 
Sharma, Suresh, ‘Savarkar’s Quest for a Modern Hindu Consolidation’. Stud-
ies in Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. II, no. 2, 1995. 
Sheth, D. L. ‘Secularisation of Caste and Making of New Middle Class’ Eco-
nomic and Political Weekly Vol. 34, nos. 34 and 35. Pp. 2502-2510. 1999. 
238 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
Simeon, Dilip. ‘Communalism in Modern India: A Theoretical Examina-
tion’. http://www.sacw.net/DC/CommunalismCollection/Articles 
Archive/Simeon.html. n.d. 
Sinha, Mrinalini. Colonial Masculinity: ‘The Manly Englishman’ and the ‘Effeminate 
Bengali’ in the late 19th Century. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1995. 
Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theo-
ries of Nations and Nationalism. London: Routledge, 1998 
Smith, Vincent. The Oxford History of India. Percival Spear (ed.) Oxford: 
OUP, (1958) 1981. 
Snitow, Ann, Christine Stansell and Sharon Thompson (eds.) Powers of Desire: 
the Politics of Sexuality. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983. 
Spencer, Jonathan, ‘Problems in the analysis of communal violence’. Contri-
butions to Indian Sociology (n.s.) 26, 2 (1992). 
Spivak, Gayatri. ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography’ Subaltern 
Studies IV. Ranajit Guha (ed). Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
Spivak, Gayatri. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Me-
thuen, 1987. 
Srinivas, M. N. Caste in Modern India and Other Essays. Bombay: Media Pro-
moters and Publishers, 1962. 
Srivastava, Sanjay, ‘The Garden of Rational Delights: The Nation as Exper-
iment, Science as Masculinity’. Social Analysis. No. 39 April 1996. 
Srivastava, Sushil. ‘Situating the Gentoo in History: European Perceptions 
of Indians in Early Phase of Colonialism’. Economic and Political Weekly. 17 
February 2001 
Stanton, Donna C. (ed). Discourses of Sexuality: From Aristotle to Aids. Ann Ar-
bor: Univ. of Michigan, 1992. 
Stern, Robert W. Changing India: Bourgeois Revolution on the Subcontinent. Cam-
bridge: CUP, 1993. 
Stoler, Ann. ‘Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power’. Micaela di Leonardo 
and Roger Lancaster (eds) The Gender/Sexuality Reader: Culture, History, Po-
litical Economy. London: Routledge, 1997. 
Subrahmaniam, Vidya. ‘Ayodhya: India’s Endless Curse’. Open Democracy. 
6 November 2003. http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-india_ 
pakistan/article_1568.jsp Accessed 6 August 2008. 
Subramaniam, Mangala. ‘The Indian Women's Movement’. Contemporary So-
ciology. Vol. 33, No. 6 (Nov., 2004). Pp. 635-639. 
 References 239 
Suri, K. C. ‘Parties under Pressure: Political Parties in India Since Independ-
ence’. Paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South Asia, 
CSDS. Delhi: CSDS, n.d. 
Sussman, Herbert. Victorian Masculinities: Manhood and Masculine Poetics in Ear-
ly Victorian Literature and Art. Cambridge: CUP, 1995. 
Tambe, Aswini. ‘Colluding Patriarchies: The Colonial Reform of Sexual Re-
lations in India’, Feminist Studies 26: 3 (Fall 2000) 
Tamminen, Tapio. ‘Hindu Revivalism & the Hindutva Movement’. Temenos 
32. 1996. 
Thapar, Romila. ‘Communalism and History’. Lecture at Khandala Work-
shop. http://us.geocities.com/indianfascism/fascism/misuses_history. 
htm n.d. 
Thapar, Romila. A History of India, Vol. I. Middlesex: Penguin, 1966.  
Told, Michaela R. The Gender of Ethnic Nationalist Conflict - A Case Study from 
Sri Lanka. M.A. Research Paper, submitted to the Institute of Social 
Studies. The Hague: ISS, June 1997. 
Torfing, Jacob. New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999. 
Turner, Bryan S. Religion and Social Theory, 2nd edn. Theory, Culture and Society. 
London: Sage, 1991 
Vanaik, Achin. The Furies of Indian Communalism: Religion, Modernity and Secular-
ization. London: Verso, 1997. 
Varshney, Ashutosh. ‘Contested Meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu 
Nationalism and the Politics of Anxiety’, Daedalus. Vol. 122, no. 3. 
Veer, Peter van der. Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India. Berke-
ley, California: University of California Press, 1994. 
Veer, Peter van der. ‘Reflections on Modern Indian Religious History’ 
http://www2.fmg.uva.nl/gm/articles/pvdv2000b.htm 2000. (Accessed 
15 October 2005) 
Veer, Peter van der. ‘Global Conversions’, in The Post-colonial Studies Reader 
(Revised edition). Eds. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffins and Helen Tiffin. 
London: Routledge, 2006 (1995) 
Verma, Pavan. The Great Indian Middle Class, New Delhi: Penguin, 1998. 
Vijayan, P.K. “Developing powers : modernisation and the masculine he-
gemony of Hindu nationalism” South Asian masculinities : context of change, 
sites of continuity. Filippo Osella, Caroline Osella, & Radhika Chopra (eds.). 
New Delhi: Women Unlimited an associate of Kali for Women, 2004  
240 MAKING THE PITRUBHUMI: MASCULINE HEGEMONY & THE FORMATION OF THE HINDU NATION 
von Stietencron, Heinrich. ‘Religious configurations in pre-Muslim India 
and the modern concept of Hinduism’. Vasudha Dalmia and Heinrich 
von Stietencron (eds.) Representing Hinduism: The Constructions of Religious 
Traditions and National Identity. New Delhi: Sage, 1995.  
Walby, Sylvia. Theorizing Patriarchy Oxford: Blackwell, (1990) 1995. 
Walby, Sylvia. ‘Woman and Nation’, in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.) Mapping the 
Nation. London: Verso, 1996. 
Weed, Elizabeth (ed.) Coming to Terms: Feminism, Theory, Politics. London: 
Routledge, 1989. 
Weeks, J. Sexuality and its Discontents. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1985. 
Wilkinson, Paul, (2000) Terrorism Vs. Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 
London: Taylor and Francis. 
Williams, P. and Crisman L. (eds.) Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory. 
London: Harvester, 1993. 
William, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: 
Fontana, 1976. 
William, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: OUP, 1977. 
Williams, Rina. "Gender, Nation, Religion: The Discursive Construction of 
Identities in India's Democracy, 1952-1956" Paper presented at the an-
nual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott 
Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, 
Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 http://www.allacademic. 
com/meta/p41853_index.html. Accessed 12 June 2006 
Winn, Craig. Prophet of Doom. 2004. http://prophetofdoom.net/Prophet_ 
of_Doom_Islams_Terrorist_Dogma_in_Muhammads_Own_Words.Isla
m Accessed 25 November 2007. 
Working Group on Women’s Rights (Amrita Chhachhi, Farida Khan, Gau-
tam Navlakha, Kumkum Sangari, Neeraj Malik, Nivedita Menon, Ritu 
Menon, Tanika Sarkar, Uma Chakravarthi, Urvashi Butalia and Zoya Ha-
san). ‘Reversing the Option: Civil Codes and Personal Laws.’ Economic 
and Political Weekly. Vol. 31, No. 20 (May 18, 1996), pp. 1180-1183  
World-Journal. http://soc.world-journal.net/governingindia.html n.d. Ac-
cessed March 18, 2006 
Young, T R. The Red Feather Dictionary of Critical Social Science: A Teaching Dic-
tionary of Key Words for Progressive, Radical, Critical, Marxist, Feminist, Left-
Liberal as well as Postmodern Scholars and Students in Sociology, Philosophy, Eco-
 References 241 
nomics, History, Social Psychology, Political Science and Anthropology as well as Re-
ligion and Theology. Website URL: http://www.tryoung.com/dict3rd.htm  
Yuval-Davis, Nira. Gender and Nation. London: Sage, 1997. 
Yuval-Davis, Nira. ‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics’. European Journal 
of Women’s Studies, Vol. 13 (3), pp.193-209. 2006. 
Zavos, John. The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India. Delhi: OUP, 2000. 
  
242 
Prem Kumar Vijayan 
 
Before defending his doctoral thesis entitled Making the Pitrubhumi: Masculine 
Hegemony and the Making of the Hindu Nation, Mr Prem Kumar Vijayan had 
attained an MA and MPhil in Literature from the Delhi University, and at-
tended a number of intensive short courses and workshops in culture and 
society, research methodologies, pedagogical tools in higher education. In 
1998 he was awarded the four-year DGIS-DPO Doctoral Research Fellow-
ship by The Netherlands government.  
Mr Vijayan has been teaching at the department of English, Hindu Col-
lege, Delhi University since 1994. In 2010 he was appointed teacher-in-
charge of the department, and is examiner for Delhi University. Between 
2003 and 2005, he was part of the UNIFEM’s “Exploring Masculinities: A 
Travelling Seminar” project. Besides this collaborative research initiative, 
Mr. Vijayan has been a part of several international collaborative research 
initiatives. Between 2009 and 2011, he was invited to participate as a Re-
search Fellow in several research themes organized by GEXcel, the Centre 
of Gender Excellence at the Department of Gender Studies, Linköping 
University, Sweden. These include one on Masculinities (‘Deconstructing 
the Hegemony of Men and Masculinities’, organized by Prof. Jeff Hearn), 
and one on understanding gender as an intersectional category (‘Distinctions 
and Authority’, with Prof. Anita Göransson). He has presented his work at 
several national and international conferences, in India and in the UK, Swe-
den and Pakistan. 
He is also a Founder Member, Secretary and Board Member of the Cen-
tre for Trade and Development (CENTAD), Delhi from 2005. He has been 
actively involved in overseeing the activities and research of the Centre. Mr. 
Vijayan regularly conducts workshops on understanding masculinity and 
gender for the students of Delhi University. His academic articles include,  
• 'Nationalism, masculinity and the developmental state: Exploring 
Hindutva masculinities' in Masculinities Matter: Men, Masculinities and 
Gender Relations in Development, Frances Cleaver (ed.) London: Zed, 
August 2001. 
• 'Outline for an Exploration of Hindutva Masculinities', in Brinda 
Bose (ed.), Translating Desire, N. Delhi: Katha Publishers, 2002. 
•  “Developing Powers: Modernity and the Masculine Hegemony of 
Hindu Nationalism”, in South Asian Masculinities, Caroline & Filippo 
Osella & Radhika Chopra (eds.) Delhi: Kali 2004. 
 Curriculum Vitae 243 
• ‘The RSS and the Cultivation of the National Man’, Deconstructing the 
Hegemony of Men and Masculinities, Katherine Harrison and Jeff Hearn 
(eds.), Linkoping: Linkoping University. 2009. 
• ‘Sex, Silence and Pedagogy: Problematics of Articulation’ (with Karen 
Gabriel), Sexual Health, Embodiment and Empowerment: Bridging Epistemo-
logical Gaps, Nina Lykke & Barbro Wijma (eds.) Linköping: Linköping 
University, 2009. 
• ‘Gender Designs: Men’s Studies in the Context of Hindutva’, forth-
coming in Exploring Masculinities in India UNIFEM Global Masculinities 
Series, Sanjay Srivastava & Rahul Roy (eds.) London: Zed 2012 (forth-
coming) 
• ‘The Intersectionalities of the Sachar Committee Report’, in Mohanty 
Manoranjan & Gilbert Sebastian (eds.): India: Class & Its Intersectionali-
ties, Daanish, Delhi 2012 (forthcoming) 
• ‘Democracy as the End of Violence and Vice Versa: Some Theoreti-
cal Considerations’, in GN Trivedi (ed.), State, Democracy and Develop-
ment in India, Delhi: Aakar, 2012 (forthcoming) 
• ‘Orientalism, Terrorism and Cinema’ (with Karen Gabriel), in the 
Journal of Postcolonial Writing Special Issue on Orientalism and Terrorism, 
Pavan Kumar Malreddy & Birte Heidemann (eds.) July 2012 volume 
48, number 3 (forthcoming). 
 
Mr. Vijayan is also actively involved in various democratic rights initia-
tives, within and outside the university space, and is regularly invited to ad-
dress public meetings on these issues. He is currently engaged in researching 
and writing on the Indian state’s policies and actions in the eastern states of 
the country, in relation to the displacement of tribal populations towards 
acquiring land for mining. 
 
Contact information: 
Work: 
Dept. of English, Hindu College 
Delhi University 
Delhi - 110 007 
India 
Tel: +91-11-27667184 
Residence:  
15-B, Hindu College Staff Quarters, 
Delhi University 
Delhi - 110 007 
India 
Tel: +91-11-27662151,  
Mob.: +91-9871767570 
 
